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Abstract 
Nuclear weapons are the most destructive weapons in military history. Their threat to 
human kind is at the core of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. The regime is aimed at 
countering the spread of nuclear weapons and advancing their disarmament, while 
supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. State compliance is built upon three systems 
of cooperation: 1. The commitment system refers to what states commit (not) to do in order 
to counter nuclear weapons; 2. The verification system contains the monitoring and 
verification of compliance; 3. The enforcement system provides for responses to cases of 
non-compliance by a state. 
This thesis analyzes the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime by assessing and 
explaining states’ commitment to and their compliance with the regime. The work comprises 
a qualitative study of the regime’s three systems (commitment, verification, and 
enforcement) including an evaluation of different institutionalist modes of explanation for 
state behavior (security, norms, economics, and status). By developing a three-dimensional 
model to assess regime effectiveness, the work offers a conceptual contribution for the study 
of security regimes. At the same time, applying different perspectives for (non-)cooperation 
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1. Assessing and Explaining Regime Effectiveness – The Concept 
1.1. International Regimes and Nuclear Weapons 
1.1.1. Introduction 
“I was just 13 years old when the United States dropped the first atomic 
bomb, on my city Hiroshima. I still vividly remember that morning. At 8:15, 
I saw a blinding bluish-white flash from the window. I remember having the 
sensation of floating in the air. 
As I regained consciousness in the silence and darkness, I found myself 
pinned by the collapsed building. I began to hear my classmates’ faint cries: 
‘Mother, help me. God, help me.’ 
Then, suddenly, I felt hands touching my left shoulder, and heard a man 
saying: ‘Don’t give up! Keep pushing! I am trying to free you. See the light 
coming through that opening? Crawl towards it as quickly as you can.’ As I 
crawled out, the ruins were on fire. Most of my classmates in that building 




With these dramatic words, Setsuko Thurlow describes her experience of the nuclear 
bombing of Hiroshima in August 1945 as part of the Nobel laureate speech on behalf of the 
International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons. There could not have been a more 
suiting place for her recollections. Thurlow’s account is not just a constant reminder of the 
destructive force of nuclear weapons. It also urges the international community to prevent a 
nuclear explosion from happening again. 
The threat of nuclear weapons has been at the core of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime. The regime is aimed at countering the spread of nuclear weapons and advancing 
their disarmament, while supporting the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The Non-
Proliferation Treaty (NPT)1 – the “cornerstone of the regime” – provides for the main 
behavioral guidelines for state parties. Nuclear Weapon States (NWS), i.e. China, France, 
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America, pledge to pursue 
disarmament and not to support other states in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. All other 
states under the treaty (Non-Nuclear Weapon States – NNWS) commit not to pursue nuclear 
weapons. 
50 years after the treaty opened for signature, the number of states that have a nuclear 
 
1 Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, July 1, 1968. Hereafter “Non-Proliferation Treaty 
(NPT).” 
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arsenal remains relatively small. The United States of America and Russia have significantly 
lowered their nuclear weapon stocks following the end of the Cold War. South Africa, 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have given up nuclear weapon capacities altogether. 
Furthermore, nuclear weapon tests have become increasingly rare. 
But the history of the non-proliferation regime is also marked by shortcomings. First, 
some Non-Nuclear Weapon States have developed nuclear weapon programs. North Korea 
started its program while being party to the NPT, then withdrew from the treaty and 
successfully established and expanded a nuclear arsenal. Second, beyond the reach of the 
NPT, India, Pakistan, and presumably Israel have developed nuclear weapons. Third, global 
disarmament is nowhere near to being a reality. There are still more than 14,000 nuclear 
weapons2 and the existing fissile material suffices for tens of thousands more (e.g. Reed, 
2019, pp.495–6). Rather than giving up their nuclear arsenals, Nuclear Weapon States have 
put modernization processes in place. 
 
Research Question 
The mixed track record of the regime raises an important question that constitutes the 
research question of this thesis: “What determines the effectiveness of the non-proliferation 
regime?” This work is by no means the first to address the issue. However, although scholars 
have assessed and explained the regime’s effectiveness for decades,3 the effectiveness of the 
regime as a whole remains surprisingly understudied. 
The amount of research has made the field somewhat confusing. In addition to differing 
in their explanatory approaches, scholars vary in their understandings of the scope of the 
regime4 as well as its effectiveness. More specifically, publications tend to demonstrate a 
narrow understanding of the nature of the nuclear threat, the regime task, or the degree of 
regime effectiveness.5 Finding a common basis for analysis is difficult. 
The lack of a convincing concept to analyze the effectiveness of the non-proliferation 
regime in its entirety is where the motivation for my work is rooted. Without a common 
 
2 This number includes retired nuclear warheads awaiting dismantlement. Throughout my analysis I will focus 
on nuclear weapons in military service. These “stockpiled” warheads are either deployed or in reserve. 
3 See e.g. Iklé (1961), Cirincione (2000b), Miles (2002), Mærli and Lodgaard (2007), Pilat (2007), Rublee 
(2008), Abe (2010), Feiveson et al. (2014). The analyses are often connected with the possible improvement 
of the regime. 
4 A particular point of contention here is to what extent disarmament and horizontal proliferation should be 
“linked” (see e.g. Knopf, 2014). 
5 Rare efforts to develop more comprehensive concepts of regime effectiveness include Fields and Enia (2009), 
Enia and Fields (2014), and Kaplow (2015). 
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ground, academic and political discussions about past achievements and future measures in 
the nuclear realm are bound to face obstacles. It would be easy to give up and say: “Too 




This thesis is aimed at assessing and explaining the effectiveness of the non-
proliferation regime in an integrating and nuanced manner. I pursue a wide-ranging analysis 
that refrains from blanket statements about the state of and causes for regime effectiveness. 
Overall, the work comprises a qualitative study of state behavior in the light of the regime’s 
three roles: commitment, verification, and enforcement. The fundamental question deriving 
from a focus on state behavior within the regime is: “What determines whether states commit 
to and comply with the regime?” To respond to this narrowed research question, I must do 
both – assess and explain (non-)cooperation within the regime. 
For an assessment of states’ commitment to and compliance with the regime, I will 
develop a three-dimensional model that accounts for different regime tasks, policy fields, 
and stages of effectiveness. This model allows for a precise judgement on where the regime 
demonstrates a high or low level of effectiveness (dependent variable). 
As regime tasks, referring to the major roles of the regime in countering the threat of 
nuclear weapons, the concept will identify the commitment system, the verification system, 
and the enforcement system. The policy fields, i.e. the thematic areas addressed by the 
regime, that I will analyze separately are the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear 
weapons. The stages of effectiveness refer to states’ pledges and compliance in countering 
the threat of nuclear weapons. Here, I will distinguish between output, outcome, and impact 
effectiveness. 
Explaining effectiveness means looking into why states behave the way they do. I will 
take a glimpse at institutionalist approaches (rational choice institutionalism, historical 
institutionalism, sociological institutionalism) to mark off a wide spectrum of possible 
explanations. I will show that driving factors put forward in the literature as independent 
variables can be treated as capacities and incentives. 
In seeking to offer a balanced and multifaceted analysis, I will examine four possible 
incentives that could illuminate states’ (non-)cooperation with the regime: security, norms, 
economics, and status (independent variables). I will develop hypotheses for each 
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perspective. These hypotheses are meant to serve as first-cut propositions to narrow down 
my theoretically grounded empirical analysis. More accurately, I will conduct an 
examination of plausible intent by evaluating the four different modes of explanation for 
state behavior for each of the three regime tasks (commitment, verification, enforcement). 
 
Argument 
Given that the goal of my thesis is to offer a more nuanced analysis of the non-
proliferation regime, this work is a testimony against simple answers in determining and 
explaining regime effectiveness. Singular observations should not be regarded as proof that 
the whole regime has succeeded or failed.6 Nor is a single driving factor governing the 
effectiveness of the regime. 
Rather than stating that the regime is effective or ineffective, I will point out where 
commitment and compliance is particularly high or low. The three-dimensional model to 
assess regime effectiveness put forward in this work is an excellent tool to do just that. Its 
three axes (regime tasks, the policy fields, and the levels of effectiveness) are a good 
reflection of the potential spectrum of regime effectiveness. The model allows me to 
articulate achievements and room for improvement. 
In the introductory chapter, I will speculate that the effectiveness of the non-
proliferation regime could resemble a pyramid, as the three axes somewhat build upon one 
another: Enforcement is often based on verification and prior commitment. A state’s use of 
nuclear weapons depends on its acquiring and possessing them first. The regime’s 
countering of the nuclear weapons threat (impact), depends on states’ pledges (output) and 
their compliance with these pledges (outcome). As effectiveness could face setbacks from 
one level to the other, all dimensions could be expected to shrink towards the top – like a 
pyramid. 
My analysis will lead me to the conclusion that there are indeed arguments that would 
support the existence of such a “pyramid of regime effectiveness” but also significant 
observations that would refute it. For instance, some states do not comply with a previous 
 
6 For instance, I would support William Walker in criticizing pessimistic claims, particularly in the United 
States, that nuclear weapon tests in India and Pakistan “show that the non-proliferation regime has failed, that 
further nuclear proliferation is unavoidable, that adherence to the Test Ban Treaty and development of further 
arms control measures are undesirable, and that only nuclear deterrence is dependable” (in: Canada House of 
Commons, 1998). 
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pledge, while other states comply without making any pledge. The reality of regime 
effectiveness could not be expressed in a traditional geometric form. 
Explaining effectiveness, I will demonstrate that all four perspectives (security, norms, 
economics, status) offer explanatory value for both – states’ cooperation and non-
cooperation within the regime. Still, there may be a tendency: Non-cooperation may be 
better explained with security and status considerations, whereas economic and normative 




The main contribution of this thesis is conceptual, as it significantly adds to macroscopic 
analyses of regime effectiveness. To my knowledge, the existing research does not contain 
a model to evaluate the non-proliferation regime as a security arrangement by integrating 
not only the different tasks and thematic fields of the regime but also different levels of 
effectiveness. 
By providing a nuanced layout of regime effectiveness, this work allows for a common 
basis for future analyses of the non-proliferation regime and presents a template for the study 
of other regimes. My contribution is mainly in the field of security regimes, but the 
effectiveness of virtually any regime could be analyzed by accounting for regime tasks, 
policy fields, and levels of effectiveness. 
In order to make the model applicable to other regimes, only the exact policy fields may 
need modification. Regimes related to weapons of mass destruction (such as biological and 
chemical weapons) could be devided into acquisition, possession, and use – just like the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime. By contrast, for the human rights regime, these policy 
fields could be countering the conduct of (e.g. torture) and platforms for (e.g. institutions) 
human right violations and promoting the prohibition thereof (e.g. through the rule of law). 
Using the model with slight amendments, future works can better describe the evolving 
effectiveness of a specific regime over time or compare the effectiveness of different 
regimes. In doing so, my concept enhances the literature on regime effectiveness in general 
as well as the non-proliferation regime in particular. 
The thesis also contains some theoretical contributions. Developing an institutionalist 
approach in an eclectic manner, the work provides a multifaceted explanatory footing for 
state behavior in the non-proliferation regime. As will be shown, driving factors for state 
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behavior can be treated as capacities or incentives. This distinction makes independent 
variables more comparable. My analysis adds to the literature that examines incentives. By 
attributing state commitment and compliance to a variety of material and non-material 
driving factors (security, norms, economics, status) that are rooted in different research 
traditions, the work accounts for the contextual background of state behavior. 
Although it is not the goal to generate new data, the thesis also offers an empirical 
contribution. The existing literature on nuclear non-proliferation includes many resources 
that I intend to utilize to judge on state behavior. I will draw on official documents, meeting 
records, speeches, media reports, published interviews, as well as the academic literature. 
Combining a broad variety of sources allows for a critical analysis and better understanding 
of states’ (non-)cooperation within the non-proliferation regime. 
 
Structure 
The remainder of this chapter is devoted to outlining the concept of this thesis in order 
to not just develop a framework for analysis but also to link my work to the existing 
literature. I will first take a glimpse at the issue area of nuclear energy and non-proliferation 
as an international regime. This is also meant to underline the eclectic nature of the thesis. 
Against this background, I will develop a model to assess state commitment and 
compliance (dependent variable). Broadly inspired by the “Oslo-Potsdam solution” to 
measuring regime effectiveness, I will introduce a no-regime and collective optimum regime 
as yardsticks for analysis, which in my case will refer to the hypothetical level of 
cooperation. 
The second part of the concept is devoted to explaining effectiveness. I will draw on 
rational choice institutionalism, historical institutionalism, and sociological institutionalism 
as starting point for explaining state behavior. On that basis, I will elaborate four incentives 
as possible driving factor for state behavior: security, norms, economics, and status 
(independent variable). 
The concept for assessing and explaining regime effectiveness will be applied in 
Chapters 2 – 4, which contain an analysis of the regime tasks of the non-proliferation regime. 
Chapter 2 is devoted to the commitment system of the regime. Chapter 3 analyzes the 
verification system and Chapter 4 evaluates the enforcement system. Using this separated 
approach allows for a multifaceted understanding of regime effectiveness. 
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The structure throughout these chapters is the same: First, I will offer an overview of 
how the regime plays out for the respective regime task. Although my analysis will 
concentrate on those state pledges that offer an added value, a brief outline of the 
international, regional, bilateral, and unilateral/autonomous level is necessary to provide for 
a fair account of the regime as a whole. 
Second, the effectiveness of the respective regime task will be assessed. I will evaluate 
to what extent states have committed to (output) and complied with (outcome) the regime. 
On this basis, I can determine the degree to which the regime has been successful in 
achieving its norms to counter the acquisition, possession and use of nuclear weapons 
(impact). 
Third, in each of the Chapters 2 – 4, I will conduct an evaluation of plausible intent for 
the explanatory perspectives of security, norms, economics, and status. The differentiation 
allows me to consider the extent to which a possible driving factor may contribute to states’ 
(non-)cooperation. 
Fourth, a summary of each chapter is aimed at connecting its findings to the larger 
concept of the thesis to determine and explain regime effectiveness. The summary facilitates 
a comparison of regime effectiveness and driving factors for state behavior according to the 
respective regime task. 
As conclusion, Chapter 5 will take up the main observations of this work. I will provide 
an overview of ways to improve the regime as a security arrangement by briefly outlining 
scenarios for reinforcing and enhancing regime commitment and compliance. Although this 
thesis is primarily devoted to analyzing the regime’s current status, possible additional 
avenues for countering the threat of nuclear weapons should be of interest to scholars and 
policy-makers alike. 
 
1.1.2. The Issue Area: Nuclear Energy – Two Sides of the Same Coin 
What makes cooperation in the nuclear field particularly interesting as object of inquiry 
is that it is not concerned with promoting or countering something. It is concerned with 
promoting and countering something, namely nuclear energy. The three pillars of the regime 
are: i) preventing the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, ii) nuclear disarmament, 
and iii) the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
The non-proliferation regime finds itself in the difficult position to balance the good and 
the bad side of nuclear energy. The problem is that the same material that can be used 
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peacefully can also be used for military purposes.7 I will briefly outline the peaceful and the 
military dimension of nuclear energy respectively, as their coexistence is a key feature of 
the non-proliferation regime. Subsequently, I will continue by defining the non-proliferation 
regime as a security arrangement. 
 
Nuclear Energy for Peaceful Purposes 
“The United States knows that peaceful power from atomic energy is no 
dream of the future. The capability, already proved, is here today. Who can 
doubt that, if the entire body of the world’s scientists and engineers had 
adequate amounts of fissionable material with which to test and develop their 
ideas, this capability would rapidly be transformed into universal, efficient 
and economic usage?” (Eisenhower, 1953). 
With these words, taken from his “Atoms for Peace” speech in December 1953, US 
President Dwight D. Eisenhower envisioned the peaceful use of nuclear energy on a global 
scale. In many ways, his dream has come true. On an international level, the cooperation to 
promote nuclear energy culminated in the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), 
which facilitates medical and scientific uses as well as energy generation. 
The “good uses of nuclear energy” have been advertised, among others, in a speech by 
former IAEA Director General Hans Blix: In the medical sector, nuclear energy is used for 
diagnosis and therapy. In agriculture, nuclear methods help to enhance water supplies or 
contribute to increasing the yield and protein content of legumes. Radiation is also used to 
combat the disease-transmitting tsetse fly (by sterilizing the male flies). Among the wide 
range of industrial nuclear applications are gauging and product improvement (e.g. 
polymerization) (Blix, 1996). 
Also in terms of energy generation, nuclear power has been associated with different 
advantages, which can be summarized under the headlines “low costs,” “energy 
independence,” and “environmental advantages.”8 As stated by James Ramey, nuclear 
energy “provides a competitive source of energy with costs which do not vary appreciably 
with location […]” and offers “freedom from overreliance on foreign energy sources” 
(Ramey, 1973, p.11). Furthermore, nuclear energy has been described as conserving 
 
7 See also Spies (2006, p.407), Louka (2011, pp.89–97), and Petritz (2012, pp.97–102). Accordingly, dual-use 
items, which may have a civilian and a military purpose, pose a particular challenge to the regime. In fact, 
“[d]esignating something as nuclear – whether in technoscientific, political, or medical terms – carries high 
stakes” (Hecht, 2012, p. 4). 
8 See also Adamantiades and Kessides (2009), Miller and Sagan (2009). 
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traditional fuels and reducing carbon emissions (e.g. Ramey, 1973, p.11; Knapp, Pevec, and 
Matijević, 2010). 
Some arguments in favor of nuclear power are contested. For instance, disputing the 
image of “low costs,” Lutz Mez (2012, p.60) claims that construction and operating costs of 
nuclear power plants are considerably high, especially in comparison to traditional fossil-
based power plants. This is not to mention nuclear catastrophes, which result in significant 
economic costs.9 Further challenges deriving from nuclear energy are nuclear waste and 
potential health risks (Bickerstaffe and Pearce, 1980, pp.317–8).10 
Although the global nuclear share in energy generation has declined over the last two 
decades, the prospects of nuclear energy remain attractive to many states. Currently, there 
are 413 reactors in operation in 31 countries.11 What the role of nuclear energy will be in the 
future remains unclear, particularly in the wake of nuclear catastrophes as in Fukushima in 
2011.12 As a consequence of nuclear disasters, some states have abandoned nuclear energy 
(e.g. Mez, 2012, p.62). 
 
Nuclear Weapons 
At the core of the non-proliferation regime as a security arrangement are nuclear 
weapons and the “chain reaction” connected with them. First, there is a physical nuclear 
chain reaction that can unleash a massive destructive force. The most powerful nuclear 
weapon ever tested is the Soviet “Tsar Bomb,” the explosion of which in 1961 was estimated 
as being comparable to about 50 megatons of TNT. The destructive capability of nuclear 
weapons, as to be seen in the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in 1945, 
underlines the importance of an effective regime. 
Second, one could consider the metaphorical sense of a chain reaction, i.e. the 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Nuclear weapons in one state may contribute to an 
initiation or advancement of nuclear weapon programs in another state. Following this line 
of thinking nuclear weapons could lead to a “domino effect” in international relations. 
 
9 For instance, the economic costs associated with nuclear disaster in Chernobyl in 1986 have been estimated 
at £144bn (McNeill, 2011). 
10 Summarizing the development in the fields of nuclear energy, John F. Ahearne (2011, p.579) observes that 
while nuclear safety and non-proliferation have been enhanced, “little progress has been made in developing a 
permanent solution to the problem of nuclear waste and resolving public attitude issues.” 
11 On the status and development of nuclear power over time see “The World Nuclear Industry Status Report” 
(Schneider and Frogatt, 2018, pp.16–8, 27-9, 152–72). 
12 See e.g. Louka (2011, pp.80–9), Guidolin and Guseo (2012), Varrall (2012), and Stulberg and Fuhrmann 
(2013). 
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Proliferation of nuclear weapons has a vertical and a horizontal dimension to it. Vertical 
proliferation refers to the expansion of an already existing nuclear arsenal. This development 
had its peak during the Cold War, when the Soviet Union and the United States challenged 
each other in a nuclear arms race. Commitments made and actions taken to decrease existing 
nuclear stockpiles are referred to as nuclear disarmament measures. 
Horizontal proliferation refers to the development or acquisition of nuclear weapons by 
states that do not already have them. A fear of an increasing number of states with nuclear 
weapons has been voiced since the very beginning of the nuclear age. A prominent example 
is US President John F. Kennedy, who stated his concern during a press conference in March 
1963, referring to discussions with the Soviet Union about inspections: 
“Now, the reason why we keep moving and working on this question, 
taking up a good deal of energy and effort, is because personally I am haunted 
by the feeling that by 1970, unless we are successful, there may be 10 nuclear 
powers instead of 4, and by 1975,15 or 20” (Kennedy, 1963). 
Against the background of the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, the goal of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime is to counter the spread of nuclear weapons. Looking at the 
coexistence of the peaceful and military uses of nuclear energy, the question appears 
legitimate whether the spread of knowledge, material, and equipment contributes to a 
proliferation of nuclear weapons. Whether a direct connection can be made is subject to 
academic debate.13 
In my thesis, I will focus on the state as the primary agent and, thus, as a starting point 
for the analysis. It is the state which is (made) responsible for nuclear weapon programs. 
Treaties and other agreements – such as the NPT, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, test bans, 
or disarmament agreements – are all based on state commitments. The primary point of 
reference for the verification and enforcement of the non-proliferation regime is also the 
state. 
Since the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime is largely based on state 
compliance it is more precise to narrow down the research question to: “What determines 
whether states commit to and comply with the principles, norms, rules and decision-making 
procedures that make up the non-proliferation regime?” 
There should be no doubt that individuals and groups with and without an official role 
within a state play an important role in the non-proliferation regime. Changes in government 
 
13 See e.g. Bickerstaffe and Pearce (1980, pp.313–4), Fuhrmann (2009), Gartzke and Kroenig (2009), Bluth et 
al. (2010), and Varrall (2012). 
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may lead to changes in the representation of the state in dealing with non-proliferation 
commitments.14 Non-governmental actors, in turn, demonstrate their importance in the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy, illicit nuclear trade, and nuclear terrorism.15 Following the 
terrorist attacks of 9/11, the regime has increasingly taken aim at the dangers of fissile 
material, nuclear weapons, or “dirty bombs”16 in the hands of non-state actors.17 
 
1.1.3. The Non-Proliferation Regime 
International Regimes in International Relations 
Before discussing the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime, I explain what I 
mean by the term “international regime” and clarify its meaning in the context of nuclear 
weapons. I want to do so critically, since the regime approach – as every concept in 
International Relations – has been confronted with criticism.  
Although speculations were made that “[r]egimes may be a passing fad” (Strange, 1983, 
pp.338–341), the last four decades have shown that regime formation, regime change, and 
regime effectiveness have been of a major interest to scholars world-wide. International 
regimes have gained increasing interest in the 1980s (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, pp.759–
763) and have become an essential tool in the analysis of international institutions by the 
1990s (Zimmerling, 1996, p.1). 
Students of international regimes have been concerned with issues like the environment 
(Helm and Sprinz, 2000; Young and Levy, 1999), trade (Lipson, 1983), finance (Cohen, 
1983), minority rights (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2012), arctic governance (Hønneland and 
Stokke, 2007) or security regimes, such as the chemical weapons control regime (Kelle, 
2004) and, of course, the nuclear non-proliferation regime (Miles, 2002), to name just a few. 
There is no single ontology of international regimes. Already in the first decade of the 
 
14 For instance, as will be examined more closely in the section on the enforcement system of the non- 
proliferation regime, changes in the political leadership in the United States of America have resulted in 
different stances in dealing with (potential) proliferation cases such as North Korea or Iran. 
15 Considering the numerous publications that focus on nuclear terrorism (e.g. Allison, 2004; Ferguson and 
Potter, 2005), one might argue that terrorist groups deserve particular attention when assessing the 
effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. Given the complexity of producing a nuclear bomb, the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons by non-state actors is largely influenced by a state’s ability to protect its 
facilities and to counter illicit trafficking. 
16 “Dirty bombs” are explosives that do not have the destructive force of nuclear weapons but the explosion of 
which results in the spread nuclear material. 
17 See e.g. Kelle and Schaper (2003), Allison (2004), Ferguson and Potter (2005), as well as Jenkins (2006). 
 22 
development of the concept, different interpretations became apparent.18 International 
regimes have attracted neoliberal institutionalists but also realists and constructivists. Hence, 
it would appear unfit to attribute “international regimes” to a single paradigm. 
My approach to regime effectiveness in this work is eclectic in nature. I will refrain 
from conducting a larger discussion between IR schools, but instead, particularly when 
identifying independent variables, will apply findings that are rooted in different schools of 
thought. In doing so, my approach is in line with “analytical eclecticism,” which has gained 
prominence in recent years.19 
The reason to use an eclectic approach is twofold. On the one hand, I want to do justice 
to the fact that the literature on international regimes today rests on different paradigms. On 
the other hand, an eclectic approach allows my analysis a more nuanced response to my 
research question. 
As noted by Sil and Katzenstein (2010, p.1) in their seminal work on “analytical 
eclecticism,” choosing one paradigm over the other may limit understanding. Different 
schools of thought may complement rather than contradict each other (see also Sil and 
Katzenstein, 2010, pp. 31–4). Accordingly, I will include different explanations for state 
behavior in my analysis. 
The decision to use an eclectic approach may underline a point of criticism made by 
Susan Strange on the regime literature. According to her, “‘[r]egime’ is yet one more wooly 
concept that is a fertile source of discussion simply because people mean different things 
when they use it” (1983, pp.342–3). Given the broad spectrum of publications on regimes 
mentioned above, Strange’s point is well taken. In addition to ontological vagueness,20 some 
scholars have criticized the epistemology21 or the operationalization of the concept (see e.g. 
 
18 Haggard and Simmons (1987) make out structural, game-theoretic, functional, and cognitive approaches to 
international regimes. 
19 Analytical eclecticism is one form of pragmatism in IR research. Other forms include, for instance, abduction 
and theory synthesis (see e.g. Friedrichs and Kratochwil, 2009, pp. 707–11). According to Katzenstein and Sil 
(2008, pp. 110–1), “analytical eclecticism” signifies that “features of analyses in theories initially embedded 
in separate research traditions can be separated from their respective foundations, translated meaningfully, and 
recombined as part of an original permutation of concepts, methods, analytics, and empirics.” Research would 
qualify as “analytical eclecticism,” if it meets three criteria – all of which are also met by this thesis: “an open-
ended problem formulation,” “a complex causal story featuring mechanisms from multiple paradigms,” and “a 
pragmatic engagement with issues of policy and practice” (Sil and Katzenstein, 2010, p. 43). 
20 Ontological vagueness may result from different understandings of what exactly belongs to a regime (e.g. 
Zimmerling, 1996). 
21 There has been criticism of a positivistic outline of regime analysis. Kratochwil and Ruggie (1986, p.764) 
criticize the reflexivity of behavior and meaning in the regime literature, concluding that epistemology actually 
refutes ontology. The authors demand that rather than limiting on positivist understandings, scholars should 
consider the value of interpretive epistemologies (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 1986, p.765). 
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Zimmerling, 1996). 
Taking these points of criticisms seriously, “[t]he only cure for wooliness and 
imprecision is, of course, to make the concept of regimes less so” (Kratochwil and Ruggie, 
1986, p.763). After defining the term “international regime,” I will develop a model to 
determine and explain regime effectiveness in the non-proliferation regime in a structured 
way. In doing so, this thesis champions the major advantage of a regime approach, i.e. a 
nuanced understanding of international cooperation in the field of nuclear weapons. The 
model also entails a template for other scholars, hopefully making the assessment of regime 
effectiveness less “wooly.” 
 
A Definition of International Regimes 
The formulation “international regime”22 was coined by John Ruggie (1975, p.569) as 
“sets of mutual expectations, generally agreed-to rules, regulations and plans, in accordance 
with which organizational energies and financial commitments are allocated.” Ruggie shows 
that international cooperation and institutions are multifaceted by pointing out different core 
elements of regimes: expectations, rules, and an organizational dimension. 
Over the last four decades, other definitions of the term have been put forward.23 These 
shall not hide the fact that the regime literature commonly uses the very same definition of 
“international regimes,” as offered in the 1983 volume edited by Stephen D. Krasner. The 
definition will also be used in this thesis. 
Following Stephen D. Krasner (1983c, p.2), international regimes can be defined “as 
sets of implicit or explicit principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures around 
which actors’ expectations converge in a given area of international relations.” The 
definition has three advantages: it is comprehensive, yet precise; it takes subject, object, and 
circumstances into account; its frequent application facilitates a common starting point of 
past contributions and, hence, a link for the added value of this work. 
A valid question is whether the elements of the definition represent a “conjunction” or 
a “disjunction” (Zimmerling, 1996, pp.5–6). Put differently, do all elements need to be given 
in order to make up a regime or is it enough that one or a few elements are given? This 
 
22 Since this work is aimed at contributing to the literature of International Relations, rather than comprehensive 
domestic analyses, the term “regime” will be used interchangeably with “international regime.” 
23 These will not be outlined here. Other authors have discussed definitions of “international regimes” (e.g. 
Rowlands, 1992, pp.25–7; Zimmerling, 1996, pp.1–5; Haggard and Simmons, 1987, pp.493–6). 
 24 
question is important, but not crucial for this thesis, since the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime reflects all elements mentioned above. In order to operationalize Krasner’s 
definition, I will apply its different elements on the non-proliferation regime in the next 
subsection. 
Recently, there has been an increasing interest in regime complexity.24 These works 
focus on the nature, causes, and consequences of the coexistence of international regimes. 
While scholars appear to agree as to how different regimes may relate to each other,25 there 
remain significant differences in the identification of complexes and the added conceptual 
value of the approach. A sheer organizational cluster can be analyzed through the lens of the 
traditional regime approach. 
Conceptual value of regime complexes has been provided by a precise definition of a 
regime complex by Orsini, Morin, and Young,26 which identifies the problematic nature of 
a network of regimes as a core element. As the main principles and norms of the non-
proliferation regime (as defined in this work) are coherent rather than problematic, I will 
refrain from applying the concept of regime complexity. 
This is not to say that an analysis of regime complexes in the nuclear field is not worth 
taking. In addition to the non-proliferation regime, I would identify a nuclear deterrence 
regime.27 Arguably, individual regimes could also be drawn around the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy or illicit fissile material trafficking. 
 
Applying the Definition on the Non-Proliferation Regime 
How does Stephen D. Krasner’s definition of “international regimes” relate to the issue 
area of nuclear non-proliferation? In order to apply the regime approach in this thesis, it is 
worth looking into what is meant by the different elements that make up a regime and then 
 
24 See e.g. Alter and Meunier (2007), Orsini, Morin, and Young (2013), Galbreath and Sauerteig (2014). 
25 There may be “parallel regimes (where there is no formal or direct substantive overlap), […] overlapping 
regimes (where multiple institutions have authority over an issue, but agreements are not mutually exclusive 
or subsidiary to another) and nested regimes (where institutions are embedded within each other in concentric 
circles, like Russian dolls) (Alter and Meunier, 2009, p.15). 
26 According to whom a regime complex is “[…] a network of three or more international regimes that relate 
to a common subject matter; exhibit overlapping membership; and generate substantive, normative, or 
operative interactions recognized as potentially problematic whether or not they are managed effectively” 
(Orsini, Morin, and Young, 2013, p.29). 
27 A similar observation, although not taking a regime approach, was made by William Walker (2000). He 
argues that during the Cold War, a normative “nuclear order” was shaped which was based on a “managed 
system of deterrence” and a “managed system of abstinence” (Walker, 2010, pp.704–10). 
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to translate the elements into the international field of nuclear non-proliferation. Krasner 
defines the regime elements as follows: 
“Principles are beliefs of fact, causation, and rectitude. Norms are 
standards of behavior defined in terms of rights and obligations. Rules are 
specific prescriptions or proscriptions for action. Decision-making 
procedures are prevailing practices for making and implementing collective 
choice” (Krasner, 1983c, p.2). 
In the understanding of this work, the core principle of the non-proliferation regime is 
that the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons is dangerous.28 There are more 
narrow understandings that focus on the horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons as the 
main threat (e.g. Keohane, 2005, p.57). Considering that the Non-Proliferation Treaty puts 
an emphasis on the spread of nuclear weapons, such a narrow interpretation appears 
legitimate. 
Yet, a limitation to the fear that new states acquire nuclear weapons constraints the scope 
of the regime. There is a greater principle at stake, namely that nuclear weapons in general 
are dangerous. Even nuclear deterrence is based on the same principle but draws different 
conclusions.29 
Another principle that could be identified in the regime is that nuclear energy for civilian 
uses offers benefits. As this thesis focuses on the regime as a security arrangement, I will 
not treat this aspect as a separate principle. Consequently, I will not discuss the norms and 
rules that relate to assistance in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Norms in the regime are the “standards of behavior” derived from the core principle. 
They are non-proliferation (states without nuclear weapons refrain from acquiring nuclear 
weapons), disarmament (states that possess nuclear weapons disarm), and the non-use of 
nuclear weapons (refrain from using nuclear weapons). 
Some scholars limit their understanding of regime norms to non-proliferation, while 
arguing that the Nuclear Weapon States in the NPT have been granted the right to possess 
nuclear weapons (e.g. Kroenig, 2014, p.11). I disagree. Downplaying the normative 
 
28 Given the principle of the regime, it may be more accurate to call the regime “nuclear weapons regime.” I 
refrain from doing so for two reasons. First, the cornerstone of the regime – though not the only element – is 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. It makes sense, to use a name for the regime accordingly. Second, the formulation 
“non-proliferation regime” is used more commonly. Although the semantics may not be precise, I do link my 
research to previous works using the same term. Rather than changing the name, I seek to affect the 
understanding of the regime. Given the strong academic focus on the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the formulation 
“NPT regime” is occasionally used interchangeably with the non-proliferation regime, see e.g. Pilat (2007). 
29 For instance, the argument is made that nuclear weapons may contribute to averting war (Waltz, 1981). 
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responsibility of NWS fails to grasp an essential part of the dynamics within the regime and 
provides a biased analytical frame. 
The legal framework in the Non-Proliferation Treaty categorizes groups of states to 
clarify their rules, rather than granting an eternal privilege to five members. The non-
proliferation norm may be more explicit than the other two norms, particularly in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. Still, part of the deal on which the NPT was built was that states with 
nuclear weapons disarm (e.g. Shaker, 1980, p.556). The pursuit of global disarmament was 
explicitly stated in Article VI of the NPT. An advisory opinion of the International Court of 
Justice also concluded that this article stands for an obligation of result (ICJ, 1996). The non-
use of nuclear weapons is, for instance, embedded in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty.30 
An argument has been made that the underlying power dynamics relating to nuclear 
weapons in international relations differ from the stated organizational and normative layout 
(Ruzicka, 2018a). Arguably, there is a difference between implicit and explicit norms, rules, 
and decision-making procedures. Also, there is no uniform treatment of states and there are 
no uniform actions of states. Still, the regime approach is a good starting point for analysis. 
I will make repeated references to where state actions contradict stated regime norms and 
rules including possible explanations for it. In addition to that, I will point to an institutional 
privileging of Nuclear Weapon States. 
Rules include the specific behavioral guidelines for states, which may be laid out in 
treaties and agreements. These guidelines are narrower than the norm. A regime 
encompasses a complex network of rules. For example, underlining the non-proliferation 
norm, Non-Nuclear Weapon States part of the NPT are subject to the rule to conclude a 
verification agreement with the IAEA. Rules may also include financial or logistical support 
of organizations associated with the regime. 
The distinction between norms and rules is one of the great advantages of the regime 
approach in general and Krasner’s definition of regimes in particular. Rather than reducing 
compliance to a simple “yes” or “no,” the regime approach enhances the explanatory 
capacity of compliance by allowing for a more specific assessment of state behavior. As will 
be shown in this thesis, a state may break a rule while complying with the norm. 
Decision-making procedures refer to interactions within the regime. On the one hand, 
decision-making procedures are the channel used for the creation and change of norms and 
 
30 Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), September 10, 1996. 
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rules (e.g. the United Nations). On the other hand, more relevant to the focus of this work, 
the procedures may refer to the implementation of the regime. 
While the non-proliferation regime does not entail a clear and coherent governance 
structure, it still includes elements of a ladder of escalation to ensure compliance of a state. 
I will differentiate between commitment, verification, and enforcement system, which 
largely build upon one another. I choose the word “system” to indicate a functional unity 
that resembles one part of the regime. These systems are part of the same regime. Their 
linking depends on inherent decision-making procedures (e.g. between the International 
Atomic Energy Agency and the UN Security Council). 
 
1.2. Assessing Regime Effectiveness 
1.2.1. The Need for a Concept 
In the previous section, I have defined international regimes according to Stephen D. 
Krasner and applied the definition to the realm of nuclear weapons. The effectiveness of a 
regime, as understood in this work, stands for states’ commitment to and compliance with 
the principles, norms, rules, and decision-making procedures within the regime. The larger 
research question of “what determines the effectiveness of the nuclear non-proliferation 
regime” can be narrowed down to “what determines whether states commit to and comply 
with the non-proliferation regime?” 
The remainder of this chapter will translate the research question into a model to assess 
regime effectiveness and it will develop explanatory factors for state behavior. I will clarify 
the dependent variable (state commitment and compliance) and independent variables 
(security, norms, economics, and status) used in the subsequent analysis. My goal is to 
further those studies that go beyond an understanding of horizontal proliferation and seek a 
more comprehensive understanding of the regime. 
Among the books that show a comprehensive understanding of the regime are volumes 
that include a collection of texts on various issue areas within the regime.31 The value of 
such volumes is immense, not just because they sketch out a broad scope of the regime, but 
also because they contribute significant empirical data. Yet, by including scholars with 
 
31 See e.g. Cirincione (2000b), Mærli and Lodgaard (2007), Pilat and Busch (2017), Black-Branch and Fleck 
(2014; 2015). 
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different backgrounds or by stringing together isolated texts, they tend to lack conceptual 
coherency. 
More coherence is demonstrated in volumes and monographies that are concerned with 
the goal and organization of the abolition of nuclear weapons.32 This research group looks 
at the nuclear fuel cycle (e.g. Feiveson et al., 2014) or the roles of the regime in a broader 
sense (e.g. Perkovich and Acton, 2008) and propose policy measures towards the goal of a 
nuclear-free world. Although these texts represent a comprehensive understanding of the 
regime, their value is often political and normative, rather than conceptually assessing 
regime effectiveness. 
Other comprehensive efforts to grasp the non-proliferation regime stem from books that 
look at non-proliferation from the perspective of international law.33 These publications have 
an eye for the details that make up the rules of the non-proliferation regime. However, by 
definition, scholars of international law apply a legalistic frame, rather than a perspective of 
International Relations as part of political science. Students of law ontologically emphasize 
the structure and blend out other causal variables that affect behavior. Consequently, by the 
standards of political science, a legalistic frame would not suffice to analyze state behavior. 
Fortunately, there are a number of works that focus on state behavior within the 
regime.34 Scholars have addressed behavioral patterns, such as why states proliferate (e.g. 
Sagan, 1996; Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2010a) or have taken a closer look at the 
underlying logics of nuclear deterrence (e.g. Shultz and Goodby, 2015). Scholars have also 
paid attention to states’ (lacking) willingness to strengthen a commitment within the regime. 
A landmark article in this area was published by Andrew Grotto (2010), who explores why 
states that support the idea of non-proliferation do not subscribe to further commitments that 
would strengthen the regime. 
The relation between the regime and state behavior deserves more academic attention. 
As Potter and Mukhatzhanova (2010b, p.5) emphasize, “[…] relatively few studies have 
sought to demonstrate the influence of non-proliferation institutions on nuclear weapons 
restraint.”35 In the introductory chapter to “State Behavior and the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
 
32 See e.g. Perkovich and Acton (2008), Krieger (2009), Daley (2010), Hinderstein (2010), Feiveson et al. 
(2014). 
33 See e.g. Edward (1984), Joyner and Roscini (2012), Beynio (2010), Petritz (2012), Black-Branch and Fleck 
(2014; 2015), Caracciolo, Pedrazzi, and Vassalli di Dachenhausen (2016). 
34 The most prominent and comprehensive look behind the scenes of the corner stone of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty was published by Shaker (1980). 
35 In an article published in Daedalus, William Potter (2010, pp.70–4) discusses several “sources of nuclear 
restraint” including the influence of alliances, institutions, non-material incentives or domestic politics. 
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Regime,” edited by Jeffrey Fields (2014b), it is claimed for the time of writing that “[w]e 
know of no other published book-length treatments that explore why states cooperate with 
or undermine global non-proliferation efforts” (Fields, 2014a, p.2). 
The 2014 volume edited by Fields represents a good point of reference for analyzing the 
effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime. It acknowledges the role of state behavior as 
a defining characteristic of regime effectiveness and provides insight into different 
behavioral explanations. The volume will, therefore, be taken into consideration when 
developing independent variables (Point 1.3. of this thesis). 
Enia and Fields (2009) have even put forward a behavioral model, based on findings by 
Haggard and Simmons (1987). Enia and Fields propose and examine five “dimensions” as 
indicator for “regime health”: Normative Foundations, Scope, Strength, Organizational 
Form, Allocation Mode in the nuclear non-proliferation regime. In the 2014 volume edited 
by Fields, the authors offer a revised model (including Normative Features, Institutional and 
Organizational Features, Behavioral Features) to assess and compare the effectiveness of 
the biological and chemical weapons regime (Enia and Fields, 2014).36 
The work by Enia and Fields is conceptually important to the literature on the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, as it offers a more nuanced understanding of the regime. However, 
it also includes some shortcomings. While their framework includes an excellent overview 
of topics that need to be considered when considering regime effectiveness and although the 
authors exemplify interactions between the categories, the aspects appear rather isolated 
towards each other. 
Another effort of applying a behavioral concept of effectiveness is a research project by 
Jeffrey Kaplow, who examines the constraining power of security institutions by 
undertaking a quantitative study of state compliance in the non-proliferation regime. Kaplow 
argues that the institutional track record may affect states’ compliance. In other words, 
regime effectiveness is based on the perception that other states comply with institutional 
commitments. The quantitative model also accounts for verification and enforcement 
(Kaplow, 2015). 
Yet, Kaplow’s research has two main drawbacks – one is methodological, the other is 
conceptual. Using a quantitative approach for an explanatory research is confronted with the 
epistemological challenges. It fails to account for the complexity of state behavior and 
 
36 Among the Behavioural Features are “specific aspects” such as verification, compliance, and enforcement, 
which will also be considered in the analytical model developed in this work (Enia and Fields, 2014, p. 45). 
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questions the reliability of the data.37 Furthermore, Kaplow (e.g. 2015, p.40) acknowledges 
that disarmament plays a role in the regime, but chooses not to integrate the aspect into his 
model but instead makes a rudimentary reference to it.38 
My goal is to build a more comprehensive framework. Enriching the current debate by 
providing a comprehensive study of the non-proliferation regime, this thesis is aimed at 
using an institutionalist perspective to determine and explain regime effectiveness. In doing 
so, it conceptually adds to two partially overlapping strands of regime effectiveness analyses 
of the regime: the determination (what?) and the explanation (why?) of regime effectiveness. 
Accordingly, the remaining chapter is divided into two main parts: I) assessing regime 
effectiveness (this section) and II) explaining regime effectiveness (next section). 
 
1.2.2. Conceptualizing the Non-Proliferation Regime 
As a starting point for a comprehensive model to assess regime effectiveness, I want to 
categorize the various thematic fields within the regime as well as the different regime tasks. 
The combination of both elements lay out the scope of the non-proliferation regime as a 
security arrangement, which can be summarized in the overview below (Figure 1). The 
policy field refers to the thematic areas surrounding the threat of nuclear weapons. The 











37 Kaplow (2015, pp.50–7) himself describes some “potential objections,” including uncertainty and nuclear 
secrecy. On the challenges of quantitative studies in the field of non-proliferation see also Montgomery and 
Sagan (2009). 
38 See e.g. Kaplow’s reference that disarmament was part of the NPT negotiation (Kaplow, 2015, pp.96–7). 
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Figure 1 – Regime Tasks and Policy Fields 
 
I) Policy Fields 
The three pillars of the non-proliferation regime are the horizontal proliferation of 
nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The obvious 
thing to do is to use these pillars as the major policy fields in the regime. Still, I refrain from 
following this categorization, as the three pillars are too bulky for an integrated model. I seek 
a more coherent abstraction in which the elements build upon one another while 
acknowledging the comprehensive scope of the regime. This approach makes it easier to see 
connections between the pillars of the regime and allows the eventual model to be applied 
on other regimes. 
Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty is considered to be the cornerstone of the regime 
(see also Enia, 2014, pp.20–1), focusing exclusively on the treaty when identifying policy 
fields would be too narrow an understanding (see also Cirincione, 2000a, p.284; Fields, 
2014a, p.12). In addition to organizations, such as the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(IAEA), the United Nations Security Council, or the Conference on Disarmament, various 
agreements can be associated with the regime:39 
• Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) 
• Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT)40 
 
39 Given the complexity of the nuclear non-proliferation regime, there are more organizations and agreements 
that could be mentioned. Since this chapter is aimed at developing a concept, a short list should suffice. 
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• Nuclear Supplier Controls 
• Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) 
• Bilateral Agreements (mainly between US and Soviet Union/Russia) 
• International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism41 
• Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons42 
These agreements demonstrate that the regime tackles the threat of nuclear weapons in 
different ways. More accurately, it addresses varying stages in the development and use of 
nuclear weapons. The regime focuses on the acquisition (production of fissile material, 
trade, and assistance), possession (stationing of nuclear weapons, nuclear disarmament, and 
nuclear reversal43) and use (strategic application of nuclear weapons, negative security 
assurances, and nuclear weapons tests) of nuclear weapons. 
The policy field of the acquisition of nuclear weapons primarily targets Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States. These states may only use fissile material, nuclear facilities, and related 
equipment for peaceful purposes. Using the same material for developing nuclear weapon 
devices is prohibited. Nuclear Weapon States have committed themselves only to trade 
fissile materials for peaceful purposes and not to assist other states in their pursuance of 
these weapons.44 
The policy fields of possession and use of nuclear weapons first and foremost address 
Nuclear Weapon States as well as states outside the NPT.45 The possession of nuclear 
weapons refers to discussions related to the existence of nuclear stockpiles, including 
bilateral disarmament agreements between the United States of America and Russia/the 
Soviet Union. The use of nuclear weapons contains their strategic use and nuclear tests. 
Despite various commitments to the contrary, Non-Nuclear Weapon States play a 
subordinate role in the possession and use of nuclear weapons. If a Non-Nuclear Weapon 
State keeps its commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons, any commitment regarding the 
possession or use of nuclear weapons only provides limited added value. 
 
41 International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, April 13, 2005. 
42 Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, July 7, 2017. 
43 Nuclear reversal as understood in this work describes a case in which a state that possesses nuclear weapons 
ends its nuclear weapons program and completely disarms. For a critical discussion of the terminology see e.g. 
Pelopidas (2015b). 
44 As to be seen in Article I of the NPT and the Guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
45 Non-Nuclear Weapon States still play a role in that they may host nuclear weapons on their territory. It has 
even been argued that the Non-Proliferation Treaty was intentionally formulated vaguely to accommodate 
nuclear sharing within NATO (Khalessi, 2015). 
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As mentioned before, there is a tendency to limit the non-proliferation regime to the 
horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Including possession and use of nuclear weapons as 
policy fields allows for a more comprehensive and nuanced reflection of the regime. 
Achievements or shortcomings in one area can be considered in a more isolated manner, 
rather than binarily labeling the overall regime a success or failure.46 
 
II) Regime Tasks 
The non-proliferation regime also comprises different roles. To categorize them, it is 
worth considering the major tasks assigned to it. Delegating authority to an organizational 
structure reflects a sense of purpose from which a certain task can be deduced. According to 
Bradley and Kelley (2008, pp.10–7), there are eight different types of delegated authority: 
legislative, adjudicative, regulatory, monitoring and enforcement, agenda setting, research 
and advice, policy implementation, and redelegation. 
Looking at the main organizations and agreements within the non-proliferation regime 
shows that it would certainly qualify for a variety of these categories. However, the regime’s 
most important role is to establish cooperation and ensure compliance in accordance with 
the regime’s norms. 
Hence, considering Bradley and Kelley’s types of delegated authority, this thesis will 
focus on the aspects of legislative (in the following commitment), monitoring (in the 
following verification), and enforcement of the regime. Taking these tasks into account, 
there are three functionally different systems within the non-proliferation regime that need 
to be considered when discussing effectiveness: 
• The commitment system 
• The verification system 
• The enforcement system 
The commitment system refers to what states commit (not) to do in order to counter the 
acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons. Commitments resemble behavioral 
guidelines for states and reflect the principles, norms, rules and decision-making procedures 
 
46 The policy field is a crucial part for determining effectiveness, as it further defines the possible scope of 
regime effectiveness. Differentiation of policy fields helps to determine the “relative success” of the regime 
(formulation borrowed from: Fields, 2014a, pp.2–3). 
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that make up the regime. Commitments also serve as points of reference when it comes to 
evaluating compliance. 
The main responsibility of the verification system is to verify that states comply with 
norms and rules relating to the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons. 
Although several institutions fall into this category (e.g. Euratom or the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty Organization), the most important body is the International Atomic Energy 
Agency (IAEA). 
The enforcement system resembles the institutionalized attempt to alter state behaviour 
towards compliance.47 These means may include positive or negative incentives using 
political, economic, or military means. The enforcement system is mainly triggered by the 
verification system of the regime. Most notably, the IAEA may report a case to the UN 
Security Council, if non-compliance or non-cooperation of a member state is detected 
(Article XII.C, IAEA Statute).48 
Many publications put an emphasis on specific regime tasks in their analyses (either 
commitment,49 verification,50 or enforcement51). Considering that the respective analysis has 
more room to examine an aspect more closely, concentrating on one aspect not only makes 
sense but is beneficial. Still, the respective focus comes at a conceptual sacrifice, limiting a 
work’s ability to draw broader conclusions. Even when looking at publications that address 
more systems (e.g. Asculai, 2004; Ford, 2005; Hinderstein, 2010), there is a lack of 
comprehensive and systematic analysis of the regime tasks along the lines of all policy fields. 
This thesis promotes an inclusive assessment of the regime and its effectiveness, 
including the different regime tasks and policy fields. Taking into account both aspects 
allows for a systematic assessment of the regime (see Figure 1 above). Given that the primary 
division of labor among the institutions in the nuclear non-proliferation regime is based on 
the task of the respective system rather than the various policy fields, the chapters in the 
analysis of the thesis are divided along the lines of the three regime tasks: the commitment 
system, the verification system, and the enforcement system. 
 
 
47 Enforcement tools are “instruments of statecraft specifically geared to change the target state’s behavior” 
(Solingen, 2012a, p.5). 
48 The Statute of the International Atomic Energy Agency, July 29, 1956, as amended up to December 28, 
1989. 
49 See e.g. Beynio (2010), Grotto (2010), and Horovitz (2014). 
50 See e.g. Goldschmidt (1999), Caughley (2016) Busch and Pilat (2017), and Bowen (2018). 
51 See e.g. Müller (2000), Speier, Chow, and Starr (2001), Butler (2003), and Solingen (2012b). 
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1.2.3. Conceptualizing the Assessment of Regime Effectiveness 
How can we translate the non-proliferation regime, including its regime tasks and policy 
fields, into an analytical frame for the analysis of this work? How can we assess regime 
effectiveness? A response to these questions requires various considerations. Similar to an 
approach presented in a volume by Miles et al. (2002), I will proceed by addressing three 
steps: 
• What is the object of evaluation? 
• What is the standard of evaluation? 
• What tools can we use to compare the object against the standard? 
(Underdal, 2002, p.5) 
What is the object of evaluation (dependent variable)? 
Students of International Relations agree that there is no single appropriate object that 
needs to be addressed when assessing regime effectiveness. As Alexander Kelle (2003, p.98) 
points out, scholars have focused on two questions: “(1) whether regimes affect state 
behavior in an issue area, and (2) whether regimes have an impact on the observable data in 
the issue area they regulate.”52 
Translating these two aspects into an example of an environmental regime, one could 
say that the first question addresses the extent to which a state implements measures to lower 
carbon emissions as agreed on the international level. The second question could then refer 
to whether the whole regime, by using measures such as lowering carbon emissions in 
member states, has been successful in countering global warming. 
Also Young and Levy (1999, p.10) underline that the domain of effects are multifaceted. 
They put forward three possible groups of effects: (1) “effects within the behavioral complex 
[…] and effects external to the behavioral complex;” (2) “direct and indirect effects;” and 
(3) “effects that help to solve a problem and effects that make it worse” (Young and Levy, 
1999, p.10). While the categories presented by Young and Levy are a helpful tool to broaden 
the understanding of effects, they are rather difficult to operationalize. 
More precise and easier to apply is a categorization put forward in the volume by Miles 
et al. (2002). Their three object categories output, outcome, and impact represent different 
stages of regime effectiveness. Output stands for “regime formation” (i.e. signing an 
agreement on the international level, ratification on the domestic level). Outcome focuses on 
 
52 A similar observation can be found in Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger (1997, p.2). 
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the stage of “regime implementation” (target groups adapt behavior). Impact stands for the 
effect on the issue area (to what extent has a problem been resolved?) (Underdal, 2002, p.7). 
The distinction between output and outcome satisfies a demand by Jeffrey Fields, who 
argues: “We need to be able to explain behavior beyond the point where countries make the 
initial yes or no decision” (Fields, 2014a, p.1). Indeed, a state may commit but fail to comply. 
Furthermore, while academic literature has put an emphasis on the output and the outcome 
level, in one form or another, it has rather neglected the impact level (see also e.g. Frantzi, 
2008, p.618). Treating the latter as a separate category allows for a better awareness of the 
relevance of cooperation efforts in the light of the issue area at stake. 
Although the categorization used in Miles et al. (2002) presents a nuanced 
understanding of effectiveness, its isolated use would be still too unsystematic as an object 
when analyzing the non-proliferation regime. After having sketched out the regime into its 
various policy fields and regime tasks, it makes sense to integrate these aspects into the 
object of regime effectiveness. Including the policy fields (acquisition, possession, and use 
of nuclear weapons) and regime tasks (commitment, verification, and enforcement) of the 
















Figure 2 – Model of Regime Effectiveness 
 
Hence, the dependent variable in this thesis consists of the output, outcome, and impact 
effectiveness of the regime. The output effectiveness primarily refers to states’ (in)ability to 
agree upon rules for individual behavior to counter the acquisition, possession, and use of 
nuclear weapons. The impulses for behavior, as to be found in treaties or other agreements 
(e.g. NPT, NWFZs, safeguards agreements, test bans), can be subdivided onto the 
commitment level, verification level, and enforcement level. 
Outcome effectiveness in the regime refers to the behavior of states according to non-
proliferation rules. Are states in compliance with agreements made? Are they contradicting 
a rule, while still respecting the norm? Regimes also have an implicit dimension. States may 
adapt their behavior in accordance to non-proliferation agreements without officially 
committing to them.53 
Impact effectiveness describes to what extent the threat of nuclear weapons could be 
countered. Put differently, to what extent could the overall regime norms on the acquisition, 
possession, and use of nuclear weapons be achieved? This includes a material and a political 
dimension. A state may have a strategic use for nuclear bombs, while lacking the capacities 
 
53 For instance, Pakistan and India have refrained from nuclear tests for two decades without signing and 
ratifying the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
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to develop them. Contrary, states may find themselves with adequate capacities without 
strategic use for nuclear weapons. 
What distinguishes the nuclear non-proliferation regime from some other regimes is that 
outcome (state behavior) and regime impact (threat of nuclear weapons) are closely related 
to each other. If all states with nuclear weapons agreed to disarm, Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States promised not to proliferate, and all states fully implemented their commitment on a 
domestic level, there are eventually no nuclear weapons. 
Against this background, the framework developed above, which focuses on state 
behavior, allows for a fair account of the overall effectiveness of non-proliferation regime 
as a security arrangement. Another advantage of the three-dimensional model is that it can 
easily be applied to other security regimes. For instance, in order to analyze regimes relating 
to conventional, biological, or chemical weapons, the only amendments that would need to 
be made are the policy fields, which in my model refer to nuclear weapons. 
However, the model may suggest that all policy fields are equally accountable for the 
different regime tasks. This possible point of criticism is important. A certain regime output 
may for pragmatic reasons be difficult or impossible to verify or enforce (e.g. nuclear 
threats). Challenges in verifying and enforcing commitment will be noted accordingly in the 
respective chapters. 
 
What is the standard of evaluation? 
In developing a standard of evaluation for assessing effectiveness, Arild Underdal 
(2002, p.7) suggests to define a point of reference for a comparison and to develop a metric 
of measurement. Aiming to find a point of reference, scholars have developed different 
approaches. James Fearon (1991) describes two empirical options: 
“Suppose it is hypothesized that C was a cause of event E. I would argue 
that when experimental control and replication are not possible, analysts have 
available a choice between two and only two strategies for ‘empirically’ 
assessing this hypothesis. Either they can imagine that C had been absent and 
ask whether E would have (or might have) occurred in that counterfactual 
case; or they can search for other actual cases that resemble the case in 
question in significant respects, except that in some of these cases C is absent 
(or had a different value)” (Fearon, 1991, p.171). 
Similarly, Levy and Young (1999, pp.16–9) propose two types of techniques: natural 
or quasi-experiments and thought experiments. The approach of natural or quasi-
experiments “involves examining situations that are broadly comparable except for the 
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presence or absence of a regime or, alternatively, situations that remain largely unchanged 
over time except for alterations in the character of the prevailing regime” (Young and Levy, 
1999, pp.17–8). In order to come to more reliable findings, the authors suggest to 
complement natural or quasi-experiments with thought experiments, more specifically the 
method of counterfactuals (Young and Levy, 1999, pp.18–9). 
The method of counterfactuals “involves a rigorous effort to reconstruct the flow of 
events as it would have unfolded in the absence of some key factor (for example, a particular 
international code of conduct or regime)” (Young and Levy, 1999, p.18). A more 
comprehensive effort has become known as the “Oslo-Potsdam solution” to measuring the 
effectiveness of regimes (see e.g. Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal, 2003a; 2003b; Miles et al., 
2002). 54 Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal (2003b) describe the essence of this approach as 
follows: 
“The Oslo-Potsdam solution is an umbrella term that refers to two closely 
related options in empirical research […]. [These] use different scaling 
techniques to quantify a no-regime counterfactual (NR), a measure of actual 
performance (AP) of the international regime, and the determination of a 
collective optimum (CO)” (Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal, 2003b, p.75). 
This approach provides for two points of references, instead of one, namely the no-
regime and the collective optimum regime. In accordance with a thought experiment, both 
yardsticks refer to circumstances that do not exist in the real world. The no-regime assumes 
a scenario defined by the absence of a given regime. The collective optimum regime stands 
for the “hypothetical state of affairs that would have come about with a perfect regime” 
(Helm and Sprinz, 2000, p.635). 
The use of a no-regime and collective optimum regime as counterfactuals marks off the 
full spectrum of effectiveness. Comparing the regime against these scenarios allows for 
showing achievements as well as room for improvement. Hence, the two counterfactuals 
also provide a good reference for the analytical frame of this thesis. However, two main 
obstacles are embedded in the “Oslo-Potsdam solution:” 1) its original application on 
environmental regimes and 2) its quantitative layout. 
Fortunately, using the no-regime and the collective optimum regime as two distinct 
yardsticks for analysis is not only limited to the environmental field, where it was applied 
first, but has also been used in the area of security studies. Alexander Kelle (2003) uses the 
two counterfactuals in his analysis of the BTW control regime. He offers a qualitative 
 
54 For other implementations of the approach see also Dombrowsky (2008), Sander (2013). 
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assessment of regime effectiveness. As no-regime he uses a historical counterfactual, as 
collective optimum regime he describes a scenario of “wishful thinking” (Kelle, 2003). 
My approach in applying the two counterfactuals is more abstract, as I return to a core 
element of a regime: cooperation. Broadly speaking, a no-regime is the absence of 
cooperation (no commitment, no compliance) in all policy fields and regime tasks. The 
collective optimum regime stands for full cooperation and compliance by all actors in all 
policy fields and all regime tasks. Against this background, I can measure regime 
effectiveness against its own standard. Cooperation is relatively easy to spot, especially 
when it comes to formal commitments. 
At the same time, my approach leaves room for critically assessing the contribution of 
the regime. Susan Strange (1983, p.345) argues that the term “regime” is “value-loaded in 
that it takes for granted that what everyone wants is more and better regimes, that greater 
order and managed interdependence should be the collective goal.” This point of criticism 
is important. My model of regime effectiveness is aimed at giving a more nuanced 
assessment of the regime, in that it allows to acknowledge that even without cases of 
“managed interdependence,” regime norms may be met. Accordingly, my four independent 
variables will include an explanation for a no-regime and collective optimum regime. 
The metric of evaluation is another aspect to be considered according to Arild Underdal 
(2002, p.7) and refers to the goal of defining a certain (quantifiable) value in relation to the 
point of reference. Considering that this work is largely undertaking a qualitative study, it is 
appropriate and sufficient to construct an ordinal metric, rather than a cardinal one (the same 
approach and a similar argument was originally made by Underdal, 2002, p.10). 
As a frame of evaluation, I will analyze states’ behavior against the background of the 
three-dimensional model developed above. This means that I will consider for every regime 
task (commitment, verification, enforcement) the different policy fields (acquisition, 
possession, use) as well as level of effectiveness (output, outcome, and impact). 
Commitment to and compliance with the regime is determined by the examination of some 
indicators for cooperation: 
• Content (To what extent does the commitment to and compliance with rules cover 
the three regime norms?) 
• Degree of commitment (What loopholes are included in the rules? Have rules 
been ratified?) 
• Durability (Is the cooperation limited in time?) 
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• Membership (What is the scope of states’ cooperation?) 
What form would effectiveness take in the three-dimensional model? The most 
cooperative regime would address all policy fields, regime tasks, and stages of effectiveness. 
A collective optimum regime would, thus, take the shape of a cube in the model. A no-
regime would take no form whatsoever, since it would not meet any of the dimensions. 
As a preliminary orientation, the actual effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime 
can be expected to resemble a pyramid. This is simply because the systems are largely built 
upon one another. In order to use nuclear weapons, a state first needs to acquire and possess 
them. The regime verifies rules to which states have committed and it enforces what has 
been verified. In order to achieve regime norms (impact), states need to commit to (output) 
and comply with (outcome) rules that achieve that goal. As every system is likely to 
demonstrate at least some elements of ineffectiveness, the range of effectiveness can be 
expected to get smaller and smaller towards the top, just like a pyramid. 
 
What tools can we use to compare the object against the standard? 
The thesis presents a qualitative study (with some quantitative references) of the 
effectiveness of the commitment system, the verification system, and the enforcement 
system of the nuclear non-proliferation regime. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 include individual 
analyses of each system in relation with the different policy fields and stages of 
effectiveness. I am drawing data from official documents, speeches, media reports, academic 
literature, published interviews, and expert accounts. On this basis, I give an account of 
states’ commitment to and compliance with the regime (dependent variable). 
The methodological structure of the assessment of the effectiveness of the regime is 
largely defined by the three-dimensional frame developed above and visualized in Figure 2. 
The model is aimed at integrating the (non-)cooperation of all states: Nuclear Weapon States, 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States, and states outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The distinction 
between output, outcome, and impact will help to differentiate between legal considerations 
as well as the actual compliance. 
Measuring the different levels of effectiveness confront the thesis with some difficulties. 
The determination of regime output is straightforward, as it is based on treaties, other 
agreements, and policies that lay the foundation for expected behavior. Documents are well 
publicized, allowing an evaluation of output effectiveness. 
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Outcome effectiveness stands for opportunities as well as challenges. On a positive note, 
there are numerous reports, analyses, and other evaluations of state compliance regarding 
the rules laid out in the regime. Owing to the lack of complete information, the interpretation 
of degrees of compliance is difficult when looking at some specific cases, as to be seen in 
the interpretation of whether Iran is seeking nuclear weapons (Sanger, 2015). In order to 
decrease unnecessary speculation, I will outline points of contention where necessary. 
The most challenging task is to evaluate the impact of the regime. I will consider how 
states’ cooperation in one system correlates with its overall compliance with regime norms. 
I will draw preliminary conclusions on the material and political aspect of norm compliance. 
At the same time, it is important to note that a desired outcome may only be partially due to 
a regime.55 
 
1.3. Explaining Regime Effectiveness 
1.3.1. Institutionalism as Explanation for State Behavior 
In order to develop independent variables for state behavior, I want to start out by taking 
a glance at institutionalism, which by some has been described as “the fundamental method 
of political science” (Wu, 2009, p.106). Beyond its frequent usage, institutionalism offers 
closer insight into how states interact with organizational structures. A categorization of 
institutionalist approaches provides a good starting point to mark off an explanatory frame. 
On this basis, I will demonstrate that driving factors as put forward in the literature as 
independent variables can be treated as capacities and incentives. Focusing on the latter, I 
will subsequently outline hypotheses reflecting four perspectives for (non-)cooperation with 
the regime: security, norms, economics, and status. Finally, a conclusion will take up the 
main findings of this chapter. 
Given that institutionalism has seen countless adoptions over time, the term has become 
very broad, summarized by the slogan “institutions matter.” A broad distinction can be made 
between traditional institutionalist approaches that began to gain prominence in the late 19th 
century and those approaches that developed in the second half of the 20th century.56 
 
55 The same is true for a nuclear stand-off. Analyzing France in the context of the Cuban Missile Crisis, Benoît 
Pelopidas (2017) warns to overestimate human influence in handling nuclear crises and, instead, to account for 
luck in research. 
56 For an account of the development of institutionalism from the late 19th century onwards see e.g. Robertson 
(1993). 
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Today’s institutionalists are particularly concerned with the extent to which an institution 
matters (March and Olsen, 2006). 
Focusing on the departure from a fixed traditional understanding of institutionalism in 
IR, March and Olsen (1984) coined the term “new institutionalism.” The authors describe 
the combination of traditional institutionalist approaches with contemporary developments 
in political science.57 Although scholars agree that there are different types of new 
institutionalism that vary among and even within each other, there are different definitions 
of the specific strands (e.g. Hall and Taylor, 1996; Peters, 2005). 
A prominent categorization has been provided by Hall and Taylor (1996). They propose 
three types of the new institutionalism that have developed separately but somewhat 
simultaneously: historical institutionalism, rational choice institutionalism, and 
sociological institutionalism (Hall and Taylor, 1996). Each strand will be briefly presented 
in the following to outline the explanatory capacity of institutionalism. 
 
Rational Choice Institutionalism (RCI) 
Given that the different strands of the “new institutionalism” reflect major theoretical 
approaches of the second half of the 20th century, it is not surprising that also rational choice 
assumptions have been related to institutionalist findings. Just as the other forms of 
institutionalism presented here, rational choice institutionalism is not a specific theory but 
rather a collective term for approaches emphasizing the rational behavior58 of actors. B. Guy 
Peters (2005) summarizes the core assumption of rational choice institutionalism as follows: 
“The fundamental argument of the rational choice approaches is that 
utility maximization can and will remain the primary motivation of 
individuals, but those individuals may realize that their goals can be achieved 
most effectively through institutional action” (Peters, 2005, p.48). 
 
57 Theoretical approaches to “new institutionalism” that have come to light since March and Olsen’s publication 
have addressed different guiding questions. 1. What is new institutionalism (e.g. March and Olsen, 1984; Hall 
and Taylor, 1996)? 2. What are the similarities and differences between the old and new institutionalism (e.g. 
Robertson, 1993)? 3. How can a common ground be built between old and new institutionalism (e.g. 
Rutherford, 1995; Selznick, 1996; Greenwood and Hinings, 1996; Wu, 2009)? The latter group has contributed 
to the difficulty in differentiating between the two generations of institutionalism (e.g. Greenwood and Hinings, 
1996). It seems that the main difference between the two is not related to the content of a work but rather the 
time of its publication. Legitimately, the question has been raised whether a strict distinction between the old 
and new generation needs to be made (Selznick, 1996; Rutherford, 1995). Instead, the new institutionalism can 
be considered to be the result of an “integration of old institutionalism with other methodologies” (Wu, 2009, 
p.108). 
58 Broadly speaking, as explained by Herbert A. Simon (1972, p.161), the term “rationality” refers to “a style 
of behavior that is appropriate to the achievement of given goals, within the limits imposed by given conditions 
and constraints.” The aspect of rationality was also briefly elaborated in my master’s thesis (Sauerteig, 2011). 
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In an attempt to define different characteristics of the rational choice approach, Hall and 
Taylor (1996, pp.944–5) elaborate four distinguishing features of rational choice 
institutionalism: 
1. Actors have clearly defined and fixed preferences. They behave instrumentally 
to achieve these preferences. 
2. Institutional arrangements reduce or prevent collective action dilemmas. 
3. The behavior of actors is determined by their strategic calculations. These 
calculations reflect expectations regarding the behavior of other actors against 
the background of a given institutional structure. 
4. The creation of an institution is based on voluntary arrangements among actors. 
The continuing existence of institutions as well as their use demonstrates that it 
promises more gains to actors than other arrangements. 
Hence, following RCI, institutions are created because of the respective interests of 
actors. Emphasis is put on the expectation that an institution lowers transaction costs (e.g. 
Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.943). Once in existence, actors will use the means in place to 
maximize their utility. The existence of the institution would seize if it repeatedly fails to 
satisfy the expected gains of the actors. 
The specific understanding of rational choice institutionalism may differ, depending on 
whether to emphasize the aspect of “rational choice” or “institutionalism.” The focus on 
rational choice assumes that actors use all means at hand to reach their goal, while ignoring 
the interests of other actors. Depending on the given situation, institutional processes may 
take the form of a zero-sum game. 
The interest-guided behavior of the actor may even be more important than securing 
power. For instance, US President Barack Obama requested the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) to reconsider its 2007 denial of a waiver that would have allowed the State 
of California to set stricter emission standards on state level than those in existence on 
national level (Obama, 2009). While at first sight it might be puzzling that the federal 
government would support the grant of authority to a state government, it represents rational 
behavior, because it reflects the goal of the Obama administration to further emission 
standards. 
The emphasis on the aspect of institutionalism, in turn, accounts for institutional 
stability despite diverse interests of actors. Following traditional rational choice, instead of 
reaching stable majorities in US Congress, a constant overturn of bills could be expected 
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(Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.942–3). The effectiveness of the institution can be explained with 
more game theoretic considerations by actors. They may accept a loss in one instance in 
exchange for a win in another case and, thereby, reinforce the institution. 
 
Sociological Institutionalism (SI) 
Sociological institutionalism differs from RCI in its understanding of institutions as well 
as the driving factors that shape them. At its core is a social and non-material interpretation 
of the world that shapes and is subject to practices. By and large, three features of SI can be 
derived from Hall and Taylor (1996, pp.947–50). 
First, sociological institutionalists have a wide-ranging understanding of institutions, far 
beyond simple organizational structures. Following a definition by William Richard Scott, 
“[i]nstitutions consist of cognitive, normative and regulative structures and activities that 
provide stability and meaning to social behavior” (in: Peters, 2005, p.116). The term culture 
itself receives an institutional connotation in that “even the most seemingly bureaucratic of 
practices have to be explained in cultural terms” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.946–8). 
Second, actors and institutions relate very interactively to one another. Behavior reflects 
the norms and cultural practices symbolized by the institution. Hence, sociological 
instititonalism emphasizes the “symbolic and valuative dimensions of organizations” 
(Peters, 2005, p.112). The expectations from other actors are seen to play a particular 
important role: “Institutions as systems of meaning do convey a sense of how their members 
should behave […]” (Peters, 2005, p.118). A guiding element for behavior is a “logic of 
appropriateness.”59 The internalization of norms can be twofold – consciously following 
socially expected behavior on the one hand and internalized behavior as a result of routine, 
on the other hand (Checkel, 2005, pp.804–5).60  
Third, according to Hall and Taylor (1996, p.947), practices are based on social 
legitimacy. Consequently, SI rejects classic cost-benefit estimations. Identities as well as the 
respective interests are formed first and foremost endogenously.61 Contrary to rational 
choice institutionalism, which primarily assumes the exogenous origin of interests, SI 
considers the reason for a specific behavior coming from within the institution. 
 
59 The formulation is frequently used in the literature. See e.g. March and Olsen (1998, pp.951–2), Checkel 
(2005), as well as Niemann and Mak (2010). 
60 See also Niemann and Mak (2010, pp.732–3). 
61 See Ben Rosamond (in: From, 2002, p.225). 
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Historical Institutionalism (HI) 
As the name suggests, an important starting point for historical institutionalists is a 
recognition of the impact of history on today’s institutions guiding international relations. 
Rather than analyzing institutions as a present-day snapshot, their existence, structure, and 
performance need to be contextualized against its historical background. Institutions 
represent “the formal or informal procedures, routines, norms and conventions embedded in 
the organizational structure of the polity or political economy” (Hall and Taylor 1996, 938). 
HI regards cooperation within organizational structures as a reproduction of certain 
paths, i.e. “path dependency” (see e.g. Fioretis 2011, 370-5). These paths are only taken off 
track at critical junctures, which in turn create new paths (e.g. Capoccia and Kelemen, 2007). 
This may occur when a major external event, such as the terrorist attacks of 9/11, cause a 
reconfiguration of a given institution or lead to the creation of new institution. 
The causes and the nature of path dependency are explained differently among historical 
institutionalists. Two different approaches can be distinguished that are either related to 
rational choice institutionalism, referring to the instrumental and strategic calculation of 
actors (“calculus approach”), or sociological institutionalism, addressing the influence of a 
respective worldview and institutionalized patterns of behavior (“cultural approach”) (Hall 
and Taylor, 1996, p.939). 
Whereas the cultural approach to historical institutionalism emphasizes the importance 
of norms and principles, the calculus approach examines the role of interests. Rather than 
contradicting RCI or SI, historical institutionalism may encompass both approaches. In other 
words, while focusing on the importance of history, it still leaves room for different 
explanations for how actors and institutions interact. 
The recognition of path dependency on behalf of historical institutionalists has 
important implications, particularly in the calculus approach. Within this organizational 
structure, the behavior of actors is influenced by their individual considerations of past gains 
and investments as well as future opportunities. Hence, institutions “affect individual action 
by altering the expectations an actor has about the actions that others are likely to take in 
response to or simultaneously with his own action” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p.939). 
Given that structures do not move easily, the founding moment of an institution becomes 
important for future developments. John Ikenberry (2001) even observes that great powers 
intentionally use institutions to lock in momentary power. Since structures are not able to 
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adjust easily to immediate requirements, historical institutionalism considers institutions as 
often being inefficient or ineffective.62 
 
1.3.2. Independent Variables in the Academic Literature 
What can we learn from the three institutionalist strands for state behavior within 
regimes? One the one hand, they demonstrate that there are very different ideas in the 
literature about the “nuts and bolts” of institutions. On the other hand, they allow a closer 
expectation of what role causal variables play in the context of institutional cooperation. 
Rational choice institutionalism underlines the pragmatic nature of structures to satisfy 
self-interest as well as the material connotation of causal variables that need to be 
maximized. Sociological institutionalism shows the importance of non-material and 
idealistic causal factors. Here, an institution is not about an organized self-interest but a 
reflection of a higher purpose or an extension of a cultural practice. Historical 
institutionalism emphasizes path dependency and its founding moment. Change is possible 
but requires a certain momentum (critical juncture). HI’s ability to account for stasis as well 
as drastic change is a good image of international regimes. 
The broad spectrum of material and non-material or idealistic aspects is to be seen in 
the driving factors for state behavior present in the regime literature. Following Stephen D. 
Krasner, who is reflecting on the 1983 book “International Regimes,” “[t]he most prominent 
[variables] put forward in this volume are egoistic self-interest, political power, norms and 
principles, habit and custom, and knowledge” (Krasner, 1983c, p.11). A volume edited by 
Jeffrey Fields describes a variety of motivators for cooperation and resistance: threat 
perception; free-riding; hegemony, legitimacy, discrimination; disarmament; security 
guarantees; resource constraints and economic interests; and self-interest (Fields, 2014a, 
pp.6–11). 
A more abstract categorization claims that students of international regimes have first 
and foremost analyzed regimes from the perspectives of interest, power, and knowledge (see 
e.g. Hasenclever, Mayer, and Rittberger 1997, pp.1–2). The variables are often based on 
 
62 There are numerous examples of scholars relating path dependency to ineffectiveness in basically every 
aspect of public life. Anita I. Anand and Peter Klein argue that there are significant inefficiencies in the 
Canadian capital markets. They observe that the securities regulatory system demonstrates path-dependency 
and demand an awareness of these paths in reform proposals (Anand and Klein, 2005). Barbara M. Kehm, 
Svein Michelsen, and Agnete Vabø (2010) argue that the implementation of the Bologna process in the 
education systems in Germany and Norway are confronted with the continuing existence of the Humboldtian 
legacy. 
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arguments made in connection with the foundation of an international regime but also with 
regime effectiveness (see e.g. Skjærseth and Wettestad, 2002, p.109). 
The categorization into interest, power, and knowledge entails some problems, 
particularly when explaining regime effectiveness. As Galbreath and McEvoy (2012, p.27) 
point out, “while [these categories] have the potential in explaining why the regime came 
into existence, they have limited utility in explaining the operation of the regime under 
investigation.” Furthermore, the role of norms, an aspect largely discussed in the 
international regime literature (e.g. Skjærseth, Stokke, and Wettestad, 2006), is ignored. 
Without further elaboration, it is also unclear whether the driving factors describe 
capacities or incentives.63 For instance, power can be both.64 A state may seek more 
influence and authority. Here, power would be an incentive. Yet, the existing authority may 
enable or limit actions in the first place. In this instance, power is a capacity. Similarly, a 
state may aim to raise the level of education of its citizens, making knowledge an incentive. 
When a state is able to act the way it does because its citizens have a high level of education, 
knowledge is a capacity. 
Any analysis would rest on unsound footing, if it fails to acknowledge the different 
nature of capacities and incentives in affecting state behavior. My work addresses this 
challenge by comparing different incentives as driving factors, rather than a mix of 
incentives and capacities. This choice has the advantage of facilitating a comparison, 
because the factors rest on a similar basis. Furthermore, I am particularly interested in the 
rationale of decisions. Here, incentives are a better starting point than capacities. 
This does not mean that I will fully ignore the role of capacities. In my analysis of 
plausible intent of four incentives (security, norms, economics, and status), I will 
 
63 Similar formulations are to be found in the larger IR literature, including capacity and willingness (Haggard 
and Simmons, 1987, p.501) or desirability and feasibility (Gilboa, 2010, p.4). 
64 In the nuclear field, the aspect of power has been associated with a global nuclear order, which in a larger 
understanding refers to the relationship between nuclear weapons and the respective policies towards the world 
order (e.g. Kutchesfahani, 2018, p. 1). For instance, Shampa Biswas (2014, pp. 15–6) claims that “the 
connections between global power, international hierarchies, and neocolonialism that postcolonial scholars 
raise are in fact quite central to thinking about the problems posed by nuclear weapons, and understanding 
them will be critical to solving those problems.” Nick Ritchie defines a hegemonic “nuclear control order” as 
structuring the international approach to dealing with nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Prohibition of 
Nuclear Weapons could be seen to question the legitimacy of that order, although it is unlikely to bear fruit 
(Ritchie, 2019). Sara Kutchesfahani (2018) notes that different perspectives shape the nuclear order/disorder 
paradigm. According to her, nuclear weapons are either seen as enhancing stability or instability. Nuclear 
Weapon States tend to recognize the orderly fashion of nuclear weapons, while Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
share a more disorderly interpretation of nuclear weapons (Kutchesfahani, 2018). 
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occasionally refer to capacities.65 After all, the realization of an incentive may become 
particularly (un)attractive because it is (un)feasible. 
 
1.3.3. Four Incentives: Security, Norms, Economics, and Status 
What incentives may influence state behavior towards the non-proliferation regime? 
The broad IR literature as well as the multifaceted nature of the non-proliferation regime 
leave many starting points for analysis.66 Following the consideration of the “three new 
institutionalisms,” the factors should include material as well as non-material or ideational 
considerations. 
Commenting on the existing literature, Andrew Grotto identifies three broad 
explanatory perspectives for state behavior relating to proliferation: 
“[…] normative factors relating to nuclear weapons as symbols of 
modern statehood, political identity, and prevailing patterns of hegemony; 
security interests concerning the balance of military power; and the 
comparative economic implications of nuclear weapons development versus 
restraint” (Grotto, 2010, pp.5–6). 
Jason Enia’s account of factors that may affect states’ nuclear decision-making shows 
several similarities with the observation by Andrew Grotto. Among other aspects, Enia 
points to the possible importance of a state’s security environment, the perception of 
discrimination, economic considerations, compliance by other states, as well as the symbolic 
connotation of nuclear weapons and the non-proliferation regime (Enia, 2014, pp.19–20).67 
During my analysis, I will focus on four incentives that cover many of those aspects put 
forward in academic literature, including those listed by Grotto and Enia. These incentives 
are: security, norms, economics, and status.68 To what extent do these aspects contribute or 
hamper states’ cooperation within the regime? Here, cooperation refers to commitment to 
and compliance with norms and rules within the regime. 
Against the two yardsticks of cooperation (collective optimum regime) and non-
cooperation (no-regime) of states, I will develop hypotheses for each incentive below. The 
 
65 For instance, Libya’s decision to give up its nuclear weapons program appears to have been at least partially 
influenced by the lacking capacity to implement a successful program (see Chapter 4). 
66 See e.g. Potter and Mukhatzhanova (2010a) and Fields (2014b). 
67 Jason Enia’s list of factors that may influence decision-making includes capacities as well as incentives. For 
my analysis, the incentives are particularly important. 
68 In fact, considerations of security, morality, and economics in shaping political outcome have even been 
associated with Thucydides and his account of the Peloponnesian War (see also Johnson Bagby, 1994). 
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goal is not to outline a comprehensive literature review for each aspect, but to provide 
different rationales for state behavior regarding commitment, verification, and enforcement.  
In political life, the different aspects cannot always be clearly separated, also because 
different factors are at stake in a decision. The hypotheses that will be elaborated in the 
remaining space of this chapter will serve as a basis for an examination of plausible intent 
in the subsequent chapters, which focus on the commitment system, verification system, and 
enforcement system of the non-proliferation regime. 
As part of that examination, for the purpose of this research, I will treat official 
justifications (e.g. in statements and agreements) as indicator for motivation. It has been 
legitimately argued that there is a difference between sincere and cheap talk (e.g. Doyle, 
2015, pp.12–5). I will, thus, point out instances in which there may be a difference between 
the two. Owing to the macroscopic approach of this work, however, I refrain from a 
comprehensive analysis of an individual speech act. 
 
Security 
Nuclear decision-making may be based on national security. Summarizing and 
simplifying this line of thinking, “states will seek to develop nuclear weapons when they 
face a significant military threat to their security that cannot be met through alternative 
means; if they do not face such threats, they will willingly remain non-nuclear states” 
(Sagan, 1996, p.54).69 
The origin of a threat, which may put the integrity and survival of a state into question, 
stems primarily from other states. Nuclear weapon development could depend on whether a 
state is in a conflictual security environment (Paul, 2000). The awareness of potential 
military capacities in another state would pose a danger and result in a domestic response 
(e.g. James, 2000). 
The incentive for state behavior is the goal to reduce a given threat. On these grounds, 
security considerations may hamper or enhance international cooperation within the non-
proliferation regime. A collective optimum regime and the no-regime offer different 
rationales as to how to handle threat environments. 
 
 
69 Sagan (1996, pp.54–5) also presents an overview of publications that would underline this statement. 
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Collective Optimum Regime 
One way to reduce a given threat may be through cooperation. Commitment to and 
compliance with agreements are an investment that enhances security in the long run. 
Ideally, an agreement is made with a potential source of a threat. Here, a bilateral agreement 
may suffice. The underlying logic is that the more states reliably cooperate within the 
regime, the lower is the global threat (e.g. Smetana and Ditrych, 2015). 
In an effort to overcome a dilemma and to contain proliferation, cooperation becomes a 
means to achieve a shared good (Enia, 2014). Similarly, following the calculus approach of 
historical institutionalism, Hall and Taylor emphasize that 
“[…] institutions persist because they embody something like a Nash 
equilibrium. That is to say, individuals adhere to these patterns of behaviour 
because deviation will make the individual worse off than will adherence. It 
follows that the more an institution contributes to the resolution of collective 
action dilemmas or the more gains from exchange it makes possible, the more 
robust it will be” (Hall and Taylor, 1996, pp.939–40). 
Other instruments shall ensure that all states keep their end of the bargain. Verification 
has a binary purpose from a security perspective. On the one hand, it is meant to timely 
detect non-compliance of a state – as this may pose a threat to the remaining states. On the 
other hand, a state’s knowledge of inspection measures is aimed at deterring non-compliance 
in the first place (e.g. IAEA, 2019a). The ability of a verification body to provide 
transparency and build confidence requires concessions by states (e.g. Blix, 2004, pp.15–
24). 
Regime enforcement offers tools to ensure a state’s compliance. Following Fred Charles 
Iklé (1961), the nature of the enforcement response significantly affects a target state’s 
behavior. According to him, (potential) sanctions must hurt the target in order to succeed. A 
simple recognition of non-compliance does not suffice (Iklé, 1961).70 Yet, enforcement is 
not limited to a “crowbar strategy.” Hence, in a collective optimum regime, the sender has a 
variety of positive and negative tools at hand to be imposed on a target state.71 
The enforcement measures need to affect the considerations of a target state. As a 
negative incentive, they can convey the message that continued non-compliance poses a new 
threat (military threats or even attacks against a target state).72 As a positive incentive, 
 
70 See also David Santoro (2012). 
71 On the variety of enforcement measures in the non-proliferation context see e.g. Solingen (2012b). 
72 On military threats and attacks as tools of enforcement see e.g. Kreps and Fuhrmann (2011) or Kreps and 
Pasha (2012). 
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security assurances to promote regime cooperation may ease the security concerns that 
provide incentive for the target state not to comply in the first place. 
The underlying logic of the collective optimum regime from a security perspective can 
be formulated in the following hypothesis: 
If cooperation satisfies its security needs, then the state will commit 
to and comply with regime norms and rules (A1). 
 
No-Regime 
Security considerations could also trigger an incentive not to cooperate. There are 
several reasons to reject an agreement in the first place. Security could be compromised by 
free-riding. A state may be worse off having refrained from nuclear weapons, if the rival 
increases its own capacities at the same time. Lacking trust in cooperation, a state would 
choose to refrain from committing.73 
States may also reject cooperation, because they “want to” or “have to” develop nuclear 
weapons (Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 2010a, pp.2–5).74 Nuclear deterrence remains an 
important strategy in the 21st century for several states.75 Focusing on international relations, 
a provocative argument was put forward by Kenneth Waltz (1981), who suggests that the 
spread of nuclear weapons to a larger number of states may be beneficial to contain 
conflict.76 
Verification, in turn, may be considered to compromise security rather than enhancing 
it. Extensive verification “force governments to open up their most diverse and sensitive 
sites to inspectors and it might give false alarms” (Blix, 2004, p.18). Transparency may not 
just expose the own capacities, thus, providing potential adversaries with insight 
information. Nuclear ambiguity itself may be a tool for deterrence (Hymans, 2006, pp.456–
 
73 For instance, Ruzicka and Wheeler (2010) argue that the functioning of the NPT depends on three 
relationships of trust: between Nuclear Weapon States and Non-Nuclear Weapon States, among NWS, and 
between NPT signatory states and those outside of the treaty. 
74 A nuclear weapons program may be aimed at countering a regional threat, see e.g. Sagan (1996, pp.57–63) 
and Singh and Way (2004, pp.863–4). In a broader understanding, academic literature has discussed the effect 
of nuclear weapons on state behavior under the term “deterrence theory” (e.g. Potter and Mukhatzhanova, 
2010b). 
75 See e.g. the analyses in Lewis et al. (2014) and Shultz and Goodby (2015). 
76 Nuclear deterrence has been criticized as guiding star for political scientists and political decision makers. 
The reality is less stable than deterrence would suggest, see e.g. Lewis et al. (2014) and Pelopidas (2015a). 
Focusing on Kenneth Waltz, Anne Harrington (2016, p.192) criticizes that the underlying assumptions lead 
him “to transform the violence of nuclear weapons from a threat to humanity into a source of security, and 
therefore a normative good.” Although Kenneth Waltz is a common point of reference in the academic 
literature, it is necessary to point out that he does not represent a consensus understanding of security, even the 
realist literature is more diverse (Bajema, 2010, p.61). 
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8). Furthermore, sensitive knowledge could be stolen and used for proliferation. This could 
create a new threat for a state. 
Regime enforcement, in turn, may fail to address a target state’s security concerns. In 
fact, it can even underline them. Military threats or attacks may demonstrate a state’s 
vulnerability and strengthen its willingness to develop a nuclear weapons program. As 
consequence, a state would continue to counter regime norms, despite enforcement. 
Summing up the no-regime, the following hypothesis can be made: 
If non-cooperation satisfies its security needs, then the state will 




Explaining the effectiveness of the non-proliferation regime simply with security does 
not suffice. A further aspect worth exploring are normative considerations. Norms are – by 
definition – part of any regime and can themselves become a driving force. They may refer 
to the pursuance of morality of an actor or the fulfillment of an expected behavior.  
As described by Carmen Wunderlich, scholars have understood norms as following a 
“logic of consequences” or a “logic of appropriateness.” In the former understanding, norm 
compliance is the result of a cost-benefit calculation, whereas the “logic of appropriateness” 
reflects a more constitutive character (Wunderlich, pp. 21–2). My understanding of norms 
will be guided by this latter category, in order to better distinguish normative considerations 
from other perspectives applied in this thesis and to put a stronger emphasis on idealistic 
aspects. 
Focusing on norms as an incentive, I want to concentrate on two aspects during my 
analysis: humanitarian considerations (as embedded in international law)77 and fairness. 
Humanitarian considerations stand for disinterested goals in that the state does not profit 
from a decision in terms of security, economics, or status. The state champions an idea, 
because it is the right thing to do. Fairness includes a judgement about responsibilities and 
the extent to which all states fulfill their role. Normative aspects may advance or lower the 
incentive to cooperate. As noted by Grotto (2010, p.46), who examines different 
 
77 For Jan Ruzicka (2018b, pp.5–6), combining humanitarian considerations with international law is a defining 
feature of the humanitarian initiative regarding nuclear weapons. 
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perspectives, “[n]ormative factors may push some countries to resist NPT- plus measures 
and others to endorse them.” 
 
Collective Optimum Regime 
In a collective optimum regime, states commit to and comply with the regime, because 
the latter is fair and satisfies international law. Cooperation follows the larger principle that 
nuclear weapons are bad (e.g. Ruzicka, 2018b, p.2). States come together to subscribe to a 
shared set of norms derived from that principle. Cooperation is not a zero-sum game or about 
enhancing profit. It is about doing the “right thing.” The participation is shared by all states. 
The role of verification and enforcement depends on the respective normative stance. 
Institutions may not need to enforce “rightful behavior,” since actors absorb and translate 
norms also without force.78 In this view, verification and enforcement measures may be 
meant to underline the original humanitarian norm. 
The notion of fairness, however, may also entail that misbehavior against a norm is met 
with punishment. The focus here is justice in the light of a global responsibility. After all, 
“[v]iolating the NPT means not only violating a public commitment but also reversing 
decades of compliance and support to a widely held international norm” (Rublee, 2014, 
p.98). Verification and enforcement are meant to signal to the target state its wrongful 
behavior. The state becomes aware of its breach of a norm and, ideally, refrains from further 
non-compliance. 
There is no single way to describe normative conditions for a successful regime.79 
Rublee (2009) presents an extensive list of hypotheses against the background of the 
international social environment. In that continuum, norms are processed through linking, 
activation, and consistency (Rublee, 2009). Galbreath and McEvoy (2012) develop norm-
driven considerations in the context of the minority rights regime. They come to the 
hypothesis that a regime is likely to be effective when state actors find the norms of the 
regime suitable for the domestic environment (Galbreath and McEvoy, 2012, p.46). As 
indicated before, my hypothesis for cooperation accounts for fairness and humanitarian 
considerations: 
 
78 For example, on the internalization of behavior following social expectance or routine see Checkel (2005, 
pp.804–5). 
79 Different approaches are put forward in e.g. Galbreath and McEvoy (2012), Müller and Wunderlich (2013), 
and Rublee (2009). 
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If cooperation satisfies international law or fairness, then the state 
will commit to and comply with regime norms and rules (B1). 
 
No-Regime 
From a normative perspective, cooperation may fail due to different normative 
preferences that fall into the categories of fairness and humanitarian considerations. A 
starting point are the three pillars of the NPT (non-proliferation, disarmament, and peaceful 
use of nuclear energy), which may entail an unequal treatment of states. Normative breaches 
by other states may frustrate a state’s own commitment to the non-proliferation regime (e.g. 
Rublee, 2009, pp.212–5). Nina Tannenwald describes a few prominent disputes that hamper 
cooperation:80 
• Denial vs. nuclear sharing 
o The right for peaceful uses of nuclear energy may contrast fears about the 
spread of nuclear weapons. 
• Non-possession norm vs. norm of sovereign equality 
o Does the prohibition of nuclear weapons for some states contradict their 
right for a sovereign pursuance of security? 
• Inspection norm vs. sovereignty 
o Inspections put a particularly heavy burden on Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States. 
• Universality vs. particularism 
o Should the international community push for a universal NPT, or should 
a special treatment for outsiders be allowed 
(Tannenwald, 2013, pp.302–305)81 
Rejections of cooperation in the field of verification and enforcement can be derived 
from these disputes. From a fairness perspective, the main obstacle to cooperation is not that 
verification is intrusive. The main problem is that it is more intrusive for some states but not 
for others. There is no equal sharing of the burden. 
Enforcement may also mean that a target state feels treated unfairly. Rather than 
accepting the demand, the state will question the legitimacy of the measures and refer to 
 
80 Tannenwald also considers the role of the status of great powers that also possess nuclear weapons. This 
falls into the category of status (see below). 
81 There is some overlap with Müller, Becker-Jakob, and Seidler-Diekmann (e.g. 2013, pp.55–9). 
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other states that are not subject to enforcement, although they would “deserve” it. In an 
extreme case a state may reject enforcement measures for humanitarian reasons in that 
sanctions may put the well-being of the people at risk. To sum up, the following hypothesis 
can be made for non-cooperation from a normative stance: 
If non-cooperation satisfies international law or fairness, then the 
state will refrain from committing to and complying with regime norms 
and rules (B2). 
 
Economics 
Among other factors, Jason Enia (2014, p.20) states that nuclear decisions may depend 
on “perceptions about the domestic costs and benefits associated with a particular decision.” 
In contrast to the normative approach, the perspective of economics has a material 
connotation that provides an incentive for self-interested state behavior. Regime 
commitment and compliance relate to a state’s calculations82 as to whether investments into 
cooperation pay off. 
The aspect of economics includes a variety of sectors. I will distinguish between two 
main categories: Costs and benefits that relate to the field of nuclear energy and economic 
considerations that lie beyond the nuclear realm. Nuclear-related considerations include 
costs and benefits83 from nuclear power as a potential source of energy, research, medical 
uses, as well as trade of fissile material and nuclear assistance. Economic aspects beyond the 
immediate nuclear field relate to a state’s larger interests in terms of budget, finance, 
industry, trade, and infrastructure. 
 
Collective Optimum Regime 
A collective optimum regime satisfies the economic interests of state actors. It does not 
resemble a zero-sum game but a platform of shared interests for everyone. As put by Andrew 
Grotto (2010, p.8), referring to several driving factors including economic ones, “[…] the 
success of efforts to mobilize greater international support for NPT-fuel cycle reform, robust 
 
82 Arguably, there is a notion of uncertainty to these calculations. As described by Maria Rublee, “[t]he greater 
the perception of uncertainty regarding potential costs and benefits of nuclear weapons, the more likely 
policymakers are to be open to considering a change in their nuclear stance” (Rublee, 2009, p.51). 
83 Analyses of costs and benefits of nuclear power as energy supply and nuclear cooperation can be found in 
e.g. Tybout (1957), Adamantiades and Kessides (2009), Ahearne (2011), and von Hippel et al. (2011). 
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export controls, an enhanced inspections regime, and other important nonproliferation 
priorities hinges on aligning incentives across states’ interests.” 
From an economic perspective, the peaceful use of nuclear energy, exchanges on 
technology, fissile material, and nuclear assistance may be attractive for states. Cooperation 
may lower the costs and increase profits of nuclear energy or offer advantages from nuclear 
research (Rublee, 2009, p.10). Against this background, states may be tempted to commit to 
and comply with the regime.84 
Cooperation in the field of verification depends on two conditions: I) a state must be 
able to connect the cooperation investment with benefits and II) verification needs to be 
efficient in that it does not outweigh potential benefits. Security gains or normative 
considerations are only of secondary importance. 
The success of enforcement depends on the regime’s ability to serve as a “soft power.” 
It needs to be able to convince a state by implementing a variety of economic tools that 
cooperation is better than non-cooperation. There is a strong emphasis on sanctions85 in the 
literature on the non-proliferation regime.86 A prominent analysis that underlines the overall 
virtues of economic sanctions87 was made by Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott (1990) in their 
analysis of dozens of case studies. 
A further option to promote regime compliance are positive inducements, that is “the 
benefits or rewards extended to leaders, ruling coalitions, or broader constituencies in target 
states, with the expectation that they will persuade recipients to eschew nuclear weapons” 
(Solingen, 2012a, p.6).88 These tools may include technical assistance as well as financial or 
economic support toward the target state. 
For commitment, verification, and enforcement the following hypothesis can be made: 
If cooperation enhances economic benefits, then the state will 
commit to and comply with regime norms and rules (C1). 
 
 
84 According to Maria Rublee (2009, p.11), domestic policy makers may even push for nuclear weapon 
forbearance due to economic interests. 
85 Sanctions are “international instruments of statecraft that punish or deny benefits to leaders, ruling coalitions, 
or broader constituencies in a given state, in an effort to dissuade those targets from pursuing or supporting the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons” (Solingen, 2012a, p.5). 
86 There are exceptions to this tendency, including Cortright (1997), Reardon (2010), and Solingen (2012b). 
87 In this thesis, economic sanctions will be understood as an umbrella term for measures referring to trade and 
financial transactions as well as to strategic export controls (see Lindsay, 1986, pp.154–5). 
88 The volume edited by Etel Solingen concentrates on enforcement in cases of potential horizontal proliferation 
of nuclear weapons. The approach of this thesis is more comprehensive, in that it also acknowledges nuclear 
disarmament and nuclear weapon tests. 
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No-Regime 
Economic considerations may also lead states to refrain from commitment to and 
compliance with the non-proliferation regime. First, a state may come in its calculation of 
costs and benefits of nuclear energy to the conclusion that costs outweigh benefits. In this 
case, the state would have less interest in nuclear cooperation in the first place. For instance, 
nuclear catastrophes as in Chernobyl or Fukushima may lead to a reevaluation of an existing 
civilian nuclear program.89 
Those states that decide in favor of a nuclear program would have to consider whether 
they should accept the rules embedded in the regime. These rules reflect a behavioral 
prescription and may be seen to impede the nuclear freedom. In this scenario, the 
international regime does not stand for a platform for enhancing nuclear energy but becomes 
a burden for nuclear development. 
Verification may underline these economic disadvantages for a state. On the one hand, 
the measures could be too expensive in terms of budget, personnel, or technical and logistical 
support. On the other hand, verification may be seen to put the existing economic 
infrastructure at risk, e.g. if on-site inspections are used for industrial espionage. 
Regarding enforcement, it may well be the case that the regime fails to implement 
positive or negative incentives for a target state. This would leave the original decision for 
non-compliance with the regime unaffected. As a response to Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott 
(1990), Robert A. Pape (1997, p.93) argues “that economic sanctions have little independent 
usefulness for pursuit of noneconomic goals.” At the same time, verification may backfire. 
For instance, in a state that pursues nuclear energy for reasons of energy independence, 
heavy economic sanctions may provide further incentive for autarchy. To sum up: 
If non-cooperation enhances economic benefits, then the state will 




Finally, during my analysis, I also want to consider status-related aspects. As an 
independent variable to describe state behavior, the term is not self-explanatory. Owing to 
 
89 An overview of immediate international reactions following the Fukushima incident in 2011 can be found 
in Schneider, Froggatt, and Thomas (2012, pp.41–50). 
 59 
its broad scope, status may refer to standing, condition, or configuration. Consequently, 
there may be overlap with other possible driving factors. 
For instance, elaborating a “norms model,” Scott Sagan (1996, p.73) focuses on nuclear 
weapons’ “symbolic functions – both shaping and reflecting a state’s identity.”90 He mixes 
normative elements, such as ethics, with status considerations, including the standing of a 
state with nuclear weapons (Sagan, 1996, pp.73–85). The terminological overlap becomes 
even more apparent when considering that, if combined, status and security can be seen to 
make up the potential driving factor of power. 
In order to distinguish status-considerations from other factors examined in this thesis, 
I will concentrate on the standing of the state and political leadership as a driving factor for 
nuclear decision-making as well as the compatibility and symbolic nature of the nuclear 
partnership. Compatibility describes to what extent a commitment is considered appropriate 
by a party. The symbolic nature of a partnership refers to the relationship between partners 
of an agreement. Status-considerations may advance or hamper cooperation in the non-
proliferation regime. 
 
Collective Optimum Regime 
From a status perspective, cooperation is a platform for enhancing a state’s standing 
rather than about the actual content. A state may commit to or comply with the regime to 
be(come) an accepted member of the international community and a recognized supporter 
of the non-proliferation cause. Ideally, the non-proliferation regime increases the status of 
all participants and resembles a trustful environment. 
Arguably, the willingness to cooperate may be greater in a friendly atmosphere than in 
a conflictual one. In this sense, commitment and compliance is an extension of an already 
trustful relationship. Daniel D. Drezner (1999) even comes to the conclusion that sanctions 
are more likely to lead to concessions if the relationship between the sender and receiver of 
sanctions is benevolent, as future conflictual situations are less likely than among 
adversaries. 
Verification commitment and compliance is not meant to enhance security but instead 
to label a state as being a compliant actor within the regime. Non-compliance in verification 
 
90 In more general terms, Steven Ward (2017, p. 3) argues that “rising powers” may contest an existing order 
not because of material interests but because “obstructed status ambitions unleash psychological and domestic 
political forces within rising states that push them to reject and challenge the status quo in order.” 
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will lead to the condemnation of a state, degrading its role in the international community. 
Verification, thus, becomes a tool of categorization. 
Enforcement measures are signals, similar to the normative perspective.91 The 
difference with norms is that status signals target the standing of a state or its political 
leadership. In doing so, they affect a state’s calculation by possibly enhancing or degrading 
its standing among other states. Sanctions may be seen as “naming and shaming” and 
positive incentives may become good practice rewards. In this sense, diplomatic tools of 
positive inducements (high level meetings, enhancing political relationship) and sanctions 
(travel bans or limitations on the diplomatic relationship) may significantly affect behavior. 
If cooperation enhances its status, then the state will commit to and 
comply with regime norms and rules (D1). 
 
No-Regime 
A state may also be deterred from cooperation owing to status-related considerations. 
Commitment to and compliance with agreements may undermine a state’s standing rather 
than enhancing it, e.g. due to the conflictual relationship with one or more partners in an 
agreement. In an extreme form, nuclear weapons themselves may appear very attractive for 
a state. It may seek to enhance prestige by joining the “nuclear club” (e.g. Perkovich, 1998; 
Tannenwald, 2013, p.305).92 
The value attributed to nuclear weapons in the larger non-proliferation and disarmament 
discourse is critically analyzed by Nick Ritchie. Devaluing nuclear weapons is a complex 
and challenging undertaking (Ritchie, 2013, pp.166–8). In this sense, non-cooperation with 
the three regime norms are likely to persist as long as the value of nuclear weapons continues 
to exist. 
The decision not to cooperate is close to the normative line of thinking described above. 
The difference is that the goal of fairness as a norm represents a higher purpose whereas 
status is more self-interested. Aiming for fairness, a state would seek an equal treatment of 
 
91 On the role of signaling in enforcement see e.g. James M. Lindsay (1986, pp.155–6) and Drezner (1999, 
pp.9–18). 
92 Barry O’Neill (2006) emphasizes the strategic component and social context of a desirable quality. Here, 
prestige resembles the meta-level of a quality. In other words, it is not just important what individuals think 
about a quality of another party (reputation) but also what individuals think about others’ beliefs about the 
presence of that quality (O’Neill, 2006).  
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all, whereas aiming for status means enhancing the own standing – even if it is already better 
than the standing of others. 
Similarly, a state may refrain from accepting verification commitments, because it 
decreases its own role within the international community. For instance, a state may object 
an underlying and allegedly unjustified general suspicion targeted against it or may question 
verification as unreliable, as an adversary may affect results. 
Enforcement tools may fail to change a state’s status considerations in favor of regime 
compliance. To the contrary, enforcement measures, whether positive incentives or 
sanctions, may be used domestically as tool of scapegoating, thus fostering the standing of 
the political leadership in a state rather than diminishing it. As noted by Maria Rublee, 
“[p]erceived U.S. bullying is a greater impetus for nonproliferation than any current 
loopholes in the nonproliferation regime” (2009, pp.86–7). 
Against the background of status considerations regarding regime commitment, 
verification, and enforcement, it can be attested that: 
If non-cooperation enhances its status, then the state will refrain 
from committing to and complying with regime norms and rules (D2). 
 
1.4. Summary 
The primary research question of this work is “What determines the effectiveness of the 
nuclear non-proliferation regime?” Given the nature of the regime, I have identified state 
behavior as the pivotal point of inquiry in assessing regime effectiveness. Accordingly, the 
research question has been narrowed down to “What determines whether states commit to 
and comply with the non-proliferation regime?” 
In order to respond to this question, the thesis is undertaking a comprehensive 
qualitative study. It makes use of a three-dimensional model to assess regime effectiveness, 
accounting for the different roles of the regime (commitment, verification, enforcement), 
policy fields (acquisition, position, and use of nuclear weapons), as well as the level of 
effectiveness (output, outcome, impact). 
Against the background of the concept put forward here, compliance in the nuclear non-
proliferation regime can preliminarily be expected to represent a “pyramid of effectiveness.” 
Since the elements of each dimension are built upon one another and may demonstrate at 
least some shortcomings from one level to another, effectiveness is likely to decrease 
towards the top in every dimension. 
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The three main systems (stemming from the roles of the regime) demonstrate varying 
institutional contexts that present state actors with varying norms, rules, and levels of 
influence. Accordingly, the following chapters will consider each system individually. 
After having evaluated output, outcome, and impact effectiveness, I will seek to analyze 
possible explanations for state behavior that lead to the regime’s (in)effectiveness, 
undertaking an evaluation of modes of pledges and justification for state behavior from four 
perspectives: security, norms, economics, and status. The following hypothesis will be used 
as first-cut propositions to narrow down the theoretically grounded empirical analysis: 
 
Table 1 – Hypotheses 
 1 - Cooperation 2 - Non-Cooperation 
A - Security If cooperation satisfies its 
security needs, then the 
state will commit to and 
comply with regime norms 
and rules. 
If non-cooperation satisfies its 
security needs, then the state 
will refrain from committing 
to and complying with regime 
norms and rules. 
B – Norms If cooperation satisfies 
international law and 
fairness, then the state will 
commit to and comply with 
regime norms and rules. 
If non-cooperation satisfies 
international law and 
fairness, then the state will 
refrain from committing to 
and complying with regime 
norms and rules. 
C - Economics If cooperation enhances 
economic benefits, then the 
state will commit to and 
comply with regime norms 
and rules. 
If non-cooperation enhances 
economic benefits, then the 
state will refrain from 
committing to and complying 
with regime norms and rules. 
D - Status If cooperation enhances its 
status, then the state will 
commit to and comply with 
regime norms and rules. 
If non-cooperation enhances 
its status, then the state will 
refrain from committing to 
and complying with regime 








2. Commitment in the Non-Proliferation Regime 
2.1. Platforms of Commitment 
The commitment system is the corner stone of regime compliance. It comprises states’ 
pledges to norms and rules that counter the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear 
weapons. States signal their standpoint and subscribe to a specific behavior. This behavior, 
in turn, can be subject to verification and enforcement measures. 
The types of commitment differ significantly, depending on the state and the nature of 
its nuclear program. Some states possess nuclear weapons, while others do not. Some states 
have an advanced civilian nuclear program, while other states massively depend on external 
nuclear support or renounce nuclear energy altogether. 
At the same time, the nature of commitment may vary. A state may be in compliance 
with norms and rules before or even without committing. For other states, the very same 
norms and rules demand a behavioral change. In a collective optimum regime, all states 
would commit to and – more importantly – comply with rules, the entirety of which cover 
the three regime norms: 
• Acquisition: states without nuclear weapons refrain from acquiring them 
• Possession: states that possess nuclear weapons disarm 
• Use: states refrain from using nuclear weapons 
What conditions determine whether a state commits to and complies with the regime in 
the areas of acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons? In an effort to respond to 
this question, I will first lay out the spectrum of commitment. While the subsequent analysis 
is forced to focus on the most important platforms for commitment, it is first necessary to 
get a grasp of the complexity of the commitment network, including the international, 
regional, bilateral, and unilateral level. 
Next, I will assess states’ commitment to (output effectiveness) and compliance with 
(outcome effectiveness) regime rules regarding the acquisition, possession, and use of 
nuclear weapons. On that basis, I will draw overall conclusions on compliance with regime 
norms (impact effectiveness) in the respective thematic field. This analysis allows an 
assessment of the extent to which states fulfill the regime norms. 
After having assessed regime effectiveness in the commitment system, I will turn to 
possible explanations for (non-)cooperation. More specifically, I will undertake an 
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examination of plausible intent by critically analyzing modes of pledges and justifications 
for state behavior from four perspectives: security, norms, economics, and status. 
Finally, a conclusion will take up the main findings of this chapter. The greatest regime 
impact is to be found in the acquisition and use of nuclear weapons. Following the 
introduction of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
breaches to the regime norm in these fields have so far been an exception. Regarding the 
possession of nuclear weapons, there are mixed signals of effectiveness. Although the 
overall number of nuclear weapons has significantly gone down, the number of states 
possessing nuclear weapons remains stable. 
All four factors – security, norms, economics, and status – have some virtue in 
explaining regime (non-)compliance. However, there appears to be a hierarchy among them. 
While normative considerations foster regime cooperation, status- and security-related 
aspects offer a strong incentive to counter regime norms. 
 
2.1.1. International Commitment 
Given the global reach of nuclear weapons, it is not surprising that a number of 
agreements have been concluded on an international level. The legal corner stone of the non-
proliferation regime is the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), which maintains the three 
pillars of the regime: preventing the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons, nuclear 
disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear weapons. Despite its name, the treaty is not 
limited to countering the acquisition of nuclear weapons. The NPT also provides a basis for 
commitments on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. 
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) is even older than the Non-
Proliferation Treaty. The agency is a champion for the civilian use of nuclear energy as well 
as nuclear safeguards. Following the introduction of the NPT, the IAEA has become the 
paramount institution for nuclear verification (see following chapter). It is first and foremost 
focused on the non-acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
Closely connected with the IAEA are provisions for nuclear exports controls, as 
outlined by two international groups of nuclear suppliers – the Zangger Committee and the 
Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG). Although the export guidelines established by both groups 
are voluntary, they are an important point of reference in nuclear trade. The goal is to prevent 
the use of material and technology for nuclear weapon programs in other states. 
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Taking the role of non-state actors into account, the International Convention for the 
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism was opened for signature in 2005. After all, the 
potential acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons by individuals or terrorist 
groups pose a threat. The convention seeks better protection of dual-use items on a domestic 
level and coins the illicit use of missile material as a criminal offence. 
Two further agreements restrict the use of nuclear devices on an international stage: The 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The 
former treaty bans nuclear tests “in the atmosphere, in outer space, and under water.” The 
CTBT bans any nuclear explosion but has not yet entered into force. 
The most recent international agreement in the non-proliferation regime is the Treaty 
on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons. The treaty offers a more comprehensive rejection 
of nuclear weapons. It seeks the “total elimination of nuclear weapons” (Article 4) and is, 
thereby, relevant for the policy fields of acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons. 
 
2.1.2. Regional Commitment 
Over the last decades, numerous regional platforms have been established to reinforce 
regime norms, including the peaceful use of nuclear energy.93 A prominent example is 
EURATOM,94 the European Atomic Energy Community. EURATOM is aimed at 
promoting the peaceful use of nuclear energy, while countering the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. It provides a market for fissionable material, a platform for joint projects, and 
cooperation in research and technology. It also plays an important role in the verification of 
nuclear programs in the European Union95 – coordinated with the IAEA. 
The most ambitious regional reinforcement of regime norms are Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zones (NWFZs), which attempt to outlaw nuclear weapons in a defined area. The term 
may refer to inhabited areas (territories that allow and demonstrate human settlements) or 
uninhabited areas (i.e. areas that do not allow human settlements, e.g. outer space, seabed, 
Antarctic) (Pande, 1998). In this thesis, I will use the term for inhabited areas. 
 
93 Wilfred Wan (2018, p.3) recently made “the case for a more specialized, decentralized, and localized nuclear 
non-proliferation regime.” More than that, he also offers a sophisticated effort to outline and compare different 
regional approaches to non-proliferation. 
94 Treaty establishing the European Atomic Energy Community (EURATOM), March 25,1957. 
95 Arguably, the European Union, which is distinct from EURATOM but shares the same state membership 
and institutions, plays an increasing role in shaping international nuclear development (see e.g. Kienzle, 2013). 
Yet, following Benjamin Kienzle (2013, 1150), despite the successful “WMD Strategy” of 2003, there is a 
“nexus between the EU’s external non-proliferation policies and the corresponding policy coordination within 
the EU.” 
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NWFZs are embedded in Article VII of the NPT, which states that “[n]othing in this 
Treaty affects the right of any group of States to conclude regional treaties in order to assure 
the total absence of nuclear weapons in their respective territories.” Accordingly, NWFZs 
address the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons. So far, six agreements have 
been finalized: The Treaty of Tlatelolco (Latin America)96, the Treaty of Rarotonga (South 
Pacific)97, the Treaty of Bangkok (Southeast Asia)98, the Treaty of Pelinda (Africa)99, and 
the Treaty of Semipalatinsk (Central Asia).100 Furthermore, Mongolia has created an 
internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status.101 
 
2.1.3. Bilateral Commitment 
Bilateral commitments add to international and regional agreements in the non-
proliferation regime by bringing together conflictual parties. Most prominently, the nuclear 
superpowers – the United States of America and the Soviet Union/Russia – have 
concluded a number of bilateral agreements that target their possession and use of nuclear 
weapons. These include the ABM Treaty102, START I103, START II104, SORT105, New 
START106, the INF Treaty107, the Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT)108, and the Peaceful 
Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty109. 
Pakistan and India have finalized two agreements related to nuclear weapons: The 
India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement110 and the Lahore Declaration111. Although both 
 
96 Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean, February 14, 1967. 
97 South Pacific Nuclear Free Zone Treaty, August 6, 1985. 
98 Treaty on the Southeast Asia Nuclear Weapon-Free Zone, December 15, 1995. 
99 African Nuclear Weapon Free Zone Treaty, April 11, 1996. 
100 Treaty on a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone in Central Asia, September 8, 2006. 
101 Law of Mongolia on its Nuclear-Weapon-Free-Status, September 25, 1992. 
102 Treaty Between the United States of America and The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on The 
Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems, May 26, 1972. 
103 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Reduction 
and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, July 31, 1991. 
104 Treaty Between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Further Reduction and 
Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, January 3, 1993. The treaty never entered into force. 
105 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Strategic Offensive Reductions, 
May 24, 2002. 
106 Treaty between the United States of America and the Russian Federation on Measures for the Further 
Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, April 8, 2010. 
107 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Elimination 
of Their Intermediate-Range and Shorter-Range Missiles, December 8, 1987. 
108 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the Limitation 
of Underground Nuclear Weapon Tests, July 3, 1974. 
109 Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on Underground 
Nuclear Explosions for Peaceful Purposes, May 28, 1976. 
110 Agreement between India and Pakistan on the Prohibition of Attack against Nuclear Installations and 
Facilities, December 31, 1988. 
111 The Lahore Declaration, February 21, 1999. 
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agreements play a role in the overall bilateral relations between the states, their immediate 
issue area is the use of nuclear weapons. The Non-Attack Agreement commits both states 
not to damage the other state’s nuclear facilities. The Lahore Declaration of 1999 calls for 
“steps for reducing the risk of accidental or unauthorised use of nuclear weapons.” 
Brazil and Argentina have built a nuclear cooperation in the form of the Brazilian-
Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control (ABACC).112 The ABACC is the only 
bilateral authority to confirm the peaceful nature of nuclear programs. As such, the agency 
is integrated in the larger IAEA verification context (see following chapter) and contributes 
to countering the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK) and the Republic of 
Korea (ROK) signed a declaration on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula113 in 
1992. Among other things, both states declared that they “shall use nuclear energy solely for 
peaceful purposes.” Although this commitment overlaps with the states’ NPT pledges not to 
acquire nuclear weapons, the declaration emphasized the importance of the norm for the 
development of peace and stability on the peninsula. It was never fully implemented. 
 
2.1.4. Unilateral Commitment 
Unilateral commitments are often verbalized by states that possess nuclear weapons. 
In this context, several states have placed conditionalities on the use of their nuclear weapons 
(e.g. to refrain from use against a Non-Nuclear Weapon State or to renounce a first-use). 
Furthermore, while Russia and the United States of America have bilateral agreements in 
place, the United Kingdom114 has unilaterally formulated a cap on its nuclear weapon stocks 
and France advocates a nuclear doctrine of “strict sufficiency” (limiting its size to the lowest 
strategic necessity). France also unilaterally decided to dismantle its nuclear testing site as 
well as its facilities to produce fissile material (Tertrais, 2007, p. 254). 
Some states also take domestic measures to further restrict the development of nuclear 
weapons on their territory. New Zealand, the Philippines, and Brazil have constitutionally 
“banned the non-peaceful use of nuclear energy” (Goldemberg, Feu Alvim, and Mafra, 2018, 
 
112 Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively 
Peaceful Use of Nuclear Energy, July 18, 1991. 
113 Joint Declaration of South and North Korea on the Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula, January 20, 
1992. 
114 The UK set out the scope of its nuclear armed forces as part of its Strategic Defense and Security Review. 
The latest review states: “We will retain no more than 120 operationally available warheads and, by the mid- 
2020s, we will reduce the overall nuclear weapon stockpile to no more than 180 warheads […]” (HM 
Government, 2015). 
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p.387). Mongolia, as stated before, went a step further by introducing the only single-state 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone recognized by the United Nations. 
 
2.2. Assessing Effectiveness 
2.2.1. Acquisition 
The regime norm not to acquire nuclear weapons primarily focusses on those states that 
do not already possess them. These states may have an advanced civilian nuclear program 
or may even have had a nuclear weapons program in the past. Countering the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons entails two major approaches, i.e. to curb the demand and the supply side 
of nuclear bombs. States shall refrain from nuclear weapons in the first place. For those 
states that pursue a weapons program, nonetheless, assistance from the outside – in the form 




A good starting point to get a grasp of state commitment in the field of the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons is the Non-Proliferation Treaty. With 191 states party to it (UNODA, 
2019b), the NPT is one of the largest international agreements in terms of membership. Only 
a few states have not joined the treaty: India, Israel, Pakistan, and South Sudan. North Korea 
joined the NPT in 1985 but announced its withdrawal in 2003. Considering that the treaty is 
subject to all states that do not possess nuclear weapons, with the exception of South Sudan, 
the legal scope represents a high output effectiveness.115 
Output effectiveness is enhanced by the strength of the commitment. In Article II of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty, Non-Nuclear Weapon States “[undertake] not to manufacture or 
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices […].” Rather than 
formulating a rule that contributes to the regime, the commitment embedded in Article II 
reflects the very regime norm not to seek nuclear weapons. 
In addition to restricting the demand side in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the 
treaty also hampers the supply side. Nuclear Weapon States commit not to assist in any way 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States in their pursuance of nuclear weapons (Article I, NPT). NPT 
 
115 In addition to legal obligation, NNWS arguably also have a moral duty not to acquire nuclear weapons, 
which may even be respected by them in the light of a possible NPT corrosion (e.g. Doyle, 2009). 
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member states also commit to ensure that safeguards are in place in a receiving NNWS 
(Article III.2, NPT). On the outset, these restrictions make it difficult for Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States to get hold of a nuclear weapon. 
A further aspect strengthening output effectiveness is that since 1995, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty is no longer timely restricted. The treaty text states in Article X that 
“[t]wenty-five years after the entry into force of the Treaty, a conference shall be convened 
to decide whether the Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely, or shall be extended for an 
additional fixed period or periods.” In 1995, the NPT Review Conference decided that “the 
Treaty shall continue in force indefinitely.”116 
Despite its significant legal footing, the Non-Proliferation Treaty also contains setbacks 
in output effectiveness. One obvious aspect is that states outside the treaty (India, Israel, 
Pakistan, and South Sudan) are not subject to the same commitments as Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States. They can, nonetheless, be subject to restrictions in nuclear trade and 
assistance. Furthermore, the NPT does not prohibit Nuclear Weapon States117 (China, 
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America) in their production 
of nuclear weapons. 
Some Non-Nuclear Weapon States also host nuclear weapons on their territory in the 
context of nuclear sharing arrangements within NATO, despite a non-proliferation 
commitment. Following Daniel Khalessi (2015), the administration of US President Lyndon 
B. Johnson even pursued a vague legal formulation on that question in the NPT to 
accommodate NATO interests. 
Current NPT members may also withdraw from the treaty, if a state’s “supreme 
interests” are threatened.118 On this basis, North Korea announced on January 10, 2003 that 
it would leave the treaty. Yet, as the discussions surrounding North Korea show (see Chapter 
4 on regime enforcement), a state may still be held accountable to NPT norms and rules even 





116 See Decision 3 in: NPT Review Conference (1995). 
117 i.e. states that have used or tested a nuclear explosive before 1967. 
118 The possible withdrawal from the NPT is formulated in Article X of the treaty. It requires a three months’ 
notice to the other parties and the UN Security Council as well as a “statement of the extraordinary events it 
regards as having jeopardized its supreme interests […].” 
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Outcome 
Looking at the implementation of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, we need to distinguish 
between larger and smaller issues of state compliance. Regarding the norm of the non-
acquisition of nuclear weapons, we can attest a positive outcome effectiveness. For Non-
Nuclear Weapon States, the abstinence from nuclear weapon programs appears to be the 
general rule.119 
Unfortunately, there have also been major cases of non-compliance. The IAEA Board 
of Governors can report a case to the UN Security Council, if non-compliance or non-
cooperation of a member state with safeguards is detected (Article XII.C, IAEA Statute). 
These cases stand for potential violations of regime norms. So far, Iran, Israel, Iraq, 
Romania, North Korea, Libya, and Syria have been reported to the Security Council.120 
North Korea initiated a nuclear weapons program while being a member of the NPT and 
fully developed nuclear weapons after declaring its withdrawal from the NPT. Libya and 
Iraq also had a nuclear weapons program while being parties to the NPT. The nuclear 
weapon aspirations in socialist Romania, also an NPT member, were revealed after the 
downfall of the administration of Nicolae Ceaușescu. The existence and extent of an Iranian 
and Syrian nuclear weapons program in the past remain unknown (see Chapter 4). 
The common interaction with the Non-Proliferation Treaty, however, goes beyond a 
sheer (non-)existence of nuclear weapon programs. Every five years, NPT member states, 
observers, and non-governmental organizations participate in a Review Conference that 
discusses the overall status and potential means of strengthening the non-proliferation 
regime. 121 As such, the NPT is also a platform for Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, test bans, 
as well as issues of nuclear disarmament. 
Member state participation in these conferences is positive. 161 out of 191 parties took 
part in the 2015 NPT Review Conference. The funding for the conference and its preparation 
is also largely positive. The financial report notes that “[w]hile most States parties are 
meeting their financial obligations, in some cases amounts outstanding since 1995 remain to 
be paid” (NPT Review Conference, 2015a; 2015b) 
 
119 See e.g. overview of nuclear weapon aspirations according to Levite (2003, p.62). 
120 Israel is not party to the NPT. The reporting occurred in connection with the Israeli attack on the Tamuz 
nuclear reactor in 1981. 
121 Hence, the latest meeting, the 2015 NPT Review Conference will be used as a point of reference in this 
chapter’s explanation of regime effectiveness. 
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Despite vigorous preparation, the decision-making of the Review Conference does not 
always bear fruit. In other words, the NPT as a policy platform leaves room for improvement. 
An important indicator for the success of a Review Conference is its ability to conclude a 
final document that includes an acknowledgement of progress and actions to be taken (see 
e.g. Wan, 2015). Consensus on a final declaration failed in 1980, 1990, 1995, 2005, and 
2015. 
 
Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty (FM(C)T) 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty offers a major disadvantage: Nuclear Weapon States and 
states outside the NPT continue to produce fissile material for nuclear weapons or have 
sufficient material to build a vast amount of nuclear weapons. In order to close this 
commitment gap, several suggestions for a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty have been put 
forward. Although the first proposals regarding an FM(C)T date back to the early days of 
the nuclear age, the most important point of reference for the current understanding of such 
a treaty is the “Shannon Mandate.” 
The “Shannon Mandate” refers to a 1995 report by Ambassador Gerald E. Shannon of 
Canada, which was aimed at laying the groundwork for negotiations on an FM(C)T in the 
Conference on Disarmament. The report called for an “Ad Hoc Committee to negotiate a 
non-discriminatory, multilateral and internationally and effectively verifiable treaty banning 
the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices” 
(Conference on Disarmament, 1995). 
More than two decades after the Shannon Mandate, negotiations on an FM(C)T have 
not even started. Member states of the Conference on Disarmament (CD) demonstrate very 
different ideas about what the treaty should look like (see e.g. BASIC, 2013). One 
controversial issue is whether or not the scope should cover only future productions or also 
existing fissile material.122 
 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs) 
Output 
The scope of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones is ambitious. Their “arrangements must 
ensure that the zone would be, and would remain, effectively free of all nuclear weapons” 
 
122 On the role of fissile material in ridding the world from nuclear weapons see Feiveson et al. (2014). 
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(UN General Assembly, 1975). In more practical terms, a NWFZ is “a specified territorial 
entity, normally a recognized geographical region, in which manufacture, receipt, storage 
and installation of nuclear weapons is forbidden” (Pande, 1998, p.35). Hence, their added 
value is a geographical approach to restricting the demand and supply side in the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons. 
Given the singular backgrounds of the NWFZ treaties, there are differences in their 
content, e.g. regarding physical protection, environmental considerations like radioactive 
pollution, the role of peaceful nuclear energy, or territorial definitions (e.g. whether or not 
continental shelves should be included).123 Still, the treaties share common features. 
All NWFZs are unlimited in duration but include possibilities for withdrawal. The 
Treaties of Pelindaba, Tlatelolco, and the CANWFZ allow for individual withdrawals in 
cases of “extraordinary events” or “circumstances” that relate to the content of the treaty. 
The Treaties of Rarotonga and Bangkok only allow an individual withdrawal if other 
member states breach the respective treaty. 
States within the zone undertake “a pledge by states not to develop, deploy, station, test, 
or use nuclear weapons within the zone” (Diehl and Moltz, 2002, p.207). This is a significant 
achievement given the number of states signing these NWFZs. In sum, more than 100 states 
have ratified or acceded a NWFZ – effectively covering the southern hemisphere (Hamel-
Green, 2009, p.359). 
Following the UN guidelines, commitments not only refer to states within the zone, but 
also Nuclear Weapon States and states outside zone (that are not NWS).124 NWS would 
make a commitment not to assist states within the zone in acquiring nuclear weapons. In 
practice, they pledge not to contribute to “violations” of the respective treaty. This would 
contribute to curbing the supply side in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
Despite their impressive conceptual layout, output effectiveness of Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zones is diminished by three aspects. First of all, Nuclear Weapon States vary in their 
acceptance of the NWFZ protocols (see Appendix 1). This lack of commitment has negative 
consequences for the possession and use of nuclear weapons in these zones. Regarding the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons, the commitment offers only limited added value, as the Non-
 
123 See e.g. Parrish and Du Preez (2004) or James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2019). 
124 For a further description of these three categories of commitments by state see also UN General Assembly 
(1975). 
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Proliferation Treaty already commits Non-Nuclear Weapon States not to acquire nuclear 
weapons. 
Second, NWFZs heavily focus on the notion of Nuclear Weapon States. Apart from 
signatory states and Nuclear Weapon States, other states are only addressed if they have a 
territorial affiliation within the zone.125 States that possess nuclear weapons but are not part 
of the Non-Proliferation Treaty do not find particular recognition. 
Finally, while in the last decades a number of NWFZ have materialized, others have 
not. Prominent zones that have not been established despite considerable efforts include a 
Weapons of Mass Destruction Free Zone in the Middle East and ideas for a Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zone on the Korean Peninsula or in Europe. One difference in these regions 
is the presence of states that (presumably) possess nuclear weapons – France, the UK, North 
Korea, and Israel. 
 
Outcome 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones are aimed at preventing the production of nuclear weapons 
and assistance of other states’ pursuance thereof. At first sight, the implementation of these 
commitments offers a very positive outcome effectiveness for the field of the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. There is no known case in which a state has pursued nuclear weapons 
while having a NWFZ treaty in force. 
This is all the more important considering some of the zones’ state parties. After 
abandoning nuclear weapons, Kazakhstan and South Africa joined a NWFZ respectively 
(the CANWZs and the Treaty of Pelindaba), legally forsaking the renewed acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. Both states have not rebuilt a nuclear weapon capability. In its Safeguards 
Statement for 2018, the International Atomic Energy Agency finds that in South Africa and 
Kazakhstan “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities” (IAEA, 2019c). 
Also, Argentina and Brazil ended their suspected explorations of nuclear weapons 
before fully implementing the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Both states put the treaty effectively into 
force in 1994 (OPANAL, 2018). The NWFZ is of particular importance in the states’ non-
 
125 Hence, some NWFZs include territory-related commitments by outside states. Here, no difference is being 
made between NWS and other states. Protocol 3 of the Treaty of Pelindaba is aimed at committing France and 
Spain to apply NWFZ rules for territories for which they are responsible within the zone. While France has 
signed and ratified the protocol, Spain has not. Similarly, Protocol 1 of the Treaty of Rarotonga was ratified 
by France and the UK and signed by the US. The Treaty of Tlatelolco was ratified by relevant states with 
territorial responsibilities within the zone, i.e. the US, the UK, France, and the Netherlands. 
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proliferation commitment. Brazil and Argentina joined the Treaty of Tlatelolco before 
joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty (UNODA, 2019b). 
If taking into account the signing of a NWFZ, outcome effectiveness offers some 
setbacks. Libya pursued nuclear weapons despite signing the Treaty of Pelindaba (Parrish 
and Du Preez, 2004, p.3). Brazil and Argentina were suspected of having pursued nuclear 
weapons after signing the Treaty of Tlatelolco in 1967 (Kutchesfahani, 2014, pp. 24–52).126 
Furthermore, Syria allegedly undertook illicit nuclear activities, despite being a vocal 
proponent of a WMDFZ in the Middle East and North Korea established a nuclear weapons 
program while advocating a denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula (see Chapter 4). This 




Nuclear export controls further limit the supply side of nuclear weapons by specifying 
rules for nuclear trade. The Zangger Committee developed a “trigger list” of material and 
equipment that shall not be diverted to nuclear explosive devices and, thus, require IAEA 
safeguards. The guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers Group are more comprehensive, among 
other things, because they include an expanded list of dual-use items and technology and 
require recipients to pledge not to use or retransfer trade items for nuclear explosives and to 
accept IAEA safeguards on all of their peaceful activities (Cirincione, 2000a, p.287). 
Export controls not only define and condition the export of nuclear material and related 
items to Non-Nuclear Weapon States. They also restrict nuclear programs outside of the 
NPT. Trade restrictions would force states outside the NPT to produce nuclear weapons 
independently or by trade among each other. This aspect considerably strengthens the output 
effectiveness of the regime. On a further positive note, states may adhere to NSG guidelines 
even without being members to the group. 
Apart from the fact that technical developments in the field of nuclear energy and related 
items demand a continuous reconsideration of the items lists, there are some challenges 
regarding output effectiveness. Shortcomings exist in the legal implementation of export 
controls among nuclear suppliers, as noted by Spector and Murauskaite (2014, p.x): 
 
126 The international suspicion of military nuclear intentions in Argentina and Brazil was underlined by a 
number of factors, including the rivalry between both states and their military leadership, unsafeguarded and 
advanced nuclear capacities, and their rejection of international agreements (Kutchesfahani, 2014, pp. 25). 
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“As of early 2011, only 60 percent of the UN’s 193 member states had 
enacted domestic laws restricting exports of nuclear-specific and dual-use 
nuclear goods, only 50 percent used commodity control lists, and only 50 
percent had export licensing systems. Some states lacking basic laws in this 
domain are in regions of proliferation concern, in particular, the Middle East. 
In some other cases, the implementation of such laws is poor.” 
After all, a major weakness of the Zangger Committee as well as the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group is that they are voluntary (Cirincione, 2000b, p.286). NSG members are neither 
obliged nor enforced to follow the export guidelines. 
 
Outcome 
Outcome effectiveness in export controls has many facets. For instance, although in 
accordance with NSG guidelines, the nature and efficiency of the application process for 
licensing of material to be exported varies significantly (Glasgow, Teplinsky, and Markus, 
2012). This has led to reform suggestions to enhance bureaucratic efficiency of the process 
(e.g. World Nuclear Association, 2015). Regarding potential nuclear proliferation, outcome 
effectiveness contains two aspects. First, do supplier states limit their licensing in conformity 
with conventions? Second, are potential proliferators still able to trade? 
As to the first question, export controls have an effect on the licensing of WMD material 
and dual-use material. Project Alpha of King’s College London (2015) has visualized export 
denials by the US and the UK. The analysis demonstrates the complex network of 
international and unilateral export controls for WMD and conventional weapons. Overall, 
Project Alpha finds that the US and the UK denied 3307 licenses between 2006 and 2014, 
with a large share of denials are based on country specific measures. Owing to transatlantic 
sanctions against Iran and Russia, denials peaked following 2012 (Project Alpha, 2015). 
Yet, there is a lacking coherence of the actions of Nuclear Suppliers Group and Zangger 
Committee members (see e.g. Anthony, Ahlström, and Fedchenko, 2007). For instance, 
although almost all NSG members argued that the transfer would contradict guidelines, 
Russia exported nuclear fuel to India in 2001 (Kimball and Davenport, 2017). Similarly, 
China has been pushing for nuclear cooperation with Pakistan (Hibbs, 2011, pp.13–15). 
The second part of outcome effectiveness relates to potential proliferators. Some 
commentators refer to problems in containing illicit trade. As pointed out by Spector and 
Murauskaite (2014, p.74), states with (previously) incomplete export controls have served 
as a hub for the A.Q. Khan network’s illicit trade and nuclear assistance, which in turn 
assisted the Libyan nuclear weapons program, as well as Iran and North Korea. 
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Also in states with more comprehensive export controls, proliferators have been able to 
defeat controls through “falsifying end-users, end uses, and destinations on licensing 
applications; employing middlemen, front companies, and brokers to obscure the true 
purposes of proposed exports; and by-passing export licensing altogether by the use of 
diplomatic pouches to move goods” (Spector and Murauskaite, 2014, p.74). An import factor 
in the increasing number of nuclear transfers and retransfers are online communication and 
exchange of data (e.g. Stewart, 2015). 
 
Impact (Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons) 
In order to shed light on regime impact, it is worth examining states’ overall compliance 
with the regime norm not to acquire nuclear weapons against the background of regime 
commitment. Indeed, there is indication that the regime has at least partially achieved its 
goal in the field of acquisition of nuclear weapons. We do not have a massive increase of 
states that possess nuclear weapons, as feared, among others, by John F. Kennedy (1963). 
Yet, this is only one part of the story. Over the last decades, several states have 
undertaken nuclear weapons activities. The introduction of the NPT in 1970 did neither fully 
stop nor reverse these number. Following an analysis by Harald Müller and Andreas 
Schmidt, the numbers actually peaked in the period between 1981-85, decreasing 
significantly in the wake of the end of the Cold War. This suggest a limited impact of the 












Figure 3 – States with Nuclear Weapon Activities127 
 
A closer look at the respective cases, however, demonstrates that several nuclear 
weapons activities of states like Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, Switzerland, Sweden, 
and Italy were ended before the respective ratification of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
Moreover, these states are not known to have taken up nuclear weapon aspirations after 
joining the treaty. This observation suggests that the NPT locks in regime compliance, once 
states decide to commit. 
The counter-example for the relevance of non-proliferation commitment also holds true. 
With the exception of South Sudan, all states that remain outside the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty today have developed nuclear weapons, i.e. Pakistan, India, South Africa, and 
presumably Israel. This indicates that non-commitment in the regime and non-compliance 
with the regime norm are closely connected. The fact that states outside the NPT could 
develop nuclear weapons also indicates a limited impact of export controls on non-
proliferation. 
There is even reason to believe that nuclear exchange, as promoted by the regime, i.e. 
trade and assistance, contribute to a negative regime impact. Applying a data set on civilian 
nuclear cooperation, Matthew Fuhrmann (2009) comes to the finding that peaceful nuclear 
cooperation and the spread of nuclear weapons or weapons programs is directly linked. He 
 
127 Data taken from Müller and Schmidt (2010, pp.157–8). The authors base their categorization of nuclear 
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argues that, due to the similarity of civilian and military programs, an existing civilian path 
lowers costs and technological challenges (Fuhrmann, 2009, p.39). 
Fuhrmann’s quantitative analysis has some virtue. As the cases of North Korea, Iraq, or 
Libya demonstrate (see Chapter 4), states may develop nuclear weapon programs while 
being members to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Considering that several Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States like Japan, the Netherlands, Australia, or Germany have used the platform 
for the peaceful use of nuclear energy to expand and share their fairly advanced nuclear 
programs may give additional proliferation concern. Yet, this fear may be exaggerated, as 
North Korea is the only state that has successfully developed nuclear weapons following an 
NPT membership. Furthermore, nuclear cooperation has also been used as a tool to contain 
proliferation (Krige, 2016; Krige and Sarkar, 2018). 
 
2.2.2. Possession 
Commitments regarding the possession of nuclear weapons particularly concern 
Nuclear Weapon States and states outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty, in other words those 
states that have nuclear weapons. By and large, commitments may refer to the placing and 
disarmament of nuclear weapons as well as the reversal of a weapons program. Placing 
describes the stationing and transfer of nuclear weapons in a defined place or area. 
Disarmament summarizes endeavors aimed at reducing nuclear weapon stocks. The term 
nuclear reversal describes cases in which states reverse a nuclear weapons program (Levite, 
2003, p.61). I will use the term for cases in which states had a successful nuclear weapons 
program but gave up nuclear weapons altogether. As such, a nuclear reversal embodies the 
regime norm of complete disarmament. 
 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and US-Russian Disarmament 
Output 
In addition to limiting the acquisition, the Non-Proliferation Treaty also addresses the 
possession of nuclear weapons. Although these commitments formally concern all of the 
states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty,128 they are primarily relevant for the five 
Nuclear Weapon States: China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States 
of America. The most important point of reference is Article VI of the treaty: 
 
128 See the interpretation of Article VI by the International Court of Justice (ICJ, 1996). 
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“Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in 
good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race 
at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and 
complete disarmament under strict and effective international control.” 
The article formulates different objectives relating to nuclear weapons, giving the 
impression of an evolutionary process: ending the further increase of nuclear weapons (i.e. 
“nuclear arms race”), reducing nuclear weapon stocks (i.e. “nuclear disarmament”), and 
pursuing a global nuclear reversal (“general and complete disarmament”) under 
“international control.” Hence, the Non-Proliferation Treaty embodies the goal of a world 
free of nuclear weapons. 
The phrasing of the disarmament provisions is rather vague, especially when compared 
to the NNWS’ commitment not to pursue nuclear weapons. Article VI demands an intent to 
negotiate an agreement (“undertakes to pursue negotiations”), which decreases output 
effectiveness. It does neither oblige the states for an immediate nuclear reversal nor specify 
a time-frame for the reduction of nuclear weapon stocks. However, the International Court 
of Justice opined in 1996 that the result of negotiations is obligatory, namely “nuclear 
disarmament in all its aspects.” 
Recent years have seen a push for a more comprehensive ban of nuclear weapons 
altogether. Numerous debates led to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, 
which opened for signature in 2017. However, no Nuclear Weapon State has signed the 
treaty. They have taken different approaches to disarmament.129 
While France advocates a nuclear arsenal of “strict sufficiency” and the United 
Kingdom has announced a cap on their nuclear weapon stocks, the nuclear superpowers – 
the United States of America and the Soviet Union/Russia – have concluded various bilateral 
agreements in the past, including: the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START) I + II,130 
the Strategic Offensive Reductions Treaty (SORT), and New START. 
The bilateral treaties enhance output effectiveness by incorporating decisive rules for 
both parties. Still, three obstacles lower the degree of commitment. 1. Withdrawal from 
 
129 The fact that those states that possess nuclear weapons remain outside of the treaty lowers its output and 
outcome effectiveness. The role of the humanitarian initiative has become subject to academic discourse. Jan 
Ruzicka (2018b, pp.9–12) criticizes that the humanitarian initiative takes a universal legalistic approach rather 
than accounting for power considerations. Cesar Jaramillo (2017), in turn, argues that “the primary arguments 
used to oppose the ban cannot withstand close scrutiny. They are either misleading, based on a dead-end logic, 
or outright wrong.” Ritchie and Egeland (2018, pp.18–9) describe the humanitarian initiative as a “multi-
layered social resistance movement,” which “demonstrates how a network of the relatively disempowered can 
affect global politics through practices of resistance.” 
130 START I is categorized in this work as a bilateral agreement. Owing to the breakup of the Soviet Union, 
the agreement not just affects the US and Russia, but also Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. 
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commitments is possible. 2. There is no inherent continuation of disarmament. START I + 
II, SORT, and New START all demonstrate a limited duration. Further measures depend on 
new negotiations. 3. The agreements do not include a complete disarmament (nuclear 
reversal). 
The commitments in START I + II, SORT, and New START have put limits on the 
existing nuclear stocks of the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States. START I restricted 
the number of Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles, Submarine-Launched Ballistic Missiles, 
and delivery vehicles. The treaty has also elements of reversal to it, as Ukraine, Kazakhstan, 
and Belarus forsake nuclear weapons on their territory. START II attempted to put further 
restrictions on warheads but became superfluous when Russia withdrew in 2002. SORT 
reduced the number of strategic nuclear warheads to 1,700 - 2,200 by 2012. 
New START replaced SORT and limits the deployed strategic nuclear warheads to 
1,550 each. Despite significant reductions, the limits placed on the US and Russia still go 
beyond the combined arsenals of other states possessing nuclear weapons. This demonstrates 
a modest scope of New START (see also Tannenwald, 2013, pp.308–9). 
 
Outcome 
Interpretations of how Nuclear Weapons States should implement their NPT 
disarmament obligations and whether they have succeeded in doing so vary significantly. 
The different understandings of outcome effectiveness become plainly obvious when 
looking at statements made during the last NPT Review Conference. For instance, the Non-
Aligned Movement promotes “a phased program and a specified time frame for the complete 
elimination of nuclear weapons” and criticizes a lacking progress in disarmament (Zarif, 
2015). 
The Nuclear Weapon States, in turn, claim that an “incremental, step-by-step approach 
is the only practical option for making progress towards nuclear disarmament, while 
upholding global strategic security and stability” (Rowland, 2015). Their statement leaves 
the impression that disarmament has seen major achievements in the past decades. As proof 
for compliance with Article VI of the Non-Proliferation Regime, NWS praise: 
• An end to the Cold War arms race 
• A decrease in global weapon stocks 
• Lower levels of deployed nuclear weapons 
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• Enhanced communication among Nuclear Weapon States (since 2009 regular 
conferences) 
(Rowland, 2015) 
While the global dimension of nuclear weapon stocks will be discussed in the subsection 
on impact effectiveness, it is worth taking a brief look at compliance with more specific 
bilateral agreements and unilateral pledges. Owing to its long-term implications, a great 
disarmament commitment was the nuclear reversal of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, as 
embedded in START I. 
The three states are in compliance with the demands to forsake nuclear weapons on their 
territory. They have joined the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapon States and are not known to 
have taken up nuclear weapon aspirations ever since. In its latest report, the IAEA found in 
the case of Belarus that “declared nuclear material remained in peaceful activities.” For 
Kazakhstan and Ukraine, the agency concluded that “all nuclear material remained in 
peaceful activities” (IAEA, 2019c). This is a substantial achievement, especially considering 
that Kazakhstan used to have the world’s fourth largest arsenal of nuclear weapons on its 
territory (Ashikbayev, 2015). 
Furthermore, the United Kingdom and France seem to be on track to fulfill their 
unilateral declarations. SIPRI estimates that the United Kingdom has now 95 stored and 120 
deployed nuclear warheads. Although the current numbers are above the target of 180 
warheads or less by the mid 2020s, the UK’s goal remains achievable. France has in recent 
years maintained a relatively stable inventory of about 300 warheads (see e.g. SIPRI, 2018, 
p.236). 
The United States and Russia also appear to be in compliance with their latest major 
bilateral nuclear agreement – New START. As noted by Hans M. Kristensen, upon the 
treaty’s entering into effect in February 2018, both states are considered to stay below the 
respective limit for deployed nuclear warheads and deployed strategic launchers. Yet, this is 




Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones strengthen the non-proliferation regime by banning the 
placing of nuclear weapons in defined areas. The protocols of the treaties demand that 
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territories owned by Nuclear Weapon States within the zones shall apply the same rules as 
the rest of the respective zone and, therefore, should not station nuclear weapons. 
Furthermore, NWFZ close an NPT-loophole, which would allow Nuclear Weapon States to 
deploy nuclear bombs in other states (Parrish and Du Preez, 2004, p.2).131 
These commitments seem very promising on the outset. If a world free of nuclear 
weapons is not possible, regions free of nuclear weapons are at least an important step 
forward. More than that, “[t]hrough their prohibition of nuclear weapon stationing, NWFZs 
have also reduced the potential fields of use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by states 
already possessing nuclear weapons” (Hamel-Green, 2009, p.360). 
Still, output effectiveness faces some setbacks. One hurdle refers to the support by 
Nuclear Weapon States. As to be seen in the overview in Appendix 1, the United States has 
refrained from ratifying protocols of the treaties creating NWFZ, with the exception of the 
Treaty of Tlatelolco. In addition to that, none of the Nuclear Weapon States has signed the 
Treaty of Bangkok. 
The second hurdle rests with the content. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones can still serve as 
transit for nuclear weapons. The Treaty of Bangkok takes a relatively comprehensive take 
on the transfer of nuclear weapons – owing to a wider territorial definition – but has failed 
to gather NWS support. According to Kelsey Davenport, NWS rejected to sign the treaty’s 
protocol, “because of concerns that it conflicts with the right of their ships and aircraft to 
have freedom of movement in international waters and airspace” (Davenport, 2017). 
As noted by Josef Goldblat, the issue of nuclear weapon transfer in specific states is 
ambivalent. Nuclear Weapon States refrain from informing a transit country about nuclear 
weapons on their ships. Although several countries around the globe have demanded or even 
legally prohibited the transfer of nuclear weapons on ships or airplanes in their territory, they 
pretend “not to be aware of the presence of nuclear weapons on board the visiting foreign 






131 The Non-Proliferation Treaty does not, however, allow Non-Nuclear Weapon States access to nuclear 
devices. In connection with this, Russia has repeatedly criticized the involvement of NNWS in the form of 
nuclear sharing as part of the NATO deterrence strategy (see e.g. Uliyanov, 2015). 
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Outcome 
Regarding Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, outcome effectiveness on the possession of 
nuclear weapons refers to two things: stationing and transfer. An assessment of the extent to 
which Nuclear Weapon States transfer nuclear weapons through Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zones is difficult, as it is the “general practice of nuclear-weapon states […] not to declare 
whether nuclear weapons are aboard their vessels” (Davenport, 2017). As the Treaty of 
Bangkok suggests, Nuclear Weapon States are reluctant to officially limit the transfer of 
nuclear weapons. 
A clearer picture exists regarding the stationing of nuclear weapons. Following an 
overview by Kristensen and Norris (2017), the deployments of nuclear weapons do not 
include the territory of the five Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones or Mongolia, which also 
achieved an internationally recognized nuclear-weapon-free status. This suggests a 
compliant behavior of Nuclear Weapon States. 
Particularly in the case of Mongolia, this is a positive assessment, considering that until 
1992 Soviet troops stationed nuclear weapons on Mongolian territory (Enkhsaikhan, 2006, 
p.16). Since the Soviet troops left Mongolia, no nuclear weapons have been stationed in the 
state – although Russia keeps nuclear weapons related facilities close to the border, e.g. in 




A unique state case regarding the possession of nuclear weapons is South Africa, the 
only state to have built nuclear weapons132 and subsequently to have undertaken a full 
nuclear reversal. The state developed a successful nuclear weapons program throughout the 
1970s and 1980s. Following a halt to the program in 1989, President de Klerk ordered the 
dismantlement of the existing nuclear explosives in February 1990 (von Baeckmann, Dillon, 
and Perricos, 1995, p.45). Post-apartheid South Africa implemented disarmament and non-
proliferation measures as part of the Non-Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction Act 
of 1993 (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2015). 
South Africa entered the Non-Proliferation Treaty as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State in 
1991 and joined the Treaty of Pelindaba in 1996 (von Baeckmann, Dillon, and Perricos, 
 
132 In this thesis, I treat Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine as cases of reversal in a larger sense. These states 
have “inherited” nuclear weapons in the wake of the end of the Cold War. 
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1995, p.45). Accordingly, the state committed itself not to take up its nuclear weapons 
program again and appears to comply with the rules deriving from its new role. The IAEA 
concluded in its latest safeguard statement for South Africa that “all nuclear material 
remained in peaceful activities” (IAEA, 2019c). 
 
Impact (Possession of Nuclear Weapons) 
To what extent has the regime fulfilled the norm on the possession of nuclear weapons 
(“states that possess nuclear weapons disarm”)? Three indicators can shed light on regime 
impact: the overall nuclear weapon stocks, the number of states with nuclear weapons, and 
the size of the nuclear arsenal by state. While the global stockpiles of nuclear warheads has 
gone down, the number of states possessing nuclear weapons has actually increased in the 
last 25 years, with nuclear stockpiles still being expanded in some countries. 
 
Figure 4 – Global Stockpiles of Nuclear Weapons133 
 
On a positive note, the global nuclear weapon stockpiles have significantly shrunk – 
from an estimated 37,863 nuclear weapons in 1970 to less than 9,500 in 2019 (Kristensen 
 
133 Data on nuclear weapon stockpiles is taken from the Bulletin of Atomic Scientist’s illustration of the Nuclear 
Notebook, based on an analysis by Hans M. Kristensen and Robert S. Norris (in: Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, 
2019). For reasons of data consistency, the graph in Figure 4 reflects the estimated cumulative number of 
warheads owned by the United States of America, Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, Israel, India, 
and Pakistan (Appendix 2 and 3), rather than the global estimate by the Nuclear Notebook. The graph does not 
account for the vague numbers for North Korea, which may have produced between 10-20 nuclear weapons 
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and Korda, 2019).134 The United States, Russia, and the United Kingdom are now below the 
stockpile levels of 1970 – when the NPT entered into force (See Appendix 2 and 3). These 
observations suggest a positive regime impact. 
Yet, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has had only a limited contribution to this. After the 
NPT entered into force, the global stockpiles went significantly up, rather than down. The 
development had its peak in 1986, with stockpiled warheads amounting to more than 
64,000.135 The primary reason for this trend was the massive increase of nuclear weapons in 
the Soviet Union. Their stockpiles increased from 11,736 warheads in 1970 to 40,159 in 
1986. Concluding that this armament is in non-compliance with Article VI of the NPT is an 
understatement. 
Following the end of the Cold War, the global numbers of warheads have been going 
down. It was not until 1993 that their level was lower than in 1970. Apart from North Korea 
(see enforcement chapter), China, Pakistan, and India continue to expand their stockpiles. 
Israel’s suspected arsenal increased up until 2004 but seems to have remained stable since 
then (see Appendix 3). 
Although four states have forsaken nuclear weapons, i.e. Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine, 
and South Africa, reversals are an exception in international affairs. Only South Africa has 
reversed an independent and fully developed nuclear weapons program. At the same time, 
since the end of the Cold War, India, Pakistan, and North Korea have established nuclear 
weapon arsenals. This development contributes to the fact that even 50 years after the NPT 
opened for signature, complete disarmament is nowhere near to becoming the reality. 
 
2.2.3. Use 
The last policy field refers to the use of nuclear weapons. The field is of particular 
importance, as it poses the most immediate danger to human life. Commitments can target a 
variety of issues, including nuclear weapon tests, peaceful nuclear explosions, negative 
security assurances, or the strategic application of nuclear weapons. 
 
134 Including warheads awaiting dismantlement, there is a global inventory of around 13,890 nuclear weapons 
(Kristensen and Korda, 2019). 
135 An important aspect when considering the number of nuclear weapons are also delivery vehicles. Multiple 
Independently Targetable Reentry Vehicles (MIRVs) have changed the ratio between weapons and missiles, 
as more warheads could be placed on a single missile. At the same time, several experts regard MIRVs to have 
significantly changed the relationship between a nuclear strike and the defense against it. On strategic 
considerations relating to MIRV see e.g. Potter (1978). 
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Nuclear weapon tests represent an important stage in establishing a nuclear weapon 
capability, i.e. to test the design of devices. Depending on the state, they may also serve as 
a demonstration of power. While North Korea has ensured media attention on its tests, South 
Africa and (possibly) Israel have refrained from doing so. 
Negative security assurances are conditions on the actual usage of nuclear devices as a 
weapon. These depend on the larger nuclear strategy of a state. Commitments may relate to 
cases in which both parties have nuclear weapons or instances in which one state has nuclear 
weapons, while the other has not. 
Peaceful nuclear explosions make use of the destructive force of a nuclear device for 
civilian proposes and are highly contentious. Potential uses include “natural resource 
exploitation, storage or waste disposal, transportation and scientific research” (Shaker, 1980, 
pp.394–5). While proponents have argued that the released power of nuclear explosions 
offers economic advantages, opponents have questioned the usefulness and manageability 
of such explosions. 
Finally, commitments on the application of nuclear weapons put limits on the larger 
infrastructure. Rather than limiting nuclear weapon stocks, an agreement may limit related 
items, such as carriers, ballistic missiles, defense mechanisms, or launchers. The 




Although the Non-Proliferation Treaty plays a more pivotal role regarding the 
acquisition and possession of nuclear weapons, it also addresses two issues in the use of 
nuclear weapons, i.e. peaceful nuclear explosions and negative security assurances. As part 
of the larger promotion of the peaceful use of nuclear energy, Article V of the NPT 
emphasizes the right of Non-Nuclear Weapon States to access peaceful nuclear 
explosions:136 
“Each Party to the Treaty undertakes to take appropriate measures to 
ensure that […] potential benefits from any peaceful applications of nuclear 
explosions will be made available to non-nuclear-weapon States Party to the 
Treaty on a non-discriminatory basis […].” 
 
136 For a close examination of peaceful nuclear explosions in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty see 
Mohamed Ibrahim Shaker (1980, pp.379–480). 
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One problem of these explosions is that they can easily be reassigned to a military 
purpose. Any pursuance or access to nuclear devices for civilian explosions are, therefore, 
bearing the risk of facilitating the horizontal spread of nuclear weapons. Article V contains 
that risk by formulating conditions for peaceful nuclear explosions. Rather than simply 
handing over explosives to Non-Nuclear Weapon States, assistance regarding peaceful 
nuclear explosions shall be subject to a bilateral or international legal framework as well as 
observation. 
The military use of nuclear explosives remains until today a point of contention.137 In 
its 1996 opinion, the International Court of Justice concluded that international law does 
neither authorize nor universally prohibit the use and threat of the use of nuclear weapons. 
In practice, Nuclear Weapon States have formulated different positions on the use of nuclear 
bombs. One strategic decision refers to whether or not they would first introduce nuclear 
weapons in a conflict against another state possessing nuclear weapons (first use). 
 
Table 2 – Stated Uses of Nuclear Weapons138 
 United States Russia United 
Kingdom 
France China 
First use Yes Yes Ambiguous Yes No 
General defense  Yes Yes Ambiguous Yes No 
Defense against 
nuclear attack 
























Discussions surrounding the Non-Proliferation Treaty have mainly called for a 
guarantee from Nuclear Weapon States not to use nuclear weapons against Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States (negative security assurance). Prior to the 1995 NPT Review Conference, 
NWS published non-binding assurances. Apart from China, which has formulated 
 
137 A decisive legal stance against the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons is embedded in the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which was not signed by any of the states possessing nuclear weapons. 
138 For an overview of the different postures of states possessing nuclear weapons see Panda (2018) or Reaching 
Critical Will (2019). 
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unconditional negative security assurances,139 the NWS require from the NNWS in question 
certain conditions to be met (see e.g. Reaching Critical Will, 2019). While the specific 
conditions vary, negative security assurances tend not to be granted if the Non-Nuclear 
Weapon State: 
• Is in a conflict in a conjunction with a Nuclear Weapons State 
• Is in non-compliance with the NPT 
• Makes use of Weapons of Mass Destruction 
Apart from the fact that the Nuclear Weapon States have failed to conclude a binding 
commitment, output effectiveness is lowered by the nature, diversity, and vagueness of the 
conditions. For instance, what constitutes non-compliance with Non-Proliferation Treaty? 
How exactly is conjunction with a Nuclear Weapon State to be determined? A broad 
interpretation of the conditions would leave a large part of Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
subject to nuclear attacks.140 
 
Outcome 
Despite the inclusion of Article V, the Non-Proliferation Treaty has not become a 
notable platform for peaceful nuclear explosions. This development is due to the general 
departure from the idea that their use would justify environmental and economic costs. Still, 
there were efforts to explore and use explosions for peaceful purposes on the territory of the 
Soviet Union and the United States. Between 1945 and 1996, over 150 out of around 2,050 
nuclear explosions had a peaceful purpose (CTBTO, 2012g). 
Regarding the negative security assurances, it would be too trivial to conclude that 
Nuclear Weapon States comply, because they have not attacked a Non-Nuclear Weapon 
State with nuclear bombs. Implicit and explicit nuclear weapon threats continue to exist until 
today. For instance, Russian President Putin declared that he “was ready for nuclear alert” 
in the Ukraine conflict regarding Crimea (BBC, 2015). This statement is remarkable, as 
Putin made it afterwards. It could be seen as a vague nuclear threat by Russia referring to 
similar circumstances in the future. 
 
139 China takes great pride in the uncompromising stance as distinguishing feature among Nuclear Weapon 
States (see e.g. Li, 2015). 
140 In order to strengthen the negative security assurances and formulate clearer conditions, some suggestions 
have been made, including the conclusions of a binding resolution by the UN Security Council (see e.g. Evans 
and Kawaguchi, 2009, pp.174–8). 
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This interpretation of Putin’s words as a pre-emptive nuclear threat is in line with 
another threat made by Russia in the context of the Crimea crisis. Russia verbally targeted 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States and their cooperation with NATO. Mikhail Vanin, the Russian 
Ambassador to Denmark, argued in a Danish newspaper: 
“I don’t think the Danes fully understand the consequences of what will 
happen if Denmark joins the American-controlled missile defence […] If it 
happens, Danish war ships will become targets for Russian atomic missiles… 
It is of course your decision” (in: Frühling, 2018, p.78). 
This threat shows that the formulated conditions for negative security assurances are not 
simply a protective tool for Nuclear Weapon States. Instead, the assurances themselves may 
become an offensive tool in a conflict to contain the military power of an opponent. The fact 
that the targeted state is a Non-Nuclear Weapon State becomes irrelevant. 
 
Partial Test Ban Treaty and Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
Output 
In terms of commitment concerning the use of nuclear weapons, most progress has been 
made on nuclear weapon tests. The international legal foundation for this comprises the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). The PTBT 
prohibits nuclear weapon tests in the atmosphere, outer space, or under water – leaving the 
possibility of underground nuclear weapon tests open. 126 states are party to the treaty, 
including Israel, India, and Pakistan. France, the People’s Republic of China, and North 
Korea have not joined the treaty (UNODA, 2019a). 
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty opened for signature in 1996. As the name 
suggests, it takes a more inclusive understanding of nuclear tests. The core commitment of 
states is embedded in Article 1 of the treaty: 
“Each State Party undertakes not to carry out any nuclear weapon test 
explosion or any other nuclear explosion, and to prohibit and prevent any such 
nuclear explosion at any place under its jurisdiction or control” (Article I.1., 
CTBT). 
The scope of this pledge suggests a high output effectiveness. By prohibiting any 
nuclear explosion, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty not just covers the commitments 
made in the Partial Test Ban Treaty. It also includes underground testing (the vast majority 
of tests during the Cold War) and all peaceful nuclear explosions. The treaty is also more 
inclusive in terms of states party to it. So far, the CTBT has been signed by 184 states and 
ratified by 167 states (CTBTO, 2019). Just like the PTBT, the CTBT is unlimited in duration 
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but includes an option to withdraw from the treaty if a state’s “supreme interests” are being 
jeopardized (Article IX). 
Yet, the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has not come into force, since China, Egypt, 
Iran, Israel, and the United States have not yet ratified the Treaty (as demanded in Article 
XIV and outlined in Annex 2). Furthermore, India, North Korea, and Pakistan still have to 
sign and ratify the treaty, in order for it to come into effect. Owing to the large number of 
states that need to ratify the treaty, the CTBT finds itself in deadlock since it opened for 
signature more than 20 years ago. 
 
Outcome 
Overall, there is a positive compliance with the treaties on nuclear testing.141 After the 
Partial Test Ban Treaty entered into force, only two states have conducted atmospheric 
nuclear tests – France (until 1974) and China (until 1980). Both states are not members to 
the treaty. All PTBT signatory states have complied with their commitment. 
Ever since the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty opened for signature in September 1996, 
three states have conducted underground nuclear weapon tests: Pakistan and India (1998) as 
well as North Korea (2006, 2009, 2013, 2016, 2017) (Kimball, 2019). Although the three 
states are required to ratify the CTBT in order for it to enter into force, they have not signed 
it. All other states have been in compliance with the CTBT. Considering that the treaty has 





Negative security assurances and test bans are the “crown jewels” of Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zones for state parties (Rosen, 1997, p.56).142 Both issues may appear redundant at first 
sight, owing to the CTBT and PTBT as well as the general assurances by Nuclear Weapon 
States towards Non-Nuclear Weapon States. For instance, although France and the United 
 
141 For an overview and analysis of states’ nuclear tests see e.g. Bergkvist and Ferm (2000) and SIPRI (2018, 
pp.300–1). 
142 Originally, the Treaty of Tlatelolco also provided for peaceful nuclear explosions (Article 18). Yet, this 
provision does not play a role in present day, as to be seen by the fact that almost all states party to the treaty 
have signed and ratified the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
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Kingdom have signed and ratified the protocols to the Treaty of Rarotonga and Pelindaba, 
the commitment on nuclear tests provides little added value, since they have also ratified the 
CTBT. 
Still, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones represent an additional layer for commitment on the 
use of nuclear weapons. First of all, negative security assurances in NWFZs are binding, 
whereas the declarations made by Nuclear Weapon States prior to the 1995 NPT Review 
Conference are not. NWFZs also take a more uniform approach, because all NWS are meant 
to sign and ratify the same protocol. In reality, however, Nuclear Weapon States also 
formulate reservations when signing a protocol.143 
Banning nuclear weapon tests is of particular importance, given that some Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones have experienced nuclear weapon tests in the past.144 Although NWFZ 
may seem to duplicate the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, it is important to bear in mind 
that the CTBT is not in force. This is also due to a missing ratification in China and the 
United States. China, France, Russia, and the UK have ratified all Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zones, with the exception of the Treaty of Bangkok. The US has only ratified the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco (see Appendix 1). 
 
Outcome 
Have states complied with their NWFZ commitments regarding nuclear weapons testing 
and negative security assurances? On a positive note, no member state of a Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zone has conducted nuclear weapon tests. The zones have also not experienced tests 
by Nuclear Weapon States after the ratification of the protocols. A major controversy, 
however, were the French nuclear weapon tests in the South Pacific. In fact, the tests were 
an incentive for the Treaty of Rarotonga in the first place (Mogami, 1988, p.416). After 
finishing the final round of testing in January 1996, France closed the site and signed and 
ratified the protocols of the Treaty of Rarotonga. 
Although Nuclear Weapon States have not fired nuclear weapons on members of 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, a closer assessment of their compliance with negative security 
assurances proves difficult. As analyzed by Sechser and Fuhrmann, NWS use threats to 
 
143 For instance, in the Treaty of Rarotonga, France stated that it would interpret the negative security assurance 
as in its 1995 NPT declaration – with the same conditions (James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 
2018). 
144 See overview of test sites developed by AJ Software and Multimedia (2015). 
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demand behavioral changes from other states. They also target members of NWFZs. For 
instance, the United States demanded from Haiti in 1994 to restore Jean-Bertrand Aristide 
as President or called for Manuel Noriega’s removal from power in Panama in 1989 (Sechser 
and Fuhrmann, 2013). Yet, these cases represent implicit nuclear threats, at best, as they 
mainly rest on the target’s general awareness that the demanding state is a nuclear weapon 
state. 
 
United States and the Soviet Union/Russia 
Output 
Bilateral agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia address 
nuclear weapon tests, peaceful nuclear explosions, and the application of nuclear weapons. 
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty 
limit underground nuclear explosions to an equivalent of 150,000 kt TNT. Hence, they take 
up a shortcoming of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which allows underground explosions. The 
treaties do not prohibit nuclear explosions altogether as the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
Since the latter is not yet in force, the TTBT and the PNE Treaty remain at least partial 
placeholders.145 
Other bilateral agreements refer to the application of nuclear weapon uses, i.e. limiting 
the number of delivery vehicles, launchers, and deployment (START I, START II, New 
START). These rules, although not discussed in detail here, are important, as they restrict 
the possible use of nuclear weapons. The INF Treaty went even further, as it banned missiles 
with a range from 500 – 5,500 km. In doing so, the treaty eliminated two entire applications 
of nuclear warheads: intermediate-range and shorter-range missiles. 
The Soviet Union/Russia and the United States have never established negative security 
assurance towards each other. Quite the contrary, the ABM Treaty of 1972 even limited 
defensive mechanisms in accordance with the idea of Mutually Assured Destruction. 
Following this logic, a state is less likely to start a nuclear war, knowing it could not 
sufficiently defend itself from the other party’s missiles. The ABM Treaty ended with the 
United States’ withdrawal in 2002. 
 
 
145 Both treaties are also legally interlinked with each other, in that the PNE Treaty does not allow withdrawal, 
as long as TTBT is in force. 
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Outcome 
On a positive note, there have been no nuclear weapon tests and peaceful nuclear 
explosions by the Soviet Union/Russia since 1990 and by the United States since 1992 
(SIPRI, 2018, pp.300–1). Shortcomings in outcome effectiveness are to be found regarding 
the application of nuclear weapons. Most notably, the INF Treaty became a great source for 
debate. While the United States has argued that the development and testing of new Russian 
ground-launched missiles as well as their launchers violated the INF Treaty, Moscow has 
claimed that three US military programs are in breach of the treaty.146 
In February 2019, the US announced its plan to withdraw from the treaty six months 
later, if Russia did not eliminate the missiles in question as well as their launchers and related 
equipment (Pompeo, 2019).147 Immediately following the US announcement, Russia 
declared its own withdrawal and its intention to develop a new missile system that would 
have been prohibited under the INF Treaty (e.g. Kramer, 2019). In August 2019, the INF 
Treaty officially came to its end. These developments suggest that the nuclear superpowers 
are about to revive their installation of nuclear weapons on intermediate-range and shorter-
range missiles. This would be a setback for the non-proliferation regime, as it abandons past 
achievements on limiting the use of nuclear weapons. 
 
India and Pakistan 
Output and Outcome 
India and Pakistan have made two bilateral commitments relating to the use of nuclear 
weapons: the Lahore Declaration and the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement. In addition 
to confidence building measures and resolving the issue of Jammu and Kashmir, the Lahore 
Declaration was signed to reduce the risks of unauthorized uses of nuclear weapons. It also 
reaffirms unilateral moratoriums on nuclear weapon tests (see “Memorandum of 
Understanding”). 
Output effectiveness of the Lahore declaration is decreased by the fact that it formulates 
vague intentions rather than specific rules. Owing to the tense relationship between the two 
 
146 These US programs in question “include (1) the use of intermediate-range missiles as targets during tests of 
US missile defense systems; (2) the use of drones as weapons delivery vehicles; and (3) the planned deployment 
of missile defense interceptors on land in the Navy’s MK-41 missile launchers” (Woolf, 2018, p.25). 
147 According to some scholars, apart from accusations against Russia, the 2018 US Nuclear Posture Review 
includes ideas for military research and development programs the implementation of which would have 
endangered the INF (e.g. Erästö and Topychkanov, 2018). 
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states, the declaration still represents a diplomatic milestone. Yet, it was not until 2004 that 
the Lahore Declaration led to an increasing cooperation between both states, particularly in 
fighting terrorism.148 
Although the name “India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement” indicates a negative 
security assurance, the agreement is much narrower, in that it only refers to the nuclear 
infrastructure of India and Pakistan. The most important commitment is that 
“[e]ach party shall refrain from undertaking, encouraging or participating 
in, directly or indirectly, any action aimed at causing the destruction of, or 
damage to, any nuclear installation or facility in the other country.” 
The Non-Attack Agreement clarifies rules on what is expected from the parties, 
including a terminological definition of “nuclear installation or facility” in point 1. Both 
sides have exchanged lists with the location of nuclear facilities (Point 2 of the agreement). 
There have been no known attacks on the nuclear facilities on one another, which suggests 
compliance with the agreement. 
 
Impact (Use of Nuclear Weapons) 
Has the regime been successful at curbing the use of nuclear weapons? The first 
benchmark for a response is their use in war. The United States dropped two nuclear bombs 
on Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. These two cases remain until today the only 
nuclear attacks. Considering that global nuclear stockpiles amount to thousands of nuclear 
weapons (during the Cold War even dozens of thousands), their non-use in conflict is a 
positive development. 
Still, one should be careful to regard the absence of nuclear weapon detonations in 
military conflict in recent decades as clear proof of a positive regime impact or the virtue of 
deterrence. As Benoît Pelopidas (2017) has demonstrated in studying the “Cuban Missile 
Crisis” of 1962, the non-use of nuclear weapons may very well be the result of luck, rather 
than the result of rational and informed leadership. 
Furthermore, a broader understanding of use must also take nuclear threats into account. 
Nuclear threats still exist, either by movement of nuclear weapon carriers (such as Vanguard-
submarines of the Royal Navy) or verbal threats. A prominent recent example for the latter 
– in addition to the aforementioned Crimean crisis – are mutual nuclear threats between the 
 
148 For an overview on the bilateral relationship leading up to the Lahore declaration and its aftermath see 
James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2011b). 
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United States of America and North Korea (see enforcement chapter). It remains to be seen 
to what extent the end of the INF Treaty broadens the strategic use of nuclear weapons in 
the future. 
Regarding nuclear testing and the peaceful use of nuclear explosions, it is striking that 
outcome effectiveness is greater than output effectiveness. With the exception of North 
Korea, states comply with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, although it is not in force. 
This has consequences for regime impact. 
 
Figure 5 – Nuclear Explosions Worldwide149 
 
As to be seen in Figure 5, nuclear explosions have massively gone down over the last 
decades. As a result, for almost 40 years, the world has not seen an atmospheric nuclear 
explosion. Underground tests have become an exception. This suggests that the CTBT and 
the PTBT had a positive impact, at least for the moment. 
Yet, a closer look at the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty appears to limit its relevance. 
The US (1992), the Soviet Union/Russia (1990), and the UK (1991) had conducted their last 
nuclear tests before the CTBT took shape and subsequently implemented moratoria. Hence, 
the treaty appears to lock in compliance rather than changing behavior for the better. 
 
149 Data based on a report by SIPRI (2018, pp.300–1). The estimations are the sum of known activities by the 
United States, the Soviet Union/Russia, the United Kingdom, France, China, India, Pakistan, and North Korea. 
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The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty may even have led to a negative regime impact. 
Months prior to the conclusion of the treaty, France and China conducted their last rounds 
of nuclear tests. France actually had a four-year-moratorium in place just prior to the tests – 
between July 1991 and September 1995 (Bergkvist and Ferm, 2000, p.12). Ending the 
moratorium to conduct tests and then to sign and ratify the CTBT leaves the impression that 
the state used a last-minute opportunity for nuclear testing. In this sense, the CTBT would 
have been a contributing factor to why France conducted the tests at that specific time. 
 
2.3. Explaining Effectiveness 
2.3.1. Security 
The remaining space of this chapter will be devoted to conduct an examination of 
plausible intent from four different perspective: security, norms, economics, and status. In 
order to explore possible explanations for (non-)cooperation within the commitment system 
of the non-proliferation regime, I will use the hypotheses developed in the introductory 
chapter as a point of orientation. 
One possible explanation for state behavior are security considerations. We can expect 
a state to commit to and comply with the regime if cooperation satisfies its security needs. 
In turn, if non-cooperation increases its security needs, then a state will refrain from 
committing to and complying with the regime. 
 
Cooperation 
Semantically speaking, a “non-proliferation regime” has a security-related notion of 
containing a threat. Likewise, pivotal commitments within the regime that are aimed at 
countering the acquisition of nuclear weapons express a strong sentiment that security is 
significantly enhanced through states’ cooperation. In its introduction, the Non-
Proliferation Treaty is described as a tool to prevent the spread of nuclear weapons. 
Proliferation would enhance the chances of nuclear war, which poses a global threat: 
“[…] Considering the devastation that would be visited upon all mankind 
by a nuclear war and the consequent need to make every effort to avert the 
danger of such a war and to take measures to safeguard the security of 
peoples, 
Believing that the proliferation of nuclear weapons would seriously 
enhance the danger of nuclear war, 
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In conformity with resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly 
calling for the conclusion of an agreement on the prevention of wider 
dissemination of nuclear weapons […].” 
The understanding that the spread of nuclear weapons is likely to happen without an 
agreement is even more explicit in the first Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone, which was 
established by the Treaty of Tlatelolco. The treaty also suggests that a disarmament 
agreement would be much more difficult to achieve, once weapons have spread. More 
specifically, in the introduction the states party to the treaty expressed their conviction 
“[t] hat the proliferation of nuclear weapons, which seems inevitable 
unless States, in the exercise of their sovereign rights, impose restrictions on 
themselves in order to prevent it, would make any agreement on disarmament 
enormously difficult and would increase the danger of the outbreak of a 
nuclear conflagration […].” 
While the NPT and the Treaty of Tlatelolco describe an abstract proliferation threat, 
looking at individual commitments by states suggests concrete security concerns towards 
other states. These worries are often found in a regional context. For example, Michael 
Hamel-Green (2005, pp.241–2) considers the Treaty of Rarotonga to reduce the proliferation 
risk between Indonesia and Australia. 
There is a legitimate rationale to this assessment. Australia’s non-proliferation 
commitment to the NPT and the Treaty of Rarotonga goes in line with security 
considerations. As noted by Stephan Frühling, although the state had explored a nuclear 
weapons option to respond to security threats, non-proliferation in the region favored 
Australia’s advantages in conventional weapons and its vulnerability to nuclear weapons 
stemming from its urbanized society. 
An Indonesian nuclear weapon could spark a proliferation in Australia, because 
Canberra could neither count on its conventional weapons nor on an extended US deterrence 
as protection (Frühling, 2018, pp.75–80). As nuclear weapons in Australia may put 
Indonesia’s regional aspirations into question, “[b]oth countries’ current adherence to the 
NPT is a sign, rather than the cause, of this interdependence, which would endure even if 
the global non-proliferation regime broke down […]” (Frühling, 2018, p.80). 
Switzerland and Poland, in turn, are seen to have initially supported the Non-
Proliferation Treaty as a tool to contain German military power (Horovitz, 2014, p.9). 
Particularly the Swiss case suggests a strategic approach of conditionality. Reflecting on the 
domestic debate in Switzerland prior to joining the NPT, Reto Wollenmann notes that the 
state made the unusual decision to treat the signing and ratification of the treaty as separate 
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political steps.150 This way, the state could signal its independent support for the NPT, while 
taking for its ratification and implementation Germany’s treaty participation into account 
(Wollenmann, 2004, pp.149–52). 
Also bilateral agreements between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States are 
associated with security considerations. A particularly interesting case is the ABM Treaty, 
the conclusion and termination of which appears to have been based on security motivation. 
The original commitment to reduce defense capacities was in line with the logic of Mutually 
Assured Destruction (MAD), i.e. “I won’t hit you, because if I do, our offensive weapons 
will destroy us both.” 
When the US announced its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in December 2001, it 
acknowledged the original virtue of MAD. Yet, Ari Fleischer, White House Press Secretary, 
argued that the security environment had profoundly changed. The US stated that it had 
realigned its commitment and abandoned the ABM Treaty, which had become an obstacle 
to security interests: 
“During [the Cold War], now fortunately in the past, the United States 
and the Soviet Union were locked in an implacably hostile relationship. […] 
Our ultimate security rested largely on the grim premise that neither side 
would launch a nuclear attack because doing so would result in a counter-
attack ensuring the total destruction of both nations. […] 
Today, the United States and Russia face new threats to their security. 
Principal among these threats are weapons of mass destruction and their 
delivery means wielded by terrorists and rogue states. […] We must develop 
and deploy the means to deter and protect against them, including through 
limited missile defense of our territory. Under the terms of the ABM Treaty, 
the United States is prohibited from defending its homeland against ballistic 
missile attack” (Fleischer, 2001). 
The expressed focus on “terrorists and rogue states” is in line with the United States’ 
promotion of new international commitments against the spread and use of weapons of mass 
destruction. These include the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1540 of 2004 
and the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism of 2005. 
Both commitments followed a perceived change of the security environment in the wake of 
the 9/11 terrorist attacks. 
If security considerations are pivotal for regime commitment and compliance, we would 
expect nuclear reversals to be based at least partially on a changing security environment. 
 
150 Following traditional Swiss diplomacy, the state would only sign a treaty that is ratified without delay by 
the parliament (Wollenmann, 2004, p.150). 
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There is some virtue in this assumption. Both types of reversals seem to be compatible with 
the respective security environment. 
The first type of nuclear reversal summarizes states that have “inherited” nuclear 
weapons: Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine. Here, the end of the Cold War opened an 
avenue for forsaking nuclear weapons. The Commonwealth of Independent States decided 
to have the Soviet nuclear weapons maintained by a “single unified authority,” rather than 
multiple states. In accordance with that, Article V of the START I Protocol called on 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, Ukraine to join the NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapon States. 
All three states confirmed the destruction of weapons on their territory in letters to US 
President George H.W. Bush. Here, Belarus and Ukraine make explicit references to acting 
in accordance with national security interests.151 The United States, in turn, provided 
economic support for the three states (e.g. by buying highly enriched uranium) and Russia 
(Levite, 2003, p.78). 
It is important to note that the former Soviet nuclear weapons were deployed on the 
territory of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine but not under command of the respective 
government (Levite, 2003, p.62).152 Hence, in order to acquire the nuclear weapons, the three 
states would have had to seize them from Russian forces (Gartzke and Kroenig, 2009, p.154). 
In this sense, the limited possession may have facilitated the reversal. 
This is different from South Africa, the second type of nuclear reversal, since the state 
developed nuclear weapons by itself rather than inheriting them. The end of the South 
African nuclear weapons program appears to have been due to domestic and international 
momentum. According to Waldo Stumpf (1995, p.6), former Chief Executive Officer of 
South Africa’s Atomic Energy Corporation, the factors that paved the way for the end of the 
South African nuclear weapons program involved: 
• a recognition in September 1985 that the state’s nuclear weapons program was 
facing significant constraints, i.e. it would only allow seven fission devices 
• an improvement of the security situation (Fall of Berlin Wall, cease fire in and 
independence of Namibia) 
• the election of Frederik Willem de Klerk as President, who furthered the 
democratization process 
 
151 Protocol to the Treaty between the United States of America and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on 
the Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms, May 23, 1992. 
152 Ukraine may have had physical possession, but apparently without launch codes (Levite, 2003, p.62). 
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• a recognition of “distinct advantages” for South Africa in the case of an accession 
to the NPT 
While the South African reversal cannot be pinned down to one single factor, security-
considerations provide plausible rationale for the decision. On the one hand, the security 
environment improved. On the other hand, the very usefulness of nuclear weapons was 
constrained by capacity limitations within the nuclear program. 
 
Non-Cooperation 
Security considerations are not just enhancing cooperation. They also seem to be crucial 
in states’ reluctance to support the NPT, the FM(C)T, the CTBT, nuclear disarmament, or 
negative security assurances. The very strategic importance of nuclear weapons may 
advance the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons – contrary to the regime 
norms. 
The development of nuclear weapon programs in India and Pakistan is a good example 
for a regional power rivalry (e.g. Khan, 2005). The importance of the respective program 
can also explain why both states refrain from a larger regime commitment. With the 
exception of the Partial Test Ban Treaty, both states have failed to support key agreements 
within the non-proliferation regime. 
India conducted its first nuclear test explosion in May 1974. Despite international 
concern, the test was officially aimed at advancing India’s peaceful nuclear program 
(Shaker, 1980, p.813). As the next series of nuclear tests in May 1998 and the accompanying 
statement demonstrate, nuclear weapon aspirations had materialized and security concerns 
were given as justification: 
“These tests have established that India has a proven capability for a 
weaponised nuclear programme. They also provide a valuable database which 
is useful in the design of nuclear weapons of different yields for different 
applications and for different delivery systems. […] 
The Government is deeply concerned, as were previous Governments, 
about the nuclear environment in India’s neighbourhood. These tests provide 
reassurance to the people of India that their national security interests are 
paramount and will be promoted and protected” (Mishra, 1998). 
Pakistan started its nuclear program as a result of the 1971 war with India and developed 
nuclear weapons, following different sources, “to counter the threat posed by its principal 
rival, India, which has superior conventional forces and nuclear weapons” (Strategic 
 101 
Security Project, 2002). This assessment is in line with Pakistan’s nuclear tests in May 1998 
which followed India’s tests within less than three weeks. In addition to the chronology of 
events, Pakistan emphasized that it considered itself forced to draw level for security 
reasons. 
“Pakistan has been obliged to exercise the nuclear option due to 
weaponisation of India’s nuclear programme. This had led to the collapse of 
the ‘existential deterrence’ and had radically altered the strategic balance in 
our region. […] After due deliberation and a careful review of all options we 
took the decision to restore the strategic balance” (Sharif, 1998). 
The nuclear rivalry also extends to the deadlock in discussions on a Fissile Material 
(Cutoff) Treaty. While Pakistan insists on the inclusion of existing fissile material, other 
states with nuclear weapons, including India, tend to limit the scope of a potential treaty to 
future productions. Pakistan’s more comprehensive stance has been justified with a 
perceived asymmetry in existing fissile material compared to India (Mian and Nayyar, 
2008). Ending only future productions would lock-in a disadvantage of its nuclear 
program.153 
The strategic coexistence of India’s and Pakistan’s nuclear arsenals is also reflected in 
the numbers of weapons. The stockpiles in both states have increased in the last 20 years 
almost synchronically. Nuclear warheads are amounting to approximately 140-150 in 
Pakistan and 130-140 in India (Kristensen and Korda, 2019). 
Overall, security considerations offer explanatory capacity for why nuclear 
disarmament has not progressed further. As the Nuclear Weapon States argue in their 
statement at the 2015 NPT Review Conference, all states can advance nuclear disarmament 
“by creating the necessary security environment” (Rowland, 2015). This would suggest that 
even after the end of the Cold War, nuclear weapons are treated as a tool to respond to global 
security demands. 
Likewise, looking at US Nuclear Posture Reviews, Daalder and Lodal conclude that US 
foreign policy still resembles Cold War thinking: The Clinton administration insisted on 
keeping large weapon stocks as a safety deposit against possible political and strategic 
changes in Moscow. The administration of George W. Bush reconceptionalized the 
relationship between conventional and nuclear weapons, underlining the role of nuclear 
weapons in the US strategy and urged to develop new types of nuclear weapons (Daalder 
and Lodal, 2008). The nuclear arsenal has been set for an immense modernization under 
 
153 India’s and Pakistan’s stances on a Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty can be found in: UN General Assembly 
(2013). 
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President Obama, an approach that has been continued under President Trump (Arms 
Control Association, 2017b). 
Nuclear weapons also remain of crucial strategic importance in Russia in both – word 
and action. As noted by RAND’s Austin Long (2018), expert evaluations of Russia’s nuclear 
weapons fall somewhere between a tool of coercion and a tool of protection. Moscow has 
pushed for a flexible nuclear arsenal that allows a wide range of use, “partly to compensate 
for its increasing inferiority in conventional armaments” (Granholm and Rydqvist, 2018, 
p.11). The importance of security considerations is also to be seen in Russia’s statement at 
the 2015 Review Conference, in which the delegation makes repeated reference to terms like 
global, strategic, security, and stability. Most notably, the state criticizes the United States 
for undermining the security environment necessary for further disarmament (Uliyanov, 
2015). 
Security considerations may also contribute to stalemates in commitment. For 
instance, they could explain Nuclear Weapon State’s reluctant support for Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zones. The latter may entail negative effects for a nuclear deterrent. Security concerns, 
such as possible conflicts between NWFZs and security alliances, have already been 
acknowledged by a UN experts group in 1975 (UN General Assembly, 1975). Security 
concerns not only appear to have led to a NWS rejection of the Treaty of Bangkok but also 
made the negotiations of the CANWFZ difficult (Parrish, 2001, p.5). 
The current deadlock in bringing the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty into force is often 
described as a strategic web of non-action. As pointed out by Lassina Zerbo (2013), 
Executive Secretary of the CTBTO Preparatory Commission, “[t]o a certain extent, this is a 
classic case of lack of political leadership: country A is looking to country B to go first, and 
vice-versa.” The treaty requires the signature and ratification of 44 specific states in order to 
enter into force. This requirement was the result of extensive discussions that indented to 
accommodate different interests by acknowledging the nuclear status of states (CTBTO, 
2012a). At the same time, the condition makes the full implementation of the CTBT unlikely. 
 
2.3.2. Norms 
Although security considerations seem to provide a strong rationale for cooperation and 
non-cooperation within the regime, it is worth taking a look at other factors, as well. To what 
extent have normative considerations played into states’ (non-)cooperation within the 
commitment system? Following the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1, we would expect a 
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state to commit to and comply with regime norms and rules, if cooperation is fair and 
satisfies international law. Vice versa, if non-cooperation satisfies fairness and international 




Humanitarian and fairness considerations appear to have played into shaping and 
maintaining the non-proliferation regime. Early initiatives to develop international 
agreements were influenced by the experience of the nuclear bombings of Hiroshima and 
Nagasaki, as to be seen in the development of the Baruch Plan (Müller, Becker-Jakob, and 
Seidler-Diekmann, 2013, p.52). Bernhard Baruch, US representative to the United Nations 
Atomic Energy Commission, proposed in June 1946 an International Atomic Development 
Authority that would have “[m]anagerial control or ownership of all atomic energy.” The 
plan also held out the prospect of a stop of nuclear weapons production and a disarmament 
of existing stocks (Baruch, 1946). 
Taking a comprehensive approach to countering the acquisition, possession, and use of 
nuclear weapons, Baruch made strong humanitarian appeals. He addressed the global 
community (e.g. “Fellow Citizens of the World”), pointed out the humanitarian threat at 
stake (“We are here to make a choice between the quick and the dead,” “We must elect 
World Peace or World Destruction”), and promoted individual sacrifice for a greater good 
(Baruch, 1946).154 
Despite the strong normative appeal, the Baruch Plan never materialized. In fact, the 
years and the decades that followed the unsuccessful Baruch Plan showed the limits of 
humanitarian ideals, which appear to have given way to security concerns. As pointed out 
by Manpreed Sethi (1998), the administration of President Eisenhower pursued a fissile 
material cutoff agreement as a means to control the nuclear arsenals of the US and the Soviet 
Union in 1956. Initially, the Soviet Union rejected the idea. Once the strategic nuclear forces 
of the Soviet Union were larger than the forces of the United States, the attitude towards a 
cutoff agreement changed on both sides: While the Soviet Union increasingly warmed up to 
an agreement, the US began to oppose it (Sethi, 1998, pp.1382–3). 
 
154 More specifically, Baruch claimed: “The search of science for the absolute weapon has reached fruition in 
[the United States]. But she stands ready to proscribe and destroy this instrument - to lift its use from death to 
life - if the world will join in a pact to that end” (Baruch, 1946). 
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Despite this anecdote of humanitarian considerations appearing to be a secondary 
concern to the role of the own nuclear weapons status, there are also examples of more 
selfless efforts. Ireland, which presented the first proposal for an agreement on the non-
proliferation of nuclear weapons in the United Nations in 1958 was guided by norms. 
Neither immediate security concerns, nor economic profits, nor an enhanced status appear 
to have driven the state. As analyzed by Mohamed Shaker (1980, p.3), the “high ideals” of 
its Minister for External Affairs, Frank Aiken, seem to be the primary driving factor for 
Ireland’s push. 
Discussions following the Irish proposal shared the notion of the destructive power of 
nuclear weapons and the threat of their proliferation (Shaker, 1980, pp.28–9). In contrast to 
the Baruch Plan, the normative scope was much more narrowly focused on the acquisition 
of nuclear weapons. The Irish proposal as well as the eventual Non-Proliferation Treaty was 
a consideration of the positions of key players in the Cold War. Former Irish diplomat Noel 
Dorr (2010) outlines the proceedings of the Irish delegation and argues that its steps were 
influenced by careful consideration of what was possible and what not. While normative 
considerations were a driving factor, they were compromised by other states’ security 
considerations. 
Vice versa, normative sensitivities may outweigh security considerations and eventually 
further regime commitment. This is all the more important in countries with advanced 
nuclear programs that could develop capacities for nuclear weapons. Maria Rublee comes 
to the finding that in Japan, Sweden, and Germany 
“significant elements of the political elite wanted an independent nuclear 
deterrent. However, in each case, portions of the domestic population lobbied 
heavily against an indigenous nuclear weapon program, activating the 
emerging international norm against nuclear weapons to strengthen and add 
credibility to their arguments. Thus the domestic political costs for going 
nuclear rose sharply” (Rublee, 2009, p.202).155 
Following Rublee’s analysis, an international social environment shaped regime 
commitment. The Non-Proliferation Treaty introduced an expected behavior that did not 
exist before (Rublee, 2009, pp.38–42). States had to decide whether or not to join the treaty. 
The decision, once made, is rarely reversed. Hence, the Non-Proliferation Treaty, just like 
 
155 Rublee (2009, p.203) argues that Egypt and Libya gave in to international pressure - an issue that will be 
considered in the section on the enforcement system of the NNPR. 
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Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones “delegitimize” nuclear weapons; legitimizing them again is 
difficult.156 
The importance of humanitarian considerations is also to be seen in the most recent 
push for outlawing nuclear weapons altogether. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons returns to a broader understanding of the regime norm as laid out in the Baruch 
Plan. The treaty was preceded by a series of conferences on the “Humanitarian Impact of 
Nuclear Weapons.” The eventual treaty text also resembles a strong humanitarian 
connotation in its introduction: 
“[…] Deeply concerned about the catastrophic humanitarian 
consequences that would result from any use of nuclear weapons, and 
recognizing the consequent need to completely eliminate such weapons, 
which remains the only way to guarantee that nuclear weapons are never used 
again under any circumstances […].” 
So far, 70 states have signed and only 25 are actually party to the Treaty on the 
Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons (UNODA, 2019c). Considering that the treaty is by and 
large a summary of norms that have existed since the very beginning of the non-proliferation 
regime, support is surprisingly low. There is a strong tendency that supporters are also 
members of NWFZs, in other words, states that have already taken a strong stance against 
nuclear weapons. 
It could also be argued that the humanitarian initiative is only supported by states that 
have no strategic need for nuclear weapons. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons is not supported by states with a nuclear weapons affiliation. It is striking that 
NATO members all rejected the ban, although generally backing the goal of a global 
disarmament (see also Rauf, 2017). The United States even urged NATO allies to reject the 
treaty.157 This again suggests that normative considerations give way to security factors, if 
present. 
This is not to say that Nuclear Weapon States have not been convinced by normative 
considerations in the past. As noted by George Bunn, in order to strengthen the regime in 
the 1995 NPT Review and Extension Conference, they made a deal with Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States that recognized the latter’s demand for NWS concessions on negative 
security assurances. This becomes apparent in an April 1995 press release by the US Arms 
Control and Disarmament Agency, which stated: 
 
156 See also Davis (1996, p.15) and Horovitz (2014, p.23). 
157 The US letter to NATO allies dating from October 17, 2016 was published by the International Campaign 
to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (2016). 
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“It is the Administration’s view that the national statements being issued 
by all five NPT nuclear-weapon states, their co-sponsorship of a Security 
Council resolution on security assurances which is under consideration in 
New York, and the common negative security assurance achieved by the five 
– together comprise a substantial response to the desire of many NPT non-
nuclear-weapon states for strengthened security assurances” (in: Bunn, 1997, 
pp.15–6). 
This shows that the notion of fairness appears to have led to a commitment by Nuclear 
Weapon States on the use of nuclear weapons. At the same time, the concession shall not be 




While the notion of fairness has advanced commitments from Nuclear Weapon States 
in the context of negative security assurances, it also appears to have led to states’ reluctance 
to commit to and comply with the regime. There are two major normative patterns for non-
cooperation. One is connected with the larger criticism against an alleged nuclear 
colonialism. The other refers to linkage diplomacy or, put differently, quid pro quo 
obstacles. 
Nuclear “colonialism” stems from a legal division – most prominently in the Non-
Proliferation Treaty – that divides states into “haves” and “have nots” (Goldemberg, Feu 
Alvim, and Mafra, 2018, pp.385–6). The division manifests a perceived hierarchy among 
states that privilege certain states, while discriminating others. Unequal rights and 
obligations in the NPT have been criticized, among others by France, Brazil, Argentina, and 
India in the past.  
As described by Mohamed Shaker, the categorization of states that “have” and “have 
not” nuclear weapons has led to skepticism in the debate on a Non-Proliferation Treaty from 
an early stage onwards. The fact that other states would be banned from nuclear weapons 
while Nuclear Weapon States, at an early point of the discussion, mainly committed not to 
assist others in their pursuance of nuclear bombs was criticized by the Argentinian 
representative in October 1958, as this 
“would mean giving legal sanction to the unequal situation resulting from 
the fact that only a few Powers possessed nuclear weapons. The effect would 
be to create a gulf between the small Powers and the great Powers” (in: 
Shaker, 1980, p.7). 
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The long-term rejection of China and France to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty is 
particularly interesting, as the treaty grants both states a privileged position as Nuclear 
Weapon States. The apparent opposition to self-interest points to higher normative ideals as 
driving factor for the respective stance. France’s criticism in the negotiation process leading 
to the NPT remarked a misguided purpose of the agreement. As elaborated by Mohamed 
Shaker (1980, pp.794–6), French representatives put a great emphasis on nuclear 
disarmament before and after detonating nuclear weapons. 
In 1967, the French Foreign Minister stated that “[p]roliferation is assuredly a problem 
[…] But there is something much more important, which is that those who possess nuclear 
weapons should make no more and destroy those that they have” (in: Shaker, 1980, p.795). 
Also in explaining France’s abstention from the vote on the NPT, the representative stated: 
“The real question is […] the complete disappearance of nuclear weapons” (in: Shaker, 
1980, p.796). Accordingly, NPT commitments privilege those states that actually pose the 
major problem, i.e. Nuclear Weapon States. 
France’s decision to eventually accede to the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992 is also 
consistent with a normative interpretation of decision-making. Arguably, joining the treaty 
would contradict its original stance. Instead, France embedded its 1992 accession in a larger 
global push against weapons of mass destruction (Riding, 1991), thus shifting the normative 
focus from fairness considerations to a humanitarian approach. 
While the French reluctance and even the eventual decision to join the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty is plausible from a normative perspective, it should not be overestimated. Joining the 
NPT could also be understood as an effort to enhance its status and to reposition itself in the 
world (Riding, 1991). Furthermore, although France advertises the goal of a complete global 
disarmament, the state has repeatedly emphasized the importance of maintaining nuclear 
weapons to satisfy its security needs (see e.g. Tertrais, 2007). 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States continue to call for a “fair” implementation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty, as to be seen in the statements made during the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference. Tannenwald (2013, pp.306–9) sees an institutional imbalance that affects the 
original bargain (i.e. non-proliferation in exchange for disarmament) and favors NWS 
norms. As observed by Müller, Becker-Jakob, and Seidler-Diekmann (2013, p.55) 
“[d]isagreements over disarmament prevented the adoption of a consensual final document 
at three out of eight review conferences: 1980, 1990, 2005.” The 1995 NPT Review 
Conference for the first time states that an essential objective of the NPT was to “eliminate 
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all nuclear weapons” leading to further normative conflicts between NWS and NNWS ever 
since (Tannenwald, 2013, pp.302–3). 
At the same time, Non-Nuclear Weapon States demand a recognition of their rights 
included in the NPT. An important point of reference is Article IV of the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty that grants state parties an “inalienable right” of peaceful uses of nuclear energy 
“without discrimination.” Apart from the actual economic gains from the peaceful use of 
nuclear energy, the very entitlement to it has become a political issue. 
States have different understandings of what signifies “inalienable right.” Especially the 
question of whether Iran is entitled to enrich uranium has been subject to debate (e.g. 
Landau, 2012; Beeman, 2013). In this sense, the very different understanding in what 
“inalienable right” entails may just mean the difference in whether a state complies with the 
regime or not. 
Non-cooperation as “quid pro quo” is often to be found in the enforcement of the non-
proliferation regime (see Chapter 4). States may choose not to commit or comply as a 
response to a development in another sector. As such, behavior in the nuclear sector may be 
conditioned on positive incentives or the retrieval of sanctions. A similar conditionality 
appears to have hampered the establishment of commitments in the first place.  
As noted by Amy F. Woolf, the Duma pushed for a Russian disregard of START II as 
a response to the US withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. In June 2002, the Russian Foreign 
Ministry announced that it would no longer abide by the treaty – a symbolic step considering 
that the US and Russia had already started exploring new avenues for limiting strategic 
nuclear weapons (Woolf, 2002, p.22). 
Furthermore, China has demonstrated reluctance to support a Fissile Material (Cutoff) 
Treaty, considering the United States’ resistance to PAROS – a treaty preventing an arms 
race in outer space (Bin, 2008). US President Donald Trump’s strengthened interest in outer 
space, as to be seen in his proposal for a US Space Force as an additional branch of the 
armed forces, can be seen to make an accord less likely. The examples of PAROS and the 
FM(C)T, on the one hand, and START II and the ABM Treaty, on the other hand, 
demonstrate that the very web of agreements may actually hamper commitment. 
 
2.3.3. Economics 
Considering that the peaceful use of nuclear energy is one of the three pillars of the non-
proliferation regime, it is worth examining its role in explaining state’s (non-)cooperation 
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within the regime. We can expect a state to commit to and comply with regime norms and 
rules, if cooperation offers economic benefits. However, if non-cooperation provides 




As outlined in the introductory chapter, nuclear energy is associated with a number of 
advantages. As energy supply, proponents have pointed out low costs, energy independence, 
and environmental advantages. In addition to that, nuclear energy has been used for research 
and medical uses. Especially given the sophisticated nature of putting fissile material to use, 
states and enterprises depend on expertise, facilities and equipment, as well as material. 
Hence, it appears plausible that states subscribe to non-proliferation commitments as part of 
a larger deal to enter the community for the peaceful use of nuclear energy. 
Looking at the negotiations leading up to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, Mohamed 
Shaker identifies economic concerns as having played an influential role.158 The right for the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy was underrepresented in the original drafts by the United 
States and the Soviet Union. The introduction of Article IV as well as the amendments made 
to it were due to the initiative and demands made by states without nuclear weapons (Shaker, 
1980, p.275). 
Furthermore, states’ decisions to join the treaty were subject to economic 
considerations, as to be seen in the case of Switzerland. As noted by Reto Wollenmann, who 
examines the political discourse leading up to the NPT decision, criticizers of the NPT 
originally argued that signing the treaty would constrain the Swiss ability to compete on the 
nuclear market or doubted that a civilian program would be sustainable without a military 
track. Eventually, the perception maintained that the Swiss economy would rather be harmed 
by sanctions if Switzerland stayed outside the treaty (Wollenmann, 2004, pp.167–8). 
The same sentiment that appears to have contributed to shaping the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty and states’ acceptance thereof continues to exist in the latest NPT Review 
Conference. Upon opening the conference, a large number of states emphasized the 
importance of the coexistence of the three pillars: non-proliferation, disarmament, and the 
peaceful use of nuclear energy. Although the latter appears to be subordinate in the 
 
158 For a background on the peaceful use of nuclear energy and explosions in the negotiation of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty see Shaker (1980, pp.273–470). 
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statements, several countries make references to developments in the peaceful use and 
formulate demands for the future. 
Saudi Arabia announces a comprehensive peaceful nuclear energy program (Al-
Mouallimi, 2015). The Caribbean Community commends the cooperation with the IAEA as 
having advanced the domestic “nuclear science, medical physics and water resources” and 
notes that exchanges have also been aimed at improving food security and ecological issues 
(Rattray, 2015). South Korea emphasizes its role as a large nuclear energy producer and 
describes the IAEA Technical Cooperation as proof of the benefits of an international 
nuclear community (Shin, 2015). A statement by the United Arab Emirates demonstrated 
the benefits of international cooperation and indicates room for improvement: 
“UAE began construction of its first nuclear reactor in 2012. This event 
marked the first construction in a new [program] in more than 27 years. 
Today, we consider this peaceful program a role model on how non-nuclear 
countries can utilize the international framework of cooperation, as provided 
for by the Treaty. Consequently, this leads us to re-emphasize the importance 
of strengthening international cooperation framework to facilitate the transfer 
of nuclear technology for peaceful uses, and to assist countries wishing to 
embark on peaceful nuclear energy programs in a responsible and safe 
manner” (Al Jaber, 2015). 
States also use the IAEA and NPT platform to share and solve problems in the peaceful 
use of nuclear energy. For instance, Indonesia is “still concerned with the lack of access to 
information on the technology necessary for research and development.” One of the greatest 
concerns, however, is nuclear safety, especially considering the experience from the nuclear 
accident in Fukushima. Based on an accident report, the IAEA put forward larger 
conclusions in an Action Plan in 2011 (IAEA Board of Governors, 2011c). This shows that 
not just the effects of but also the solutions for nuclear catastrophes are subject to 
international cooperation. 
The exchanges in the NPT Review Conference, therefore, would lead to the assumption 
that economic considerations in a larger sense play an important role in attracting nuclear 
cooperation. Apart from these vocal exchanges, another factor that highlights the 
significance of economic considerations in the commitment system of the non-proliferation 
regime is the continuing importance of nuclear energy. 
The Annual Report of the International Atomic Energy Agency allows insight into a 
broad range of issues in which the international nuclear community, and the IAEA in 
particular, has provided benefits for member states. Following the IAEA, its technical 
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cooperation is being used by 144 states and territories. Overall, there were “807 active 
technical cooperation projects at the end of 2017” (IAEA, 2018). 
To be sure, according to the World Nuclear Report, there is a global decrease in the role 
nuclear energy as power source. For instance, in 2017, nuclear energy made up 10.7 % of 
the global energy mix, decreasing from 17.5 % in 1996. Still, there are 413 reactors in 
operation in 31 countries and a number of “potential newcomer countries” consider to 
advance a nuclear program (Schneider and Frogatt, 2018, pp.16–8, 152–72). In this sense, 
international cooperation regarding the peaceful use of the atom remains attractive. 
A great push in the field of nuclear energy is being undertaken by China, which appears 
to pursue domestic and international economic interests. Following the World Nuclear 
Report, the state has had the largest number of reactor startups in recent years and has 
currently 16 reactors under construction (most of which are delayed). In 2017, China was 
the third largest country in terms of generating nuclear energy (following the United States 
of America and France). 
In addition to developing nuclear energy domestically, another advantage of the 
infrastructure of the non-proliferation is the export of nuclear technology. Analyzing China’s 
2004 joining of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, Sean Lucas (2004) notes: “As part of its export 
control policy, China aims to strike a balance between its nonproliferation objectives and its 
efforts to provide the developing world with access to emergent nuclear technologies for 
peaceful purposes.” While Beijing has put its eyes on a number of perspective deals, so far, 
not much has materialized. Agreements on nuclear cooperation with Cambodia, Brazil, and 
Uganda are still waiting to bear fruit .159 
 
Non-Cooperation 
To what extent have economic considerations contributed to states’ non-cooperation 
within the commitment system of the non-proliferation regime? By and large, there are two 
strings of argumentation. The first one refers to the existence of nuclear deals outside the 
framework of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The second one accounts for the potential 
economic hampering of regime commitments. 
Making nuclear deals outside of the NPT framework counters a core principle laid out 
in the treaty and subsequent guidelines for export controls: i.e. non-proliferation 
 
159 See Schneider and Frogatt (2018, pp.51–2) and World Nuclear Association (2019a). 
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commitment in exchange for nuclear cooperation. The peaceful use of nuclear energy is 
supposed to be a selling point of regime commitment and compliance. As criticized in its 
statement at the NPT Review 2015, 
“[…] Malaysia remains perplexed why States outside of the NPT have 
enjoyed [Article IV] rights. The international community, particularly States 
Parties to the Treaty, should live up to its obligations in upholding principles 
of transparency and non-discrimination in the implementation of the Treaty. 
Selectivity and discrimination would only serve to undermine the Treaty” 
(Ibrahim, 2015). 
This observation by Malaysia indicates different scenarios for non-compliance with the 
regime. 1. States may refrain from committing to larger regime norms and rules, because 
economic benefits are also available outside of the NPT framework. 2. Advanced nuclear 
states do not comply, as they offer benefits to states outside the NPT. 
There is some virtue in Malaysia’s points of criticism. With the exception of South 
Sudan, all states outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty have developed nuclear research 
reactors (World Nuclear Association, 2018) and are considered to have established nuclear 
weapon capabilities. The current role of nuclear energy as power resource differs. In 
Pakistan (6.2 %) and India (3.2 %), the nuclear share is a fraction of the overall nuclear 
energy production. Israel and North Korea currently have no nuclear power plants but are 
planning to build power reactors in the near future (World Nuclear Association, 2019b). Not 
being members to the Non-Proliferation Treaty has not prevented domestic nuclear 
capacities. 
Quite to the contrary, foreign assistance has contributed to the development of the 
respective nuclear program. For instance, India (from UK and France), Israel (from USA), 
Pakistan (from China), and North Korea (from Russia) have all received fuel for their HEU 
reactors from other countries (World Nuclear Association, 2018). Accordingly, the question 
can be raised whether nuclear suppliers are giving up regime norms on non-proliferation in 
exchange for economic benefits. 
There is indeed reason to believe that economic interests may compromise non-
proliferation norms. The 123 agreement between the United States and India established a 
larger nuclear cooperation between both states that forced India to put its civilian program 
under IAEA safeguards, while acknowledging the existence of a military program in India 
(Müller and Rauch, 2007). 
Similarly, China cooperated with Pakistan before joining the Nuclear Suppliers Group. 
Now, being a member in the NSG, Beijing is pushing for cooperation with Pakistan (Hibbs, 
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2011, pp.13–15), which remains the only partner for China with which exports have actually 
materialized (Schneider and Frogatt, 2018, pp.51–2). Pakistani plants have received major 
investments from China (World Nuclear Association, 2019a). 
The other drawback for regime commitment and compliance is that states may feel that 
non-proliferation commitments constrain the peaceful use of nuclear energy, rather than 
advancing it. Criticism about such constraints are mirrored in the 2015 NPT Review 
Conference. For instance, the Non-Aligned Movement demanded that a state’s nuclear 
policies – including the decision for a full national full cycle – should be recognized and that 
any limitations on the peaceful use of nuclear energy shall be removed. 
The concern that regime commitment could lead to economic disadvantages is as old as 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. As noted by Mohamed Shaker in his analysis of the negotiation 
period and the issue of controls: 
“Fears were expressed by the [Non-Nuclear Weapon States] that the 
NPT, by instituting such a control on their peaceful nuclear activities in order 
to prevent the proliferation of nuclear weapons, would hamper their full 
access to the knowledge and technology of the peaceful atom most needed 
for their future progress and prosperity; that international inspection might 
turn into industrial espionage; and that the Treaty would place them at the 
mercy of the nuclear-weapon States which would continue to enjoy their 
privileged position as the major suppliers of nuclear fuel and necessary 
equipment” (Shaker, 1980, p.274). 
Some of the more vocal critics refrained from joining the Non-Proliferation Treaty when 
it opened for signature. Brazil and India demonstrated skepticism about NPT constraints on 
the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Both states were proponents of independent peaceful 
nuclear explosions (Shaker, 1980, p.380). 
As noted in the section on security, India advanced the peaceful use of nuclear energy, 
even after detonating a nuclear device. Following an official statement, “India had no 
intention of producing nuclear weapons, and reiterated its strong opposition to military uses 
of nuclear explosions” (in: Shaker, 1980, p.813). Eventually India proclaimed its nuclear 
weapon status in 1998. 
Brazil considered peaceful nuclear explosions to enhance infrastructure and to facilitate 
access to natural resources. As described by Rosenbaum and Cooper (1970, p.78) at the time: 
“Nuclear excavation of Brazil’s vast interior to improve river navigation and to provide 
water for increased acreage, as well as a scheme designed to spur the release of oil from 
crushed shale, are among the projects being seriously discussed.” 
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Following José Goldemberg, Brazil also justified its nuclear program as a response to 
the 1973 oil crisis and, against this background, concluded a nuclear agreement with 
Germany. Analyzing the legitimacy of the economic argument, Goldemberg finds that 
Brazil’s claims were unjustified. In reality, the military dictatorship also pursued nuclear 
weapons (Goldemberg, 2006). As India, Brazil, and cases subject to regime enforcement 
(see Chapter 4) demonstrate, the economic arguments may be put forward even when a state 
pursues a nuclear weapons program. 
 
2.3.4. Status 
Rather than enhancing security, norms, or economic benefits, states could be guided by 
status-related considerations in their nuclear decision-making. In this work, status refers to 
the standing of the state and political leadership as well as the compatibility and symbolic 
nature of a nuclear partnership. Against this background, the very nature of commitment 
platforms becomes important. We can expect a state to commit to and comply with the 
regime if cooperation satisfies its status. The state will refrain from commitment, if non-
cooperation better suits its status. 
 
Cooperation 
Agreements in the non-proliferation regime can fulfill a number of status-related 
desires. The label of being compliant may increase a state’s standing. Furthermore, the very 
platform of exchange associated with agreements allows for self-representation and 
influence. 
The Non-Proliferation Treaty divides states into Nuclear Weapon States and Non-
Nuclear Weapon States. This binary categorization may disguise the fact that the latter group 
are very diverse in terms of nuclear status. In fact, NNWS may include states with an 
advanced civilian nuclear program, commonly referred to as nuclear latency. If the nuclear 
component is accompanied with a strong military infrastructure, the term nuclear hedging 
may be used.160 
 
160 In this thesis, “nuclear latency” refers to the nuclear infrastructure for a weapons program rather than the 
actual intention to build nuclear weapons. A similar term is “nuclear hedging,” which includes a stronger focus 
on building capabilities also in other sectors, including weaponization (see also Pilat, 2014). The latter would 
allow a state to develop nuclear weapons in a short amount of time, if deemed necessary. 
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Latency and hedging rest on a state’s official compliance with the norms and rules of 
the regime. States expand a nuclear program while respecting the given legal framework. 
This very status offers various advantages. States can make use of benefits as Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States (e.g. by providing and receiving nuclear cooperation) and exclude possible 
repressions connected with non-compliance with the regime. In addition to that, willingly or 
unwillingly, the status keeps the nuclear weapons option at short distance. 
There is some virtue in the attractiveness of being an advanced Non-Nuclear Weapon 
State. After all, North Korea advanced its nuclear infrastructure as a NNWS, eventually left 
the NPT and developed nuclear weapons. In recent years, countries associated with nuclear 
hedging include Japan, Egypt, Taiwan, South Korea, and Iran. 
Ariel E. Levite describes Japan as a prominent example for nuclear hedging. The state 
has an advanced nuclear fuel-cycle as well as components and expertise for bomb-making. 
Some state officials have also indicated that a nuclear weapons program may be taken up, if 
necessary. At the same time, Japan has portrayed itself as a champion for the regime norms 
of non-proliferation and disarmament (Levite, 2003, p.71). 
Another state, possibly pursuing a nuclear hedging status is South Korea. The state has 
a fairly advanced peaceful nuclear program, owing to its nuclear energy generation and 
foreign nuclear programs. Although portraying itself as a supporter of the non-proliferation 
regime (e.g. Shin, 2015), there could be incentive to develop nuclear weapons. As described 
by Lami Kim (2018, pp.126–7): “The combination of enrichment capability, lack of 
international inspections [regarding naval nuclear propulsion], a nuclear enemy, and a leaky 
nuclear umbrella is a recipe for nuclear proliferation.” At the moment, however, the intention 
of South Korea and Japan to build nuclear weapons remains doubtful. 
In addition to nuclear latency and hedging, the very cooperation resembled in an 
agreement may play an important role in facilitating commitment and compliance, as to be 
seen in the relationship between Argentina and Brazil. The ABACC and the Treaty of 
Tlatelolco in a larger context bridge a rivalry between both states. As noted by Goldemberg, 
Feu Alvim, and Mafra (2018, p.387) “[t]he ABACC Agreement not only creates barriers to 
proliferation by using the safeguards procedures but also drastically reduces the motivation 
for having nuclear weapons by building trust among the regional countries.” 
Argentina’s and Brazil’s enhanced regime commitment, including the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, was based on better domestic and bilateral relations (Parrish and Du Preez, 2004, 
pp.2–3). More specifically, the increasing bilateral cooperation in peaceful uses of nuclear 
energy and the democratization in both states eventually led to a regional cooperation 
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(Treaty of Tlatelolco) and an international commitment (NPT) (Hamel-Green, 2009, p.359). 
In this sense, the new agreement was an extension of a changing domestic and bilateral status 
and made cooperation more compatible with the states’ nuclear policies. 
The non-proliferation regime also offers a stage for representation and influence. The 
most comprehensive platform for exchange is the NPT Review Conference. States make use 
of the possibility to give their view on the status and future course of non-proliferation, 
disarmament, and the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The more than 100 statements made 
on the prelude of the conference between April 27 – 30, 2015, have a very similar structure: 
• Condolences for the April 2015 earthquake victims in Nepal 
• Congratulations on the election of the President of the Conference 
• Identification with other statements (made by a group of states) 
• Criticism and demands in the context of regime norms and rules 
• Domestic contributions on how the state complies with regime norms and rules 
Individual statements often lack added value, which leaves the impression that they are 
simply considered an important tool for states to be heard. Some variation can be found 
concerning the individual contributions and specific demands of states. Regarding the 
former, Mongolia emphasizes its vision of establishing a Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone on its 
territory (Od, 2015). Italy underlines its implementation of nuclear safety and nuclear 
research (Della Vedova, 2015). Canada and Belgium describe the respective contributions 
to nuclear security (Frankinet, 2015; Yelich, 2015). Argentina declares that it has shared its 
experience in the peaceful use of nuclear energy for prosperity with other states (Perceval, 
2015). 
Statements like these can keep other states up-to date about domestic developments. 
Yet, they are also self-advertisement, especially when issues are being discussed about 
which other participants can be expected to have good knowledge (such as the existence of 
NWFZs) or which are irrelevant for the nuclear issues at stake (such as the EU’s 
humanitarian help to Nepal). In this sense, the NPT Review Conference appears to be an 
attractive platform for self-advertisement. 
In addition to self-representation, states also formulate demands – either on their own 
or collectively. The 2015 NPT Review Conference included a number of groups of states 
that emphasized different issues from the wide range of norms and rules in the non-
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proliferation regime.161 These groups allow like-minded parties to have an influence on the 
course of the non-proliferation regime. 
In the aftermath of the 2010 NPT Review Conference, a humanitarian focus appears to 
have had a particular effect on the regime.162 In 2013 and 2014, states and non-governmental 
organizations explored the “Humanitarian Impact of Nuclear Weapons” in conferences in 




Status-related considerations also appear to have provided incentive for non-
cooperation in the commitment system of the non-proliferation regime. They contribute to 
the deadlock in achieving a world free of nuclear weapons. The prestige of nuclear weapons, 
a perceived degrading nature of agreements, and the nature of the relationship reflected in 
an agreement have hampered regime commitment and compliance. 
States may find nuclear weapons prestigious, as they have a destructive force, 
sophisticated design, and the number of states that possess them is scarce. In several 
publications, political scientists and decision-makers describe the limited group of states that 
got hold of these weapons as a “nuclear club.”163 This formulation is misleading, as a state 
may have an advanced nuclear infrastructure without having nuclear weapons. Yet, the 
notion of a “nuclear club” very well describes the exclusiveness of the nuclear weapons 
status. 
Looking at the cases in which states have acquired nuclear weapons, Perkovich (1998, 
pp.16–7) comes to the finding that the majority of states were either seeking nuclear weapons 
to protect their respective form of government or to enhance a state’s prestige. Accordingly, 
limiting the incentive to advance a nuclear weapons program to security threats is too narrow 
an understanding. I will exemplify the virtue of this status-related assessment by briefly 
looking at the cases of Russia and Pakistan. 
 
161 For instance, the African Group, Arab Group, CELAC, CARICOM, European Union, Humanitarian 
Consequences Group, League of Arab States, New Agenda Coalition, Non-Aligned Movement, Non-
Proliferation and Disarmament Initiative, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, Nuclear Weapon States, P-5, and 
Vienna Group of 10. 
162 On the humanitarian approach see also Jan Ruzicka (2018b, pp.2–9). 
163 A few examples of publications by political scientists and former decision-makers in which readers come 
across the formulation “nuclear club”: Aikin (1961), Waltz (1981), Perkovich (1998), Levite (2003), 
Gorbachev (2007). 
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As mentioned before, Russia – like other Nuclear Weapon States – adjusts its nuclear 
weapons policy in accordance with security considerations. But this picture of security 
appears incomplete when looking at Russia’s rejection to further pursue disarmament 
beyond New START. The state appears to maintain its edge as a nuclear superpower. When 
US President Barack Obama brought into play an additional cut of deployed nuclear 
weapons by one third (in relation to New START), Russian Foreign Secretary Lavrov 
emphasized that such a cut would bring the nuclear superpowers close to the nuclear weapon 
stocks of other nuclear powers. He demands a multilateral discussion regarding further 
reductions as well as a recognition of Russian concerns regarding the US missile defense 
(Morley and Kimball, 2013). The key in this argument is the relational dimension of nuclear 
weapon stocks. 
It is fair to say that approximately 1,000 – 1,100 deployed nuclear weapons in the US 
and Russia would bring the numbers closer to other states possessing nuclear weapons. Still, 
the nuclear superpowers would not draw level but instead keep a considerable margin. By 
insisting on its own advantage, Russia’s status as nuclear weapons superpower becomes a 
bargaining chip for the reductions in other states. This claim of a special status goes beyond 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty which makes no difference among Nuclear Weapon States and 
does not coin a superpower. The insistence to include all parties that possess nuclear 
weapons in further reductions, in turn, effectively leads to a stalemate. 
Status considerations appear to have played also a considerable role in Pakistan’s 
decision to conduct a series of nuclear weapon tests on May 1998. In the wake of the tests, 
Islamabad emphasized security considerations to restore the balance in the region as driving 
factor for the tests (Sharif, 1998). Yet, Perkovich (1998) refutes a narrow security 
perspective as driving force for the Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapons test. According to 
him, the idea of security pressure from India is exaggerated. Rather, internal political 
pressure within the Pakistani government led to the tests (Perkovich, 1998, p.16). The 
nuclear weapons program was enhanced by nationalism (e.g. Nizamani, 2000; Khan, 2005). 
Indeed, security considerations are unlikely to have been the sole factor for the tests. 
For one thing, Pakistani Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif makes repeated status-
related references in his statement following the tests. He points to degrading comments by 




“Immediately after its nuclear tests, India had brazenly raised the demand 
that ‘Islamabad should realize the change in the geo-strategic situation in the 
region’ and threatened that ‘India will deal firmly and strongly with Pakistan’. 
[…] 
As a self-respecting nation we had no choice left to us. […] 
I would like to congratulate the nation on the achievements of our 
scientists and engineers. They have made it possible for the people of Pakistan 
to enter the next century, with confidence in themselves and faith in their 
destiny” (Sharif, 1998). 
A further aspect that limits the notion of security is the timing of the tests or as Perkovich 
(1998, p.16) put it: “Why now?” The fact that Pakistan was able to conduct nuclear weapon 
tests only weeks after India shows that the state already had the military capacities necessary 
for nuclear weapons. Even Sharif’s statement points to a political nature of the decision to 
conduct the tests by noting: “After due deliberation and a careful review of all options we 
took the decision to restore the strategic balance.” Hence, the tests were more about a 
demonstration of capacity, rather than the building or exploration of capacity. In doing so, 
Pakistan crossed the status line from a latent power to an actual nuclear weapon power. 
Commitment to and compliance with the non-proliferation regime has also been 
restricted by degrading states in the NPT framework. In addition to the rules (see 
subsection on norms in this chapter), the very status appears to privilege Nuclear Weapon 
States. In 1958, before France became a nuclear weapon power, the French representative 
Jules Moch stated: 
“France would not accept being excluded from the number of ‘nuclear 
Powers’ so long as other Powers continued to increase their stockpiles of 
nuclear weapons and consequently, the risks of war” (in: Shaker, 1980, p.6). 
After France had detonated its first nuclear device, showing the successful military 
dimension of its nuclear program, the state pushed for a discussion among Nuclear Weapon 
States. In February 1962, Charles de Gaulle stressed in a letter to Nikita Khrushchev 
“that France would only participate in talks that would be between the 
nuclear Powers and that would have as their immediate goal, the destruction, 
the ban and control of all means of delivery of nuclear weapons” (in: Shaker, 
1980, p.72). 
In this sense, being part of a diplomatic dialog appears to be an aspect of status, to which 
France made an appeal before and after having detonated nuclear weapons. Beforehand, the 
state seems to have criticized the exclusivity of the club. After becoming a Nuclear Weapon 




The commitment system of the Non-Proliferation regime consists of a wide range of 
international, regional, and bilateral agreements as well as unilateral pledges. While they 
address all three norms, i.e. countering the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear 
weapons, the greatest output effectiveness is to be found in the field of acquisition. This is 
mainly due to the large number of states party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the 
Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. 
Looking at the outcome effectiveness leaves room for optimism. Most states that 
commit to a certain behavior also comply. Unfortunately, there are also some exceptions to 
this tendency, including enforcement cases (such as Libya, Iraq, and North Korea) that will 
be discussed in Chapter 4. There is also compliance without commitment. Although the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not in force, almost all states on this planet comply with 
its major rules. Furthermore, Nuclear Weapon States have been reluctant to give binding 
negative security assurances but still seem to respect their content. This observation appears 
to confirm Susan Strange’s regime criticism to give too much credit to managerial structures 
in international relations. 
The output and outcome effectiveness appear particularly high in commitments that 
reflect a behavioral manifestation, in other words cases in which states had already been 
complying before making a commitment (most notably Non-Nuclear Weapon States in the 
NPT and the NWFZs). Agreements that demand a behavioral change do often not materialize 
(e.g. FM(C)T or NWFZs in the Middle East or on the Korean Peninsula) or tend to have a 
limited scope (e.g. disarmament agreements). The exception to this observation is the 
unilateral nuclear reversal of South Africa. 
Overall, the impact suggests that the regime has been successful on two fronts: 1. The 
acquisition has been largely contained. Only few states have successfully acquired nuclear 
weapons, while a larger number have given up nuclear weapon programs. 2. There are 
positive developments regarding the use of nuclear weapons. Nuclear explosions have 
massively gone down in the last three decades. Also, the world has not seen a detonation of 
nuclear weapons in a military conflict since the end of World War II, although this may also 
be due to a fortunate turn of events, especially during the “Cuban Missile Crisis” (Pelopidas, 
2017). 
Regarding the possession of nuclear weapons, the picture is more diverse. The number 
of nuclear weapons has significantly gone down but the number of states possessing nuclear 
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weapons has not. Also 50 years after the NPT entered into force, a world free of nuclear 
weapons is nowhere near to being a reality. 
A look at possible driving factors for (non-)cooperation demonstrates the complexity of 
state decisions within the regime. As concluded by Way and Sasikumar in a cross-state 
study, 
“[s]tates with acute security concerns are less [likely] to join the NPT, 
states with high energy needs are more likely to join it, and states for whom 
developing nuclear weapons would be a simple and inexpensive task are 
reluctant to join” (Way and Sasikumar, 2004, p.4). 
An analysis of the commitment system supports the virtue of historical institutionalism, 
sociological institutionalism, and rational choice institutionalism alike. Material (RCI) and 
non-material considerations (SI) appear to shape nuclear decision-making. At the same time, 
(non-)cooperation demonstrates path-dependent features (HI). 
Economic considerations have been pivotal in shaping the non-proliferation regime as 
we know it. The regime offers a platform for giving and receiving nuclear cooperation in 
advancing peaceful uses of nuclear energy and finding solutions for problems like nuclear 
safety – very much as envisioned in Eisenhower’s (1953) “Atoms for Peace” speech. This is 
in line with a more material understanding of driving factors. Economic arguments have also 
been made by states that initially refrained from signing the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
However, as the cases of India or Brazil have shown, these states may also explore nuclear 
weapon options. 
Normative factors are non-material and appear to have contributed to a positive regime 
impact by delegitimizing nuclear weapons (see also Rublee, 2009). The Non-Proliferation 
Treaty triggered and, for the most part, ended domestic discussions across the world as to 
whether a state should acquire nuclear weapons. These decisions not only remain largely 
uncontested. In some cases, they were also strengthened by additional commitments, such 
as Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones. Norms appear to have “locked-in” positive behavior, which 
would suggest a path-dependent effect. 
Security considerations, if present, have a tendency to trump normative aspects. 
France’s nuclear weapon tests up until 1996, the stalemate in the Fissile Material (Cutoff) 
Treaty, or the lack of a full global disarmament all go in line with security motivations. This 
strongly points to the persistence of nuclear deterrence and shifts the regime more towards 
a no-regime from a security perspective. Yet, security considerations have also facilitated 
the establishment of the Non-Proliferation Treaty. 
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Status may attract states’ cooperation. For instance, the NPT Review Conference 
resembles a platform for self-advertisement in regime compliance as well as a tool to push 
ideas forward. Yet, the very prestige of nuclear weapons and the exclusiveness of the nuclear 
club also provide a plausible explanation for non-cooperation (e.g. Perkovich, 1998). 
Despite global reductions in nuclear weapon stocks, no Nuclear Weapon State is close to 
giving up nuclear bombs altogether. Instead, NWS stay on the nuclear weapons track, which 
would support the virtue of historical institutionalism. This observation confirms the need 
to find further ways to devaluate nuclear weapons, the challenges of which have been 


























3. Verification in the Non-Proliferation Regime 
3.1. Platforms of Verification 
The verification system is aimed at shedding light on a state’s compliance with the non-
proliferation regime. It allows a state to assure others of its adherence to commitments made. 
At the same time, verification makes it more difficult to pursue nuclear weapons undetected, 
deterring non-compliance with the regime in the first place (see also Ifft, 2010, p.5) or paving 
the way for regime enforcement (see Chapter 4). 
The network of verification is quite complex. For the most part, a verifying body does 
not evaluate a state’s compliance with regime norms164 but with specific verification rules.165 
Effective verification, therefore, rests on the triangle between the verifying body, the state, 
and the verification commitment. Conclusions are particularly difficult for states that offer 
few analytical tools. 
What conditions determine whether states commit to and comply with regime 
verification in the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons? In order to address 
this question, I will start by giving a brief overview on international, regional, bilateral, and 
autonomous verification. Although the following analysis in this chapter needs to focus on 
the most principal platforms, the overview is meant to account for the wide spectrum of the 
verification system. 
Subsequently, I will examine to what extent states have ratified (output) and complied 
with verification commitments (outcome). Based on this, I will consider how cooperation in 
verification correlates with a state’s compliance with regime norms (impact) in the 
respective thematic field. The latter allows for insight into states’ larger nuclear behavior. 
Following this assessment of the three stages of regime effectiveness, I will seek to explain 
(non-)cooperation in the verification system by an examination of plausible intent of the 
factors of security, norms, economics, and status. 
A conclusion will take up the most important findings of the chapter. Output and 
outcome effectiveness are strongest in the fields of the acquisition and use of nuclear 
weapons. Verification plays a subordinate role in decreasing nuclear weapon stocks. This is 
consistent with the commitment system of the non-proliferation regime, which resembles 
relatively few commitments in nuclear disarmament. 
 
164 The major regime norms are to counter the acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons. 
165 This is particularly the case for the verification in the context of the Non-Proliferation Treaty and Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones. 
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Verification allows for limited additional value to the non-proliferation regime, in that 
it appears to reinforce states’ compliance rather than preventing non-compliance. States with 
nuclear weapon programs refrain from making strong verification commitments. On a 
positive note, states that implement strong verification tools are facing further hurdles to 
develop nuclear weapons at a later stage. 
 
3.1.1. International Verification 
Over the years, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) has established 
itself as the cornerstone of verification in the non-proliferation regime. This is due to the 
agency’s pioneering role as an international institution in the nuclear age and the reference 
to it by subsequent agreements. Article III of the Non-Proliferation Treaty made IAEA 
safeguards agreements mandatory for Non-Nuclear Weapon States. Similarly, Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones demand IAEA cooperation (see Appendix 4). 
Despite its prominent role within the regime, the verification spectrum of the agency is 
narrow. It is more concerned with the acquisition of nuclear weapons than it is with the 
possession or use of these weapons. The broad objective of the IAEA to promote the civilian 
use and to counter the military use of nuclear energy166 would allow for the verification of 
nuclear disarmament. Still, the agency has played a subordinate role in this regard (see also 
Drobysz and Persbo, 2016, pp.135–7). Nuclear Weapon States are not required by the Non-
Proliferation Treaty to conclude safeguards agreements. 
The IAEA’s verification work, particularly the inspection rights and the access to 
information, depend on its agreement with a state. Ideally, the agency can make a judgement 
about the correctness and completeness of state reports on their respective nuclear 
program.167 Acknowledging different paths in the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the IAEA 
looks for the diversion of declared material or the non-declaration of activities, facilities, or 
material (Rauf, 2015, p.16). 
Although its Charter168 neither mentions verification nor monitoring, the United 
Nations (UN) is a potential verification platform in the non-proliferation regime. The UN 
Security Council may create subordinary organs to facilitate its functions (Article 29, UN 
Charter). While these bodies – in the form of Sanctions Committees or the Non-Proliferation 
 
166 See Article II of the IAEA Statute. 
167 This is to be seen in a 1992 IAEA Board of Governors judgement about Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements (e.g. Rauf, 2015, p.15). 
168 Charter of the United Nations, June 26, 1945. 
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Committee – may be established to check on the implementation of UN resolutions, they 
may also be used for verification purposes. 
More importantly, Chapter VII of the UN Charter allows for action in cases of “threats 
to” or “breaches of” peace as well as “acts of aggression.” This may include enforcement 
(see Chapter 4) but also verification. In addition to mandating the IAEA with verification 
tasks, the Security Council may create a new verification body.169 It did so by establishing 
UNSCOM and UNMOVIC as a response to Iraq’s programs of weapons of mass destruction. 
Since the evaluation of and response to a threat rests on the UN Security Council, 
Nuclear Weapon States are unlikely to become subject to these measures. As Permanent 
Members, they have a de-facto veto right. Consequently, verification in the UN context is 
more likely to be used in cases relating to the acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
The two international treaties on nuclear weapon tests have taken different approaches 
in verification. The scope of the Partial Test Ban Treaty and the ability to verify its 
implementation were a crucial part of the negotiation phase (US Department of State, 2017). 
The eventual treaty did not include international verification in its text. This choice reflected 
the understanding that states verify the commitment of other states through national means. 
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, in turn, lays out sophisticated provisions to verify 
that states do not undertake nuclear explosions underground, underwater, or in the 
atmosphere. Verification in the CTBT, therefore, focuses on the use of nuclear weapons. 
The major tools of verification are a global monitoring system and, in the event of suspicion, 
on-site inspections. 
 
3.1.2. Regional Verification 
Verification is an important pillar of Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones (NWFZs). They 
tend to mix three elements: IAEA verification, an executive body, and special inspections 
(see Appendix 4). By implementing and complementing the International Atomic Energy 
Agency, NWFZs strengthen the verification system in countering the acquisition of nuclear 
weapons. 
According to the 1975 UN expert panel on NWFZs, the verification tasks of Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones fall into two categories: Checking that zonal states do not acquire 
 
169 There is a tendency to leave nuclear issues with IAEA. A rivalry may develop between verification bodies. 
In the case of Iraq, occasional conflicts occurred between the IAEA and UNSCOM (Harrer, 2014, pp.28–31). 
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nuclear weapons and ensuring that outside sources effectively leave the zone free from them 
(UN General Assembly, 1975). In reality, there is a strong emphasis on the former category. 
State parties rather than the signatories of the protocols are subject to reporting and 
inspections. 
Within the European Union (EU), verification is based on an accord between the IAEA 
and EURATOM safeguards. The EURATOM verification work is carried out by the 
European Commission (Chapter 7, EURATOM Treaty170), which evaluates documentation, 
sends inspectors, and circulates an annual report on nuclear safeguard activities. 
EURATOM’s autonomy makes it unique as a regional body. The right to “self-
inspection” has created tension with the IAEA in the past, as detailed by John Krige. Former 
IAEA Director Sterling Cole’s feared that granting too much independence to a regional 
body would set a dangerous precedent (Krige, 2015). EURATOM prevailed and coined its 
role as an important pillar of European integration. 
The EURATOM safeguards system has also allowed inspections of civilian parts of the 
nuclear fuel cycle in France and the United Kingdom. In this sense, it has offered an added 
value in relation to the original IAEA outset. In the course of the United Kingdom’s 
withdrawal from the European Union (Brexit), the state is also planning to leave EURATOM 
(HM Government, 2017). 
 
3.1.3. Bilateral Verification 
Bilateral safeguards agreements have a long history in the non-proliferation regime that 
even precedes the IAEA.171 As noted by John Carlson, they resemble a prerequisite for 
nuclear supplies of fissile material and equipment rather than verification procedures per 
se. Their purpose is to ensure that material, facilities, and equipment from advanced nuclear 
states are only used for peaceful purposes in other states. This makes the retransfer of these 
items or their military use in the receiving state more difficult, even if an acknowledged 
Nuclear Weapon State is at the receiving end of the nuclear trade (Carlson, 2005). 
This institutional layout puts nuclear suppliers into an influential position. They can 
translate their market position into demands for safeguards. Less advanced nuclear states 
 
170 Treaty Establishing the European Atomic Energy Community, March 25, 1957. Consolidated Version as of 
October 26, 2012. 
171 The United States had 20 agreements in place by 1957, when IAEA was founded (Carlson, 2005). 
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depend on them to develop their own nuclear program. Therefore, nuclear suppliers can be 
seen to be bilateral agenda-setters in the context of verification. 
Furthermore, verification may be part of a larger bilateral agreement. The arrangements 
between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have made different uses of 
verification (see e.g. Woolf, 2011). Agreements either exclude specific tools of verification 
(SORT), provide for national means (ABM Treaty), or take a more comprehensive approach 
including exchange of information and on-site inspections (START I, START II, New 
START, INF). 
Countering the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the verification work of the IAEA in 
Argentina and Brazil is complemented by the Argentine-Brazilian Agency for Accounting 
and Control of Nuclear Materials (ABACC).172 The peaceful use of nuclear material is 
verified through the Common System of Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. The 
verification mechanism checks the correctness of state reports and non-diversion of fissile 
material. 
 
3.1.4. Unilateral Verification 
Unilateral (or autonomous) verification in this work refers to assessments of nuclear 
programs in other states based on intelligence. National intelligence not only contributes to 
domestic political decision-making. It is also an integral component of verification bodies 
within the regime (e.g. the IAEA, NWFZs, or the CTBTO). Intelligence agencies may even 
be better suited to produce analyses. The IAEA’s regular budget of around €372 million173 
and its staff of around 2560 (IAEA, 2019b) are only a fraction of that of some intelligence 
agencies.174 
Yet, national intelligence has two potential drawbacks, one referring to legitimacy, the 
other to accuracy. Discussions surrounding the legitimacy take two different perspectives, 
as noted by Pierluigi Salvati. The missing consent by a targeted state may reflect “a violation 
of international law.” At the same time, “the lack of an ad hoc prohibitive rule and a 
 
172 The exact relationship between both states and the verification bodies is laid down in the “Quadripartite 
Agreement”: Agreement between the Republic of Argentina, the Federative Republic of Brazil, the Brazilian-
Argentine Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials and the International Atomic Energy 
Agency for the Application of Safeguards, December 13, 1991. 
173 As appropriated for 2019, see: IAEA General Conference (2018). 
174 Data regarding national intelligence agency’s is often a matter of secrecy. In 1998, the US intelligence 
budget accumulated to $26.7 bn (CIA, 2008). In 2018, the US National Intelligence Program was appropriated 
to $59,4 bn (ODNI, 2018). 
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substantial ‘tolerance’ of such activity by states” could be seen to legitimize intelligence 
(Salvati, 2016, p.40). 
Furthermore, conclusions from intelligence may intentionally or unintentionally lack 
accuracy. For one thing, intelligence conclusions may be subject to political motivation (see 
e.g. Porter, 2014; Bollfrass, 2017a). In addition, there are procedural challenges. As noted 
by Keith Hansen looking at the US example, a reliable collection of data may be obstructed 
by limited access to human sources and the reliance on unvetted data from intelligence 
services of partner states (Hansen, 2011, 10). 
 
3.2. Assessing Effectiveness 
3.2.1. Acquisition 
Owing to its paramount role in verifying non-proliferation, the best angle to get a grasp 
of states’ verification commitments countering the acquisition of nuclear weapons is the 
International Atomic Energy Agency. To what extent have states committed to (output) and 
complied with (outcome) IAEA safeguards? How does verification behavior of a state relate 
to the larger regime compliance (impact)? 
Verification commitments with the IAEA can be categorized into Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement with an Additional Protocol, a Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement without an Additional Protocol, a Small Quantities Protocol, an Item-Specific 
Safeguards Agreement, and a Voluntary Offer Agreement. 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (CSAs) are the main pillar of verification 
agreements, as required in the Non-Proliferation Treaty and by Nuclear-Weapon-Free 
Zones.175 Under a CSA, a state must inform the IAEA about nuclear material and facilities 
subject to safeguards.176 States must also “ensure that Agency inspectors can effectively 
discharge their functions [...].”177 The IAEA is responsible for checking these reports with 
their own means. Its tools include the use of material accountancy, inspections178, and 
intelligence179 (open source and national intelligence). Their aim is the timely detection of 
diversion of nuclear material. CSAs provide a good basis for the verification of the 
 
175 CSAs are based on the frame document INFCIRC/153 (corrected). In the negotiation between a state and 
the IAEA, the CSA is complemented with a Subsidiarity Agreement, a supplementary set of provisions (Petritz, 
2012, pp.120–1). 
176 See Article 7 and 8, INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (IAEA, 1972). 
177 See Article 9, INFCIRC/153 (corrected) (IAEA, 1972). 
178 Inspections include ad hoc, routine, and special inspections (Rauf, 2015, pp.16–8). 
179 On the role of intelligence in the verification work of the IAEA see Pierluigi Salvati (2016). 
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correctness of states’ verification reports. States with no or minimal nuclear activities have 
the option to conclude a Small Quantities Protocol (SQP), which simply aims at facilitating 
the implementation of safeguards. 
Yet, what happens if the items listed in the reports are correct but only one part of the 
nuclear program? To enhance the IAEA’s tools to check the completeness of states’ reports, 
the agency introduced the Additional Protocol in May 1997. The protocol provides the 
agency with more information as well as access rights to facilities and persons.180 Due to its 
comprehensive scope, it was praised as a “milestone” for the non-proliferation regime 
(Goldschmidt, 1999, p.2). A CSA in combination with an Additional Protocol is the 
strongest verification commitment regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons.181 
In contrast to the Non-Nuclear Weapon States, Nuclear Weapon States have by 
definition developed nuclear weapon capacities. In these states, the IAEA only verifies 
nuclear facilities and material for peaceful purposes, based on Voluntary Offer 
Agreements (VOAs). Although limited, VOAs are a way to include NWS in the verification 
system. The verification work also allows the IAEA “to obtain and verify information that 
could enhance the safeguards conclusions in States with comprehensive safeguards 
agreements in force” (IAEA, 2019c). 
The use of Item-Specific Agreements (ISAs)182 even precedes the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty. They are still used for peaceful nuclear activities in India, Pakistan, and Israel. Since 
it is prohibited for NPT member states to export fissile material and related equipment 
without IAEA safeguards, “[i]tem-specific safeguards agreements are […] a basic condition 
of nuclear trade between NPT and non-NPT states” (DeFrancia, 2012, p.38). Similar to 
Voluntary Offer Agreements, they leave room from a separate nuclear weapons track for 
fissile material which is not subject to safeguards, but they enhance the inclusion of states 
with nuclear weapons in the verification system. 
 
Output 
In order for the IAEA to make a sound judgement that nuclear material is only used for 
civilian purposes, the respective state needs to put into force a Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement as well as the Additional Protocol. Here, the last 15 years have demonstrated a 
 
180 An overview of state’s obligations under the Additional Protocol can be found in Kerr and Nikitin (2017). 
181 For the categorization of verification commitments by state see Appendix 5. 
182 The legal basis is INFCIRC/66/Rev.2 (IAEA, 1968) and related documents. 
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very positive trend. As illustrated in Figure 6 below, the number of Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States without a CSA has significantly gone down, from 45 in 2003 to 11 in 2018. 
Furthermore, the number of states that have a CSA as well as the AP in force increased from 
40 in 2003 to 129 in 2018. Iran is provisionally implementing the Additional Protocol as 
part of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). This means that the IAEA has the 
legal tools to make a fair judgement regarding 71% (129 out of 182) of the states in which 
safeguards are applied. 
 
Figure 6 – Safeguards Agreements in Force183 
 
Despite the increasing strength of the verification system on the possible acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, several shortcomings deserve attention. While verification agreements 
with the Nuclear Weapons States (China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the 
United States of America) as well as three states outside of the NPT (India, Israel, and 
Pakistan) have been largely stable over the last 15 years, they leave the IAEA with a blind 
eye on their production of nuclear weapons. 
Three other concerns relate to Non-Nuclear Weapon States. First, in 2018, 45 states had 
a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force without an Additional Protocol. In 2003, 
98 states belonged to this group. For these states, the IAEA can only judge on the correctness 
 
183 Without Taiwan, China. Data derived from annual Safeguard Implementation Reports, typically issued in 









2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
CSA + AP Only CSA NNWS without CSA VOA ISA
 131 
but not on the completeness of reports. The number includes states with fairly advanced 
nuclear programs, such as Argentina, Brazil, and Egypt.184 
Second, 11 Non-Nuclear Weapon States do not even have a CSA in place. This is a 
breach of their Non-Proliferation Treaty commitment. As a consequence, the International 
Atomic Energy is unable to make judgements about the respective nuclear program. 
Fortunately, the states in question do not pose serious proliferation concerns.185 
Finally, in 2018, 37 states still have failed to amend their Small Quantities Protocols 
(IAEA, 2019c). The older version of the SQPs represented a weakness that was accounted 
for in a revised version (see also IAEA Board of Governors, 2006b). For instance, under the 
original text, the IAEA could neither verify that the state actually meets the criteria for the 
simplified implementation of safeguards, nor was the state obligated to initially report all its 
nuclear material to be put under safeguards (JAEA, 2016, pp.27–8). Hence, Small Quantities 
Protocols without amendments represent a loophole in the verification system. 
 
Outcome 
For the IAEA to claim that “all nuclear material remained in peaceful activities,” a state 
not only has to ratify a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional Protocol. 
The agency also needs to complete its evaluations in time. The IAEA has been able to make 
more and more judgements that all nuclear material of a state is used peacefully. At the time 
of publication of the 2018 Safeguard Statement in June 2019, the IAEA made such a 
conclusion for 70 out of 182 member states. This number has increased from 40 in 2003.186 
In 2018, the IAEA concluded for 54 % of the states that have a Comprehensive 
Safeguards Agreement and an Additional Protocol in force that all of their nuclear material 
was used for peaceful activities. The proportion of conclusions that all nuclear material has 
remained peaceful against the legal background of states with a CSA and an AP in force has 
been largely stable over the last ten years. While there is still room for improvement, 
considering that the agency has to digest an increasing amount of verification commitments, 
this observation can be seen as a success. For the other states, the IAEA determined that 
reported material was used peacefully. 
 
184 The non-ratification of the Additional Protocol in Brazil and Argentina is partially compensated by the 
aforementioned “Quadripartite Agreement.” 
185 These are Benin, Cabo Verde, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Micronesia, Palestine, 
São Tomé and Príncipe, Somalia, Timor-Leste (IAEA, 2019c). 
186 The data is based on the IAEA’s annual Safeguards Statements (IAEA, 2019c). 
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Figure 7 – Full Safeguards Implementation187 
 
Compliance with verification agreements cannot be reduced to a simple yes or no. At a 
minimum, analysts should distinguish between smaller and larger cases of compliance.188 
The implementation of IAEA verification commitments in larger terms is rather positive. 
Considering the 174 states that have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force, major 
breaches of verification commitments – which may put the overall norm compliance of a 
state into question – are the exception. 
In the past, non-compliance with IAEA safeguards has been associated with Egypt, Iran, 
Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Romania, South Korea, and Syria. Out of these states, Iran, Libya, 
North Korea, Romania, and Syria were reported to the Security Council (Findlay, 2015, 
p.97).189 Iran, Iraq, and North Korea were sanctioned for their programs (see following 
chapter). The greatest verification challenges that remain in the 2018 IAEA Safeguards 
Statement are Syria (which has provided an unsatisfactory clarification on the nature of a 
compound at Dair Alzour) and North Korea, where the IAEA has not been able to implement 
verification measures since 2009 (IAEA, 2019c). 
 
187 Without Taiwan, China. Data derived from annual Safeguards Statement, typically issued in June of the 
following year (IAEA, 2019c). 
188 Accordingly, although not standardized, the IAEA uses different terminology for non-compliance (see 
Findlay, 2015, pp.91–108). 
189 The Iraqi WMD programs had already been on the agenda of the Security Council. Libya and Romania 
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Although not questioning the overall norm compliance with the regime, minor 
shortcomings in states’ cooperation with the IAEA can still negatively affect the agency’s 
ability to draw safeguard conclusions. One aspect is the IAEA budget.190 The Regular 
Budget (revalued final budget)191 of the IAEA in 2018 consisted of around €358 million. 
€139 million went to the nuclear verification program, only a fraction of a national nuclear 
weapons program (IAEA, 2019e). Fulfilling increasing verification demands, in the face of 
budget constraints is a continuing challenge for the agency (Findlay, 2016). 
In addition to the limited budgetary horizon, several states have failed to pay their share. 
By the end of 2018, the IAEA budget had outstanding contributions in the amount of around 
€62.4 Million from states, a large share of which was to be paid by Brazil (€11.8 million) 
and Venezuela (€10.3 million). Nonetheless, Director General Amano stated that the Agency 
has a “strong overall financial health” (IAEA, 2019e). 
The IAEA also faces logistical hurdles to perform its verification work. In its 2018 
Safeguards Statement, the agency criticizes that some states lack a domestic infrastructure 
for reliable verification.192 The agency also experienced “access restrictions to locations, 
material, facility records and other relevant documentation.” Furthermore, there are 
deficiencies in state and regional systems of accounting for and control of nuclear material, 
which are necessary for efficient safeguards implementation. Although required in 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements, some states have failed to implement such systems 
(IAEA, 2019c). 
While efficient verification depends on the IAEA member states, it shall be noted that 
the agency itself may be the cause for deficiencies in the implementation of safeguards. As 
pointed out by Trevor Findlay, in one instance, the safeguard goals for Canada were not met, 
because the IAEA failed to conduct the necessary inspections due to “personnel shortages.” 
Australia, in turn, was temporarily believed to have misstated its nuclear material, although 
it had acted upon prior advice from IAEA inspectors (Findlay, 2015, p.120). 
 
 
190 Details on the budget can be found in the Agency’s Annual Financial Statements. For 2018 see IAEA 
(2019e). 
191 In addition to the Regular Budget, technical cooperation funding, as well as voluntary contributions are part 
of the IAEA funding (e.g. IAEA, 2019e). 
192 More specifically, various states lack “legal authority, resources, technical capabilities or independence 
from nuclear facility or [locations outside facilities (LOFs)] operators to implement the requirements of 
safeguard agreements and additional protocols” and do not “provide sufficient oversight of nuclear material 
accounting and control systems at nuclear facilities and LOFs to ensure the required accuracy and precision of 
the data transmitted to the Agency” (IAEA, 2019c). 
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Impact (Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons) 
By enhancing transparency and deterrence, verification is supposed to strengthen the 
non-proliferation regime regarding the acquisition of nuclear weapons. A brief look into 
how verification relates to regime compliance gives an indication of verification impact. To 
what extent is there a link between compliance with verification rules and a state’s overall 
compliance with regime norms? 
At first sight, the verification developments of the last 25 years give reason for hope. 
The increasing output and outcome effectiveness allow for more transparency. As pointed 
out by Petritz (2012, p.135), already a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement increases the 
difficulty of keeping a clandestine nuclear program secret, as a state would need to develop 
and establish two completely separated fuel cycles. The Additional Protocol allows for an 
even better picture of the nature of a nuclear program. These aspects would suggest that 
verification reforms have enhanced transparency and deterrence. 
Still, although the combination of CSA and AP is the best legal outset to verify, it is not 
perfect. IAEA Director General Hans Blix noted during the Board of Governors meeting on 
the passing of the Additional Protocol that the new tools would not secure a 100% detection 
capability but would significantly enhance detection and deterrence (IAEA General 
Conference, 1997). Mistakes in verification may also occur in the future. 
There is a positive correlation between verification commitment, on the one hand, and 
overall norm compliance, on the other hand. Out of the increasing number of Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States that have a CSA and an Additional Protocol in force, no norm violations can 
be noted.193 This observation would be in line with the argument of a deterrent effect of 
verification. Considering, however, that Libya only joined the Additional Protocol after 
having given up its nuclear weapons aspirations leads to the assumption that a verification 
commitment may simply be an extension of the overall commitment to the regime rather 
than a deterrent. 
The inversion of the deterrence argument can also be maintained. In other words, 
anticipating a higher detection risk, states with clandestine programs would be reluctant to 
make strong verification commitments. Indeed, states that have pursued nuclear weapons in 
 
193 This observation is based on a confrontation of state cases that have tried to develop or in other ways acquire 
nuclear weapons in the past, as listed by Levite (2003, p.62), the time period of the respective nuclear program 
(Müller and Schmidt, 2010, p.157) and the entry into force of the Additional Protocol. A notable exception 
may be South Korea, which gave the IAEA headaches in 2004 (see summary of events in: Findlay, 2015, 
pp.72–5). Here, non-compliance may have occurred without the knowledge of the government (Kang et al., 
2005, pp.47–8). 
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the aftermath of the Cold War, or have been suspected thereof, have refrained from 
committing to more transparency than necessary (see Table 3 below). Iran, Libya, and Syria 
had no Additional Protocol in force when IAEA concerns arose. 
Iraq, Romania, and North Korea could not have had an AP in place when their programs 
became an issue. Yet, Iraq demonstrated ambiguous verification cooperation throughout the 
1990s (see Chapter 4) and North Korea only reluctantly concluded its safeguards agreement 
with the IAEA (Findlay, 2015, pp.39–40). These considerations would suggest that a nuclear 
weapons program deters the conclusion of intrusive safeguards agreements, rather than the 
other way around. 
 
Table 3 – Verification and Potential Cases of Non-Compliance 
 Suspicion triggered by194 Verification commitment at 
time of suspicion195 
Iraq Operation Desert Storm, 1991 INFCRIC/172 (1972), no AP 
Romania Post-Ceaușescu government 
informed IAEA, 1992 
INFCIRC/180 (1972), no AP 
North Korea Suspicion due to long CSA 
conclusion, IAEA verification, 
1992 
INFCIRC/403 (1992), no AP 
Irana Reports by National Council of 
Resistance in Iran about illicit 
nuclear activities, 2002 
INFCIRC/214 (1974), no AP 
Libya Revelation about WMD 
programs by Libyan 
government, prior involvement 
of UK and US, 2003 
INFCIRC/282 (1980), no AP 
Syriaa Israeli bombing of Dair Alzour 
compound, 2007 
INFCIRC/407 (1992), no AP 
a While the other states in this table were non-compliant with the regime norm, in that 
they had secret nuclear weapons programs, the past and current nuclear weapons 
aspirations of Iran and Syria remain subject to debate. 
Arguably, verification procedures have helped to shed light upon cases of non-
compliance.196 Put differently, they may have offered transparency without enhancing 
deterrence. Werner Petritz (2012, p.138) considers it unlikely that after the strengthening of 
the verification system more states will follow non-proliferation commitments, breaches are 
just better documented. Similarly, Kang et al. (2005) speculate that the Additional Protocol 
may cover up past non-compliance of states, as it did in South Korea. 
 
194 See e.g. Findlay (2015). 
195 See IAEA (2016a). 
196 See e.g. Findlay (2007, p.49) as well as Rockwood and Johnson (2015, p.88). 
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The IAEA’s track record of actually detecting non-compliance by itself is rather grim. 
Looking at the cases listed in Table 3, it is noticeable that more often than not, verification 
is not triggered from the IAEA but other actors. In fact, non-compliance reporting has only 
taken a strong turn since the 1990s. In the 25 years prior to the discovery of the WMD 
programs in Iraq no diversion was detected (Hooper, 1999, p.9). As noted and illustrated by 
Findlay (2011, p.88) “the overall trend over time has been an increase in the number and 
complexity of non-compliance reports by the Secretariat.” Yet, the IAEA’s tools of detection 
are still not at their full potential, since even twenty years after the Additional Protocol 
opened for signature, it is not in force in all Non-Nuclear Weapon States. 
 
3.2.2. Possession 
There are several demands for verification in academic literature that fall into in the 
field of the possession of nuclear weapons. Some texts refer to specific agreements, while 
others comment on the overall structure of the verification system.197 Often, the ideas are 
presented as part of a larger take on global disarmament. In other words, if we want to 
achieve a world free of nuclear weapons, reliable verification is inevitable.198 
Accordingly, various efforts have explored the challenges of disarmament verification. 
Debates include experts with governmental affiliation, NGOs, academia, and other 
stakeholders. The number and scope of projects already hint to the complexity and difficulty 
in achieving reliable verification.199 Some of the more recent international efforts have been 
summarized by Tim Caughley: 
• United Kingdom-Norway Initiative (UK-NI) 
• The International Partnership for Nuclear Disarmament Verification (IPNDV) 
• Nuclear Threat Initiative’s Verification Pilot Project (NTI Project) 
• Trilateral Initiative/Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement 
• Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty 
(Caughley, 2016, pp.11–7) 
Looking at the proposals, it becomes apparent that effective verification requires 
solutions for a variety of issues, most notably technical, logistical, as well as political 
 
197 See e.g. Kile and Kelley (2012) or Smetana and Ditrych (2015). 
198 See e.g. Hinderstein (2010), Feiveson et al. (2014), VERTIC (2015), Busch and Pilat (2017). 
199 As the explanation section will show, some experts and politicians opine that there are instances where 
reliable verification is simply impossible. 
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challenges. Similar to the actual process of disarmament, verification contains different 
tasks, which can be broadly categorized. A primer by the “Verification Research, Training 
and Information Centre” identifies five steps of disarmament verification: 
• Verifying Nuclear Weapon Dismantlement 
• Verifying the Disposition of Fissile Material Recovered from Dismantled 
Weapons 
• Verifying the Elimination or Reversal of Nuclear Weaponization Activities 
• Verifying the Decommissioning of Fissile Material Production Facilities 
• Verifying the Ongoing Peaceful Nuclear Activities of a Disarmed State 
(VERTIC, 2015) 
Any state that has had nuclear weapon ambitions at one point would be subject to a 
combination of verification elements mentioned above even without fully developing 
nuclear weapons – such as Libya or Iraq. Since this section is devoted to the possession of 
nuclear weapons, I will focus on states that have reduced parts or all of their nuclear weapon 
stocks. 
 
Output and Outcome 
Verification in disarmament has played a subordinate role compared with verifying the 
(non-)acquisition of nuclear weapons. Nuclear Weapon States do not verify the disarmament 
of their weapon stocks on an international level. The Non-Proliferation Treaty makes no 
mention of the verification of disarmament. Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones do not verify 
adherence to their protocols (which would be relevant for Nuclear Weapon States).200 Even 
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons lacks a clear notion of disarmament 
verification (Onderco, 2017, p.394). Rather than accompanying the disarmament process, 
the treaty aims at preventing a nuclear weapons relapse (Articles 3 and 4 of the treaty).201 
Verification in the field of the possession of nuclear weapons, therefore, demonstrates 
a low output effectiveness. Overall, only few verification commitments are being concluded 
 
200 According to the Treaty of Pelindaba, the IAEA would be tasked with disarmament verification “should 
nuclear weapons ever re-emerge on that continent” (Drobysz and Persbo, 2016, p.137). 
201 The negotiations of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons accounted for two different 
approaches: “destruction before accession” and “accession before destruction” (Caughley and Mukhatzhanova, 
2017, pp.30–3). Verification, as laid in Article 3 and 4 of the eventual treaty, focuses on ensuring the 
irreversibility of disarmament. It is less explicit about verifying the actual disarmament process. 
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in disarmament. This becomes evident when looking at an overview of commitments by 
state (see Table 4). 
 
Table 4 - Verification Commitments by State (Possession of Nuclear Weapons) 
 International Regional Bilateral 
Belarus IAEA* - - 
China - - - 
France - - - 
India - - - 
Israel - - - 
Kazakhstan IAEA* - - 
North Korea (IAEA) - - 
Pakistan - - - 
Russia (Plutonium Management 
and Disposition Agreement) 
- START I, New START, 
National Technical 
Means: SALT I + II, INF 
South Africa IAEA*  - 




and Disposition Agreement) 
- START I, New START, 
National Technical 
Means: SALT I + II, INF 
United 
Kingdom 
- - - 
In bold: States that reportedly still possess nuclear weapons. 
In parantheses: Not implemented 
* IAEA verification to certify compliance as NNWS 
The International Atomic Energy Agency only has rudimentary roles in disarmament 
verification.202 Contrary to the Plutonium Management and Disposition Agreement, in 
which Russia and the United States undertake to dispose of 34 metric tons of nuclear 
weapons (or other military) plutonium, neither state has finalized verification measures with 
the IAEA (VERTIC, 2015, p.41).203 
More important is the agency’s task to certify that a state that previously owned nuclear 
weapons fulfills the requirements as Non-Nuclear Weapon State. Here, the IAEA played a 
prominent role in the disarmament verification of South Africa. Although the development 
and dismantlement of nuclear weapons took place on a domestic level, the IAEA verified 
the correctness and completeness of the South African inventory and could find no indication 
 
202 On the IAEA and its disarmament role see e.g. Drobysz and Persbo (2016). 
203 Russia suspended the agreement in 2016 but is reportedly ready to resume to the agreement once the 
relations between the two countries “normalize” (TASS, 2018). 
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that would question the successful disarmament (von Baeckmann, Dillon, and Perricos, 
1995). 
It is important to note that the dismantlement of the nuclear weapons program preceded 
IAEA verification, rather than accompanying it. This lowers the output effectiveness of 
South Africa’s verification commitment in disarmament. The chronology of events affects 
the accuracy of verification, as pointed out by Busch and Pilat: 
“Because South Africa dismantled its nuclear weapons and nuclear 
weapons infrastructure prior to the verification by the IAEA, it is not possible 
to know for certain if all materials and equipment were destroyed. However, 
the IAEA’s inspections and analyses have been able to reduce the uncertainty 
significantly” (Busch and Pilat, 2017, p.241). 
Arguably, the state did more than it was legally required. Since the NPT focuses on a 
state’s commitments upon joining the treaty, South Africa was not legally required to give 
the IAEA insight into its past nuclear weapons activities – but did so, nonetheless (Purkitt 
and Burgess, 2005, p.127). 
Today, the state has a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and the Additional 
Protocol in force. For 2018, the IAEA concluded that “all of nuclear material remained in 
peaceful activities” (IAEA, 2019c). In this sense, IAEA verification is crucial to certify 
South Africa’s nuclear reversal and to attest the continuing compliance of the state. 
As Table 4 shows, disarmament verification is almost exclusively based on bilateral 
agreements between the two nuclear superpowers, Russia/Soviet Union and the Unites States 
of America. The specific provisions differ significantly.204 START I included a fairly 
extensive combination of verification means, including National Technical Means 
(NTM)205, exchanges of data sets, and On-Site Inspections (James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, 2011c). Edward Ifft summarizes the output and outcome 
effectiveness of START I as follows: 
“Through the 2009 expiration of the treaty, the United States conducted 
659 START inspections and Russia 481. […] The treaty provided for special 
access visits […], but this was never used, since suspicions of undeclared 
illegal facilities never arose. A massive data exchange of over 100 pages was 
updated every six months with data on the numbers locations, and technical 
characteristics of specified systems. Between these updates, an extensive 
system of notifications, using the Nuclear Risk Reduction Centers of the 
sides, maintained an up-to-date database of the numbers and locations of all 
relevant systems” (Ifft, 2010, p.8). 
 
204 I will focus on verification commitments relevant after the end of the Cold War. 
205 These include uses of satellites, radar, and electronic surveillance (Woolf, 2011, p.4). 
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Despite using a mix of verification tools in START I, their implementation 
demonstrated shortcomings in accuracy. As noted by Mark Donaldson (2010), there was 
occasionally a mismatch of information: “[…] the last data exchange under START I in July 
2009 reported United States as deploying over 5,900 warheads, when Pentagon said that the 
number was under the 2,200 limit of the Moscow Treaty.” The very approaches used to 
determine compliance showed weaknesses. For instance, rather than counting warheads, 
START I took delivery systems and their maximum capacity into account (Donaldson, 
2010). Conclusions regarding the warheads were, therefore, only projections. 
Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine, which inherited nuclear weapons and related 
facilities, were also subject to START I. The translocation of nuclear weapons as well as 
related material and facilities was not verified on an international level. All three states 
joined the IAEA as Non-Nuclear Weapon States and comply with their verification 
commitments. Ukraine, and Kazakhstan have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and 
Additional Protocol in force. Belarus does not have an Additional Protocol in force, but 
complies with its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (IAEA, 2019c). 
The Moscow Treaty (SORT) went “against the widely held view that reductions should 
be ‘irreversible’ and ‘effectively verifiable’” (Ifft, 2010, p.9). Other than START I, SORT 
did not include inspection rights. The only platform for checking the implementation of the 
treaty was a Bilateral Implementation Commission (Article III). This decision suggests a 
low output effectiveness regarding verification. 
By political decision-makers, SORT was described more as a supplement than a stand-
alone treaty. During the signing procedure, Russian President Vladimir Putin noted 
“[…] I’d like to point out that we’re very much satisfied with the U.S. 
administration approach to [verification]. Our American partners have agreed 
that we need to retain START I, which is provided for by the system of 
verification. We agreed we will continue this work on the basis of the 
documents signed today, as well” (in: White House, 2002). 
In this sense, the lack of formal verification in SORT was justified with the coexistence 
of verification in START I. Yet, in the wake of the 2005 Bilateral Implementation 
Commission meetings, Russia reportedly proposed a verification mechanism, which was not 
met with US approval (Yesin, 2008, pp.134–5). SORT was eventually superseded by New 
START, which included more institutionalized verification. 
New START builds upon START I in terms of verification. In addition to exchanges 
of data and notifications, the treaty allows for National Technical Means of verification and 
inspection activities (Articles VI, X, XI). In comparison with START I, the new provisions 
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streamline inspections. As noted by Mark Donaldson, they include less types of inspection 
while providing more information.206 A new tagging system and the ability to count 
warheads enhances accuracy (Donaldson, 2010). 
The Treaty also encourages each party to undertake ad-hoc transparency measures to 
clarify “ambiguous situations” (Article VIII). This provision is taking up the spirit of the 
SORT, which was more informal in verification than START I. New START can, thus, be 
seen as an evolutionary strengthening of output effectiveness in bilateral verification. 
The implementation (i.e. the outcome effectiveness) of the New START verification 
provisions is considered to be an important pillar of overall compliance with the agreement 
(e.g. Kristensen, 2018). The seven years between the treaty entering into force and its 
entering into effect have shown that the comprehensive verification tools have been applied 
as envisaged. Overall, the transparency measures between Russia and the United States 
included more than 14,600 notifications, 14 data exchanges, 252 on-site inspections, 14 
exhibitions, and 14 meetings of the Treaty’s Bilateral Consultative (US Department of State, 
2018). 
 
Impact (Possession of Nuclear Weapons) 
Verification can have two effects on compliance. On the one hand, the tools can offer 
transparency on state behavior and, on the other hand, they may deter non-compliance. How 
does verification on the possession of nuclear weapons relate to the larger regime 
compliance? 
Apart from intelligence analyses, transparency on nuclear weapon stocks and their 
stationing depend on verification commitments. Since only few disarmament agreements 
exist, it is not surprising to find even fewer verification concessions. Hence, particularly 
compared with the acquisition of nuclear weapons, the regime offers little tools for 
transparency of state behavior. 
One might argue that formal verification tools are not necessary to get an understanding 
of state behavior. Even worse, transparency on nuclear weapon capabilities may bear a 
proliferation risk, if inspectors forward observations to states pursuing nuclear weapons. In 
this case, the regime could have a negative impact. 
 
206 Furthermore, while New Start provides for 18 on-site inspections per year, in contrast to 28 inspections 
under START, only 35 Russian facilities come into question (in contrast to 70 facilities under START). 
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Questioning the relevance of verification in disarmament is legitimate. A number of 
NGO publications draw conclusions on existing nuclear weapon capabilities, irrespective of 
whether a state is part of a verification mechanism. There is reason to believe that these 
estimations have some value. For instance, following an announcement by former US 
Secretary of State, John Kerry, it was noted that both the number of active US warheads and 
of those to be dismantled were close to estimates in the FAS Nuclear Notebook (Kristensen, 
2015). 
Yet, this finding shall not ignore the fact that the availability of data varies when looking 
at different states. The US American nuclear capacities are better explored than others. For 
instance, the estimations of the Nuclear Notebook are based, among other sources, on the 
State Department’s published data on START I and New START.207 In other words, even 
“autonomous” sources use verification related data to enhance accuracy. 
Verification commitments, even though scarce, offer more tools for transparency. The 
added value of verification mechanisms becomes apparent when looking at bilateral 
agreements between the US and Russia. In comparison with START I, New START 
provides for more accurate tools to count the number of nuclear warheads and, thus, draw 
conclusions on compliance with the respective agreement. More than that, verification 
enhances predictability: 
“Like SALT I and most arms-control deals since, New START contained 
detailed verification and monitoring arrangements. These not only ensured 
that the two parties were doing what they had said. They also provided 
insights into how they ran their nuclear forces which improved confidence on 
both sides” (Economist, 2018). 
Another possible impact relates to verification as a deterrent. According to this line of 
thinking, we would expect a larger rule and norm compliance in states that are subject to 
verification. Yet, looking at shifts in nuclear weapon capabilities, there appears to be no 
immediate influence on norm compliance. 
The fact that agreements between the Soviet Union/Russia and the United States of 
America have different verification provisions does not appear to have changed compliance 
for the worse. Both states have adhered to START I, SORT, and New START, irrespective 
of the scope of verification. 
 
207 See footnote 1 in: Kristensen and Norris (2017, p.295). 
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China, France, India, Israel, North Korea, Pakistan, and the United Kingdom have 
refrained from structured disarmament verification.208 Their compliance with the regime 
differs significantly. China, India, Israel, North Korea, and Pakistan have, to a greater or 
lesser degree, increased their stockpiles (Appendix 3). In terms of deterrence, their nuclear 
programs are neither contained by commitment nor by verification. 
France and the United Kingdom have unilaterally decreased their nuclear weapon stocks 
in the last 20 years (Appendix 3). The cases show that refraining from making verification 
commitments209 does not mean non-compliance with the regime. Again, this would suggest 
that the effect of verification on compliance is limited. 
 
3.2.3. Use 
States’ commitments in the use of nuclear weapons can take different forms. They may 
refer to negative security assurances, nuclear weapon tests, peaceful nuclear explosions, or 
the application of nuclear weapons. As the previous chapter has shown, states with nuclear 
weapons have only made limited commitments. Nuclear Weapon States have given non-
binding and, except for China, conditional negative security assurances. The Soviet 
Union/Russia and the United States have signed bilateral agreements on peaceful nuclear 
explosions and the application of nuclear weapons. On an international level, most progress 
has been made regarding nuclear weapon tests. 
Given the low level of commitments in the first place, the regime offers even fewer 
avenues for verifying the possession of nuclear weapons. There are only two notable 
platforms for verification – the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the bilateral agreements 
between the two nuclear superpowers.210 Commitments in the field of negative security 
assurances are not subject to verification and are unlikely to be in the future. This is due to 
a lack of feasibility and usefulness of verifying state behavior. While the actual use of 
nuclear weapons in a conflict is an easy thing to spot, nuclear threats are not. 
 
 
208 On individual instances of disarmament, verification has been included. For instance, France used IAEA 
verification for the dismantlement of its nuclear test site. North Korea provisionally accepted verification in 
the context of the Six-Party-Talks. 
209 The United Kingdom also takes a leading role in research connected with disarmament verification (United 
Kingdom-Norway Initiative). 
210 In addition to IAEA verification, Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones also provide for reporting schemes for non-
compliance of state parties (see Appendix 4). Of course, nuclear weapon tests would fall into this category. 
However, in terms of verifying nuclear weapon tests, NWFZs do not offer significant added value in 
comparison with the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. 
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Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
Output 
International verification on a possible detonation of a nuclear device rests on the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Article IV) and associated decisions. Despite the name, 
verification of the CTBT not only focuses on tests, but “any nuclear explosion,” as outlined 
in the subject matter of the agreement (Art. I., Paragraph 1, CTBT). Since the nature and 
scope of a nuclear explosion cannot be determined right away, the treaty provides for 
different stages of verification: 
• International Monitoring System 
• Consultation and clarification 
• On-site inspections 
• Confidence-building measures 
(Article IV, Paragraph 1, CTBT) 
The combination of these verification elements is promising in spotting possible nuclear 
explosions in a state.211 One advantage is the variety of modern instruments that allows for 
transparency. A paramount feature that has largely been installed is the International 
Monitoring System (IMS). The IMS contains sophisticated, state-of-the-art monitoring to 
detect a suspicious event, including: 
• seismological monitoring 
• radionuclide monitoring including certified laboratories 
• hydroacoustic monitoring 
• infrastructure monitoring 
• means of communication 
• an international data center 
(Article IV, Paragraph 16, CTBT) 
In addition to technical sophistication, the verification is unbiased towards members in 
providing information (Article IV, Paragraph 4, CTBT). The IMS mechanism works broadly 
as follows: The monitoring stations and laboratories across the globe detect the location, 
time, and magnitude of nuclear tests. The data is subsequently submitted using satellite 
 
211 To what extent the system is able to detect minor tests remains subject to discussion, see e.g. Hansen (2006). 
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systems to the international data center in Vienna and data bulletins including data and 
analysis are forwarded to member states.212 
Also, when it comes to a possible case of non-compliance, the IMS system is meant to 
be objective and non-discriminatory. While the International Atomic Energy Agency’s 
approach is to judge on the correctness and completeness of state’s reports, spotting a 
suspicious activity under the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is more independent from a 
state in question. A state does not even have to be a member of the CTBT to set off its 
verification. This is illustrated best in data published in the context of North Korea’s nuclear 
weapon tests, which the CTBTO Preparatory Commission (PrepCom) has made available 
on its website.213 
The IMS system is also independent from the ratification status of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty. In other words, the CTBT does not need to be in force for the mechanisms 
to work. As a result, the verification system can already now spot suspicious events. In this 
regard, the output effectiveness of CTBT verification is actually higher than that of CTBT 
commitment. 
Despite these advantages of the IMS system, other elements of CTBT verification are 
currently ineffective. Since the elements of “consultation and clarification” as well as “on-
site inspections” depend on the treaty entering into force (CTBTO, 2012f), they are not yet 
in place. If an explosion were to take place in a CTBT signatory state, the nature of such 
could not be determined, because the tools that require physical presence in the area of 
concern are not available. Consequently, the verification system is able to detect a suspicious 
event and narrow down its location. Yet, the system is unable to fully judge on the nature of 
the event, which decreases output effectiveness. 
 
Outcome 
The success of the verification of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty depends on the 
political, financial, and logistical support of its member states (e.g. CTBTO, 2012h). Article 
IV, Paragraph 3, of the treaty lays out the verification commitments. By and large, member 
states shall cooperate in the clarification of outstanding issues (e.g. in consultation and on-
site inspections)214 and establish the infrastructure and communication means for the 
 
212 On the verification and communication procedures see CTBTO (2014b). 
213 See overview on nuclear weapon tests (CTBTO, 2016a). 
214 As this aspect depends on treaty ratification, it will not be discussed in this subsection. 
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monitoring system. In addition to that, states support verification through their budget 
contributions. How have states complied with the verification requirements? 
States’ contribution in implementing CTBT verification has been largely satisfactory. 
The CTBTO PrepCom has been tasked to lay the groundwork for verification to facilitate 
the entry into effect of the treaty. The PrepCom not only commends a quick implementation 
phase, but also states’ cooperation: 
“It is interesting to note that, even though the Treaty negotiations 
themselves were long, complex and hard fought, the period between the 
Treaty’s opening for signature, the establishment of the Commission, and the 
commencement of [Provisional Technical Secretariat] operations comprised 
a bare six months. This swift pace showed the urgency with which States 
Signatories were getting on with the establishment of an efficient and 
effective CTBTO” (CTBTO, 2016b). 
The International Monitoring System currently consists of 337 stations, of which 296 
are already certified, 10 installed, 6 under construction, and 25 planned (CTBTO, 2018b). 
Parts of the network of international monitoring stations could be integrated smoothly, since 
some national detection facilities had been in place before the CTBT opened for signature.215 
The functioning of the network has also been enhanced by technological developments: 
“Since 1996, the analysis procedures and technologies have improved so much that the IMS 
is already now capable to fulfill the verification requirements of the Treaty” (Bönnemann, 
2017, p.24). 
Some monitoring stations have not been implemented, also for political reasons.216 This 
observation shall not diminish the positive trend of verification implementation. For 
instance, the United States and China have not ratified the CTBT, but still contribute to the 
budget and provide data for IMS analysis (CTBTO, 2018b). They comply, without fully 
committing to the treaty. 
Another indicator that outcome effectiveness is higher than output effectiveness relates 
to the capacity building for on-site inspections. While such inspections can only be used 
once the treaty comes into force, the CTBTO PrepCom has made great progress in 
facilitating their implementation. Two major “Integrated Field Exercises” took place in 2008 
and 2014. The inspection tools have been enhanced and are now mostly tested. This 
underscores the accuracy of on-site inspections. If implemented, “[t]here is a high 
 
215 The United States, for instance, began in the late 1940s (Hansen, 2006, p.57). 
216 Other hurdles included environmental, technical challenges, logistical and administrative challenges 
(CTBTO, 2012h). 
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probability of detecting evidence of a nuclear explosion during a CTBTO on-site inspection” 
(Gestermann, Müller, and Groneschild, 2017, p.259). 
A further positive sign for outcome effectiveness is budget compliance. Although the 
treaty is not in force, the PrepCom needs to be financed. The budget for verification of the 
CTBT consists of assessed and voluntary contributions from member states (similar to the 
UN), following the “ability to pay,” based on national income (CTBTO, 2012c).217 Budget 
compliance is high. In 2018, the collection rate was above 90% (CTBTO, 2018a). 
Room for improvement is to be found in the establishment of a domestic communication 
system. Signatory states of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty are called upon to install 
National Data Centers, which are voluntary but highly recommended by the PrepCom to 
facilitate the communication with the International Data Centre and the evaluation of data. 
100 States have installed such a center (CTBTO, 2012d). The remaining states have limited 
access to information, in case of the detection of a suspicious event. 
 
Bilateral Agreements between the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia 
Output and Outcome 
The United States of America and the Soviet Union/Russia have made various 
commitments on a bilateral level that address the use of nuclear weapons. These refer to 
nuclear weapon tests, peaceful nuclear explosions, and the application of nuclear weapons 
and are embedded in a network of agreements: 
• Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty (START) I 
• New Strategic Arms Reductions Treaty 
• Threshold Test Ban Treaty (TTBT) 
• Peaceful Nuclear Explosions (PNE) Treaty 
• Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty 
• Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces (INF) Treaty 
All of these treaties provide for means to observe compliance, although the exact tools 
differ. While verification in START I and New START has already been considered in the 
subsection on the possession of nuclear weapons, it is worth taking a brief look at other 
 
217 An overview of payments can be found in CTBTO (2017). 
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agreements. As the following overview demonstrates, the bilateral commitments take up 
three elements of verification, i.e. National Technical Means, consultations, and inspections: 
 
Table 5 – Verification: US and Russia/Soviet Union (Use of Nuclear Weapons) 
 National Technical Means Consultation Inspections 
ABM 
Treaty218 
Make use of own NTM, do 
not interfere with other 
party’s NTM (Art. XII) 
Standing Consultative 
Commission (Art. XIII) 
No 
INF Treaty Make use of own NTM, do 
not interfere with other 
party’s NTM (Art. XII) 
Special Verification 
Commission (Art. XIII) 
Yes (Article XI + 
Protocol)219 
TTBT Make use of own NTM, do 
not interfere with other 
party’s NTM (Art. II) 
Consultation as necessary 
(Art. II), Bilateral 
Consultative Commission 
(Sect. XI in Protocol) 
Yes (Sect. III + VII in 
Protocol) 
PNE Treaty Make use of own NTM, do 
not interfere with other 
party’s NTM (Art. IV) 
Joint Consultative 
Commission (Art. V) 
Yes (Sect. III + VII in 
Protocol) 
 
Providing for National Technical Means in all of the agreements shows the importance 
of and confidence in both states’ domestic technical infrastructure to gather information. The 
treaties entitle the states to make use of their means and demand not to obstruct the 
respectively other party in their application of NTM. Consultations have different purposes, 
including sharing information and updating technical details. They are also meant as a 
platform for clarifying issues of possible non-compliance. 
In terms of outcome effectiveness, the latter has become particularly important in the 
context of the INF Treaty. Russia and the United States have used consultations to bring 
forward their observations of possible treaty violations by the respectively other party. 
Instead of resolving the allegations or offering more transparency, divisions appear to have 
entrenched during consultations. “Proof” of treaty violations as well as assurances of 
compliances have been refuted on both sides (see e.g. Woolf, 2018). In 2019, the United 
States and Russia announced their withdrawal from the treaty. 
Verification also played a crucial role in the Threshold Test Ban Treaty and its sister 
treaty, the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty. Edward Ifft (2009), who was as a member 
 
218 Although providing for verification, the ABM Treaty plays a subordinate role in its use, compared with 
other treaties listed here. It will, therefore, not be discussed in further detail. 
219 On-site inspections in the context of the INF Treaty ended in 2001 with the completion of the elimination 
of the relevant items (Woolf, 2018, p.13). 
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of the US delegation part of the negotiations in 1974, provides a good account of the evolving 
development and implementation of verification tools. He emphasizes technical and political 
challenges in the wake of concluding and implementing verification. Technically, predicting 
and determining the exact yield of a nuclear explosion was considered difficult (Ifft, 2009). 
Politically, the implementation of verification tools necessary to reduce uncertainties 
evolved over time, as Ifft continues to describe. Many provisions (including the exchange of 
data, notification of explosions, and on-site inspections) did not take form until Mikhail 
Gorbachev became General Secretary. After the full verification instruments came to be 
available in 1990, the Soviet Union could monitor two tests by the United States, until 
nuclear tests were stopped. The Soviets had already put a moratorium in place before, 
depriving the US from tests to be monitored (Ifft, 2009). 
 
Impact (Use of Nuclear Weapons) 
What effect does verification on the use of nuclear weapons offer for transparency and 
norm compliance? Looking at the bilateral agreements between the nuclear superpowers 
may leave skepticism regarding the usefulness of verification in ensuring compliance. On 
the one hand, shortcomings in transparency may be accepted without a negative effect on 
compliance. On the other hand, observations may become a political tool that makes 
cooperation more difficult. 
The Threshold Test Ban Treaty and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty 
demonstrate technical challenges in verification. We cannot say today to what extent the 
parties may have violated the treaty unintentionally in the past (Ifft, 2009). Despite this 
uncertainty, both treaties remain in force. The US and Russia have not detonated nuclear 
devices in more than 25 years, leaving little room for heated debates about the agreements. 
In the case of the INF treaty, information may have contributed to tension. The existing 
verification provisions have turned into platforms for political debate on treaty compliance. 
Rather than clarifying issues, “evidence” of the respectively other side has been rebuffed as 
being insufficient or misinterpreted. This shows that even when verification provisions are 
being implemented, they may fail to ensure treaty compliance. To the contrary, they become 
tools for political exchanges. 
The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty offers more room for optimism. A large share of 
its verification tools was meant to be ready before the treaty’s entering into force. This 
chronology has a major advantage. Although crucial states still have failed to ratify the 
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CTBT, larger nuclear weapon tests are unlikely to remain undetected. The precision of 
technology was praised by Hans Blix (in: CTBTO, 2016c), former Director General of the 
IAEA, who acknowledged that “[t]here is hardly any area in which the verification system 
is more reliable than in the area of nuclear testing.” 
Transparency even exceeds nuclear weapon tests. Verification also covers peaceful 
nuclear explosions (Bönnemann, 2017, p.21) and has possible applications in the field of 
natural catastrophes, such as tsunamis (Bauer and O’Reilly, 2015, p.146). This suggests a 
positive regime impact, also because it has triggered interest from states outside of the 
current CTBT realm. For instance, former CTBTO Executive Secretary Wolfgang Hoffmann 
recalled after a trip to Pakistan that the state was interested in the civilian use of CTBT 
verification tools and that officials had not been aware of the broad range of its technical 
applications “from tsunami to ash cloud warning to the study of climate change and 
pollution” (CTBTO, 2014a). 
The biggest problem of transparency in the context of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty rests with the ability to make decisive conclusions regarding suspicious events. 
Despite the CTBTO Preparatory Commission’s ability to circulate data on nuclear weapon 
tests in North Korea, conclusions did not include on-site inspections. Instead, it evaluated 
official comments made in North Korean media. Its analysis was, therefore, not fully 
independent from the state. 
In addition to transparency, another crucial factor of verification impact must take into 
account norm compliance. There appears to be a correlation between verification compliance 
and norm compliance. North Korea, India, and Pakistan, which have tested nuclear weapons, 
have no active role in CTBT verification. They do neither contribute to the CTBT budget 
nor host monitoring stations.220 
The opposite holds true as well. All states that have ratified the CTBT and/or support 
its verification system largely comply with the regime norm not to test nuclear weapons. As 
noted by Bauer and O`Reilly, verification and norms appear to go hand in hand: 
“In that light, even before entry into force, there is not only a globally 
emerging norm against nuclear testing, but also a verification architecture in 
place that already surpasses those of many legally binding instruments in 
international arms control” (Bauer and O’Reilly, 2015, p.138). 
 
220 In Pakistan, the integration of an infrasound and a seismic facility into the IMS is planned (CTBTO, 2018b). 
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Accordingly, verification in the context of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty can be 
considered a great success of the non-proliferation regime. This is somewhat ironic 
considering that the treaty it is supposed to verify has not even entered into force. 
 
3.3. Explaining Effectiveness 
3.3.1. Security 
The remaining part of this chapter will examine possible driving factors for state 
behavior that may strengthen or weaken the verification system of the non-proliferation 
regime. One explanatory factor for cooperation and non-cooperation regarding regime 
verification are security considerations. Following the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1, a 
state will commit to and comply with verification, if it satisfies its security needs. Vice-
versa, a state may consider its security compromised under verification commitment and 




Since the end of the Cold War, the greatest development in verifying the non-acquisition 
of nuclear weapons have been the strengthened safeguards of the IAEA, including 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements with an Additional Protocol. The predominant 
argument in academic literature for why states accepted enhanced verification measures 
relates to the painful experiences from the cases of Iraq and North Korea. 
North Korea demonstrated a judicial quagmire. The state failed to fulfill its NPT 
requirements for a long time, in that negotiations about a CSA did not materialize (Petritz, 
2012, p.107). Instead of rejecting safeguards right away, Pyongyang continued a half-
hearted pursuance of safeguards, thereby, hampering effective verification of its non-
proliferation commitments. 
Iraq questioned the very usefulness of existing safeguards.221 Somewhat coincidently 
troops taking part in the operation “Desert Storm” found signs for a clandestine program 
(Petritz, 2012, p.107). The case made short-term verification actions and a long-term 
solution necessary. On the one hand, the IAEA should better implement the tools it already 
 
221 The graveness of Iraqi non-compliance is reflected in IAEA debates and documentation (See e.g. IAEA 
Board of Governors, 1991). 
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had at hand. On the other hand, further reporting, inspection rights, and other investigative 
tools became necessary (Findlay, 2007, p.48). 
Particularly the experience from Iraq cast a dark shadow on the debate within the IAEA 
on strengthening measures. During a Board of Governors meeting in 1996, Nelson F. 
Sievering, then US representative to the IAEA, pointed to a mismatch between overall 
regime compliance and verification tools. After all, Iraq was able to develop a significant 
nuclear weapons track without raising a flag at the IAEA. Originally, there was no proof that 
the state broke verification commitments (IAEA Board of Governors, 1996b, Paragraphs 
30–45). 
The debates within the Board of Governors showed that some states followed an 
understanding of reciprocity: “In other words, states comply with international law because 
they see (or expect) others to comply” (Onderco, 2017, p.398). Representatives from South 
Korea and Morocco explicitly noted that they were willing to accept a greater burden for the 
sake of a strengthened international security (IAEA Board of Governors, 1996b, Paragraph 
104; 1996c, Paragraph 74). This argumentation would explain why the vast majority of states 
was willing to commit, without ever having caused suspicion themselves. According to 
IAEA Director General Hans Blix, in addition to facilitating peaceful nuclear activities, 
transparency provisions were aimed at strengthening the confidence among states (IAEA 
Board of Governors, 1996a). 
The debates also reflect an awareness of a window of opportunity, especially triggered 
by the Iraqi non-compliance.222 During the talks at the Board of Governors on strengthening 
safeguards, the IAEA Director General commended the continuous momentum of talks and 
argued that it shall not be lost. To facilitate the conclusion of the talks, he advertised a 
committee to formulate verification provisions (IAEA Board of Governors, 1996a). This 
suggests that the timing itself was used as an instrument and gave momentum for 
strengthening the regime. A historical institutionalist would call it a critical juncture. 
Security considerations are also an explanation for the apparent paradox surrounding 
the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, where some states support verification although 
failing to ratify the treaty. In fact, verification may be considered a premise for overall 
regime commitment. Following Gideon Frank, Director General of the Israel Atomic Energy 
Commission, Israeli decision-making in the CTBT context depends on “the level of 
 
222 A similar reference to a window of opportunity is also made by Trevor Findlay (2007, p.48). 
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development and readiness of the verification regime achieved by the Prep-Com, its 
effectiveness and immunity to abuse” (Frank, 1999). 
Similarly, as argued by the Permanent Representation of China in Vienna, Chinese 
cooperation in the field of verification is seen as a way to facilitate an entry into force of the 
treaty (FMPRC, 2004). The verification system, in turn, also depends on states like China 
that have not ratified the treaty in order to function. During a 2018 opening ceremony of 4 
IMS stations in China, Lassina Zerbo, Executive Secretary of the CTBTO PrepCom, stated: 
“The international monitoring system and comprehensive test 
responsibilities [are] relying on the experts in China, with their skills and 
technical capabilities to build us a verification regime to support a world free 
from nuclear test” (Zerbo in: Ge, 2018). 
Global support is a precondition for reliable test ban verification. Reliable verification, 
in turn, can be seen to condition commitment to and compliance with the treaty. 
Unfortunately, this chronology may lead to a vicious circle, as the full capacity of 
verification depends on the treaty entering into force. CTBT verification has significantly 
advanced in the last two decades. Nonetheless, key states have failed to ratify the treaty 
which is why the argument of verification conditioning commitment shall not be 
overestimated. 
Verification may still serve as a platform for a larger regime commitment, rather than 
the other way around. Verification was a driving force in furthering the relationship 
between Brazil and Argentina. Both states embedded nuclear verification in the ABACC. 
According to Argentinian nuclear expert Sonia Fernández-Moreno, who was part of the 
bilateral verification negotiations, the “ABACC is more than a safeguards agreement: it’s 
a non-proliferation agreement between Argentina and Brazil” (in: Kutchesfahani, 2014, 
p.24). Following this understanding, the agreement offered security related gains that 
exceeded the immediate advantages of verification. 
Transparency and confidence have also been pivotal in the nuclear relationship between 
the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia. Both states maintain a technical 
infrastructure that is more sophisticated than that of other states. As noted by Keith Hansen 
(2006, p.35), the inclusion of National Technical Means has helped bringing forward 
bilateral nuclear talks during the Cold War. 
While the confidence in their own tools was a good point to get started on a verification 
infrastructure, looking at more recent bilateral disarmament, the importance of accuracy of 
verification has increased. This is particularly to be seen in New START. The element of 
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foresight as a security gain was emphasized by former US Secretary of State John Kerry, 
who praised the treaty as follows: 
“[New START] gives us the confidence and level of oversight we need 
– and could not otherwise have – by allowing U.S. inspectors unprecedented 
access to Russian nuclear facilities. […] New START furthers our goals to 
promote trust, transparency, predictability, and stability” (Kerry, 2016). 
The direct link between transparency and security was also pointed out by former 
Russian President Dmitry Medvedev. During the New START signing ceremony in Prague, 
he noted that the mechanism “ensures the proper verification, irreversibility and 
transparency of the entire process of reducing strategic offensive arms” (in: White House, 
2010). In this sense, verification is an important pillar of a larger security arrangement, 
rather than a complement. 
 
Non-Cooperation 
There are also cases to be found where security considerations appear to have hampered 
verification commitment. Overall, there seem to be three arguments for why states are 
reluctant to cooperate: 
1. Verification fails to enhance transparency and security 
2. Verification means are intrusive 
3. Verification would contradict the larger nuclear strategy 
The first security obstacle is a potential doubt of the usefulness of enhanced 
verification measures. This was noticeable in the reform of IAEA safeguards. The original 
Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements (on the basis of INFCIRC/153) were a compromise 
of what was possible and needed, but Iraq demonstrated that the absence of proof was no 
proof of absence.223 Even though today the IAEA declares for states that implement a CSA 
and an Additional Protocol that all nuclear material was used peacefully, the agency cannot 
possibly verify the non-diversion from bulk-handling facilities (Findlay, 2007, p.50). 
The debate on strengthening the IAEA verification tools was marked by questioning its 
security value, in that it leaves larger issues at stake unaddressed. The Indian representative 
said that enhanced verification measures fail to create a universal nuclear order, the only 
thing that would help to solve the “nuclear dilemma.” In the same discussion, the Israeli 
representative emphasized the importance of the political context of an agreement. Although 
 
223 See also Rich Hooper (1999, p.10). 
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Israel supported stronger verification measures in principle, there was no verification tool 
that could secure a state’s compliance (IAEA Board of Governors, 1996c, Paragraphs 52, 
96–7). 
Within the realm of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, verification was even one of 
the arguments put forward to resist treaty ratification in the US Senate. More specifically, 
opponents argued “that the Treaty is unverifiable because it is not possible to monitor nuclear 
testing activity down to the zero-yield advocated by the Clinton Administration” (Hansen, 
2006, p.51). Despite expert assessments that the CTBT was by and large verifiable, several 
decision-makers remained skeptical.224 Until today, the US Senate has failed to ratify the 
treaty. 
In contrast to his predecessor, US President George W. Bush avoided verification to 
which the United States could be subject. On the one hand, his administration pushed for 
weak verification instruments in SORT. This decision is in line with a decreasing perception 
of a security threat following the end of the Cold War. US Secretary Donald Rumsfeld 
argued during a Senate Hearing that SORT merely puts into writing unilateral 
announcements to reduce stocks and that the US would no longer define its military 
infrastructure as a response to the other nuclear superpower (Woolf, 2011, p.8). According 
to this line of thinking, verification would only be relevant in the context of a strong security 
incentive. 
On the other hand, the Bush administration offered a proposal for a Fissile Material 
(Cutoff) Treaty that excluded specific verification provisions altogether, arguing that the 
treaty was effectively not verifiable and that, by establishing verification mechanisms, “the 
appearance of effective verification could provide a false sense of security” (Ford, 2007). 
The verification of compliance has been an important point of contention in the context of a 
Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. The suggestions put forward reach from a comprehensive 
approach to a focused approach, to no verification at all (BASIC, 2013, pp.10–2). 
A further security concern of states is the intrusiveness of verification measures. As 
noted by former IAEA Director General Hans Blix, states traditionally tend to oppose 
intrusive inspections (in: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). In the committee to develop 
stronger verification measures for the IAEA in the wake of the Iraq discoveries, the 
“confidentiality of information obtained by the Agency” turned out to be one of the most 
discussed topics (IAEA General Conference, 1996). Likewise, individual comments by state 
 
224 For a summary of Senate discussions surrounding CTBT verification see e.g. Hansen (2006, pp.50–3). 
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representatives in the Board of Governors urged for a sensible balance of verification 
tools.225 
The negotiation and implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty verification 
was marked by similar fears. Keith Hansen, member of the US negotiation team, describes 
that several states were concerned about the intrusiveness of on-site inspections. This led to 
difficulties in hammering out the details for the mechanism (Hansen, 2006, pp.30–6). 
Despite “bumps in the road” during the negotiations of the IAEA reforms and the CTBT, it 
needs to be pointed out that both verification platforms eventually received great support. 
Finally, verification may contradict the very nuclear policy of a state. Just as security 
considerations may motivate a nuclear weapons program (e.g. Onderco, 2017, p.394), 
revealing details of said program may be harming. It is not surprising that states with nuclear 
weapons are very careful about agreeing to and complying with comprehensive verification. 
Libya, North Korea, and Iraq – which will be discussed in greater detail in the next chapter 
– all made their verification commitment dependent on the nature of their program. 
Furthermore, the very use of nuclear ambiguity may be a tool for deterrence (Hymans, 
2006, pp.456–8). This is particularly true for Israel’s strategy of nuclear opacity. Although 
sharing the idea of deterrence with Nuclear Weapon States, the ladder in establishing a 
nuclear weapons program is quite different in Israel’s case (Cochran, 1996, pp.322–3). Any 
action that may confirm an actual nuclear weapon status, such as a public nuclear weapon 
test, would contradict the strategy. 
Accordingly, the state has refuted intrusive verification of its own program (Datan, 
2010, p.39). This is unlikely to change in the near future. First, nuclear opacity is considered 
by many as “one of the Jewish state’s greatest strategic and diplomatic success stories” 
(Cohen and Miller, 2010, p.31). Transparency would threaten that success. Second, the 
larger security context would have to improve (e.g. recognition of Israel by other states, 
establishment of a WMDFZ). Third, openness may significantly put a security risk to the 
state, since Arab states threatened that they would leave the Non-Proliferation Treaty, if 
Israel were to announce its program (Cohen and Miller, 2010, p.31). 
 
 
225 For instance, concerns about intrusiveness and calls for an efficient approach were mentioned on the Board 
of Governors by South Korea, India, and Germany (IAEA Board of Governors, 1996b, Paragraphs 106–8; 
1997a, Paragraphs 55, 82). 
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3.3.2. Norms 
States may also be influenced by normative considerations in their nuclear policy. 
Chapter 2 has shown that there are particularly two normative aspects that influence regime 
commitment and compliance. One refers to the firm belief that nuclear weapons are a threat 
to humanity. The other consideration relates to the premise of fairness. Both aspects may 
also play into states’ decision-making in verification. Taking a normative stance, we can 
expect a state to commit and comply with regime verification if cooperation is fair and 
satisfies international law. If, however, non-cooperation represents fairness and international 
law, then the state will refrain from committing to and complying with regime verification. 
 
Cooperation 
Humanitarian considerations have played an important role in shaping the 
commitment system of the non-proliferation regime (see previous chapter). Looking at 
verification, humanitarian concerns appear to be subordinate, particularly in comparison 
with the demand for fairness. Nonetheless, verification debates make occasional references 
to humanitarian aspects. 
One of the platforms used to put forth humanitarian concerns were the IAEA Board of 
Governors debates in the 1990s devoted to strengthening the agency’s means of verification. 
Here, Kuwait noted that stronger tools for the IAEA were a contribution to the global effort 
of the elimination of weapons of mass destruction. Iran, Malaysia, and Mexico used their 
remarks on the proposal to point to the goal of a world free of nuclear weapons and the 
overall necessity to disarm that goes along with it (IAEA Board of Governors, 1997a, 
Paragraph 68; 1997b, Paragraphs 1–2, 10, 13, 56). 
Despite a humanitarian reference, none of these states explicitly connected their own 
verification commitment with the global norm. To the contrary, Malaysia still has no 
Additional Protocol in force and Iran is only provisionally implementing the protocol as part 
of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. This suggests that the humanitarian reference 
was not meant for themselves but rather for other states, including those that possess nuclear 
weapons. 
Verification compliance is frequently described as an extension of a general 
commitment to the non-proliferation regime. This is to be seen in the context of the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. For instance, Wolfgang Hoffmann (2000), Executive 
Secretary of the CTBTO PrepCom at the time, argued in 2000 in the UN General Assembly 
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that the high budget collection rate demonstrated a willingness to support the overall purpose 
of the treaty. There appears to be a notion of obligation also among states that have not 
ratified the CTBT. 
Similarly, the domestic implementation of the verification infrastructure is connected 
with an overall commitment. Hoffmann’s successor Lassina Zerbo commended the 
commissioning of four monitoring stations in China, describing the responsibility of an 
individual state as part of a global goal: 
“The CTBT provides China with an opportunity to demonstrate its 
leadership, dedication and independence on an issue on which nearly the 
entire international community is united. […] China has also set a positive 
example for other Member States by robustly increasing its engagement on 
technical issues related to the Treaty’s verification regime” (CTBTO, 2018c). 
The idea of keeping up with a commitment was echoed in China. Ambassador Shi 
Zhongjun of the Chinese Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Vienna proclaimed 
that “China was one of the first countries to sign the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban 
Treaty. The certification of these four stations fully exhibits China’s responsible attitude in 
realizing its commitment” (in: Ge, 2018). 
A greater normative driving factor for cooperation than humanitarian considerations 
seems to be the aspect of fairness. Although the primary aim of the enhanced verification 
tools for the IAEA were to better prevent a horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, also 
Nuclear Weapon States made voluntary commitments to implement at least parts of the 
protocol. 
While other NWS selectively agreed to apply verification measures, the United States 
announced that it would implement all provisions of the Additional Protocol, as long as they 
would not affect national security concerns. The US repeatedly mentioned on the IAEA 
Board of Governors that it followed an understanding of fairness. The state referred to a 
1967 announcement by President Johnson that it would not demand from other states to 
implement safeguards that it would deem unacceptable for itself (IAEA Board of Governors, 
1997a, Paragraph 47). 
A similar notion was reflected in a statement by US President Bill Clinton who 
emphasized that “[…] the United States stands ready to accept the new safeguards as fully 
as possible in our country consistent with our obligations under the NPT” (IAEA Board of 
Governors, 1997b, Paragraph 30). In this light, fairness played into the decision of the United 
States to accept verification commitments. 
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The commitment was also a concession to states with Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements to ease their acceptance of the Additional Protocol. Following Hans Blix, states 
like Germany and Belgium were skeptical “having inspectors milling around, especially as 
the nuclear weapons states did not have to do it” (in: Council on Foreign Relations, 2014). 
As described by Werner Petritz (2012, pp.111–2), reluctance on behalf of some Western 
Non-Nuclear Weapon States could only be eased after the United States declared that it 
would also put some of its civilian nuclear facilities under the Additional Protocol. 
As the Board of Governors (1997a; 1997b) records show, the United States’ decision 
was applauded by several NNWS. The importance devoted to its voluntary verification 
commitment cannot be explained with significant security gains or a status change, as the 
United States remains a Nuclear Weapon State with an active nuclear weapons program. 
Neither can economic considerations explain the commitment, because further verification 
also enhances the costs of the whole mechanism. The decision can primarily be seen as a 
signal to share the burden of verification. 
Fairness has also played a role in shaping the very capacity for verification. This is a 
particular challenge considering that states have different means to collect and analyze data. 
Ideally, verification in an international agreement compensates for these dissimilarities to 
allow for a non-discriminatory and reliable system for its members. A fair provision of data 
is also crucial to provide for regime enforcement. 
Accordingly, in the negotiations of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, states like 
China, India, and Pakistan feared “that the superpowers would use their superior national 
monitoring capabilities (read intelligence) to the disadvantage of less capable countries” 
(Hansen, 2011, p.16). The eventual verification tools of the CTBT are aimed at providing 
benefits to all participating states. While the communication system itself requires support 
from the member states, they have an equal right to access monitoring data and bulletins 
from the organization (CTBTO, 2012d). 
 
Non-Cooperation 
Verification in the non-proliferation regime may appear to resemble a puzzle. Why are 
states that are not seeking nuclear weapons and “have nothing to hide” reluctant to 
implement mechanisms like the Additional Protocol?226 While a number of reasons have 
 
226 The question relates to a larger puzzle: “Why do states that are members of the NPT refrain from undertaking 
further commitments that would strengthen the regime?” (See e.g. Grotto, 2010; Enia, 2014). 
 160 
been put forward for this observation,227 the premise of fairness appears to have significantly 
contributed to states’ reservations against verification commitments. Fairness offers two 
shades of restraints: one referring to measures as being “unjust” and another one perceiving 
them as “one-sided.” 
Although not leading to an outright rejection of verification measures, the fear of being 
treated unjustly has contributed to shaping the verification of Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty. As noted by Hansen (2006, p.31), some states initially argued that Nuclear Weapon 
States should finance verification. Put differently, why should states that have no intention 
of testing and have no record of doing so in the past be subject to the costs? 
Furthermore, instead of offering insight on a state’s regime compliance the tool of 
transparency could be exploited by other states. A major concern during the CTBT 
negotiations was that on-site inspections could give opportunity to ill-minded states for 
intelligence gathering (Hansen, 2006, pp.30–6).228 In order to allow for a more objective 
assessment of compliance, “[n]o national of the requesting State Party or the inspected State 
Party shall be a member of the inspection team” (CTBT, Part II, A.9). 
A similar line of thinking is to be found in the rejection of the International Atomic 
Energy Agency as a potential CTBT verification body. States that have only limited 
agreements with the IAEA, notably Israel, India, and Pakistan, were worried that data within 
the same institution could easily be transferred and be used for other verification purposes 
(Hansen, 2006, p.30). Although making the CTBT more attractive for these states by leaving 
the IAEA aside, none of them has ratified the treaty. 
Fairness may also mean that measures are one-sided, a criticism which is often 
connected with the demand for a universality of verification measures. Regarding the 
Additional Protocol, universality may refer to different things. Traditionally, it relates to the 
goal that all Non-Nuclear Weapon States implement a Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement with an Additional Protocol.229 In addition to that, mostly for NNWS, the notion 
of universality applies to all states, including those with nuclear weapons. Here, verification 
 
227 A summary of arguments broadly related to power, interests, and norms can be found in Enia (2014). 
228 Such a concern is not far-fetched, considering that, as noted by Hans Blix, there is reason to believe that US 
participation in the UNSCOM inspections was used or at least perceived to be used for intelligence gathering 
(e.g. to make out possible targets) (in: Hansen, 2006, p.18). 
229 See e.g. Action 29 of the Action Plan concluded in the 2010 NPT Review Conference, which promotes the 
implementation of Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements and the Additional Protocol in NPT state parties. 
Although this also includes Nuclear Weapon States, the action is listed in the subsection on “nuclear non-
proliferation” (NPT Review Conference, 2010). 
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commitments are part of the original bargain of non-proliferation in exchange for nuclear 
disarmament (see e.g. Grotto, 2010, pp.1–2; Tannenwald, 2013, pp.304–5). 
A prominent example of the latter position is the Islamic Republic of Iran, which over 
the last years has been under suspicion of seeking nuclear weapons, while declaring the 
contrary. During the 2010 NPT Review Conference, President Ahmadinejad criticized 
Nuclear Weapon States by declaring: “The IAEA has been putting the most possible 
pressures on non-nuclear weapon states under the pretext of proliferation risks, whilst those 
having nuclear bombs continue to enjoy full immunity and exclusive rights” (Ahmadinejad, 
2010). During the last NPT Review Conference, Iran – this time on behalf of the NAM230 – 
again criticized that NWS were not doing enough to keep their end of the bargain (Zarif, 
2015). 
Already during the IAEA Board of Governors talks on strengthening the verification 
tools, some states criticized the limited involvement of Nuclear Weapon States in the 
verification process. Except for the United States, NWS were called upon to implement 
further measures from the Additional Protocol. A very critical voice was offered by Spain, 
which appeared staggered about the selectiveness of verification measures (IAEA Board of 
Governors, 1997b, Paragraph 55). Yet, Non-Nuclear Weapon States rarely depended their 
cooperation on NWS cooperation. A notable exception is Switzerland, which announced on 
the Board of Governors that its parliament would await the Nuclear Weapon States’ 
implementation of verification before deciding on the Additional Protocol (IAEA Board of 
Governors, 1997a, Paragraph 110). 
In addition to the Nuclear Weapon States, states outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
became a target for NNWS. Here, the sentiment of unfairness also materialized as an 
extension of a regional conflict. As result of this, Egypt has rejected to implement the 




Economic benefits from nuclear energy have been part of the non-proliferation regime 
since its very foundation. In order to achieve them, states may be willing to accept 
verification. At the same time, the implementation of safeguards and the maintenance of 
 
230 In general, the Non-Aligned Movement is a strong supporter of nuclear disarmament. See also Grotto (2010, 
pp.14–21) and Petritz (2012, p.137). 
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verification bodies demand a financial and logistical effort, the anticipation of which may 
cause reluctance to comply. 
Hence, it is worth considering whether economic considerations have affected states’ 
cooperation in the verification system. We can expect a state to commit to and comply with 
regime verification if cooperation enhances economic benefits. If, however, non-cooperation 
enhances economic benefits, then the state will refrain from committing to and complying 
with regime verification. 
 
Cooperation 
Economic incentives have played an important role in the conclusion of verification 
commitments. As demonstrated in the last chapter, states associate benefits with joining the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty in the first place. Concluding a Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreement with the IAEA is an extension of a larger NPT commitment, in which Non-
Nuclear Weapon States renounce nuclear weapons to enjoy the benefits of peaceful nuclear 
energy. The link between NPT commitment and verification is strong. Only 11 Non-Nuclear 
Weapon States do not have a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement in force (see Appendix 
5). 
The importance of verification is also resembled in nuclear trade. The Zangger Group 
and the Nuclear Suppliers Group give verification guidelines for trade. Hence, nuclear 
suppliers, whether providing nuclear material or equipment, have enhanced the scope of 
bilateral verification agreements. As noted by John Carlson in 2005, the greatest network of 
bilateral verification agreements includes either Australia, Canada, or the United States of 
America. While Australia and Canada make up 65 % of the world’s uranium production, the 
United States is a major player in enriching material. Overall, “80 per cent of uranium in the 
global civil nuclear industry is estimated to have [US] consent rights attached” (Carlson, 
2005, p.1). 
Looking at specific agreements, states have accepted significant verification demands 
in exchange for economic benefits. Two prominent cases are India and Iran. Iran accepted, 
among limits on its nuclear weapons program, enhanced verification measures in exchange 
for a sanctions relieve in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (see following chapter). 
Since the conclusion of the agreement, the Islamic Republic has provisionally implemented 
and complied with the Additional Protocol. 
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India considerably enhanced its international verification commitment on the basis of a 
bilateral nuclear deal with the United States. The 123 Agreement offered New Delhi nuclear 
trade and assistance as well as support for its satellite program. The composition of the 
agreement was expected to allow India to expand its nuclear program, while attracting 
popular support domestically. For instance, the formulation of the treaty was chosen to 
emphasize advantages for the rural areas in India (Baru, 2015). 
Although the bilateral agreement was controversial, as it recognized the nuclear weapon 
status of India (see e.g. Kimball, 2005), the economic incentive led to a direct impact on the 
Indian nuclear program. The state agreed to separate its civilian and military program and 
accepted IAEA verification on its civilian nuclear track. On this basis, the agreement further 
included a non-party to the NPT into the non-proliferation regime. 
Moreover, the very nature of a commitment may decrease the financial and logistical 
burden on a state, thereby, making verification more attractive. The Small Quantities 
Protocol allows Non-Nuclear Weapon States with small nuclear activities to comply with 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty without facing a bulk of verification demands. Unsurprisingly, 
SQPs enjoy great popularity (see Appendix 5). 
In a general effort to strengthen safeguards, the IAEA Board of Governors concluded in 
2005 that SQP are a weakness to the existing safeguards. In order to close loopholes, the 
original text was amended. Despite the recognition of security concerns based on the original 
Small Quantities Protocol, various states urged that amendments should be kept to what is 
necessary. The Argentinian representative demanded that verification activities need to be 
proportionate to dimension of nuclear program. South Africa acknowledged that the old SQP 
provisions were problematic. Nonetheless, further financial burden should be minimized 
(IAEA Board of Governors, 2006b, Paragraphs 105, 110). 
The exchanges on the Board of Governors also demonstrated how important assistance 
in the safeguard implementation is for SQP state parties. Repeatedly, state representatives 
commended the assistance of the International Atomic Energy Agency in providing support 
for the smaller states in fulfilling their verification duties, including training and guidelines 
on the implementation of the Small Quantities Protocol (IAEA Board of Governors, 2006b). 
 
Non-Cooperation 
There are two predominant economic considerations that have caused skepticism on 
behalf of states in accepting verification: One refers to objections against the costs, the other 
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to the economic intrusiveness of the measures. While serving as argument to reject 
verification in some cases, the concerns were mostly integrated into shaping the verification 
measures. 
Every debate surrounding verification appears to a smaller or larger extent to be subject 
to cost objections, including bilateral agreements between US and Russia, the Fissile 
Material (Cutoff) Treaty (BASIC, 2013), or the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBTO, 
2012e). In the larger discussions surrounding the Additional Protocol, virtually every IAEA 
institution (Secretariat, the Director General, the Board of Governors, General Conference) 
pushed for keeping costs of the measures to a minimum (see e.g. IAEA General Conference, 
1993). Paving the way for an agreement, a Standing Advisory Group on Safeguards 
Implementation (SAGSI) 
“addressed improvements in cost-effectiveness through the use of new 
techniques, the use of procedures to detect undeclared facilities, the use of 
increased co-operation with State Systems of Accounting and Control 
(SSACs) and the use of alternative safeguards approaches” (IAEA General 
Conference, 1993). 
Building upon the SAGSI’s work, a “Program 93+2” by the Secretariat was tasked to 
develop ideas for a “strengthened and more cost-effective safeguards system.” The program 
undertook seven tasks, four of which made reference to cost analysis, cost saving, or 
efficiency and build the groundwork for the later IAEA verification reforms see e.g. IAEA 
General Conference, 1994). In this sense, cost considerations significantly contributed to 
verification as we find it today. 
Several states raised economic concerns in the discussions on the IAEA Board of 
Governors at the time. Russia repeatedly portrayed itself as a strong proponent of “zero real 
budgetary growth.” According to its representative Yury Sokolov, new measures could be 
compensated with cutting some measures under the Comprehensive Safeguards 
Agreements. In addition to that, rather than implementing a comprehensive routine use of 
the IAEA under the new provisions, the IAEA should focus on key facilities that may give 
reason for concern (IAEA Board of Governors, 1996c, Paragraph 44). 
The Tunisian representative, Mohamed El Fadhel Khalil, argued that a successful 
implementation depended, among other things, on the burden on smaller nuclear states. 
Countries that had neither nuclear facilities nor nuclear weapons should not be confronted 
with increased costs. Furthermore, these states should not face a reduction in technical 
support (IAEA Board of Governors, 1997a, Paragraph 101). 
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Although the International Atomic Energy Agency has found ways to operate under 
budget restrictions, the constant premise of keeping costs to a minimum appear to have left 
their mark. As described by Trevor Findlay, the IAEA has been frustrated with limited 
resources and argued that it could not work properly without adjusting its budget: 
“In June 2007, [IAEA Director General] ElBaradei decried the board’s 
refusal to approve a requested increase of 4.6 percent in the IAEA annual 
budget of around $275.5 million, revealing that the agency’s safeguards 
function was being ‘eroded over time’ He noted that the organization was 
forced to use an unreliable 28-year-old instrument for environmental 
sampling and rely on external laboratories for analysis, ‘which puts into 
question the whole independence of the agency’s verification system.’ 
Moreover, there has been no general implementation of wide-area 
environmental sampling due to the projected costs” (Findlay, 2007, p.50). 
The financial evaluation of verification tools was also subject to debate in the context 
of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The broad scope of the treaty came along with 
ambitious demands for monitoring compliance and detecting non-compliance. Similar to the 
IAEA reform, shaping the infrastructure of the International Monitoring System was heavily 
subject to economic considerations: 
“China and Pakistan insisted that the IMS include satellites as well as 
monitoring for electromagnetic pulses (EMP). The French also initially 
supported a satellite system, but acknowledged that the cost might be 
prohibitive. Russia supported space-based sensors and the maintenance of 
aircraft to monitor for radionuclide particulates emitted from nuclear 
explosions. At US$3000 million, many delegates were discouraged by the 
estimated cost of such a system” (CTBTO, 2012b). 
This extract shows that, while there was large consensus that verification was important, 
a pivotal question in the CTBT negotiations was whether specific measures are worth 
implementing. Tools that were considered too expensive were ruled out. Again, economic 
considerations appear to have significantly shaped today’s verification. 
Using costs as a guiding star in negotiations may fail the original purpose. Being asked 
about the premise of cost-effectiveness in drafting a monitoring system, Ola Dahlman, Head 
of the CTBTO verification working group, argued that the financial aspect should not be 
exaggerated: 
“I don’t find it wise to overemphasize cost. After all, if one considers the 
costs of military spending, the comparative costs of arms control and 
disarmament are not even ‘peanuts’. Conversely, we should invest more, not 
less, in arms control. And we should do it both efficiently and effectively” 
(in: CTBTO, 2012e). 
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A further concern leading to reluctance in accepting verification is economic 
intrusiveness. In contrast to the security dimension of intrusiveness, the economic 
perspective refers to the very protection of the civilian use of nuclear energy. Preventing 
economic disadvantages for a state subject to verification is an important guideline for the 
International Atomic Energy Agency (Drobysz and Persbo, 2016, p.134). 
Despite finding accommodation in the provisions of the Additional Protocol, 
intrusiveness has also led to outright rejection. Until this day, Brazil has refrained from 
ratifying the Additional Protocol arguing it would endanger its nuclear industry. As stated 
by former foreign minister of Brazil, Celso Amorim, Brazil’s rejection of the Additional 
Protocol reinforced the right for industrial secrecy (Patti, 2010, p.186). 
The larger consequences of Brazil’s rejection of the Additional Protocol also 
demonstrates that economic interest in nuclear trade may prevail verification interests. With 
the introduction of enhanced verification tools for the IAEA, nuclear suppliers have raised 
their verification demands for trade. For instance, former US President George W. Bush 
defined the universalization of the Additional Protocol as a crucial pillar of non-proliferation 
and claimed in February 2004: “I propose that by next year, only states that have signed the 
Additional Protocol be allowed to import equipment for their civil nuclear programs” (in: 
Hirsch, 2004, p.140). 
Despite the support of several states, the conclusion of the Additional Protocol is still 
not the gold standard for nuclear trade. A reform of the guidelines of the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group watered down the notion of an AP requirement, in that Argentina and Brazil could 
still take part in nuclear trade, even without having the protocol in force (Hibbs, 2010; Viski, 
2012). This suggests that economic interests may compromise non-proliferation verification. 
 
3.3.4. Status 
To what extent have status-related considerations affected verification within the non-
proliferation regime? The notion of status takes different forms when it comes to monitoring 
regime compliance. Verification commitments may play into a state’s domestic or 
international standing. Here, cooperation depends on whether or not an obligation enhances 
a state’s self-image. Furthermore, the very platform of cooperation may facilitate or hamper 
cooperation. Following the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1, we would expect a state to 
commit to and comply with verification if cooperation enhances its status. If, however, non-
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The establishment of verification provisions can be seen to be at least partially due to 
status-related factors. The development of monitoring provisions has attracted states as a 
platform to signal a stance and to provide room for expertise. Rather than being the main 
driving factor, these aspects may facilitate commitment and compliance in the verification 
system. 
First of all, nuclear verification appears to be an important platform for a state to 
reinforce its non-proliferation stance. In addition to discussing the virtues of certain 
measures, debates among representatives are also used to highlight contributions of their 
respective state. These statements keep other countries informed about domestic 
developments. Furthermore, the comments convey the message of a state being a champion 
of the global effort to counter nuclear weapons. 
One example for this observation is the IAEA Board of Governors. Upon finalizing the 
talks on the 93+2 program, Nuclear Weapon States expressed their regime compliance as 
well as their support of the IAEA and effective new verification measures.231 Their 
expressions are particularly noteworthy considering that other states used the same talks to 
criticize the lacking regime compliance of NWS. Overall, the exchanges between states 
leave the impression of switching from accusation to defense and vice-versa. 
In addition to that, the discussions on the reform of the Small Quantities Protocol were 
used by states to emphasize their contribution. States expressed their support of closing legal 
loopholes and described their achievements in the ratification and implementation process, 
for instance, by preparing legal requirements or by hosting regional seminars.232 
Such statements on verification reforms are not necessarily a matter of vanity, but they 
also suggest the symbolic meaning of partnership. For some states, the importance of 
signaling a shared vision may even be a stronger driving factor than a security driven 
 
231 See Annex 4 in: IAEA General Conference (1997). 
232 See e.g. comments by the chairman of the Board of Governors, as well as by the representatives from 
New Zealand and Ecuador on the implementation of the reform of the Small Quantities Protocol (IAEA 
Board of Governors, 2006b, Paragraphs 99–101, 117, 119). 
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understanding of compliance. Commenting on the Additional Protocol, former Director 
General of the IAEA Hans Blix notes: 
“[T]he first point, I think, is that the world is not milling of would-be 
proliferators. There is a sort of attitude in the West that everyone is keen to 
do it, as if they can get away with it. That is not so. I mean, even if the NPT 
were to collapse, I think most of the countries that are parties would say that 
we have decided to join this treaty because we think it’s in our interest not to 
have nuclear weapons. We are not going to have it, and we want to signal that 
by joining the [Additional Protocol]” (in: Council on Foreign Relations, 
2014). 
The notion of a community of states was also reflected in the negotiation process of the 
93+2 program. Some states on the Board of Governors not just commended their own role 
but also the “spirit of cooperation.”233 Similarly, the chairman acknowledged talks outside 
of meetings as having contributed to the progress (IAEA Board of Governors, 1997b, 
Paragraph 73).  
This leads to the conclusion that international cooperation itself seems to be an 
important symbolic driving factor. Nonetheless, one should be careful when reading these 
statements. For instance, Libya demanded that the safeguards system should be built upon 
“trust and co-operation” (IAEA Board of Governors, 1996c, Paragraph 80), while at the 
same time breaking the non-proliferation norm by pursuing nuclear weapons (see Chapter 
4). 
The history of the non-proliferation regime also demonstrates that verification offers a 
platform for expertise that may pave the way for cooperation. Given its technical nature, 
verification offers a good basis for the creation of epistemic communities, i.e. expert groups 
that share similar ideas and push for their realization. These platforms of exchange even 
bridge distrust and rivalry between states. In doing so, they have an important influence on 
the successful negotiation of verification agreements. 
A good example for this is the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, which was heavily 
influenced by a Group of Scientific Experts (GSE). According to Ola Dahlman, former 
Chairman of the CTBTO Working Group on verification, the GSE not only offered a 
significant technical input for the eventual agreement but also enhanced cross-border 
confidence building and a training platform in matters of verification. He also describes the 
 
233 See e.g. the comments by Italy (on behalf of the EU) and China (IAEA Board of Governors, 1996b, 
Paragraph 79; 1996d, Paragraph 101). 
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GSE as an important tool to “keep the process going” in the Cold War era when political 
progress was difficult (Dahlman in: CTBTO, 2012e). 
Cooperation of experts also led to regional verification in the form of the Argentine-
Brazil Agency for Accounting and Control of Nuclear Materials. As elaborated by Sara 
Kutchesfahani, Argentinian and Brazilian diplomats, scientists, and military officials 
developed a network of expertise. The opportunity to express and exchange ideas led to an 
increasing rapprochement in the area of peaceful uses of nuclear energy which eventually 
allowed the creation of the ABACC. One of the shared virtues was the criticism of the Non-
Proliferation Treaty as being discriminatory (Kutchesfahani, 2014, pp.42–52). 
There is a somewhat ironic connotation to the success of this bilateral cooperation, as 
it was originally based on conflict. Similar to the CTBT, expertise helped to ease political 
stalemate. Technical cooperation led to political progress: 
“The creation of ABACC was a remarkable accomplishment given that 
the two nations had hitherto been embroiled in a century-long rivalry. It is 
therefore quite significant that the one sensitive area in which they were 
competing, mistrusting, and suspicious, in fact, brought them closer together” 
(Kutchesfahani, 2014, p.26). 
Although the technical nature of verification may facilitate states’ support, e.g. by 
allowing for epistemic communities, expert groups are no guarantee for finding solutions to 
a conflict. To the contrary, technical discussions may also be used to reinforce political 
discussions. In order to reduce the chances of a political clash, members of expert groups 
are often meant to distinguish themselves through a strong technical knowledge of the issue 
at state rather than a close governmental affiliation. 
The latter understanding was also the case in the discussions surrounding a potential 
Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty. Facing a political deadlock even before negotiations have 
started, the Conference on Disarmament introduced a Group of Governmental Experts 
(GGE) “to make recommendations on possible aspects that could contribute to but not 
negotiate a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other 
nuclear explosive devices” (UN General Assembly, 2012). 
This purpose of the GGE already summarized the hopes and limits associated with it. 
So far, the meetings appear to have failed to spur negotiations. The group published a report 
in 2015 and was followed by a “High-Level Fissile Material Cutoff Treaty Preparatory 
Expert Group” to make recommendations on possible elements of a treaty. While the 
discussions may have helped to keep the FM(C)T on the agenda, actual negotiations have 
still not taken place. 
 170 
Non-Cooperation 
Status-related factors may also hamper the development or implementation of 
verification commitments. These aspects include logistical incompatibility, the nature of a 
nuclear program, and the verification environment. As a result, verification cooperation may 
be compromised or even rejected. 
To begin, it is worth keeping in mind that there is no one-size-fits-all verification 
commitment. This is simply due to the uniqueness of every nuclear program and the purpose 
of verification. Even though there are templates for agreements, getting the specific content 
into writing and implementation may be complicated by an incompatibility with 
verification provisions, even if state parties intend to comply. 
As noted by Werner Petritz (2012, pp.119–24), given their individual and complex 
nature, Comprehensive Safeguards Agreements were often not concluded within the 
deadline, thereby reducing output effectiveness of verification. Moreover, in the 
implementation phase (outcome effectiveness), domestic capacities have hindered effective 
IAEA verification. On the very outset, authorities may lack capacities to fulfill safeguards 
agreements (IAEA, 2019c; Drobysz and Persbo, 2016, p.133). 
For instance, South African officials faced legal difficulties in the state’s nuclear 
reversal and its verification. The very fact that the state had had a nuclear weapons program 
made the conclusion and implementation of a verification commitment with the IAEA 
difficult.234 This shows that the nature of the nuclear program may affect verification 
commitment and compliance. 
Another prominent example for the latter relates to the 1990s discussions on 
strengthening the tools of the IAEA. Although the enhanced measures were primarily 
introduced for Non-Nuclear Weapon States, other states were urged to implement the 
provisions, as well. Yet, Nuclear Weapon States as well as States outside the Non-
Proliferation Treaty were reluctant to do so. 
As the records of Board of Governors meetings demonstrate, China and France noted 
that they could, by definition, not introduce the Additional Protocol because of the status of 
their nuclear program. States outside the NPT – namely Israel, India, and Pakistan – rejected 
 
234 In an interview, Waldo Stumpf, former Chief Executive Officer of South Africa’s Atomic Energy 
Corporation (AEC), “noted that the AEC was unable to use existing INFCIRC-153-type Safeguard Agreements 
in its efforts to join the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty. South African officials felt hampered by the fact that 
there was no legal way to join the treaty until all nuclear weapons had been dismantled and safeguards had 
been applied to all nuclear activities” (Purkitt and Burgess, 2005, pp.273–4). 
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the idea that they were subject to the provisions on similar grounds. In this context, on a rare 
occasion, Pakistan even explicitly identified itself with the position of its rival India (IAEA 
Board of Governors, 1997a, Paragraphs 12, 31, 57, 67; 1997b, Paragraph 60). 
Finally, verification may be rejected because of the status of a relationship. While 
distrust and rivalry may enhance verification, a good relationship may lower commitments. 
For instance, the Moscow Treaty (SORT) included minor provisions for verification. 
Following Edward Ifft (2010, p.9), “[t]his treaty is the product of the view of the Bush 
administration (reluctantly accepted by the Russians) that the new era of cooperation and 
openness between the United States and Russia makes traditional monitoring and 
verification unnecessary.” 
Despite leaving out strong verification measures, both states complied with the overall 
commitments made. This shows that weak verification provisions do not equal non-
compliance. To the contrary, accounting for rather informal platforms of exchange to ensure 
compliance can make an agreement more attractive. Taking up the experience from SORT 
and START I appears to have facilitated the establishment of verification provisions in New 
START. According to former US Assistant Secretary Rose Gottemoeller (2010), the fast 
negotiation of the measures goes back to mutual experience and efficient communication. 
 
3.4. Summary 
Verification in the non-proliferation regime is legally and structurally fragmented. 
Requirements to conclude verification agreements differ from one state to another, 
depending on the nature of the respective nuclear program and the purpose of verification. 
There are different levels of verification: international, regional, bilateral, or national. Hence, 
there is no single verification body. 
More than 40 years after the Non-Proliferation Treaty came into force, the primary task 
of the verification system is still to shed light on the (non)-acquisition of nuclear weapons. 
While the verification commitments and compliance of Non-Nuclear Weapon States 
demonstrate a positive trend, Nuclear Weapon States and states outside the NPT have a 
privileged position. Their “Voluntary Offer Agreements” and “item-specific” verification 
only focus on selective parts of their nuclear fuel cycle. In this sense, verification manifests 
a discrimination among states that is already to be found in the commitment system. 
Verification has, so far, played a subordinate role regarding the possession of nuclear 
weapons. The major exception in verification are bilateral agreements between 
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Russia/Soviet Union and the United States of America. Numerous research projects have 
been put forward to pave the way for future disarmament verification but are still awaiting 
implementation – just like disarmament commitments themselves. 
Regarding the use of nuclear weapons, verification has seen significant advances on an 
international level in the last 20 years – technologically, as well as politically. Most progress 
has been made in the context of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. Although the treaty is 
not in force, its verification is fairly advanced and receives wide support by states. 
In terms of verification impact, there is a strong notion that verification compliance is 
an extension of overall regime compliance. Put differently, verification tends to follow a 
prior intention to comply. Here, transparency can make it more difficult to break regime 
rules undetected and deter non-compliance (e.g. Ifft, 2010, p.5). In this regard, verification 
offers a lock-in effect on compliance, in accordance with historical institutionalism. At the 
same time, states that intend to break regime norms appear to refrain from undertaking 
verification commitments in the first place. 
Yet, just because a state fails to conclude or comply with verification does not mean 
that it has the intent to build up a clandestine nuclear program. This observation would again 
confirm Susan Strange’s skepticism regarding the virtue of managerial structures in 
international relations. Looking at different explanatory factors shows that states’ decisions 
to commit to and comply with specific verification measures appear to be subject to different 
influences. 
Security considerations appear to be a pivotal driving factor. The discussion 
surrounding the strengthening of the IAEA, including the Additional Protocol, is the best 
proof of that. In the wake of the illicit nuclear activities in Iraq (resembling a critical 
juncture), states seem to have made their own commitment to strengthen the regime as a 
whole. This is comparable with bilateral verification between the US and Russia. Reciprocal 
disarmament requires knowledge about whether the other party is keeping its end of the 
bargain. Still, there is a constant fear that measures may be too intrusive, thereby, countering 
national interest. 
Normative aspects also seem to have played a contributing factor. Overall, 
commitments in the non-proliferation regime go along with an understanding of “it is the 
right thing to do.” This is also true for verification. Yet, more important in terms of the focus 
of this chapter is the aspect of fairness. Although Nuclear Weapon States kept emphasizing 
that the Additional Protocol was targeted at Non-Nuclear Weapon States, they also decided 
to apply stronger verification on their own fuel cycle. The symbolic nature of the NWS 
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commitments indicates the virtues of sociological institutionalism. Arguing that verification 
leads to discrimination among states, some countries (such as Egypt) have refrained from 
further commitments. 
Economic considerations proved to be a driving factor as well as an obstacle to 
verification. The conditionality of safeguards in nuclear trade is a helpful element to promote 
the verification regime. Yet, every verification measure, irrespective of its area of use, has 
been subject to a close cost-benefit analysis – in accordance with rational choice 
institutionalism. Efficiency has become the subtitle of verification. If measures are too 
expensive or economically too intrusive, they are ruled out. 
Status has played a subordinate role in verification. Still, there are platforms for 
exchange and representation that make cooperation attractive. Similar with the platforms 
presented in the commitment system (chapter 2), states vividly engage on them and make 
sure that their voice is heard. At the same time, status may hamper commitment and 






















4. Enforcement in the Non-Proliferation Regime 
4.1. Platforms of Enforcement 
Enforcement may be a bit of an overstatement when talking about the non-proliferation 
regime. The term suggests a clear and coherent prescription for countering non-compliance 
with the regime. This is not the case. Although there are several explicit decision-making 
procedures, the decisions themselves are very diverse. 
Overall, enforcement tools are the sum of positive and negative incentives (political, 
diplomatic, economic, or military) to stimulate regime compliance of a state. They may shift 
the security, norm, economic, or status-related considerations of the target state. There are 
different nuances that may put varying degrees of pressure or inducement on the target, 
including theme-specific, linkage-diplomatic, and existential measures.235 
What conditions determine whether states commit to and comply with the regime in the 
light of enforcement? Addressing this question, I will first briefly map out the spectrum of 
enforcement in order to get a glimpse of the complexity of approaches. The most common 
path of enforcement is that the IAEA reports a suspected case of non-compliance to the 
United Nations Security Council, which may implement further actions. While my analysis 
focuses on this path, it is important to bear in mind that enforcement can be embedded on an 
international, regional, bilateral, and even unilateral level. 
Subsequently, I will assess the effectiveness of the enforcement system regarding the 
acquisition as well as the possession and use of nuclear weapons. Here, my analysis consists 
of three steps. I will examine 
• whether the target state of enforcement incentives has made a regime 
commitment (output) 
• whether the target state changed its behavior (outcome) 
• to what extent enforcement correlates with states’ compliance with the overall 
regime norms – non-proliferation, nuclear disarmament, and the non-use of 
nuclear weapons (impact) 
 
235 “Theme-specific” measures focus on the issue at hand, i.e. the nuclear program. Positive inducements may 
include trade or assistance in the peaceful use of nuclear energy. Damaging tools, in turn, could be a suspension 
of institutional privileges or restrictions on the target’s access to fissile material and nuclear assistance. 
“Linkage diplomacy” reflects approaches of “making policy for one issue contingent on another state’s 
behavior on a different issue” (Li, 1993, p.349). These measures go beyond the scope of the issue at hand 
(nuclear energy). They intend to facilitate behavioral change by including other areas, such as the trade, 
infrastructure, or financial markets. Measures that threaten or strengthen the political leadership in the target 
state can be considered “existential.” 
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On this basis, the remaining space of this chapter will be devoted to possible 
explanations for target states’ behavior. Examining official documents, published 
interviews, and expert accounts, I will conduct an exploration of plausible intent based on 
the hypotheses developed in the introductory chapter. The four perspectives include security, 
norms, economics, and status. For each aspect, I will undertake an evaluation of modes of 
pledges and justification with a focus on the cases of Iraq, Libya, Syria, Iran, and North 
Korea. 
A conclusion will take up the major findings regarding the assessment and explanation 
of regime effectiveness. While lacking tools to stimulate the compliance of Nuclear Weapon 
States, the regime may place strong incentives on Non-Nuclear Weapon States. A closer 
look at enforcement shows that there is no one-size-fits-all solution to stimulate regime 
compliance. The same incentives may play out contrarily in different states. Finding the right 
enforcement tools requires close attention to the state’s domestic context. Rather than 
continuously turning the screw of sanctions, positive incentives may be more effective. 
 
4.1.1. International Enforcement 
While several international agreements may serve as a basis for regime enforcement,236 
the most important platform in the non-proliferation regime is the United Nations. This is 
due to the institution’s unique authority in conflict resolution to champion international 
peace.237 The UN Security Council is responsible for assessing a threat to international peace 
and for initiating proper measures (Art. 24.1, UN Charter).238 Under the umbrella of the UN, 
the General Assembly (Art. 11.3, UN Charter), individual members (Art. 35.1, UN Charter), 
or the Secretary-General (Art. 99, UN Charter) may inform the Security Council about a 
threat. 
More importantly in the nuclear context, the IAEA Board of Governors has the right 
and responsibility to report the non-compliance of a member to the Security Council (Art. 
XII.C, IAEA Statute).239 By doing so, the IAEA can escalate a specific case to a more 
 
236 A crucial treaty within the non-proliferation regime that accounts for a variety of enforcement tools is the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. The Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons and the International 
Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism provide for a settlement of disputes. 
237 Article 103 of the UN Charter states: “In the event of a conflict between the obligations under any other 
international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter shall prevail.” In this sense, the UN takes 
over in international agreements subject to the UN topics, such as peace and security. 
238 Following Resolution A/RES/377 (“Uniting for Peace”), the General Assembly can make recommendations, 
if the Security Council is unable to maintain peace. So far, this tool has not been used for non-proliferation 
purposes. An overview of Emergency Special Sessions can be found in Dag Hammarskjöld Library (2019a). 
239 A comprehensive study of the IAEA reporting can be found in Findlay (2015). 
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powerful platform.240 The cases reported by the IAEA to the Security Council are: Israel, 
Iraq, Romania, North Korea, Libya, Iran, and Syria.241 A similar option of reporting to the 
UN is also provided for in the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (Art. V, CTBT). 
The Security Council has great liberty to enforce regime compliance. First, the vague 
formulations “threats to peace,” “breaches of the peace,” or “acts of aggression” (Art. 39, 
UN Charter) are the only reference to initiate actions. A broad interpretation of the 
formulations would justify enforcing all policy fields of the non-proliferation regime 
(acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons) – even if the respective state has not 
signed the NPT. 
Second, resolutions by the Security Council have a global dimension. Even though a 
decision is made by 15 states in the Security Council, it is subject to all other UN member 
states (Art. 25, UN Charter). Ideally, this rule allows for uniform measures to be taken. These 
should also state clear expectations from a target state (UN Security Council, 2006a). 
Third, the United Nations has a variety of tools at its disposal. The UN Charter allows 
for a suspension of membership privileges (Art. 5) or, in a case of a persistent violation of 
UN principles, an expulsion from the UN (Art. 6). If “threats to peace,” “breaches of the 
peace,” or “acts of aggression” are present, the Security Council can initiate non-military 
(Art. 41)242 and military (Art. 42)243 action. There are no explicit means of positive 
inducements. Nonetheless, the Security Council may reward (partial) compliance of a state 
with sanction relief (Ban, 2007),244 economic assistance, or the support of the civilian 
nuclear program. 
Still, there is a major drawback in regime enforcement by the UN. The Security Council 
was created “[i]n order to ensure prompt and effective action by the United Nations” (Art. 
24.1, UN Charter). This is ironic, as any non-procedural decision by the Security Council 
 
240 The International Atomic Energy Agency has also intra-institutional enforcement measures. It may suspend 
a state’s institutional privileges or place restrictions on a nuclear program (IAEA General Conference, 1988). 
Apart from taking measures owing to outstanding payments, the use of these sanctions is almost non-existent. 
Two notable exceptions are attempts to suspend Israel owing to its strike on an Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981 
and South Africa for its Apartheid regime (see Magliveras, 1999, p.224). Following Trevor Findlay (2015, 
p.19), the IAEA has a preference of reporting a case to the Security Council rather than using its own sanctions, 
as this decision could backfire and a state withdraw from the IAEA or even the NPT. 
241 See e.g. Myjer and Herbach (2012, p.132). The reporting of Libya and Romania occurred for information 
purposes only. Israel was reported owing to its bombing of an Iraqi nuclear facility in 1981. 
242 Non-military measures “may include complete or partial interruption of economic relations and of rail, sea, 
air, postal, telegraphic, radio, and other means of communication, and the severance of diplomatic relations” 
(Art. 41, UN Charter). 
243 Armed forces may be applied by land, air, or sea if non-military actions would be inadequate (Art. 42, UN 
Charter). 
244 See also Golnoosh Hakimdavar (2014, p.5). 
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not only requires the support of 9 of the 15 members, but also the support or acceptance of 
all five Permanent Members (P5): The United States, Russia, France, the United Kingdom, 
and China (Art. 27, UN Charter). This outset has paralyzed decision-making from the very 
beginning (see also Wolf, 2016, p.7). The list of vetoes used over the last decades include 
around 200 cases on a variety of topics (see below). 
 
Figure 8 – Veto Use in UN Security Council245 
 
Although many of these resolutions would have been passed without veto rights, the 
“dark figure” of failed resolutions is higher, as proponents of action may refrain from putting 
a resolution on the table, knowing it would be vetoed. For the non-proliferation regime, the 
veto power has two consequences: 
1. UN enforcement against any of the P5 is virtually impossible. 
2. Enforcing the compliance of other states requires support or acceptance by all 
Permanent Members. Resolutions are difficult to achieve or may be “watered 
down.”246 
 
245 Data as of March 2019 from: Dag Hammarskjöld Library (2019b). 
246 To make things even more challenging, the P5 have demonstrated different approaches and priorities in 





















































































4.1.2. Regional Enforcement 
Given their regional role in strengthening the non-proliferation regime, Nuclear-
Weapon-Free Zones are an ideal candidate for enforcement. Since NWFZs are not based on 
uniform treaties, they differ on whether dealings with non-compliance are stated, how non-
compliance should be determined, and what should be done as a consequence (see Appendix 
4). 
One similarity is that Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones lack tools to enforce the compliance 
of Nuclear Weapon States. The Treaty of Bangkok is the only zone that provides for the 
enforcement of its protocols, which none of the Nuclear Weapon States has signed. 
Nonetheless, NWFZs offer some advantages for regime enforcement: 
• They complement the Non-Proliferation Treaty. The NPT does neither provide 
for non-compliance (Findlay, 2015, p.2) nor an executive body – other than most 
NWFZs. 
• NWFZs reinforce the International Atomic Energy Agency and strengthen the 
“IAEA track” of enforcement. All treaties demand the conclusion of IAEA 
safeguards. 
• Most NWFZs provide for the escalation of a case to the United Nations, which 
strengthens the warning system. 
• The Treaties of Tlatelolco, Bangkok, Pelindaba, and Rarotonga establish 
mechanisms for special investigations. These bodies can trigger further 
investigations, independent from IAEA decision-making. 
As another regional nuclear platform, EURATOM accounts for two types of regime 
enforcement: against states as well as “persons and undertakings.”247 Article 83 of the 
EURATOM Treaty relates to “an infringement on the part of persons or undertakings.” Here, 
the European Commission can apply a variety of sanctions, including a warning, “the 
withdrawal of special benefits such as financial or technical assistance,” or the retraction of 
material. 
More important from a state perspective, Article 82 of the EURATOM Treaty is 
concerned with “infringements” by a member state. After inspectors report a case to the 
European Commission, the latter urges the state to take “all measures necessary to bring 
 
247 See Articles 82 and 83 as well as the corresponding Articles 141 and 142 of the EURATOM Treaty. 
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such infringement to an end.” If non-compliance continues, the Commission or a 
EURATOM member state may forward the case to the European Court of Justice. 
This approach is very similar to the infringement proceedings against an EU member 
state that breaks EU law. The European Commission seeks an adjustment by the state itself. 
Only if the state fails to produce satisfying results, the issue is taken to the European Court 
of Justice. Rather than using a “crowbar strategy” that sanctions right away, this approach 
gives a state room for improvement without punishment. 
 
4.1.3. Bilateral Enforcement 
As the previous chapters have shown, bilateral agreements are an important part of the 
commitment system and the verification system of the non-proliferation regime. Yet, they 
play a subordinate role when it comes to enforcement. For the most part, bilateral agreements 
either include no provisions to ensure regime compliance or their enforcement is integrated 
into the larger IAEA-UN enforcement mechanism. 
The general bilateral nuclear cooperation (trade and assistance) does not independently 
enforce compliance. This is in line with the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group, which are voluntary and do not include enforcement tools. Still, there are elements 
of enforcement in nuclear trade and assistance. On the one hand, bilateral nuclear 
cooperation includes a conditionality of safeguards. Without meeting this condition, 
cooperation may fail to be implemented. On the other hand, including IAEA safeguards 
makes the cooperation part of regime enforcement and reporting by the IAEA. 
This is similar to the nuclear cooperation between Argentina and Brazil. The agreement 
between the two states, the ABACC, and the International Atomic Energy Agency 
(Quadripartite Agreement) requires both countries to implement safeguards and gives the 
IAEA the “right and obligation to ensure that safeguards will be applied.”248 Hence, the 
cooperation is subject to the IAEA reporting scheme to the UN Security Council in potential 
cases of non-compliance. 
In addition to that, the bilateral agreement between Argentina and Brazil accounts for 
enforcement in different ways.249 Disputes between the two states are meant to be settled 
bilaterally through diplomatic means (Art. XVIII). A serious breach of the agreement allows 
 
248 See Articles 1, 2, and 15 of the Quadripartite Agreement. 
249 Agreement between the Republic of Argentina and the Federative Republic of Brazil for the Exclusively 
Peaceful use of Nuclear Energy, July 18, 1991. 
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the other party to terminate the agreement and to inform the UN Secretariat and the 
Secretariat of the Organization of American States (Art. XIX). The agreement also provides 
for penalties if the “confidentiality of information” is compromised in the verification 
process (Art. XIV). 
The provisions in the bilateral agreements between the United States and Russia are 
diverse, in terms of content and verification. When it comes to enforcement, they share a 
similarity: there is none. START I, New START, SORT, the ABM Treaty, the INF Treaty, 
the Threshold Test Ban Treaty, and the Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaty do not account 
for specific tools to enforce compliance. Although not including possible sanctions or 
positive incentives, agreements include commissions or committees to take up and clarify 
possible cases of non-compliance (see Chapter 3). 
Finally, also India and Pakistan have refrained from establishing explicit enforcement 
measures in the Lahore Declaration and the India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement. This is 
not surprising considering that the content of the agreements is very limited. The Non-Attack 
Agreement may be implicitly covered by the larger notion of nuclear deterrence, as an attack 
on a nuclear facility could be followed by a counter-attack. 
 
4.1.4. Unilateral/Autonomous Enforcement 
Another scenario is the enforcement of the regime without using the institutional ladder 
of escalation. Autonomous measures may include unilateral action as well as selective 
multilateralism. Considering that the United Nations has close to 200 member states, 
unilateral action as well as measures by a countless combination of states have – 
mathematically speaking – a massive potential. 
Whether states are individually entitled to apply economic sanctions remains legally 
contested. In practice, states react in the affirmative (Hakimdavar, 2014, p.28). Unilateral or 
collective military action is legitimate without UN approval in cases of self-defense (Article 
51 UN Charter). Other forms of independent measures are not provided for in the UN 
Charter, as military and non-military action is subject to the Security Council (UN Charter, 
Articles 41 and 42). 
The advantages of taking autonomous action appear straightforward. A potential nuclear 
threat may be addressed without losing valuable time by internationalizing and 
institutionalizing a response. Autonomous measures could also be useful in addressing gaps 
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of the UN system, enforcing disarmament commitments, minor cases of non-compliance 
with the regime, or agreements that do not explicitly state enforcement instruments. 
Nonetheless, the judgement to use tools of enforcement is highly subjective and lacks 
international legitimacy. The target may deem autonomous action as a malicious act. This 
would question the virtue of the enforcement message and may escalate a conflict. 
Autonomous action has also a structural disadvantage in that it reinforces the power of states 
that have economic or military tools of enforcement. 
 
4.2. Assessing Effectiveness 
Looking at the most prominent enforcement platforms in the non-proliferation regime 
(see Table 6) demonstrates that there are different avenues to ensure regime compliance, 
such as intra-institutional means (e.g. withdrawal of privileges), military action, sanctions, 
or positive inducements. These provisions give reason for hope that a state’s considerations 
of security, norms, economics, or status may be influenced in favor of regime compliance. 
 
Table 6 – Prominent Platforms of Enforcement 
 Acquisition Possession Use 




military and non-military 
measuresa 
Intra-institutional, 
military and non-military 
measuresa 
IAEA Intra-institutional, 
reporting to UNb 
Intra-institutional, 
reporting to UNb 
Intra-institutional, 
reporting to UNb 
NWFZs Intra-institutional, 
reporting to UN 
Only in Treaty of 
Bangkok 
Only in Treaty of 
Bangkok 
Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty 
  Intra-institutional, 







military and non-military 
measures 
Positive inducements, 
military and non-military 
measures 
a Enforcement against P5 virtually impossible 
b Basis for enforcement are membership and safeguards agreements. Strong emphasis on NNWS 
c Not yet in force 
Underlined: Enforcement tracks predominantly used 
Yet, there are two tendencies that reduce the effectiveness of the enforcement system 
on its very outset. First, there is a strong emphasis of enforcement on the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons. All the tools that could hypothetically be used against Nuclear Weapon 
States and, thus, the possession or use of nuclear weapons are unlikely to be used. 
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Second, the most common tools of enforcement available are intra-institutional 
measures and reporting powers. Except for withdrawing voting rights (e.g. to sanction 
members for outstanding payments), both tools are rarely used. In fact, only one institution 
stands out for addressing larger cases of regime non-compliance, namely the IAEA. The 
agency has reported several states to the UN Security Council. The most prominent cases of 
regime enforcement are Iraq, Libya, Syria, North Korea, and Iran. 
 
4.2.1. Acquisition 
By and large, the acquisition of nuclear weapons consists of a demand and supply side. 
Enforcement may target both in order to ensure regime compliance by a state. Furthermore, 
illicit nuclear activities may depend on individual persons and non-state entities that could 
be subject to sanctions. 
In order to get an idea of the regime’s effectiveness in countering the acquisition of 
nuclear weapons, I will take up state cases that have been subject to enforcement: Iraq, 
Libya, Syria, and Iran.250 Although my approach concentrates on states, it shall be pointed 
out that a work that focuses on non-state actors would likely put a stronger emphasis on the 
enforcement of the International Convention on the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear 
Terrorism or UN Resolution 1540. 
 
Iraq 
Output and Outcome 
In the history of weapons of mass destruction, Iraq is unique because it reflects the 
highest degree of regime enforcement imaginable. The developments leading to the 2003 
invasion of the state (Operation Iraqi Freedom) are multifaceted, with nuclear weapon 
concerns being just one aspect. In a post-9/11 context, Iraqi leader Saddam Hussein posed a 
threat in the eyes of the United States and some allies for a number of reasons, owing to “his 
track record of invading other countries, his support for terrorists, his brutal treatment of his 
 
250 As North Korea has succeeded in developing nuclear weapons, the case will be considered in the following 
subsection on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. 
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own people, his attempts to shoot down US aircraft patrolling no-fly zones, as well as his 
WMD arsenal” (Duelfer, 2016, p.167).251 
In terms of weapons of mass destructions, the threat of which became even more 
apparent in the wake of the Gulf War of 1990/1991, there were two demands:252 
• The complete abandonment and dismantlement of its WMD programs 
• The provision of information and cooperation with verification bodies (IAEA, 
UNSCOM, UNMOVIC) to ensure WMD compliance 
The measures against Iraq included international and unilateral sanctions targeting the 
WMD sector as well as the larger economy (e.g. trade embargoes, freezes of financial 
assets), military attacks by Israel in 1981 and by the United States and the United Kingdom 
in 1998, military threats, and a multilateral invasion in 2003. 
There were also positive inducements, such as the “oil-for-food program.”253 Rather 
than targeting regime compliance, the UN initiative was aimed at easing the humanitarian 
consequences of sanctions, by allowing Iraq to sell limited amounts of oil for the provision 
of basic supplies for the Iraqi population (Reynolds and Wan, 2012, p.69).  
Although Iraq reaffirmed its commitment to the non-proliferation regime (output 
effectiveness), throughout the 1990s and particularly during the months prior to the 2003 
invasion of Iraq, the international community was widely divided as to what extent the state 
was complying with international demands (e.g. Blix, 2004). 
Looking at the outcome effectiveness of the regime enforcement efforts, we can 
acknowledge today that Iraq did end its weapons of mass destruction programs, although 
failing to fully cooperate with the verification bodies to assure the international community 
of its compliance. Put simply by Hans Blix (2004, p.259), the Head of UNMOVIC, “[t]he 
UN and the world had succeeded in disarming Iraq without knowing it.” 
When in the fall of 2002 UNMOVIC inspectors were readmitted into the country, some 
illicit activities in missile development as well as apparent attempts to hide documents were 
revealed (Duelfer, 2016, p.165). However, no indications could be found about an active 
 
251 The insistence of the US and the UK that Iraq continued its programs of weapons of mass destruction 
(including a continuation of alleged nuclear aspirations) and, therefore, posed a serious threat was labeled by 
Hans Blix (2004, pp.259–60) as the “Mother of all Misjudgments.” 
252 These demands are, for instance, embedded in Security Council Resolutions S/RES/687 (1991), S/RES/949 
(1994), S/RES/1051 (1996), S/RES/1060 (1996), S/RES/1115 (1997), S/RES/1154 (1998), S/RES/1441 
(2002). 
253 A good overview of sanctions, military action, and positive inducement was put together by Reynolds and 
Wan (2012). 
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WMD program. The illicit nuclear program found in 1991 had apparently been ended and 
there were no indications of efforts to resume the program (Lopez and Cortright, 2004, 
pp.92–3).254 Although Iraq had some hidden activities, WMD stocks were not found, 
according to the Iraqi Survey Group assessment (Duelfer Report) (Duelfer, 2016, p.172). 
Saddam Hussein’s claims that Iraq had no weapons of mass destruction, while failing 
to fully cooperate with verification bodies divided the Security Council. The United States 
and the United Kingdom pushed for military action, based on false intelligence assumptions 
that Iraq had active WMD programs.255 Russia, France, and Germany were against military 
action and prevented the explicit authorization of military force by the Security Council. 
While the argument can be made that particularly Russia also had economic interests in 
Iraq,256 the rejection of war was based on a differing judgement about the existing threat. In 
his speech at the Munich Security Conference 2003, German Foreign Secretary Joschka 
Fischer (2003) rejected a German support of military action against Iraq, stating “I am not 
convinced.” The Operation Iraqi Freedom, which overthrew the political leadership in Iraq 
and occupied the country, was initiated without explicit UN Security Council support and 
can, thus, be seen as autonomous action. 
 
Libya 
Output and Outcome 
Libya had a long history of nuclear weapon aspirations under the leadership of Muamar 
al-Gaddafi. After the coup d’état in 1969, the state tried before and after ratifying the NPT 
in 1975 to acquire nuclear weapons as well as material and assistance for a nuclear weapons 
program from China, Pakistan and reportedly from France, India, the Soviet Union, and the 
black market. Crucial support in the Libyan nuclear weapons program was provided by the 
international network of A.Q. Khan, starting in the second half of the 1990’s. The state, 
however, never came close to successfully detonating a nuclear device.257 
 
254 For instance, UNMOVIC could not confirm alleged purchases of yellowcake or other indicators of uranium 
enrichment (Duelfer, 2016, p.165). 
255 As to be seen in US Secretary of State Colin Powell’s statement in the Security Council in February 2003: 
“The facts and Iraq’s behaviour demonstrate that Saddam Hussain and his regime have made no effort to disarm 
as required by the international community. Indeed, the facts and Iraq’s behaviour show that Saddam Hussain 
and his regime are concealing their efforts to produce more weapons of mass destruction” (In: UN Security 
Council, 2003). 
256 See e.g. Palkki and Smith (2012, pp.278–81) and Charles Duelfer (2016, p.176). 
257 See Palkki and Smith (2012, pp.264–6). A closer look at the different efforts to establish a successful nuclear 
weapons program can be found in Chapter 2 in: Wyn Q. Bowen (2006). 
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Although Libya faced several sanctions under Muamar al-Gaddafi, nuclear weapons 
played a subordinate role. One possible reason for this is that the ambitions were effectively 
kept secret (see also Reynolds and Wan, 2012, p.65), another reason is that other issues 
proved to be more pressing. The sanctions against Tripoli by the United Nations Security 
Council prior to 2003 took up other illicit activities, most notably Libya’s support of 
international terrorism (as on PAN-AM Flight 103 in 1988).258 
For the same reason, the Unites States had already extended unilateral sanctions 
throughout the 1980s, including (threats of) military attacks (Palkki and Smith, 2012, 
pp.266–9). The administration of US President George W. Bush eventually linked the lifting 
of the US sanctions to the dismantlement of the Libyan weapons of mass destruction 
programs (e.g. Leverett, 2004). The international sanctions against Libya included 
diplomatic, financial, and other economic sanctions, as well as arms and air embargoes 
(Reynolds and Wan, 2012, pp.63–5). 
The major turning point that put an end to the nuclear weapons program occurred in 
December 2003 when Libya proclaimed that it would “eliminate ... materials, equipments 
and programs which lead to the production of internationally proscribed weapons” and 
assured the Security Council of its adherence to the NPT, its acceptance of its IAEA 
safeguards agreement and the additional protocol, and its welcoming of international 
inspectors (IAEA Board of Governors, 2004a). As this announcement reflected a full 
behavioral change in line with the international demands as well as the regime norms and 
rules, enforcement can be seen to demonstrate a high output effectiveness. 
In March 2004, the IAEA Board of Governors decided to report the Libyan nuclear case 
“for information purposes only” to the Security Council, but also acknowledged the Libyan 
promise to adhere to non-proliferation commitments (IAEA Board of Governors, 2004b). 
The UN Security Council (2004) also welcomed Libya’s announcement and encouraged 
assistance to Libya in reversing its nuclear weapons program. 
In addition to the positive output effectiveness, also the outcome can be seen to be 
successful. Following the December 2003 announcement, Libya dismantled its nuclear 
weapons program. The process included turning over documentation, equipment, and Highly 
Enriched Uranium.259 The IAEA applauded Libya’s cooperation, including provision of 
 
258 An overview of UN Security Council resolutions on Libya is published by the Security Council Report 
(2019a). 
259 An overview of Libya’s WMD disarmament was published by the Arms Control Association (Davenport, 
2018). 
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information and access to sites and personnel, “beyond that required under its Safeguards 
Agreement and Additional Protocol” shedding light on its nuclear past (IAEA Board of 
Governors, 2008). Although Libya made great progress in realizing its non-proliferation 
commitments, there have been concerns about the combination of Libyan WMD past and 
current instability (e.g. Dahl, 2011; Terrell, Hagen, and Ryba, 2016). Nonetheless, there 
appears to be no immediate threat.260 
 
Syria 
Output and Outcome 
The exact nature of the Syrian nuclear program is ambiguous. On the outset, the state 
appears to be committed to nuclear non-proliferation. Syria signed the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty on the very same day it opened for signature and has repeatedly called for a WMD 
free zone in the Middle East.261 Reemphasizing this commitment, Syrian Ambassador to the 
UN Bashar Ja’afari (2016) describes non-proliferation as a national priority for Syria in 
“word and action.” Still, there is concern whether “actions” match the “words.” 
The greatest reason for skepticism has been a facility at Dair Alzour/Al-Kibar. While 
Syria has insisted that the building was constructed as a non-nuclear military facility, 
academic and intelligence analysts see a strong resemblance of the facility to the North 
Korean plutonium production reactor at Yongbyon.262 Israel bombed the compound in a 
secret air strike in September 2007. 
Prior to the attack, Ehud Olmert, Israeli Prime Minister at the time, launched a fact-
finding mission and had exchanges with the United States (Follath and Stark, 2009). US 
President Bush rejected Olmert’s request to bomb the Syrian facility and decided in favor of 
 
260 In its latest evaluation, the IAEA does not raise a flag on Libya (IAEA, 2019c). In a broader consideration 
on the situation in Libya, the Security Council makes no mention of fissile material in its latest statement on 
the issue (UN Security Council, 2017c). Stocks of yellowcake were found but not deemed as a serious threat – 
in 2013, a UN Panel of Experts “opin[ed] that the yellowcake posed no significant security risk without 
extensive processing, which required national facilities” (UN Security Council, 2013). 
261 While being a member of the Security Council in 2003, Syria introduced on behalf of the Arab Group a 
proposal for a WMD free zone in the Middle East. Since Israel is the only state in the region considered to 
possess nuclear weapons, the state was a target of the draft resolution. Syria describes Israel as the greatest 
non-proliferation threat in the Middle East (Ja’afari, 2016). 
262 A model visualization of the Dair Alzour facility and its resemblance to the North Korean Yongbyon reactor 
was published by the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2011a). 
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a diplomatic option combined with a military threat (Bush, 2010, pp.420–2). Israel 
eventually acted unilaterally.263 
Upon receiving information following the demolition of the Dair Alzour compound that 
the facility had been a nuclear reactor before completion, the IAEA started an investigation 
including requests of detailed information and access to the site from the Syrian government. 
In 2011, the IAEA came to the finding that “Syria’s statements […] are limited in detail, are 
not supported by documentation and have not allowed the Agency to confirm Syria’s 
assertions regarding the non-nuclear nature of the destroyed building” (IAEA Board of 
Governors, 2011b). 
The Agency concludes that the Dair Alzour facility was probably a nuclear facility that 
should have been (but was not) reported. Owing to the frustration with Syrian authorities in 
assisting the IAEA, the Agency found Syria in breach with its safeguards agreement and 
reported the case to the Security Council in June 2011 (IAEA Board of Governors, 2011b). 
The Security Council did not act. This is due to several reasons – one being institutional. 
China and Russia voted against the IAEA Board of Governors resolution on Syria, which 
was issued nonetheless, but could have vetoed any action in the Security Council (James 
Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies, 2011d). 
Another factor was that the non-proliferation concern became part of the UN Security 
Council debate in a moment it had to deal with humanitarian and political considerations in 
Syria (Security Council Report, 2011). UN Security Council resolutions addressed political, 
humanitarian, and military challenges arising from the Syrian Civil War.264 While weapons 
of mass destruction were addressed in UN Security Council Resolution 2118 (2013) on the 
destruction of Syrian chemical weapon stockpiles, no resolution referred to the Syrian 
nuclear program. 
The perhaps greatest reason for why the Security Council did not act is due to the 
chronology of events. The unilateral attack by Israel made a UN decision against Syria 
irrelevant. Not only was the IAEA not informed in time. By attacking the facility, Israel also 
destroyed possible evidence265 the IAEA would need to make an informed assessment. The 
 
263 Reflecting on the development, George W. Bush emphasizes the unilateral nature of the strike: “Finally, the 
bombing demonstrated Israel’s willingness to act alone. Prime Minister Olmert hadn’t asked for a green light, 
and I hadn’t given one. He had done what he believed was necessary to protect Israel” (Bush, 2010, p.422). 
264 An overview of the UN Security Council Resolutions is published by the Security Council Report (2019b). 
265 Further evidence was likely destroyed by Syria after the attack (e.g. Bush, 2010, 422). 
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withholding of information and destruction of evidence was “regret[ted]” in a report by the 
IAEA Director General (IAEA Board of Governors, 2011a). 
Until today, Syria has failed to “cooperate fully with the Agency in connection with 
unresolved issues related to the Dair Alzour site and other locations” (IAEA, 2019c). Syria 
has not provided the IAEA with further information or clarifications on the site and has 
refrained from admitting any wrongdoings. As the rejection of cooperation on the matter 
contradicts the IAEA demands, the enforcement effort itself demonstrates a low output and 
outcome effectiveness. Still, it needs to be pointed out that the IAEA concluded in its latest 
Safeguards Statement that Syria’s “declared nuclear material remained in peaceful 
activities” (IAEA, 2019c). 
 
Iran266 
Output and Outcome 
The Iranian nuclear program has been one of the greatest concerns within the non-
proliferation regime. While Iranian leaders have emphasized the peaceful nature of the 
program, two observations give rise to worry: I) Over the last two decades, Iran has 
repeatedly failed to comply with verification commitments, limiting transparency on its 
nuclear program (Giles, 2015, pp.48–9).267 II) The Iranian nuclear program has seen an 
enormous expansion since the beginning of this millennium, reducing the time needed to 
develop a nuclear weapon.268 
The international community has used a variety of instruments to ensure Iran’s 
compliance with the non-proliferation regime, including positive and negative incentives. 
The incentives have had two goals: motivating Iran to make and keep international 
commitments as well as reducing its capacities to potentially produce nuclear weapons.269 
Following a failed diplomatic effort by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom, the 
Board of Governors of the International Atomic Energy Agency decided to report the Iranian 
 
266 The analysis of the enforcement system of the non-proliferation regime in the case of the Iranian nuclear 
program includes parts of my master’s thesis “Tehran under Transatlantic Sanctions: A Rational Choice 
Perspective” (Sauerteig, 2011). 
267 For instance, in 2003, the National Council of Resistance of Iran revealed the existence of undeclared 
facilities for uranium enrichment and heavy water production (Mukhatzhanova, 2010, pp.43–4). 
268 For an overview of Iran’s nuclear program see e.g. Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (2010, pp.43–6), Robert 
Reardon (2012, pp.10–61), Matthew Kroenig (2014, pp.7–18), and Gregory Giles (2015, pp.41–7). 
269 The aspirations to affect Iran’s material capacities and motivations are reflected in a statement by former 
Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, who claims that CISADA was aimed at “constraining Iran’s nuclear 
program, changing the calculus of Iran’s leaders, and demonstrating that Iran’s policies decrease its standing, 
and further isolate it in the international community” (Rodham Clinton, 2010). 
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case to the United Nations Security Council in 2006 (IAEA Board of Governors, 2006a). 
Urging Iran to comply with IAEA safeguards agreements and to suspend its enrichment and 
reprocessing activities, UN Security Council Resolutions 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 
(2008), and 1929 (2010) introduced sanctions against the Islamic Republic. 
These measures include an embargo of proliferation-sensitive goods, an arms embargo, 
an asset freeze, and a travel ban on selected Iranian persons and entities. While the 
resolutions by the UNSC focused on limiting the development of a possibly military nuclear 
program in Iran, measures by the European Union and the United States have addressed the 
Iranian economy in more general terms. 
The carrots offered to Tehran have primarily included a relief from existing sanctions, 
support in the nuclear energy sector, and larger economic incentives. The most 
comprehensive concessions by the international community materialized in the 2015 Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) (in: UN Security Council, 2015). The E3/EU+3270 
commit to terminate UN and transatlantic sanctions related to the Iranian nuclear program 
and to support Iran in accessing enriched uranium fuel for the Tehran Research Reactor. The 
Iranian commitment in the JCPOA reflects a significant output effectiveness, as the state 
accepts limitations on its enrichment capacity, refrains from producing highly enriched 
uranium, and consents to intrusive verification on civilian facilities.  
In terms of Iran’s compliance with non-proliferation demands (outcome effectiveness), 
the last two decades can be divided into two parts: before and after the JCPOA. Under 
President Ahmadinejad, Iran refuted international sanctions and expanded the nuclear 
program. In 2007, former Iranian Deputy Secretary of State, Gholami Khoshrou, stated: 
“The Security Council passes more and more resolutions; Iran installs more and more 
centrifuges” (in: Perthes 2008, p.89). 
This material observation is accurate. Iran completed its first cascade of 164 centrifuges 
in March 2006 (Shire and Albright, 2007). At the beginning of the talks in 2013 that led to 
the JCPOA, Iran had 19,000 working centrifuges and 27,000 deployed (John Kerry in: 
Chatham House, 2017b). Sanctions did also fail to stop the construction of the secret uranium 
enrichment facility in Qom (Nincic, 2012, p.137). 
Tehran is, however, largely seen to have complied with the provisions of the JCPOA, 
which was negotiated under Iranian President Rouhani, until US withdrawal. The IAEA 
 
270 Including China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. The 
High Representative of the European Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy also participated in the 
negotiations. 
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confirmed that Iran undertook the necessary steps leading up to the implementation day and 
that Iran has continued to follow verification commitments resulting from the agreement 
(IAEA Board of Governors, 2017).271 
US President Trump decided that the United States would withdraw from the agreement, 
claiming that the JCPOA included too many concessions from the US in exchange for too 
few concessions from Iran regarding its nuclear program and other activities (White House, 
2018a). The other negotiating parties of the JCPOA have reaffirmed their commitment to 
the agreement (Deutsche Welle, 2018). 
Iran has expressed frustration about renewed US sanctions and has demanded the 
remaining signatories of the JCPOA to compensate for the resulting economic damage. More 
recently, Tehran has ramped up parts of its nuclear program and has selectively broken 
commitments made in the JCPOA, including enrichment activities (see e.g. Wintour, 2019). 
This development lowers outcome effectiveness connected with the agreement. 
 
Impact (Acquisition of Nuclear Weapons) 
Exploring the regime impact demands a look at the correlation between enforcement 
measures and the regime norms. In the field of acquisition, the regime norm is: states without 
nuclear weapons refrain from acquiring them. To account for the demand and supply side of 
nuclear weapons, it is worth considering to what extent the regime norm has been achieved 
in material and political terms. The political aspect refers to the willingness to develop 
nuclear weapons. The material aspect refers to the capacity to do so. 
Iraq and Libya indicate a strong regime impact, as both states dismantled their nuclear 
weapon programs. While the Libyan reversal did not take place until December 2003, 
Saddam Hussein is reported saying as early as early as 1991 to senior Iraqi officials: “I have 
given them [the Americans] everything. I mean, I have given them everything: the missiles, 
and the chemical, biological and nuclear weapons” (in: Palkki and Smith, 2012, p.290). 
Hussein reinforced the lack of WMD on multiple occasions.272 Yet, Iraq appeared to have 
kept elements of its nuclear program secret which would have allowed an easier restart of 
the program after the withdrawal of sanctions (Duelfer, 2004). 
 
271 According to US President Donald Trump (2017a), “Iran is not living up to the spirit of the deal.” Trump 
also criticizes the Iranian treatment of inspectors and points out that Iran “exceeded the limit of 130 metric tons 
of heavy water. Until recently, the Iranian regime has also failed to meet our expectations in its operation of 
advanced centrifuges” (Trump, 2017a). 
272 See e.g. Palkki and Smith (2012, pp.289–91). 
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Libya’s reversal was more decisive, but its nuclear program was also less promising. 
Some estimates speculate that, had Iraq decided to develop a nuclear device at the peak of 
its program, it would have taken another 6 - 24 months (FAS, 2012). In Libya the story is 
different. Although the state had acquired and successfully installed centrifuges, an 
intelligence expectation that Tripoli would have a nuclear bomb by 2007 was overrated 
(Braun and Chyba in: Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.68). 
Libya’s history of efforts to gain access and material for a nuclear weapon were 
frustrated by rejections from other states, a limited reliability of the Khan network, and 
lacking expertise of the Libyan engineers (see e.g. Palkki and Smith, 2012, pp.264–6). In his 
March 2004 report on the Libyan case to the Board of Governors, the IAEA Director General 
noted that although the state had received documentation on the design of nuclear weapon 
components around 2001/02, “Libya stated that it had no national personnel to evaluate the 
data and would have asked the supplier for help in the event it had opted to take further steps 
to develop a nuclear weapon” (IAEA Board of Governors, 2004a). 
In Iran and Syria, it remains unclear whether there has been political willingness to 
develop nuclear weapons. In both states, leaders have repeatedly emphasized the 
peacefulness of the respective nuclear program. Still, there remains skepticism. In Syria, the 
unilateral attack by Israel in 2007 may have had a positive impact on a possible nuclear 
threat, as it destroyed the facility in question. Kreps and Fuhrmann (2011, p.173) conclude 
that “[b]y destroying the physical plant […] Israel negated about six years of progress toward 
nuclear development, the average time states have taken to build a gas-cooled graphite-
moderated reactor.” 
But Israel’s attack also diminished clarification on Syria’s political stance on nuclear 
weapons. Referring to the Dair Alzour facility, Russian Deputy Ambassador to the UN 
Alexander Pankin pointed out: “In a crime investigation, if you don’t have a corpse you 
don’t have a case. […] There is nothing there. We are not an investigation team, we are the 
Security Council. We deal with imminent or coming threats” (in: James Martin Center for 
Nonproliferation Studies, 2011d). 
His Chinese counterpart Wang Min stated: “We should not talk about something that 
does not exist. There are a lot of things that happened in the past -- should we discuss all of 
them” (in: Worsnip and Davies, 2011). Both comments suggest the Security Council’s 
lacking capacity or willingness to enforce a “mere” non-compliance with IAEA safeguards 
agreements following autonomous action. 
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In the Iranian case, the interpretation of regime impact depends on the value of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action. Among others, Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu 
criticizes that the ballistic dimension is not included in the deal and that inspections do not 
include military facilities. The JCPOA also entails a “sunset clause,” putting an end date to 
several commitments (Netanyahu in: Chatham House, 2017a). 
Accordingly, Iran could develop some elements outside the scope of the JCPOA and its 
termination would leave the Islamic Republic with great liberty in enriching uranium. Hence, 
the agreement does not put an end to a possible future decision of Iran to pursue nuclear 
weapons. Furthermore, granting domestic enrichment may also set a negative precedent for 
other states, such as Saudi Arabia (see also Kroenig, 2016). 
Despite these shortcomings, the JCPOA comprises major advantages in ensuring 
Tehran’s compliance with the non-proliferation regime. It puts strong limitations on the 
Iranian nuclear program. John Kerry estimates that the nuclear weapon breakout time for 
Iran now is about one year, as opposed to 2-3 months before the agreement (in: Chatham 
House, 2017b). Materially speaking, the JCPOA may have saved – for now – a state from 
proliferating. 
The additional value of the JCPOA is that Iran’s nuclear program is much more 
transparent, as it applies a Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement with the IAEA as well as 
provisionally the Additional Protocol and further measures. Combining limitations and 
transparency, the four most important nuclear sites – the enrichment facilities at Natanz and 
Qom, the uranium conversion plant at Isfahan, and the nuclear reactor at Arak273 – have little 
room of maneuvering in establishing a secret nuclear weapons program. 
 
4.2.2. Possession and Use 
Several thematic subfields fall into the policy fields of possession and use of nuclear 
weapons and could serve as a starting point for regime enforcement.274 The fact that states 
have failed to comply with the regime norms in different ways (see Chapter 2) would even 
provide incentive to do so. Yet, when it comes to ensuring regime compliance regarding the 
 
273 As pointed out by Matthew Kroenig (2014, p.22), these facilities would be essential for Tehran to build 
nuclear weapons. 
274 The subfields include the stationing of nuclear weapons, disarmament, nuclear reversal, nuclear weapon 
tests, negative security assurances, as well as the application of nuclear weapons. 
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possession and use of nuclear weapons, only two issues appear to be taken up, i.e. calls for 
the nuclear reversal of a specific state und demands to stop nuclear weapon tests. 
As for nuclear weapons testing, a common point of reference is the Comprehensive Test 
Ban Treaty, which provides for a variety of enforcement tools. The treaty entails that a state 
may lose institutional privileges, be subject to collective measures, or be reported to the 
United Nations (Article V). The Preparatory Commission of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty Organization is also involved in Security Council decision-making.275 
International demands for nuclear reversals tend to be accompanied with a reference to 
the Non-Proliferation Treaty. This may seem unusual, as the NPT itself does not include 
enforcement measures. Instead, the target state is called upon to give up its nuclear weapons 
and join the NPT as a Non-Nuclear Weapon State. 
One of the most prominent cases of enforcement in the non-proliferation regime is North 
Korea. The state has been facing different waves of sanctions that target its nuclear weapons 
program, more recently following nuclear weapon tests. Yet, just looking at North Korea 
would give a wrong impression of the effectiveness of the enforcement system. I will, 
therefore, also briefly turn to the cases of France and China as well as India and Pakistan. 
 
France and China 
Output and Outcome 
In the months leading up to finalizing the text of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, 
France and China conducted their last rounds of underground nuclear weapon tests. France 
undertook six tests in 1995 and 1996, with the last one taking place on January 27, 1996. 
China conducted four nuclear weapon tests in both years up until July 29, 1996 (Kimball, 
2019). Both states subsequently signed the CTBT and have not taken up nuclear testing 
since. 
Considering that nuclear history has seen more than 2000 nuclear explosions, the tests 
may seem as a minor breach of the regime norm not to use nuclear weapons. Still, they were 
highly contentious, not because of the actual number of tests but because of the timing. All 
other Nuclear Weapon States had ceased their nuclear weapon tests by 1992. In fact, even 
France had a moratorium in place before taking up its final round of tests. Consequently, 
there had already been a trend against nuclear explosions that preceded the CTBT. 
 
275 See e.g. Jeffrey Feltman (2017). 
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Still, the institutional landscape made regime enforcement difficult. The Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty had not yet been negotiated, so the states could not have been parties to it. 
The treaty’s provisions for compliance were also not in place, making enforcement on the 
basis of the CTBT impossible. Furthermore, although France detonated its weapons in the 
Pacific, it was not subject to the enforcement of the Treaty of Rarotonga. The state had not 
signed the protocols of the treaty. Even if France had signed them, the Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zone does not state the enforcement of protocols. 
In addition to that, China and France have as Permanent Members a veto right in the 
UN Security Council, allowing them to block action that would target their tests. An 
alternative would be a resolution in the UN General Assembly, which is non-binding.276 The 
most flexible incentive would have been autonomous action, which is difficult to implement, 
as both states are economically and militarily strong targets. 
Although the Security Council was concerned with other WMD issues (i.e. WMD 
destruction) in the years of 1995 and 1996, it did not address nuclear testing by China and 
France. The UN General Assembly was more active in this regard. Its resolutions repeatedly 
spoke in favor of “utmost restraint” regarding nuclear testing and urged for the negotiation 
of a test ban treaty (UN General Assembly, 1994; 1995a). 
In December 1995, the General Assembly became more vocal on the status of testing at 
the time by commending cessation of nuclear testing and criticizing its continuation. Here, 
it is striking that criticism of nuclear testing was not explicitly targeted against China and 
France. Instead, the General Assembly used a more abstract formulation: 
“Sharing alarm expressed internationally, regionally and nationally at 
recent nuclear tests, 
1. Commends those nuclear-weapon States observing nuclear testing 
moratoria, and urges them to continue those moratoria pending the entry into 
force of a comprehensive nuclear-test-ban treaty; 
2. Strongly deplores all current nuclear testing; 
3. Strongly urges the immediate cessation of all nuclear testing.” 
(UN General Assembly, 1996) 
This does not mean that China and France did not become subject to explicit criticism. 
Discussion in the First Committee of the UN General Assembly singled out and condemned 
both states for their nuclear tests. Concerns brought forward by members of the First 
Committee were related to the consequences for environment and health, alleged breaches 
 
276 The General Assembly may still “carry political and moral weight” (Goldblat, 1986, p.131). 
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of existing commitments, and a poisoning of the atmosphere of the CTBT negotiation (UN 
General Assembly, 1995b; 1995c; 1995d). 
Even though the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty had not been negotiated, there was an 
implicit rule not to test for which both states were held accountable. Rather than sanctioning 
the states, the discussions resembled a “naming and shaming.” Particularly Pacific states 
made their outrage as a result of the tests heard. For instance, Epsen Ronneberg, 
Representative of the Marshall Islands, made an emotional statement pointing out that 
France was not living up to its role as an advanced state: “It is simply incomprehensible to 
us that this great nation of culture, science and fine arts, that this nation could visit this 
abomination upon us in the Pacific” (UN General Assembly, 1995c). 
Adding to the discussions in the First Committee, there was also a major public 
resistance to the actions of Nuclear Weapon States. France especially had to face a public 
outcry, including domestic and international protests as well as boycotts of French products 
(Pullar-Strecker, 1996; BBC, 2008). This indicates that regime enforcement may also be 
strengthened by non-state actors. 
Following their last rounds of testing, there has been a rather positive development in 
terms of output and outcome effectiveness. China and France have put in place moratoria 
and have signed the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty. While France has also ratified the 
treaty, China’s ratification is still pending. 
 
India and Pakistan 
Output and Outcome 
The 1998 nuclear weapon tests by India and Pakistan are commonly mentioned together, 
also in regime enforcement. This is due to their regional and political connection (see 
Chapter 2) but also owing to the timing of the detonations. Both tests were conducted in May 
1998 and represented the first nuclear explosions after the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty 
opened for signature. 
In an apparent anticipation of an international condemnation of the tests, Pakistani 
Prime Minister Muhammad Nawaz Sharif (1998) claimed in his public statement on May 29 
that “[…] Pakistan will oppose all unjust embargoes aimed at preventing it from exercising 
its right to develop various technologies for self-defence or peaceful purposes.” As it turned 
out, Sharif’s apparent anticipation of international opposition became reality. 
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In contrast to the nuclear weapon tests by China and France, which were conducted only 
a few years earlier, the UN Security Council condemned India and Pakistan for their actions 
(UN Security Council, 1998). The UNSC demonstrated concern that the tests, on the one 
hand, would significantly raise the regional tension. On the other hand, the tests were 
described as countering non-proliferation efforts: 
“Gravely concerned at the challenge that the nuclear tests conducted by 
India and then by Pakistan constitute to international efforts aimed at 
strengthening the global regime of non-proliferation of nuclear weapons, and 
also gravely concerned at the danger to peace and stability in the region” (UN 
Security Council, 1998). 
In addition to acknowledging that the tests posed a threat to the international security 
environment, the resolution of the Security Council formulated a number of demands277 
towards India and Pakistan. The states were urged and called upon to 
• Not conduct further nuclear weapon tests 
• Not export knowledge, equipment, or material that could proliferate WMD 
• Not further escalate the bilateral conflict 
• End their nuclear weapon programs, including a related development of ballistic 
missiles and the production of fissile material for weapon devices 
• Take up the bilateral dialogue 
• Join the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and Non-Proliferation Treaty 
The demands refer to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty and the Non-Proliferation 
Treaty, which shows that regime enforcement is not just used as a tool to counter non-
compliance with norms. It is also used as a platform to further integrate states into the 
regime. To underline the demands, the resolution by the UNSC introduces the notion of 
sanctions that target the nuclear programs by India and Pakistan: 
“8. Encourages all States to prevent the export of equipment, materials 
or technology that could in any way assist programmes in India or Pakistan 
for nuclear weapons or for ballistic missiles capable of delivering such 
weapons, and welcomes national policies adopted and declared in this 
respect” (UN Security Council, 1998). 
Although the international community massively criticized the nuclear tests by India 
and Pakistan, the actual international response varied significantly. As noted in Oliver 
Meier’s (1999) analysis of international reactions, the idea of implementing sanctions was 
 
277 In the resolution it was formulated that the Security Council “demands,” “urges,” or “calls upon.” 
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only supported by some and even those who did appeared to doubt that they would have a 
positive effect in changing both states’ behavior. 
In June 1998, the United States implemented sanctions that prohibited economic and 
military assistance with India and Pakistan. In the case of the latter, a number of sanctions 
had already been imposed since 1979 (Wagner, 2001). Those US measures that were 
introduced for the 1998 nuclear tests were ended in the fall of 2001.278 The step became part 
of a larger cooperation effort in the Bush administration’s fight against terrorism 
(Krishnadas, 2001). 
India and Pakistan have unilateral moratoria in place not to conduct further nuclear 
weapon tests. The unilateral declarations were also reaffirmed in the Lahore Declaration of 
1999. This reflects a positive but modest output effectiveness, as the commitments are non-
binding and do not extend to other parts of the nuclear programs. The outcome effectiveness 
is also positive when it comes to nuclear testing as both states have, so far, refrained from 
new nuclear weapon tests. Other than that, the nuclear development in both states leave little 
room for optimism. Over the last twenty years, they have continued to advance their nuclear 
weapon programs and have an increasing arsenal of nuclear weapons (Appendix 3). 
 
North Korea 
Output and Outcome 
There is a long history of inducements targeting the North Korean nuclear program, 
falling into all policy fields (acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons).279 The 
international demands include a stop of nuclear weapon tests, a dismantlement of the 
weapons program, and adherence to international treaties. The goal has not changed: making 
the DPRK a compliant Non-Nuclear Weapon State. 
Connected with the demands, the UN Security Council has issued eleven resolutions on 
North Korea since 2006.280 The sanctions demand inspection against North Korean cargo 
and include a prohibition to export weaponry and materials that could be used for WMD 
 
278 Some sanctions against Pakistan remained in place that sanctioned missile proliferation and the 1999 
military coup (Wagner, 2001). 
279 Fittingly, a vast amount of works on the problem and possible solution of the North Korean nuclear crisis 
have been published (just to name a few: Hayes, 2007; Acharya, 2009; Bechtol, 2010; Haggard and Noland, 
2012; Roehrig, 2012; Sun and Wit, 2015; Iverson, 2017). 
280 These resolutions are S/RES/1718 (2006), S/RES/1874 (2009), S/RES/2087 (2013), S/RES/2094 (2013), 
S/RES/2270 (2016), S/RES/2321 (2016), S/RES/2345(2017), S/RES/2356 (2017), S/RES/2371 (2017), 
S/RES/2375 (2017), S/RES/2397(2017). 
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purposes, an export ban of luxury goods, a limitation of the number of North Korean 
diplomats, a prohibition to employ or educate North Koreans (in WMD related fields), as 
well as financial sanctions against individuals and entities. 
Lately, there have been increasing restrictions on North Korean exports, such as coal, 
iron, lead, and seafood.281 There is also a military dimension to the North Korean nuclear 
crisis. The US is ally to South Korea and has a military presence on the Korean peninsula.282 
The state was repeatedly subject to military threats as well as nuclear engagement throughout 
the 1990s. This dual approach has also been embodied by US President Donald Trump 
(2017b), who has made several explicit threats, declaring the US would “totally destroy” 
North Korea if “forced to defend itself or its allies.” Still, he has enganged in personal 
meetings with Kim Jong-un. 
Positive incentives towards North Korea have included assistance in developing a 
peaceful nuclear energy infrastructure, delivering energy resources, food aid, providing cash 
payments, and offering security assurances.283 In the US-DPRK Agreed Framework of 
1994,284 the US agreed to support the building of a light water reactor (LWR). Pyongyang 
consented to freeze and eventually dismantle its graphite-moderated reactors and related 
facilities, which were to be compensated for by the US through energy replacement. Upon 
the discovery of the secret North Korean uranium production, the administration of George 
W. Bush put a halt to the fuel oil shipments. The LWR which was originally to be completed 
by 2003, was not finished. 
Considering that North Korea accepted limitations on its reactors, the Agreed 
Framework succeeded in enhancing output effectiveness (i.e. commitments from the DRPK). 
Yet, the scope was rather narrow, limiting the degree of effectiveness. This became all the 
more apparent when the DPRK was able to develop a uranium production in parallel. At the 
same time, the secret uranium production decreases outcome effectiveness, as the state’s 
behavior following the commitment not only contradicted IAEA safeguards but also the 
Agreed Framework. North Korea did not work towards a denuclearization of the Korean 
 
281 For an overview of the respective sanctions and contents see e.g. Arms Control Association (2018), US 
Department of the Treasury (2019), Council of the European Union (2019). 
282 The Mutual Defense Treaty Between the United States and the Republic of Korea, October 1, 1953. 
283 A similar summary of positive inducements can be found in Haggard and Noland (2012, pp.245–7). A cash 
payment in the amount of $500 million was reportedly paid for the 2000 North-South summit (Cha, 2012, 
pp.2–3). The North-South summit was aimed at improving the bilateral relations in more general terms. 
284 Agreed Framework between the United States of America and the Democratic People’s Republic Korea, 
October 21, 1994. 
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Peninsula and did not remain in the NPT (withdrawing in 2003), as demanded in the Agreed 
Framework. 
The most prominent international attempt to engage with North Korea were the Six-
Party Talks held between 2003 and 2009 by China, Japan, North Korea, Russia, South 
Korea, and the United States. The parties eventually concluded two agreements in 2007 
aimed at completely dismantling North Korea’s Yongbyon facility in exchange for economic 
incentives such as heavy fuel oil shipments (Haggard and Noland, 2012, pp.232–3) and prior 
unfreezing of North Korean funds (Bechtol, 2010, p.90). Again, in terms of output, North 
Korea’s commitment reflects a modest achievement. Neither the uranium production (which 
North Korea kept secret) nor the already produced fissile material were part of the 
agreement. 
The outcome demonstrates elements of success, as North Korea put temporary halts on 
plutonium production and publicly took down a water tower. Yet, outcome effectiveness 
overall was not positive, as the DPRK never fully dismantled the Yongbyon facility. 
Although there have been repeated attempts by different parties to revive the Six-Party 
Talks, no new rounds have taken place since 2009. 
The DPRK reportedly approached Russian President Vladimir Putin in 2014 to signal a 
willingness to resume the Six-Party talks (Arms Control Association, 2017a). In the 
meantime, North Korea’s behavior arguably became more aggressive in other areas, as noted 
by David Santoro (2012) referring to the 2010 sinking of a South Korean corvette and the 
bombardment of Yeonpyeong Island. 
China, South Korea, and the United States of America have engaged with North Korea 
bilaterally in recent months. In June 2018, US President Donald Trump met with North 
Korean leader Kim Jong-un. Both leaders signed a joint declaration, which expresses the 
goal to improve bilateral relations and provide a basis for further negotiations. The statement 
notes that “President Trump committed to provide security guarantees to the DPRK, and 
Chairman Kim Jong Un reaffirmed his firm and unwavering commitment to complete 
denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula” (White House, 2018b). 
In the wake of negotiations, Pyongyang has halted its nuclear weapon tests and started 
dismantling a nuclear weapon test site at Punggye-ri. Still, as North Korea has not taken 
irreversible steps to dismantle its nuclear program, the state is largely non-compliant with 
international demands (outcome effectiveness). In a most recent meeting between Trump and 
Kim in Hanoi in February 2019, the leaders did not come to an agreement on how to proceed. 
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Impact (Possession and Use of Nuclear Weapons) 
How does regime enforcement correlate with the larger (non-)compliance with norms 
on the possession and use of nuclear weapons? States that possess nuclear bombs are 
expected to disarm and refrain from using nuclear weapons. Considering that enforcement 
mainly focuses on nuclear weapon tests and nuclear reversals lowers the prospects of regime 
impact. In order to get a grasp of the regime’s effect, I will briefly turn to nuclear weapon 
tests and nuclear programs described in this subsection before specifically turning to the 
North Korean case. 
A positive trend of regime impact can be found in the field of nuclear weapon tests. This 
is in line with the regime’s impact as outlined in the commitment system (Chapter 2). The 
scope of enforcement tools that the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has to offer towards its 
members is remarkable. More important than that, it has also become a yardstick for states 
outside the CTBT that undertake nuclear weapon tests. 
Detonations by India, Pakistan, and North Korea have been condemned by the United 
Nations with reference to the CTBT, although none of them is a signatory of the treaty (e.g. 
UN Security Council, 1998; 2017a). This also means that every nuclear weapon test after 
CTBT opened for signature has triggered an international response. A further positive 
correlation exists in the cases of India and Pakistan. Both states have refrained from 
conducting tests since 1998. 
Although there has been a massive international outcry regarding nuclear weapons in 
India and Pakistan, both states have failed to comply with the demands to reverse their 
programs. Instead, they have significantly expanded their arsenal. This indicates that the 
sanctions did not change the political aspiration for nuclear bombs. If anything has changed, 
it is the stance of the international community. The United States, a vocal critic of the tests, 
reversed its sanctions in 2001, because they no longer resembled US “national security 
interests” (Krishnadas, 2001). 
China and France did not even face an UN Security Council condemnation of their 
nuclear tests in 1995 and 1996. Both states are far from dismissing their nuclear weapon 
status. On a positive note, however, they have not taken up nuclear weapon tests again and 
France has even lowered its nuclear weapon stocks. This confirms again that, even without 
sanctions, states may increasingly comply with the regime’s norms and rules. 
The most ambitious enforcement case is North Korea which faced international 
sanctions even before detonating its first nuclear bomb. While the exact number of nuclear 
 201 
weapons remains unknown, Kristensen and Norris (2018, p.41) “cautiously estimate that 
North Korea might have produced sufficient fissile material to build 30 to 60 nuclear 
weapons, and that it might possibly have assembled 10 to 20 warheads.” 
The DPRK has conducted six nuclear weapon tests and has been developing a variety 
of missiles with different ranges. Thus, Pyongyang’s nuclear threat is or will soon be of 
intercontinental reach (Kristensen and Norris, 2018). This development is perhaps the 
greatest failure in the enforcement of the non-proliferation regime. Looking at norms, the 
regime failed in every aspect imaginable in North Korea, as it could not counter the states 
acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons, regardless of extensive sanctions along 
the way. 
Despite this negative impression, the impact of international efforts against the North 
Korean nuclear program is more nuanced. It should be noted that Pyongyang reacts to 
incentives. Without these reactions, we may be worse off than we are now (e.g. Barbaro, 
2017). The Agreed Framework put a temporary halt on the separation of plutonium to be 
used for nuclear weapons. Similarly, the 2007 agreement resulting from the Six-Party Talks 
suspended the reprocessing facilities at Yongbyon, which were inspected by the IAEA and 
sealed until North Korea resumed production in 2009. 
While these achievements point to a material impact on North Korea’s nuclear program, 
the political relevance of nuclear weapons remains unchanged. Pyongyang plays a double-
game: Demonstrating compliance while keeping an ace up its sleeve. When asked whether 
the freeze of Yonbyon negotiated in the Agreed Framework slowed North Korea’s nuclear 
program, defector Kim Duk-hong, former assistant to ideological mastermind Hwang Jang-
yop, responded: 
“Of course, I think the Clinton administration was great. […] [But the 
North Koreans] resumed the development of nuclear weapons as soon as they 
signed the Geneva Agreed Framework, even before the ink dried on the paper. 
In 1995, the national military industry secretariat went to Pakistan to trade 
skills in exchange for producing nuclear weapons. They sent engineers to 
Pakistan after they signed for Geneva Agreed Framework in 1994. They 
began to talk about nuclear weapons with Pakistan 1995” (in: Frontline, 
2003). 
North Korea also worked on the secret enrichment of uranium, despite signing the 
Agreed Framework. Thus, nuclear freezes are no proof for political will to disarm.285 
 
285 Former North Korean chief ideologist Hwang Jang-yop questioned the very usefulness of nuclear freezes, 
claiming that Pyongyang would just build new facilities. He argued that “[t]he more North Korea has to gain 
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Accordingly, skepticism regarding the declared dismantlement of a nuclear weapon test site 
is justified. Especially considering that there are reports about new constructions on the site 
(Brunnstrom and Lambert, 2019). 
 
4.3. Explaining Effectiveness 
The cases of regime enforcement described above indicate some material and/or 
political progress in meeting regime norms. This would suggest that enforcement has at least 
partially countered states’ non-compliance. Instead of prematurely assuming such a 
causality, it is worth exploring state behavior more closely. Taking the perspectives of 
security, norms, economics, and status, I will use the remaining space of this chapter to 
examine states’ (non-)cooperation with the regime in the light of enforcement. The most 

















from the six-party talks, the stronger the Kim Jong-il regime will become” (Hwang Yang-jop in: Kim Song A, 
2007). 
 203 
Table 7 – Prominent Cases of Regime Enforcement 
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To what extent did security considerations affect states’ willingness to cooperate? We 
would expect a state to commit to and comply with regime norms and rules if the cooperation 
satisfies its security needs. A state may improve its security environment by investing in 
international cooperation or may feel threatened by pursuing a nuclear weapons track. 
Military threats in particular could affect this calculation (see e.g. Kreps and Pasha, 2012). 
However, pursuing nuclear weapons may also be used to counter a regional threat (e.g. 
Sagan, 1996, pp.57–63; Singh and Way, 2004, pp.863–4). According to some analysts, states 
may also pursue nuclear ambiguity as a tool for deterrence (Hymans, 2006, pp.456–8). 
Regime enforcement may fail to address security concerns or may even underline them. We 
can assume that if non-cooperation satisfies its security needs, then a state will refrain from 
complying with regime norms and rules. As consequence, a state would continue to counter 
regime norms, despite enforcement. 
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Cooperation 
Security considerations may contribute to ensuring compliance with the non-
proliferation regime. Although the reasons for Libya to give up its nuclear weapons program 
were very multifaceted, one aspect was possibly a military threat (see e.g. Jentleson and 
Whytock, 2006). This is due to a combination of two factors. 
On the one hand, particularly the administration of George W. Bush emphasized that 
Libya drew lessons from the war on Iraq.286 Accordingly, Libya would have to fear the same 
destiny had it continued a WMD path. Muammar al-Gaddafi is even reported saying to 
former Italian Prime Minister Silvio Berlusconi “I will do whatever the Americans want, 
because I saw what happened in Iraq, and I was afraid” (in: Litwak, 2007, p.193).287 On the 
other hand, an October 2003 interception of the vessel BBC China, which included 
centrifuge components and was bound for Libya, underlined the state’s illicit activities to 
the international community (Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.74). 
At first sight, the timing of Libya’s decision to give up its WMD programs fits into the 
narrative of a perceived military threat. Libya’s public dismissal took place in the same year 
as the discovery of its illicit nuclear activities and the Operation Iraqi Freedom. Still, there 
is skepticism regarding security threats as having played into Libya’s calculations. For 
instance, Benoît Pelopidas questions the virtue of linking the 2003 invasion in Iraq with 
Libya giving up its WMD programs: 
“(1) The 1986 bombings intended to kill Gadhafi did not lead him to give 
up the WMD programs, so why should a more remote threat produce a 
stronger effect? (2) In the 1990s, during the secret negotiations with the 
United States and the United Kingdom, the Libyan regime offered to give up 
its weapons of mass destruction after the threat of regime change was 
removed, not because of it” (Pelopidas, 2015a, p.43). 
Harald Müller (2007, pp.86–8), in turn, argues that the decision to give up the WMD 
programs had been made and communicated internally before the October 2003 interception 
of the BBC China. Rather than overemphasizing the security dimension, Libya’s decision to 
dismantle may have been due to diplomatic efforts (e.g. St John, 2004), domestic economic 
 
286 Even years after the incident, former President George W. Bush (2010, p.267) claimed that Libya reversed 
its course also because of the experience from Saddam Hussein. 
287 Robert G. Joseph, who was part of the US negotiation team in the talks leading to Libya’s WMD reversal, 
claims that Libya was likely to have been affected by a number of motivations – including a possible removal 
of sanctions, a strive for domestic change, and the fight against Islamic extremism. In his view, a key aspect 
was also the possibility of becoming a military target – just like Iraq under Saddam Hussein. This would be 
somewhat ironic, as military attacks on Libya were not immediately planned by the US (Joseph, 2009). 
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factors (e.g. Barnum and Fearey, 2016), sanctions (e.g. Park, 2017), and even status (e.g. 
Braut-Hegghammer, 2008) considerations which will be taken up in following subsections. 
As for Syria, some scholars see a positive deterrent impact of Israel’s 2007 military 
attack. For instance, Kreps and Fuhrmann (2011, p.175) speculate that Israel’s destruction 
of the Dair Alzour facility may have scared off North Korea in providing nuclear assistance, 
thereby, further hampering illicit nuclear activities. Yet, there are indications that Syria 
continued illicit nuclear activities, including help from Iran and North Korea (e.g. Follath, 
2015). This observation would question a deterrent effect on Syria and North Korea. 
Considering that Pyongyang is a far greater nuclear concern for the international community 
than Damascus, it is unlikely that North Korea would give-in to a secondary deterrence rather 
than the threats to which it itself is subject. 
Israel’s attack on the Dair Alzour facility is also described as serving as a possible 
deterrent for other Middle Eastern states considering a nuclear weapons program (Spector 
and Berman, 2010, p.127). While the argument is plausible, it is difficult to prove. The fact 
that Libya, Syria, and Iran have demonstrated illicit nuclear activities despite Israel’s attack 
of an Iraqi facility in 1981 shows that deterrence following a unilateral military attack is 
limited. 
To the contrary, being subject to military attacks may even demonstrate vulnerability, 
which can even increase the willingness to develop a nuclear deterrent. For Libya, this 
assumption is in accordance with Muammar al-Gaddafi speaking in favor of a nuclear 




This latter consideration already indicates that security aspects may lead to non-
compliance with the regime. Reading and listening to official statements by North Korea, 
one gets the impression that the state’s refusal to give up its nuclear weapons program is 
security driven. Although certainly not the only factor, there is some virtue in this claim. 
Pyongyang often makes references to its nuclear program as a response to US military 
power. 
For instance, the North Korean news agency KCNA reported that the 2013 nuclear 
weapons test was meant “to defend the country’s security and sovereignty in the face of the 
ferocious hostile act of the US” and concluded that “[i]f the U.S. continues with their 
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hostility and complicates the situation, it would be inevitable to continuously conduct a 
stronger second or third measure” (in: Mullen, 2013). Pyongyang has also portrayed the 
alleged reach of its missiles to US mainland as a milestone of its program (e.g. Cohen et al., 
2017). In this sense, the vast expansion of Pyongyang’s nuclear program was particularly 
aimed at the United States. 
The security-related value of North Korea’s nuclear weapons program appears to have 
been confirmed by experiences from other states. North Korea follows events in other states 
closely and draws conclusions for its own military.288 The lack of nuclear weapons appears 
to be a striking feature of vulnerability. Libya as well as Iraq have been portrayed in the 
DPRK as negative examples for how states without nuclear weapons can end up.289 
There is reason to believe that North Korea’s threat perception is real. The United States’ 
involvement in the Korean War, its continued military presence in the region (including 
military exercises), and the hostile rhetoric by political leaders290 that also involve military 
threats may give the impression that Washington wants to replace the political leadership in 
Pyongyang. In fact, the DPRK is legally still at war. 
A perceived existential threat would also explain why North Korea has always tried to 
keep the upper hand in agreements, never seriously endangering the long-term existence of 
its nuclear weapons. According to Haggard and Noland (2012, p.259), the strong opposition 
to comprehensive verification may be part of a greater strategy to retain deterrence. 
Furthermore, North Korea’s halt to nuclear weapons testing or even the aforementioned 
destruction of a water tower have no long-term impact on the program. 
Still, it is hard to say which instances are perceived as a real threat. For example, while 
the KNCA described the Foal Eagle military exercise in the past as an aggression (Reuters, 
2017), Kim Jong-un expressed his understanding for the drill to a South Korean delegation 
(Hancocks, 2018). Furthermore, despite prior vivid exchanges of nuclear threats between 
 
288 As described by John Cha (2012, p.86), “[i]n March 2003, it was reported that Kim Jong-il had not been 
seen in public for forty-three days. It was eventually discovered that Kim had spent time at the underground 
bunker Cheol Bong Li near Pyongyang, watching and analyzing television broadcasts about the American 
invasion of Iraq. He and his military leaders were no doubt concerned about whether or not US forces could 
roll across North Korea in the same way they had in Iraq.” 
289 For instance, in a conversation about the nuclear weapons program, US Representative Eliot Engel was told 
by a high-ranking North Korean official: “Saddam Hussein didn’t have nuclear weapons and look how he 
wound up” (in: Thae, 2017). On Libya, a North Korean spokesperson commentated: “It has been shown to the 
corners of the earth that Libya’s giving up its nuclear arms, which the U.S. liked to chatter on about, was used 
as an invasion tactic to disarm the country by sugarcoating it with words like ‘the guaranteeing of security’ and 
‘the bettering of relations’” (in: Kim, 2011). On the discussion of the “message” of Muammar al-Gaddafi’s 
toppling and Libya’s decision to give up its WMD programs see also Pelopidas (2015a, pp.39–43). 
290 President George W. Bush’s denouncement of North Korea as a member of the infamous “axis of evil” in 
his 2002 state of the Union address is a prominent example (Bush, 2002). 
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Kim Jong-und and Donald Trump,291 both leaders made complimenting comments during 
the June 2018 Singapore summit. Hence, the image of the enemy is also subject to rhetoric. 
Security considerations appear to have also restrained Iraq’s compliance with 
international demands. First, weapons of mass destruction were considered to have benefited 
Baghdad. According to the Duelfer Report, Iraqi senior officials were convinced that WMD 
prevented an Iraqi loss in the war against Iran and deterred a US invasion into Baghdad in 
1991. Iraqis even contemplated that the outcome of the 1991 Gulf War would have been 
different with nuclear devices. Against this background, complying with the demand of 
WMD dismantlement was a difficult decision (Duelfer, 2004). 
Second, some analysts suggest that even after having given up its weapons of mass 
destruction, Baghdad pursued a “strategic ambiguity” to deter neighbors, particularly Iran, 
(Palkki and Smith, 2012, pp.285–7). This interpretation is in line with the mixed public 
messages by Saddam Hussein on his stance on WMD. These were misread by the US 
administration at the time, as noted by Charles Duelfer, former Acting Chairman of 
UNSCOM: 
“Saddam was asked about a speech he gave in June 2000, in which he 
said, ‘You cannot expect Iraq to give up a rifle and live only with a sword, if 
its neighbors do not also give up their rifles and keep only swords.’ In 
Washington, this sounded like ‘Saddam-speak’ for declaring that he had 
retained WMD. Saddam explained that he had Tehran in mind as his 
audience, not Washington. […] Ironically, Saddam assumed that the United 
States knew the true status of his WMD stocks – that they were basically 
gone” (Duelfer, 2016, p.175). 
While making empty threats himself, Saddam Hussein misread real military threats that 
were guided against him by the United States. He reportedly had doubts that a war was 
imminent, much to the surprise of George W. Bush.292 Bush (2010, p.269) suspects that 
Hussein may have underestimated the threat due to “mixed signals from France, Germany, 
and Russia.” While mixed signals may have played a role in the Iraqi threat perception, the 
Duelfer Report suggests that Hussein mainly failed to understand US domestic politics and 
 
291 For instance, President Trump emphasized that his “Nuclear Button” was “bigger and more powerful” than 
Kim Jong-un’s (Beech, 2018). 
292 In his autobiography the former US President stated: “I’m not sure what more I could have done to show 
Saddam I meant what I said. I named him part of an axis of evil in my State of the Union address. I spoke to a 
packed chamber of the United Nations and promised to disarm him by force if diplomacy failed. We presented 
him with a unanimous Security Council resolution. We sought and received strong bipartisan backing from 
U.S. Congress. We deployed 150,000 troops to his border. I gave him a final forty-eight-hours’ notice that we 
were about to invade his country. How much clearer could I have been” (Bush, 2010, p.269)? 
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the international security environment in the context of 9/11, until it was too late (Duelfer, 
2004). 
The aspect of security is also a popular explanation for Iran’s secretive nuclear behavior 
and reluctance to make nuclear concessions. Iran finds itself in confrontation with Arab 
states, most notably Saudi Arabia, while major opponents – the United States and Israel – 
have nuclear weapons. Accordingly, Tehran would seek nuclear weapons itself (e.g. 
Kroenig, 2014, pp.32–40) or at least nuclear ambiguity (e.g. Jones and Holmes, 2012, 
p.214).293 
Nonetheless, security is unlikely the primary driving factor for Iran’s nuclear program. 
Gaukhar Mukhatzhanova (2010, pp.47–57) examines the threat argument looking at Iran’s 
different phases of relationship with Iraq, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, Israel, and the United 
States since the 1980s and concludes that the threat perception may be exaggerated.  
In the last few years, Iran has found itself countering a range of threats. US President 
Donald Trump is particularly hostile to the state leadership and Iran’s entanglement in the 
wars in Syria and Yemen underline conflict with other regional forces. Still, the Islamic 
Republic has complied with the JCPOA and accepted constraints on and verification of its 
nuclear program. Hence, security considerations do not appear to have pushed Iran towards 
non-cooperation. 
Tehran’s nuclear behavior would be inconsistent when assuming a security driven 
perspective to non-cooperation with the regime. Materially speaking, Iran could have 
developed a nuclear weapon. Why would Tehran conclude the JCPOA if it seeks nuclear 
weapons? The extensive verification commitments of the agreement, with which Iran has 
complied, reduces Tehran’s ability to make use of nuclear deterrence and decreases the 
state’s possible pursuance of strategic ambiguity.  
Overall, there is no general response to whether security considerations facilitate or 
hamper cooperation within the non-proliferation regime in the light of regime enforcement. 
As noted by Derek Smith looking at deterrence and “rogue states,” the motivation for nuclear 
weapon programs is diverse and so are states calculations on possible retaliation, most 
notably by the United States. A harsh approach of bullying states into compliance can easily 
backfire, which makes enforcement a delicate act (Smith, 2006). Any form of explicit or 
implicit military threat may offer incentive for regime compliance (which may have been a 
 
293 Following Scott A. Jones and James R. Holmes (2012), strategic considerations in the regional context may 
even exist without the current Islamic leadership. 
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contributing factor in Libya) or it may push a state further down the road of proliferation, as 
it appears to have been the case in North Korea.294 
 
4.3.2. Norms 
As Chapters 2 and 3 have shown, normative considerations have strengthened 
commitment to and compliance with the non-proliferation regime. Against this background, 
it makes sense to consider the normative contribution to states’ (non-)cooperation in the 
enforcement system. Looking at the hypotheses, we expect a state to commit to and comply 
with regime norms and rules, if cooperation is fair and satisfies international law. In turn, if 
non-cooperation represents fairness and international law, then the state will refrain from 
committing to and complying with regime norms and rules. 
 
Cooperation 
Deriving from its behavior, Libya appears to be a candidate for a normative change of 
heart. Not only did the state give up its WMD programs but has also made several non-
proliferation commitments, including the implementation of the Comprehensive Test Ban 
Treaty as well as the ratification of the Treaty of Pelindaba and the Additional Protocol. 
Under new leadership, Libya has become a champion of the humanitarian initiative and has 
signed the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons.  
Nonetheless, normative considerations do not appear to have been a crucial motivation 
for Libya to end its WMD programs.295 Rather, the state was subject to other driving factors 
discussed in this thesis. Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, a leading figure behind the reversal, 
emphasizes the diplomatic deal with Western powers as main condition for Libya’s decision 
(in: Andersen and Kleber, 2009). According to this line of thinking, compliance was the tool, 
not an end by itself. 
Following Iran’s argumentation, several normative considerations are defining its 
nuclear program. One argument put forward is humanitarian. Iran portrays itself as a non-
proliferation champion, because it has itself been a victim of weapons of mass destruction 
 
294 Proliferation may even occur at radical consequences. As noted by Maria Rublee, “[c]ases such as North 
Korea, Pakistan, and Iran only underscore the point: if a country has the political will, not even poverty or 
underdevelopment can keep it from building a nuclear weapons program” (Rublee, 2009, pp.202–3). 
295 The literature on the Libyan reversal do not account for normative factors as having played a defining role. 
See e.g. Wyn Q. Bowen (2006), Jentleson and Whytock (2006), Palkki and Smith (2012), William Tobey 
(2014), as well as Barnum and Fearey (2016). 
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and seen its devastating effects. Accordingly, nuclear weapons are prohibited by religious 
decree by the Supreme Leader (e.g. Mousavian, 2017). On these grounds, Iranian leaders 
have repeatedly emphasized that Iran has complied with the non-proliferation norm and will 
continue to do so.296 The humanitarian argument could explain why the state has, so far, 
refrained from developing nuclear weapons, despite an advanced nuclear infrastructure.  
In the context of its controversial uranium enrichment, Iran claims to pursue 
international law and fairness. The Islamic Republic refuted calls to suspend its activities 
(e.g. UN Security Council, 2006b) while maintaining to honor the non-proliferation norm. 
Iranian leaders consider enrichment as an “inalienable right” that can be derived from Article 
IV of the NPT.297 In this sense, the state is cooperating with the regime, as it is following the 
NPT. 
The notion of fairness derives from Iran’s reference to other nuclear programs. Allowing 
some states peaceful enrichment and refusing the right to others is considered by Tehran as 
highly discriminatory (Mukhatzhanova, 2010, p.62). Domestic enrichment is considered 
vital to maintain a fair regime. Referring to uranium enrichment, former President Mahmud 
Ahmadinejad stated: 
“This is one of our rights in terms of international law. We don’t 
necessarily wish to call on these rights. […] Countries which produce 
uranium over 20 % enrichment based on their rights must also allow us to 
produce at 20 % enrichment level, but so far we’ve not been permitted to do 
so” (in: FRANCE 24 English, 2012). 
Still, normative considerations are unlikely an isolated driving factor for Iranian nuclear 
behavior. The legalistic argumentation by Ahmadinejad above does not explain why the state 
broke IAEA rules like failing to declare nuclear facilities. There are also less controversial 
ways than enrichment to show discontent with an (allegedly) unfair implementation of the 
NPT and to underline humanitarian concerns, which Iran does not pursue (e.g. supporting 
the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons).298 Nonetheless, the image of fairness 
plays into the driving factor of status, which will be considered in subsequent pages. 
 
296 For instance, in a 2017 interview with NBC, Iranian President Hassan Rouhani pointed out that Iran will 
only pursue peaceful nuclear activities, even if the JCPOA were to break down (in: NBC Nightly News, 2017). 
297 More specifically, Article IV.1. of the NPT states that “Nothing in this Treaty shall be interpreted as 
affecting the inalienable right of all the Parties to the Treaty to develop research, production and use of nuclear 
energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination and in conformity with Articles I and II of this Treaty.” 
Iran’s “inalienable right to enrich” is also rejected by some scholars (e.g. Kroenig, 2014, pp.84–6). 
298 Accordingly, there have been calls for Iran to be a greater champion of non-proliferation on an international 
stage (e.g. Mousavian, 2017). 
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Also, Iraq insisted that it was cooperating with the regime while critizising a lack of 
fairness. The Operation Iraqi Freedom showed that the state was, from a material 
perspective, in compliance with the non-proliferation norm. Prior to the 2003 military 
invasion, Hussein publicly and internally criticized international sanctions. Apparently, he 
had doubts that extensive compliance with UN demands would lead to a relief of the 
measures. He reportedly stated to his inner circle that Iraq would have “sanctions with 
inspectors or sanctions without inspectors” (Palkki and Smith, 2012, p.283). 
Indeed, there were structural challenges imposed by the sanctioning states. Iraq could 
not possibly comply with rules that assumed it had an active WMD program. As pointed out 
by Mohamed El Baradei (2011, p.68), the demands in a March 2003 draft Security Council 
resolution by the United Kingdom included six demands towards Iraq, at least three of which 
the state could not fulfill because it simply did not have the suspected material and inventory. 
 
Non-Cooperation 
Iraq also vocally refuted international sanctions and claimed that they were inhuman, 
giving a possible incentive for less cooperativeness. There is validity in the claim, as 
sanctions are seen to have made it more difficult for the Iraqi population to fulfill basic needs 
(Reynolds and Wan, 2012, p.68). According to several scholars, the sanctions may have 
contributed to the death of thousands of Iraqi children (e.g. Pape, 1998, p.76; Pyka, 2015, 
pp.35–6; Reynolds and Wan, 2012, p.68). 
However, Charles Duelfer, former Acting Chairman of UNSCOM, concluded from his 
investigation of the Iraqi WMD programs that Saddam Hussein intentionally used 
humanitarian arguments to pressure the Security Council to lift sanctions. He finds that 
Saddam Hussein “emphasized the suffering of the innocent Iraqi civilian population and 
argued that the sanctions were immoral. At the same time, he gave prominent vocal Iraq 
supporters and willing influential UN-officials lucrative oil allocations” (Duelfer, 2004). The 
Iraqi leader could have eased the suffering of his people, but instead chose to consolidate 
power. Hence, the humanitarian aspect seems to have been not a driving force, but a tool to 
refute international sanctions. 
A normative argumentation is also to be found in statements by Syria, which has failed 
to cooperate in clarifying the nature of its Dair Alzour facility. Criticizing the IAEA Annual 
Report, the Syrian Ambassador to the United Nations, Bashar Ja’afari, reemphasized the 
non-proliferation commitment of his country and described Israel as the “real nuclear threat” 
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in the region. Ja’afari (2016) denounced a “double standard” in the non-proliferation regime 
as well as an alleged failure by the IAEA to condemn Israel’s military attack in 2007. 
Criticism of the unilateral attack against the Syrian compound is legitimate. The former 
Director General Mohamed El Baradei described the attack as being hypocritic, since Israel 
– with the knowledge of the United States – attacked Syria, but refrained from providing the 
IAEA with information, which they were obliged to do (El Baradei, 2011).299 In contrast to 
its 1981 bombing in Iraq, Israel was not sanctioned by the Security Council. Spector and 
Berman (2010, p.127) even come to the finding that “[t]he reluctance of the international 
community to criticize Israel’s attack on Dair Alzour implies that the rules for using military 
force preemptively where emerging nuclear threats are concerned may be changing.” 
Still, calls for fairness fail to explain Syria’s reluctance to fully comply with the IAEA’s 
demands for cooperation in the matter of the Dair Alzour facility, which is simply another 
issue. If the bombing of the compound had created a normative incentive for Syria, an 
immediate public outcry could be expected. Instead, immediately after the attack, Syria and 
Israel reportedly had a silent agreement not to make the attack public (Follath and Stark, 
2009). This would suggest that Syria, instead of crying out injustice, was taking other 
considerations than fairness into account. 
In the case of North Korea, normative arguments are made to justify non-compliance 
with the non-proliferation norm. The state has repeatedly rejected UN Security Council 
resolutions as illegitimate (UN Security Council, 2017b, p.8). Pyongyang defends its 
development of nuclear weapons often as a combination of self-defense and pursuing an 
“inalienable right.” Similarly, the North Korean ambassador to the United Kingdom Choe Il 
explains in an interview: 
“Our nuclear power is a result of the US hostile policy against us. The 
US has been threatening us with their nuclear power for 60 years. They have 
been threatening that they would launch a nuclear attack and destroy us. We 
need nuclear power to defend ourselves. Our nuclear power is our sovereign 
right. It is the only way to protect the peace of the Korean Peninsula and the 
region” (in: Sky News, 2017). 
In this description, mixing considerations of norms and security, self-defense trumps 
the non-proliferation norm. There is also a legalistic aspect to this thinking, as the Non-
Proliferation Treaty accounts for a withdrawal of a state party in the circumstances of 
 
299 The passage was also quoted by Syrian Ambassador Ja’afari (2016) at the United Nations General 
Assembly. 
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“extraordinary events” (Article 10). North Korea is the only state that has, so far, made use 
of this option. 
The decision to make use of Article 10 is by itself interesting, as the state could also 
have chosen to further pursue nuclear weapons in secret while being party to the NPT. One 
possible explanation is that North Korea withdrew not only because of its “right” for self-
defense but also because it acknowledged the international procedure that goes along with 
it. This line of thinking is doubtful, as the state had a nuclear weapons program in place 
while being an NPT-member, in other words the track record of the DPRK stood in contrast 
to the content of the treaty. At the same time, the decision could be a step targeted at the 
United States to come to an agreement – just as the first announcement of withdrawal in 
1993 lead to the Agreed Framework. 
From a normative perspective, another striking feature of North Korea’s withdrawal 
from the NPT is that it is not equated with the pursuit of nuclear weapons. To the contrary, 
despite having a nuclear weapons program, Pyongyang argued in its announcement that 
“[t]he withdrawal from the NPT is a legitimate self-defensive measure 
taken against the US moves to stifle the DPRK and the unreasonable 
behaviour of the IAEA following the US. Though we pull out of the NPT, we 
have no intention to produce nuclear weapons and our nuclear activities at 
this stage will be confined only to peaceful purposes such as the production 
of electricity” (in: Acronym Institute, 2002). 
Again, considering that North Korea had, contrary to the statement, an active nuclear 
weapons program in place, suggests that the normative justification given is unlikely to have 
motivated the state. Similarly, as mentioned in Chapter 3, Libya demanded that the IAEA 
safeguards system ought to be built upon “trust and co-operation” (IAEA Board of 
Governors, 1996c, Paragraph 80), although the state had at the same time a secret nuclear 
weapons program.  
The North Korean and Libyan cases show that normative considerations are frequently 
put forward by states subject to regime enforcement – but their value in inspiring state 
behavior is questionable. Humanitarian arguments are often made to assure a state’s regime 
compliance. Yet, this may be a decoy. Furthermore, fairness arguments, in which failures of 
other states or international organizations are emphasized, could be used to distract from 
one’s own non-compliance with the non-proliferation regime. As Syria’s (but also Iran’s) 





Considering that financial sanctions and trade bans are a frequent tool of regime 
enforcement, it is worth exploring whether economic considerations have influenced states’ 
(non-)cooperation with the regime. Drawing from the hypotheses developed in the 
introductory section, we expect a state to commit to and comply with regime norms and 
rules, if cooperation significantly enhances economic benefits. In turn, if non-cooperation 
provides economic benefits, then the state will refrain from committing to and complying 
with regime norms and rules. 
 
Cooperation 
Overall, economic considerations appear to have played an important role in achieving 
regime compliance. Sanctions and positive incentives can significantly influence a target 
state’s economy as well as its nuclear decision-making. As such, they have the potential to 
serve as important tools of regime enforcement. 
In the case of North Korea, the latest rounds of sanctions are particularly strong. 
S/RES/2371 (2017) was praised by the United States Mission to the United Nations by 
effectively “prevent[ing] North Korea from earning over a $1 billion per year of hard 
currency that would be redirected to its illicit programs” (Department of State, 2017). 
The sanctions seem to have put the state into further economic isolation.300 While North 
Korea’s trade with China has increased between 2000 and 2015, the trade volume with 
secondary trade partners has by and large gone down (Wertz and Ruch Clegg, 2017). More 
recently, also Chinese trade has reportedly decreased. China has stated that it would 
discontinue the import of coal from North Korea (UN Security Council, 2017b) and 
continues to emphasize its implementation of Security Council resolutions (e.g. UN Security 
Council, 2019, p.29). 
Economic sanctions have had a direct impact on the nuclear program. The 2005 US 
sanctioning of Banco Delta Asia had a significant effect on Pyongyang’s budget, as 
suggested by Chairman Ed Royce of the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs. Royce 
stated that a senior defector familiar with the North Korean missile program “indicated that 
 
300 An overview of the implementation reports on the sanctions can be found on the website of the United 
Nations (United Nations, 2017). The effect of the sanctions on trade partners is ambiguous – also because of 
limited data (Wertz and Ruch Clegg, 2017). 
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because we had cut off the hard currency, they had to shut down their ICBM program” (in: 
US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2017). 
Financial and economic considerations are an important incentive for North Korea – 
especially for small concessions. The main aim for the international community has been to 
establish (ideally verifiable) limitations on the production of fissile material. For North 
Korea, the threshold to justify positive incentives has been much lower, as noted by Haggard 
and Noland (2012, p.246) analyzing the Six-Party-Talks: “Inducements were periodically 
demanded simply to talk, in exchange for declaratory statements of intent, or to take actions 
that were easily reversible, most notably a ‘freeze’ of existing activities.” 
Iran appears to have been immensely affected by transatlantic sanctions, as to be seen 
in the EU-Iranian trade relationship. The year 2013, in which the JCPOA was concluded, 
represents the lowest levels of EU-Iranian trade. Exports were only 48.2% and imports only 
5.4% of the values in 2006. Following the termination of sanctions in 2016, trade with the 
EU and the rest of the world, as well as foreign direct investment went up.301 In the wake of 
the US withdrawal from the JCPOA, Iran’s global trade decreased again by around €2.6 bn 
in 2018 (European Commission, 2019). 
US-American pressure on banks from third party states has also put Tehran into 
isolation from the financial world in the past (e.g. Perthes, 2008, p.45; Jacobson, 2008, p.76). 
Major banks reduced or even ended their cooperation with Iran (Jacobson, 2008, p.76).302 
Likewise, Shell and BASF are said to have given up their plan to sell Basell, a Joint Venture, 
for €4.4 bn to the Iranian National Petrochemical Company (Kubbig and Fikenscher, 2007, 
p.16). Iranian business men are even said to have gone to Supreme Leader Khamenei to 
complain about the economic isolation of Iran and the fact that some Chinese banks have 
reduced or even cancelled their transactions with the Islamic Republic (Perthes, 2008, p.46). 
Many politicians outside of Iran agree that the very fact that Tehran was willing to 
negotiate and eventually make an agreement on its nuclear program shows that sanctions did 
have an impact on getting Iranian concessions on its nuclear program.303 Similarly, during a 
 
301 With imports from Iran increasing from €1.2 bn to €5.5 bn and exports increasing from €6.5 bn to €8.3 bn 
in the same time period (European Commission, 2017). 
302 According to Kubbig and Fikenscher (2007), Daimler Chrysler has also suspended its activities with Iran 
because of US persuasion. 
303 For instance, in an interview with Mic Network, former US President Barack Obama (2015) emphasized 
that strong sanctions were necessary to bring Iran to the negotiation table on its nuclear program. Opponents 
to the JCPOA argue that sanctions against Iran should have been kept as leverage to achieve a more 
comprehensive nuclear deal or to end other illicit Iranian activities (e.g. Rothfus, 2015). The argument was 
repeatedly mentioned in the US political debate (e.g. in: US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, 2017). US 
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debate of candidates for the Iranian presidential elections in 2013, the eventual victor of the 
elections, Hassan Rouhani, stated: 
“All of our problems stem from this – that we didn’t make the utmost 
effort to prevent the [nuclear] dossier from going to the UN Security Council. 
It’s good to have [uranium enrichment] centrifuges running, providing 
people’s lives and sustenance are also spinning” (in: Giles, 2015, p.45). 
Rouhani’s election was a political momentum. He sought a lifting of international 
sanctions; two months after him taking office, nuclear talks with the P5+1 resumed (Giles, 
2015, p.45). The JCPOA was a sanction relieve, Iran’s reason to make a commitment in the 
first place. In a meeting with the Assembly of Experts, Supreme Leader Khamenei (2015) 
made clear: “We negotiated so that the sanctions framework will be eliminated and that 
sanctions in general will be lifted,” reiterating that if sanctions stayed in place, the JCPOA 
was baseless. Thus, the conclusion of the JCPOA suggests that a combination of effective 
sanctions and prospects of sanction relieve had a positive impact on Iran making and keeping 
its international commitments. 
International sanctions also provided momentum for Libya to give up its nuclear 
weapons program. Although the state had been under sanctions for decades, the years prior 
to the December 2003 announcement were pivotal. As noted by Barnum and Fearey (2016), 
while sanctions had only a minor effect until 1992,304 they lowered investments and 
increased uncertainty throughout the 1990’s. In combination with domestic failures, 
sanctions constrained economic development (Barnum and Fearey, 2016, pp.238–41). 
A diplomatic solution could relieve these constraints. Following Jentleson and Whytock 
(2006), in the summer of 2002, weapons of mass destruction became part of a larger offer 
by the US and the UK to normalize relations with Libya. By March 2003, the communication 
had turned into serious negotiations (Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, pp.73–4). 
According to Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, giving up WMD programs was, above other 
things, a political deal in exchange for ending Libya’s isolation (in: Andersen and Kleber, 
2009). At the same time, the feasibility and the prospects of a successful nuclear weapons 
program offered fewer gains (Palkki and Smith, 2012, p.273). To the contrary, continuing 
the nuclear weapons program may have caused significant retribution. 
 
President Donald Trump estimates that the lifting of the sanctions in the context of the JCPOA prevented a 
collapse of the Iranian regime (Trump, 2017a). 
304 The costs of sanctions between 1980 and 1992 only amounted to an estimated $850 million (O’Sullivan in: 
Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.238). 
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Also in Iraq, economic considerations played a role in dismantling the nuclear program. 
Overall, the enforcement measures against Iraq are seen to have been efficiently agreed upon 
and implemented, while having a shattering effect on the Iraqi society in the 1990’s (Pyka, 
2015, pp.33–5). The Gulf War and the economic sanctions led to a massive inflation and a 
decreasing Gross Domestic Product (Reynolds and Wan, 2012, p.68). 
According to internal documents and statements by affiliates of the Iraqi leadership, 
Saddam Hussein was very concerned about the falling morale of the Iraqi people, as it could 
pose a domestic threat to his leadership (Palkki and Smith, 2012, pp.278–9). According to 
the Duelfer Report, Iraq’s primary goal throughout the 1990s was to get rid of international 
sanctions and, therefore, the state dismantled its WMD programs (Duelfer, 2004). 
However, Iraq only complied as much as necessary. Following the Duelfer Report, 
Iraq’s conflict with UNSCOM in 1998 was accompanied by increasing pessimism about 
gains from cooperation. Instead, Iraq strategically aimed at escalating the conflict to the 
Security Council, where it found support by France and Russia (Duelfer, 2004). This would 
suggest that the very same measures that provided for Iraq’s compliance with the non-
proliferation norm was also the basis for breaches of verification rules. 
In sum, economic considerations have been a strong incentive to get nuclear concessions 
from a state. Whether the concessions resemble a long-term compliance depends on the case. 
In Libya, the relieve of sanctions contributed to a full reversal of the nuclear weapons 
program. Iraq dismantled the WMD programs but failed to comply with verification. In the 
Iranian case, sanctions paved the way for the JCPOA. In North Korea, nuclear concessions 
have only been very minor. 
 
Non-Cooperation 
Looking at the enforcement cases considered in this chapter, one argument to explain 
non-cooperation may be that international measures have failed to create economic 
momentum in the target state. There are indicators for setbacks in the firepower of sanctions. 
In Iran, there have been differences in capacity305 and willingness among the sanctioning 
states to implement UN resolutions successfully.306 
 
305 In a striking illustration, Jacobson (2008, p.80) pointed to the shortcoming that Italy “has less than 15 people 
working in its export control office, and only eight of these are investigators.” 
306 A comprehensive report regarding the implementation of sanctions against the Iranian nuclear program was 
produced annually by the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution 1737 (2006) up until 
2015. 
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While the UN resolutions gave the US and the EU room for maneuvering to implement 
tough measures, the reading of the UN sanctions was much narrower by other international 
powers, such as Russia and China, which demanded that sanctions should neither disturb 
usual commercial relations nor hurt the Iranian people (see O’Sullivan 2010, p.16). 
During the early years of UN sanctions, the economic relationship between Iran and 
Russia grew steadily (Ilias, 2010, p.23). Russian-produced goods, such as passenger 
airplanes, and weaponry have been sold to Iran (Trenin and Malashenko, 2010, p.21). A 
“flagship of Russo-Iranian economic cooperation” is the $1bn Bushear nuclear power 
reactor, which was officially launched in August 2010 (Trenin and Malashenko, 2010, p.21). 
China’s trade position has also profited from the sanctions. Iran and China have signed 
a $100bn-agreement, described as the “deal of the century,” about the delivery of liquefied 
natural gas to the People’s Republic over the period of 25 years (Afrasiabi and Kibaroglu, 
2005, p.263). In 2018, China was Iran’s most important trading partner, representing 26.4 % 
in Iran’s total trade with the world (European Commission, 2019). 
Also in North Korea, there are indicators for a limited influence of sanctions on the 
national economy. The state has been living under sanctions for many years (see also: Thae, 
2017). Even though the new sanctions of 2016 and 2017 are more comprehensive, the 
immediate leverage of Western states is limited. 
In 2015, the DPRK imported goods worth around $39,7 million from Europe and $21.5 
million from North America (OEC, 2017). China has a much greater pull but has 
demonstrated less willingness to take a hard stance on Pyongyang, as seen in the discussions 
surrounding previous UN resolutions. The international community has, thus, either too little 
leverage or to little incentive (see also: Haggard and Noland, 2012, p.240). 
According to the Panel of Experts which is monitoring the implementation of the UN 
sanctions against North Korea, there is also an evasion of the sanctions from North Korea, 
other states, and entities/individuals. Pyongyang has found various ways to circumvent the 
effect of sanctions. In the maritime sector, strategies of the North Korean maritime 
administration have included the renaming and re-registering of vessels, an illicit 
certification for vessels and crew, and an alteration of vessel identity and documentation. In 
the financial sector, front companies or foreign ownership of North Korean financial 
institutions have been used to access the international banking system (UN Security Council, 
2017b, pp.18–25).  
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Pyongyang’s evasion of UN sanctions is also facilitated by the poor implementation or 
intentional circumvention of the resolutions by some UN member states, limiting the 
outcome effectiveness of sanctions. For instance, after China stopped the import of coal from 
North Korea, Pyongyang shifted its coal exports to other states like Vietnam and Malaysia. 
In other cases, the trade route is disguised through trans-shipments (UN Security Council, 
2019). In addition to the violation of sanctions through UN member states, the high 
frequency of sanctions puts challenges to a quick implementation of the measures in the UN 
member states,307 leaving Pyongyang time to adjust to the new circumstances. 
The vigorous attempts to circumvent sanctions show again that they can have a strong 
impact on a state’s economy. Whether the economic effect translates into norm compliance 
in the nuclear field seems to depend on the target state’s economic alternatives and the state’s 
political insistence (e.g. regarding domestic enrichment in Iran). Iran and North Korea have 
seen many rounds of sanctions in the past. North Korea, in particular, shows that even one 
of the poorest countries in the world prefers not to cooperate with the regime to a great 




Inducements may also shift a state’s calculations on its own domestic or international 
standing. Did status-related considerations play into (non-)cooperation with the non-
proliferation regime? Following the hypotheses developed in Chapter 1, a state would 
commit to and comply with regime norms and rules if cooperation enhances its status. If, in-
turn, non-cooperation enhances a state’s status, then it will refrain from committing to and 
complying with the regime. 
 
Cooperation 
For Iran, status-related aspects seem to play an important role in making and refraining 
from a nuclear commitment. Tehran refrains from great concessions on its nuclear policy 
due to the prestige connected with the nuclear program (e.g. Perthes, 2008, p.93; Sadjadpour, 
 
307 An indicator for the administrative challenges to the implementation are state reports on the respective UN 
resolutions: “As of 7 November 2017, 7 Member States [have] submitted reports on the implementation of 
resolution 2375 (2017), 20 Member State have submitted report on the implementation of resolution 2371 
(2017), 87 Member States have submitted reports on the implementation of resolution 2321 (2016) and 101 
Member States on the implementation of resolution 2270 (2016)” (United Nations, 2017). 
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2009, pp.23–4). Developing an advanced nuclear technology underlines Iran’s place among 
the powerful countries in the world (Afrasiabi and Kibaroglu, 2005, p.257). For Supreme 
Leader Khamenei, the nuclear program represents the spirit of the revolution of 1979, 
namely the Iranian struggle for independence, the injustice of foreign countries, the Iranian 
need for self-sufficiency, and Islam’s high respect toward science (Sadjadpour, 2009, p.22). 
Sanctions have not changed the Iranian goal to establish an advanced nuclear program. 
Following estimations by nuclear physicists, Iran could have saved billions of dollars if it 
decided in favor of importing enriched uranium. Nonetheless, Khamenei emphasized the 
benefits of the full and independent nuclear cycle (Sadjadpour, 2009, pp.23–4). 
Sanctions may have even strengthened the incentive to proceed with enrichment. As 
noted by Miroslav Nincic (2012, p.137), “it seems that each new wave of sanctions has been 
coupled with Tehran’s strengthened commitment to its nuclear program, and with staunch 
public support for it.” Following Iranian Foreign Minister, Mohammad Zarif, Iran increased 
its centrifuges from 200 to 20,000 from the beginning of the sanctions to the talks that would 
lead to the JCPOA. Describing Iran’s behavior to sanctions, Zarif stated: “Iran does not 
respond well to threats. We respond very well to mutual respect and mutual interest” (in: 
CNN, 2017). 
The JCPOA acknowledged Iranian domestic uranium enrichment. In exchange, for the 
first time in 8 years, Iran was willing to accept limits on its program (Giles, 2015, p.45). Put 
differently, all carrots and sticks combined did not change Iran’s insistence on domestic 
enrichment. Only when the P5+1 negotiators yielded to that stance, was Iran willing to 
conclude an agreement. 
Status may also have contributed to Libya’s reversal of its WMD programs. First of all, 
status considerations were part of the reason why Tripoli initiated a nuclear weapons 
program. Following Saif al-Islam al-Gaddafi, a main actor behind Libya’s reversal, Libya 
pursued nuclear weapons to respond to the power and presence of the United States (in: 
Andersen and Kleber, 2009). Muamar al-Gaddafi imagined an “Arab bomb” as 
deterrence.308 By promoting the Arab cause, the Libyan leader was seeking to expand his 
position among Arab allies in the region (Bowen, 2006, p.22). 
Libya’s affiliation changed prior to the 2003 WMD reversal. Facing UN sanctions, al-
Gaddafi grew frustrated with insufficient Arab support and turned increasingly from Pan-
 
308 Muammar al-Gaddafi made several references to an Arab bomb, to counter the military power of the United 
States and Israel (Bowen, 2006, pp.20–22). 
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Arabism to Pan-Africanism, which made nuclear weapons as status symbol superfluous 
(Barnum and Fearey, 2016, pp.241–2).309 More than that, by creating a Nuclear-Weapon-
Free Zone in Africa, “Pan-Africanism” reflected a stance against nuclear weapons. 
Publicly reversing the WMD programs also offered status gains for Libya. Saif al-Islam 
al-Gaddafi stated that his father “believed that if this problem were solved, Libya would 
emerge from the international isolation and become a negotiator and work with the big 
powers to change the Arab situation” (in: Jentleson and Whytock, 2006, p.48). This would 
suggest that cooperation, by itself, was perceived as a tool to improve Libya’s standing in 
the region. 
Cooperation meant that Libya had to make a behavioral U-turn, from a state sponsor of 
terrorism to a supporter of the fight against terrorism and from a potential WMD 
proliferation to a chastened member of the non-proliferation community. Libya is, therefore, 
an example of how a change of status perception may contribute to regime compliance. The 
non-proliferation regime was not the initiator of the status-related change. Rather, it seems 
to have served as a platform to which Libya could subscribe to lose its image as a rogue 
state. 
While Iran as well as Libya appear to have been affected by status-considerations in 
their willingness to make a nuclear agreement, the outset was quite different. In Libya, the 
preferences regarding status changed by recognizing the very virtue of international 
cooperation and Pan-Africanism. Thus, status interests became compatible with 
international demands. In Iran, it was the international demand that changed (to suspend 
domestic enrichment in Iran), making cooperation from a status-perspective more attractive 
for the Islamic Republic. 
 
Non-Cooperation 
Iraq under Saddam Hussein never lost the image of a rogue state. This is also due to a 
variety of status-related considerations that added to the state’s non-compliance with the 
regime. The Duelfer Report gives insight into the worldview and calculations of Saddam 
Hussein. His goal was to ensure Iraq’s leadership in the region. As the state saw itself to be 
inherently superior to other Arab states, it had to lead in a variety of fields. Duelfer notes in 
his transmittal message: 
 
309 Similarly, Malfrid Braut-Hegghammer (2008) describes a changing calculus in Libyan leadership regarding 
its nuclear weapons program. 
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“In [Saddam Hussein’s] view, the most advanced and potent were 
nuclear science and technology. By all accounts, and by the evidence of the 
massive effort expended by the Regime, nuclear programs were seen by 
Saddam as both a powerful lever and symbol of prestige. He also did not want 
to be second to the Persians in neighboring Iran” (Duelfer, 2004). 
Iraq had, therefore, status-related incentives to advance its nuclear program. The main 
driving factors to pursue nuclear weapons were similar to those of Libya. Saddam Hussein 
intended to develop a deterrence, mainly against Israel and Iran, and to position Iraq as leader 
among Arab states (Brands and Palkki, 2011). 
Another aspect that drove Iraq to its original non-compliance was its relationship with 
the United States. Saddam Hussein could generate a lot of domestic support by portraying 
himself as a rival to the “last superpower,” which made non-compliance with demands by 
the US intriguing (Duelfer, 2004). International sanctions were used by him to strengthen 
his position, by scapegoating the sanctioning parties, establishing a state-controlled rationing 
system, and rewarding domestic allies (Palkki and Smith, 2012, p.278). Iraq could generate 
financial means illegally and redistribute them. For instance, the state managed to secure 
$10.1 billion between 1997 and 2002 through illicit activities, such as oil smuggling 
(Reynolds and Wan, 2012, p.70). 
For North Korea, compliance with the non-proliferation regime has been hampered by 
the value of the nuclear program. In 1993, Kim Jong-il convinced his father, Kim Il-sung, 
that nuclear weapons were a better option to improve the economy than the Chinese model 
of market opening (Cha, 2012, p.4). In choosing a nuclear weapons pursuit, the state 
followed a path on which it still finds itself today. Also, Kim Jong-un’s Byungjin strategy 
emphasizes the close link between the success of the North Korean economy and its nuclear 
arsenal (Sun and Wit, 2015, p.70). 
On an international stage, North Korea uses its nuclear weapons status frequently to 
push for concessions in other fields. For instance, during the Six-Party Talks, North Korea 
made the Banco Delta sanctions part of the negotiations (Bechtol, 2010, p.82). The financial 
freeze going along with it was not specifically aimed at nuclear weapons, but money 
laundering.  
Furthermore, the successful development of nuclear weapons by Pakistan and India as 
well as the status that goes along with it, appear to be an important point of reference for 
Kim Jong-un (Thae, 2017). Hence, North Korean ideological mastermind and later defector 
Hwang Jang-yop demanded from sanctioning countries in 2006 that they should not reward 
North Korea’s nuclear weapons status: 
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“We should tell them (North Korea) ‘You can't take part in six-party 
talks. You are not qualified to come to the six-party talks. The remaining five 
parties can prove that Kim Jong-Il’s regime is an international criminal 
organisation and the enemy of democracy. There is plenty of evidence” (in: 
AP Archive, 2006). 
Nuclear weapons also seem to be an essential instrument for the domestic survival of 
the Kim dynasty. According to former North Korean diplomat Thae Yong-ho, the nuclear 
weapon ICBM program has been streamlined to the command of Kim Jong-un. Thae also 
states that “[Kim Jong-un] believes that ICBM equipped with nuclear weapons can provide 
him a kind of legitimacy of the leadership for [the] next several decades” (Thae, 2017). 
Similarly, foreign powers are used by the political leadership to foster its status at home. 
In a most dramatic example, the North Korean famine in the second half of the 1990s was 
blamed on external forces: “People in general were made to believe that South Korea and 
the United States were taking advantage of the absence of Great Leader Kim-Il-sung and 
conspiring to start a war. They also believed that South Korea and the United States were 
plotting to starve the people in preparation for war” (Cha, 2012, p.75). In reality, other states 
provided food aid, which was rotting, owing to storage and transportation problems, or was 
used primarily for the military (Cha, 2012, pp.79–80).310 
To sum up, nuclear weapon programs as well as international cooperation may stand 
each for respect and authority. Compliance with the regime has changed when either the 
domestic calculations on status change, as in the case of Libya, or if the international 
demands adopt to the domestic standing of the nuclear program, as in Iran. In North Korea, 
the general importance of nuclear weapons has not changed. This would explain, why the 
state has refrained from giving up on nuclear weapons. 
A further status-related obstacle to regime enforcement is the very structure of the non-
proliferation regime, which fails to accommodate for the current nuclear landscape. The 
Non-Proliferation Treaty as well as other major agreements311 are based on the 1968 
definition of a “Nuclear Weapon State.” As such, the existing institutional framework 
constraints enforcement regarding states outside of the Non-Proliferation Treaty that 
presumably possess nuclear weapons: India, Pakistan, Israel, and (after its withdrawal from 
the NPT) North Korea. 
 
310 During a hearing in the US House Committee on Foreign Affairs, former North Korean diplomat Thae 
Yong-ho stated that the ration system is currently only available to civil servants (Thae, 2017). 
311 Such as Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones, the Nuclear Suppliers Group, or the IAEA. 
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As matters stand, states outside the Non-Proliferation Treaty could not join the NPT as 
Nuclear Weapon States despite possessing nuclear bombs, since they tested their weapons 
after 1967 (Article IX, NPT). Nuclear Weapon States, in turn, would keep their status even 
if they individually decided to fully disarm. This outset leads to a deadlock in terms of 
disarmament. It is unlikely that Pakistan and India be accepted as Nuclear Weapon States 
into the NPT. Yet, it is also doubtful that the states give up their nuclear weapons to join the 
NPT as Non-Nuclear Weapon States (see also Nielsen, 2007). 
As the Non-Proliferation Treaty provides the basis for other regime commitments, it is 
also difficult to integrate states outside the NPT into other institutions to strengthen regime 
commitment. A current example is India’s bid for membership in the Nuclear Suppliers 
Group. Although a number of NSG members would except India into their ranks, China has 
repeatedly rejected the idea referring to NSG guidelines according to which membership is 
only for members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.312 
 
4.4. Summary 
Enforcement in the non-proliferation regime is almost exclusively about preventing the 
acquisition of nuclear weapons. Just as the commitment and verification system, the 
enforcement system privileges the Nuclear Weapon States. Cases of non-compliance with 
the regime are eventually channeled to the UN Security Council. As Permanent Members, 
NWS can veto resolutions against their interest. Thus, enforcing the compliance of these 
states is virtually impossible. 
Regarding the possession and use of nuclear weapons, the Security Council has passed 
resolutions on North Korea, India, and Pakistan. The nuclear weapon tests of the latter two 
were largely condemned, but the international community was divided on how to proceed. 
North Korea has been confronted with a variety of inducements over the last 25 years, 
without a notable effect on norm compliance. The state has repeatedly spoken in favor of 
denuclearization but has only made minor concessions on its nuclear program. 
Just as in the North Korean case, there is a broad range of tools available to stimulate 
regime compliance in the acquisition of nuclear weapons. Inducements have targeted nuclear 
programs, the economy, or even the existence of the political leadership. Negative incentives 
have encompassed diplomatic and economic sanctions as well as the use of military. Positive 
 
312 Arguably, China’s position resembles a double standard, as it is more likely to endorse Pakistan’s 
membership, which is – like India – not a member of the NPT (see also Singh, 2018). 
 225 
inducements have contained the suspension or ending of sanctions, nuclear energy 
assistance, economic support, and security assurances. 
The outcome and impact of these measures differ. Libya gave up its WMD programs. 
Iraq largely dismantled its WMD but failed to comply with verification demands. Saddam 
Hussein also retained an eye on a future nuclear weapons program. Syria has failed to fully 
clarify the nature of the Dair Alzour compound, the destruction of which may have set back 
a possible nuclear weapons program. Iran’s capacities to develop nuclear weapons under the 
JCPOA is restrained. Yet, the agreement is limited in time and, after US withdrawal, rests 
on unsound footing. 
Traditionally, particularly the literature on sanctions shows a strong overlap with 
rational choice institutionalism. Following this line of thinking, if sanctions hurt, the target 
state will change its behavior (e.g. Iklé, 1961). This chapter has shown that material as well 
as non-material considerations play a role in state’s willingness to cooperate. Regime 
enforcement may shift the security, normative, economic, or status-related considerations of 
the target states very differently. Yet, it would be to short-sighted to regard state behavior as 
a linear result of inducements. Sometimes they are simply a contributing factor in a larger 
picture. 
Targeting security calculations, as in the (threat of) use of military force, is ambiguous. 
The political leadership surrounding Saddam Hussein was toppled by military invasion 
although the state had already largely followed regime norms. According to Muammar al-
Gaddafi, the Iraqi case provided a contributing factor for Libya to end its WMD programs. 
North Korea, in turn, reportedly sees the overthrow of both leaders as incentive to maintain 
a nuclear weapons program. Hence, security considerations seem to affect regime 
compliance for better or worse. 
Normative considerations are frequently brought forward by target states. There is a 
tendency to renounce nuclear weapons and to champion the non-proliferation regime. This 
is different in North Korea, which argues that it has a right to a nuclear weapons program as 
means of self-defense. Sanctions, in turn, are often referred to as unjust. Saddam Hussein 
dismissed international sanctions as inhuman. Yet, instead of easing their effect on the Iraqi 
society, he did the contrary, apparently attempting to consolidate power. 
Economic concerns appear to have been crucial for Libya’s reversal in that the political 
leadership saw potential gains in bringing the state out of international isolation. Economic 
considerations also seem to have motivated the newly elected Iranian President Rouhani to 
negotiate an agreement with the P5+1, thus, shifting the course of the administration of his 
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predecessor Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. In North Korea, sanctions have significantly hurt the 
state’s economy. Although Chairman Kim Jong-un is seeking a retrieval of sanctions, the 
development of the North Korean nuclear arsenal continues. 
Finally, status-related considerations are important. In several states targeted by 
regime enforcement, nuclear energy represents an aspect of great pride. Arguably, one of the 
reasons for why the JCPOA could be concluded was because the P5+1 acknowledged Iran’s 
domestic uranium enrichment. On the other hand, nuclear weapons in North Korea continue 
to strengthen the international and domestic standing of the political leadership, making 
denuclearization difficult. 
Reflecting on these factors, it becomes clear that there is no recipe for effective regime 
enforcement. A general or binary assessment of whether or not incentives work is 
misleading, even if it is just used as a pretext in some works on economic sanctions (e.g. 
Hufbauer, Schott, and Elliott, 1990; Pape, 1998). States react very differently to the same 
incentives. The success of enforcement depends on the formulation of enforcement tools and 
the target states’ domestic context.313 
For regime enforcement, this requires a variety of enforcement tools and the ability to 
make a sound judgement about the intentions of the political leadership in the target state. 
Otherwise, incentives can easily backfire, in that a state ends up more encouraged to pursue 
nuclear weapons or exploits positive incentives. In some cases, such as Libya or South 
Africa, regime compliance could even be achieved without specifically putting sanctions on 
a nuclear weapons program. This would contrast Fred Iklé’s (1961) assumption that political 







313 This is in line with other scholars such as Derek Smith (2006). 
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5. Conclusion 
Despite a vast amount of efforts to determine and explain the effectiveness of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, the existing literature lacks – apart from a few exceptions314 – 
concepts for a macroscopic analysis. Instead, scholars demonstrate a narrow interpretation 
of the nature of the nuclear threat, the regime task, or the degree of regime effectiveness. 
Furthermore, the research includes very different understandings of what factors determine 
state behavior. 
Outright conclusions that the non-proliferation regime is good or bad do not do justice 
to the complexity of the regime and its effectiveness. Aiming for a more nuanced 
understanding, this thesis presents a novel approach to analyze regime effectiveness by using 
an eclectic approach. It offers a manual on how effectiveness can be determined and 
explained in a more organized manner. 
Integrating the different tasks and thematic fields of the regime as well as different levels 
of effectiveness, the model developed here (Figure 2) has two advantages: It allows for a 
better insight into the non-proliferation regime and strengthens the regime concept as an 
analytical tool in international relations. With slight amendments, the model can also be used 
for other security regimes. 
In addition to its conceptual contribution, there is theoretical and empirical value. It was 
not my goal to claim that one driving factor rules the overall state behavior but to show 
where certain incentives may have particularly influenced states’ (non-)cooperation. 
Applying a broad institutionalist frame, including a wide spectrum of incentives for state 
behavior, and drawing on a variety of resources allows a better account of the contextual 
background of state behavior. 
My starting point was to broaden the awareness of the scope of regime effectiveness on 
different fronts. Fields and Enia have done important work in this regard,315 but my intension 
was to establish a more integrative model. Taking three considerations into account allows 
for a three-dimensional model as an analytical tool to assess regime effectiveness in a 
comprehensive and nuanced manner. 
First, we need to be aware of the primary norms of the non-proliferation regime as a 
security arrangement. The underlying principle of the regime is that nuclear weapons are a 
 
314 Comprehensive approaches to the regime’s effectiveness include Fields and Enia (2009), Enia and Fields 
(2014), and Kaplow (2015). 
315 See Fields and Enia (2009) as well as Enia and Fields (2014). 
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threat to human kind. Three norms derive from this principle: States without nuclear 
weapons do not acquire them, states with nuclear weapons give them up, and states do not 
use nuclear weapons. This leaves us with different policy fields within the regime, i.e. the 
acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons. 
Second, the regime stands for a variety of roles to provide for, observe, and ensure 
states’ compliance with the different norms. States may pledge or coordinate a certain 
behavior, thus, bringing their actions in line with the norms (commitment system). Tools of 
monitoring and verification shed light on whether states comply (verification system). In 
possible cases of non-compliance with rules and norms, the regime includes ways of 
enforcing compliance (enforcement system). Commitment, verification, and enforcement are 
to be found on a unilateral, bilateral, regional, and international level. 
Third, we need to sharpen our understanding of what exactly is meant by effectiveness. 
A useful way to give a more precise account of the term is the distinction between output, 
outcome, and impact, as applied by Miles et al. (2002). Output effectiveness is the declared 
behavior relating to the regime’s norms and rules. Outcome effectiveness reflects states’ 
compliance with regime rules. Impact effectiveness is the larger effect on the nature of the 
problem, i.e. the overall acquisition, possession, and use of nuclear weapons. 
Yet, the research question of this work – “What determines the effectiveness of the non-
proliferation regime?” – goes beyond a description of the regime’s effectiveness. Focusing 
on state behavior, I have developed an analytical rationale to explain why states (fail to) 
commit to and comply with the regime. Inspired by different institutionalist perspectives, I 
have defined a variety of possible incentives frequently associated with the regime that could 
explain states’ decisions to cooperate or not: security, norms, economics, and status. Based 
on these incentives, I have explored the virtue of different hypotheses throughout the 
analysis of the regime’s three systems (commitment, verification, and enforcement). 
The remaining few pages are meant to reflect on this work to draw some general 
conclusions. Instead of repeating the chapters’ summaries, I will sketch out some general 
findings regarding the assessment and explanation of regime effectiveness. On that basis, I 
will briefly lay out three modes of regime change that can be identified from the regime’s 
past and could serve as starting points for enhancing regime effectiveness. Finally, aware of 
the limits of my thesis, I am pointing to potential additional research. 
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5.1. Assessing Effectiveness 
In the introductory chapter, I made some forecasts of what shape the effectiveness of 
the non-proliferation regime could take. Inspired by the Oslo-Potsdam solution to regime 
effectiveness (e.g. Hovi, Sprinz, and Underdal, 2003b), I included two counterfactuals as a 
starting point for orientation: the no-regime and the collective optimum regime. Both 
scenarios play out differently in the three-dimensional model that includes the levels of 
effectiveness (output, outcome, impact), the policy fields (acquisition, possession, use), and 
the regime tasks (commitment, verification, enforcement). 
Following the no-regime, there is no state cooperation in regime commitment, 
verification, and enforcement. In the three-dimensional model that displays the strength of 
cooperation, an illustration of the no-regime would take no shape. In stark contrast is the 
collective optimum regime, which assumes full cooperation in all its dimensions. As it 
addresses all dimensions in the model, the form would resemble a cube. 
I have speculated that the actual non-proliferation regime could take the form of a 
pyramid. This is due to the understanding that the three axes are somewhat built upon one 
another: To enforce, you need first some form of verification, which tends to follow state 
commitment. To use nuclear weapons, you need to acquire and possess them. Finally, regime 
impact depends on states’ commitment to and compliance with rules. Following the premise 
that effectiveness is likely to face some loss from one level to the other, all dimensions would 
get smaller towards the top – like a pyramid. 
Reflecting on the past chapters, it can be argued that there are elements that suggest the 
existence of a “pyramid of effectiveness,” meaning that there are instances that demonstrate 
a loss of effectiveness from one level to another. Not all states comply (outcome) with their 
declared behavior (output). Even complying with rules does not mean that regime norms are 
actually satisfied (impact). Furthermore, regime commitment in the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
does not translate into full verification (Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement and 
Additional Protocol). Success in regime enforcement seems to be even more limited. 
In addition to that, the United States and the Soviet Union/Russia have concluded a 
number of bilateral agreements. Although both states have complied with most treaties, the 
discussions surrounding the INF Treaty demonstrate that there has also been non-compliance 
– decreasing outcome effectiveness towards output effectiveness. Looking at the global 
stocks indicates an even more limited success on the impact level. Again effectiveness 
appears to get smaller from one level to another – like a pyramid. 
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Despite these indicators that suggest the validity of a “pyramid of effectiveness,” this 
work also offers observations that would contradict the notion. In fact, the reality is messier 
than any traditional geometric form could express. For instance, nuclear sharing 
demonstrates that, although Non-Nuclear Weapon States have not acquired nuclear weapons 
(thus complying with their NPT commitment), they may still be affiliated with nuclear 
weapon systems. 
Furthermore, the levels not always build upon each other. Outcome effectiveness may 
trump output effectiveness and verification may be stronger than commitment. One of the 
greatest achievements of the non-proliferation regime is that in the 21st Century only one 
state has conducted nuclear explosions: North Korea. We also have a sophisticated 
verification infrastructure in place to detect nuclear explosions. Both achievements exist, 
although the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is not in force. Again, this would contradict 
the notion of a “pyramid of regime effectiveness.” 
The three-dimensional model should also not divert from the fact that the necessity of 
commitment, verification, and enforcement varies. One should not overemphasize 
managerial structures (see Strange, 1983, p.345). Particularly in enforcement, this work 
confirmed the understanding that there is no one-size-fits all tool to ensure states’ 
compliance with regime norms, as states have reacted very differently to positive and 
negative incentives. Enforcement may even be superfluous in cases of unintentional non-
compliance. Verification, in turn, may do more harm than good, as knowledge about a 
nuclear weapon infrastructure could contribute to proliferation. 
 
5.2. Explaining Effectiveness 
My approach to develop independent variables to assess regime effectiveness was based 
on a twofold choice. On the one hand, I have focused on state actors. On the other hand, my 
explanatory factors resemble incentives rather than capacities. Against this background, I 
have conducted an analysis of plausible intent from the perspectives of security, norms, 
economics, and status to assess their respective virtue in states’ decisions in the systems of 
commitment, verification, and enforcement. 
All four factors offer explanatory value for regime cooperation as well as non-
cooperation. This also means that material and non-material considerations appear to have 
affected interactions in the non-proliferation regime. Yet, when looking at the different 
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systems as well as the nature of cooperation, there appears to be a hierarchy among the 
factors. 
Security and status seem to play a crucial role in the establishment and maintenance of 
nuclear weapons programs. Both factors can be attributed to all states presumably possessing 
nuclear weapons. In my framework, security and status appear to represent strong incentives 
for non-commitment and non-compliance with the regime, as the programs contradict the 
norms on the possession and use of nuclear weapons. This finding is in line with the 
understanding that nuclear deterrence has a persistent value for states. 
It would be an intellectual game to consider to what extent states possessing nuclear 
bombs would build them from scratch in today’s landscape, if they did not already have 
them. For France, the response is likely “No!” (e.g. Tertrais, 2007, p.251). Such an analysis 
would allow a weighing of the importance of acquiring and maintaining nuclear weapons, 
thereby, further clarifying the role of path-dependency and, thus, the virtue of historical 
institutionalism. Unfortunately, an extensive examination of individual states is beyond the 
scope of this work. 
Norms seem to strengthen the regime by contributing to a lasting effect of regime 
commitment and compliance. In accordance with the historical institutionalist literature, 
states do not appear to constantly question their choice to join the Non-Proliferation Treaty 
as Non-Nuclear Weapon States. The vast majority of states that had stopped nuclear weapon 
programs before becoming party to the NPT have not restarted them. But effectiveness goes 
beyond that. Particularly in recent years, the humanitarian purpose of the non-proliferation 
regime has been reemphasized by a number of NNWS. In this sense, norms remain a guiding 
star for strengthening the regime. This observation confirms the validity of sociological 
institutionalism, which emphasizes non-material and idealistic driving factors. 
Economic considerations, in turn, appear to play a particularly important role in the 
enforcement system. Sanctions and, most notably, credible offers to retrieve sanctions have 
led to concessions from target states to commit to and comply with rules. Whether extensive 
cooperation can be achieved on the basis of enforcement depends on the state. Libya gives 
reason for hope, as the state decided to fully stop its nuclear weapons program, among other 
aspects in order to get rid of international sanctions. North Korea has, so far, demonstrated 
limited effect in stopping a nuclear weapons program, despite multiple rounds of sanctions. 
Again, these observations are valid if official justifications, as presented in statements 
and agreements, are accepted as indicator for motivation. Given the macroscopic approach 
of this work, I have decided to refrain from a comprehensive analysis of an individual speech 
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act. Nonetheless, I have shown some instances in which justifications are unlikely to reflect 
motivation – often to be found in statements that appear to disguise illicit nuclear 
activities.316 
 
5.3. Enhancing Regime Effectiveness 
Although major changes within the non-proliferation regime depend on a certain degree 
of momentum (e.g. strengthening the regime’s verification after discovering Iraq’s WMD 
programs or enhancing the tools against non-state actors in the aftermath of the 9/11 terrorist 
attacks), it is important to keep in mind that regime effectiveness is not static. The framework 
for analysis developed in this work would have offered different results if it were applied in 
1987, simply because the political and legal landscape differed. The framework is also likely 
to show other observations in 20 years from now, since regime effectiveness will probably 
change – for better or for worse. 
After having conducted an assessment and explanation of regime effectiveness in this 
thesis, the question is: Where do we go from here? It should be the goal of politicians and 
scholars of political science to continue strengthening the non-proliferation regime. The 
macroscopic focus of this work allows for the identification of different avenues for 
enhancing effectiveness that can also be used for future approaches. 
Based on my observations, I will briefly identify three ways to strengthen regime 
cooperation: the reform approach, the layering approach, and the wildfire approach. All of 
these avenues offer advantages and disadvantages in terms of states’ cooperation. 
Consequently, a combination of approaches may be a promising way to strengthen the 
regime. 
 
5.3.1. Reform Approach 
One way of improving the regime is to reach universality through the existing 
frameworks of the NPT, the IAEA, the CTBT, and the UN. This “reform” approach has, for 
instance, been used for a reform of the Small Quantities Protocol or the extension of the 
Non-Proliferation Treaty. Accordingly, states outside the NPT could be included through a 
 
316 For instance, Brazil’s pursuit of nuclear energy allegedly owing to the oil crisis, North Korea’s declared 
intention not to develop nuclear weapons, although withdrawing from the NPT, Saddam Hussein’s rejection 
of sanctions on humanitarian grounds, or Libya’s demand for “trust” in the course of verification reform, while 
secretly developing a nuclear weapons. 
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reform of the treaty (e.g. Kumar, 2010), Nuclear Weapon States be forced to comply with 
disarmament obligations (e.g DiFilippo, 2005), and withdrawal from the NPT be made 
impossible (e.g. Miller, 2012). 
The reform approach offers several advantages. To begin, integration would prevent 
additional institutional overlap, thereby, enhancing efficiency and clarity. The recognized 
Nuclear Weapon States have favored the traditional institutional track, which facilitates their 
involvement in shaping the future of the regime. Including Israel, India, and Pakistan through 
an NPT reform may even strengthen the regime by better reflecting current world affairs. 
However, ambitious reforms are unlikely to materialize. Changes that depend on all 
states or a vast majority to take effect are difficult to implement. Most notably, the 
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty was criticized for being a “stillborn” agreement, owing to 
its ratification requirements. Also, proposals to change the composition or voting system 
within the Security Council are very difficult to achieve due to current decision-making, 
even if a reform could facilitate regime enforcement. 
There are also two difficulties in trying to include states outside the NPT in the treaty 
framework. First, no matter which legal way would be used, 317 all of them would virtually 
allow Israel, India, and Pakistan a Nuclear Weapon State status. Put differently, states that 
decided to stay outside the NPT in the first place are being “rewarded” for countering the 
spirit of the treaty. Non-Nuclear Weapon States could even be seen to be overburdened from 
a security perspective, if the option to withdraw, i.e. the “safety valve” (Shaker in: Miller, 
2012), would be taken away. 
Second, it remains doubtful whether the states outside the NPT would be willing to join 
the treaty. For instance, Israel’s strategy is nuclear opacity (e.g. Miller and Scheinman, 
2003). Joining the NPT would force the state to provide more transparency on its actual 
status. Being recognized for possessing nuclear weapons could also add to regional tension. 
 
5.3.2. Layering Approach 
Another approach to strengthening the regime is filling commitment gaps through 
institutional layering. On a macro-level, this scenario resembles a patchwork of international 
commitment, as new commitments are not achieved through institutional reform but 
 
317 There are several ways to recognize the nuclear weapon status of Israel, India, and Pakistan under the NPT-
framework, i.e. through pushing the 1968 cutoff to 1998, through adding a third category (e.g. “state with 
nuclear weapons”), or adding a protocol to the NPT (Kumar, 2010). 
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additional agreements (e.g. regional or bilateral agreements) and the according verification 
and enforcement commitments. On a micro-level, individual commitments are being 
addressed through a step-by-step approach, e.g. through open-ended working groups or 
consultations. 
The presence of different agreements may lead to overlapping rules. States may be given 
the opportunity to pick favorable rules or to play institutions against each other. For instance, 
the FM(C)T discussions have been hampered, among other things, by the fact that China 
linked its support to another agreement, i.e. PAROS, which is rejected by the United States. 
On a micro-level, a step-by-step approach is time consuming, as more input is fed into a 
decision. Each expert group has a selection process, a time of evaluation, and a certain form 
of reporting that needs to be evaluated. 
Despite these disadvantages, the institutional layering approach is a good way to 
improve output effectiveness, since agreements “of the willing” are easier to achieve. 
Overlapping agreements could also serve as “back-up” towards each other, reinforcing the 
main goals of the regime. Even if individual agreements fail, others remain in place. 
On a micro-level, careful preparations by group of experts can anticipate the impact of 
a treaty. For instance, in the context of a possible Fissile Material (Cutoff) Treaty, the Group 
of Governmental Experts addressed a wide field of topics – including scope, definitions, 
verification, and legal/institutional arrangements (UNOG, 2014). Furthermore, they may 
keep the process going in times of political tension, such as international expert meetings on 
verifying a test ban treaty during the Cold War. 
Individual agreements also have the advantage of addressing specific concerns and 
deals. In the case of Brazil and Argentina, bilateral cooperation led to regional and 
international cooperation. The JCPOA with Iran or the US-India nuclear deal allowed for 
additional commitments from states. As for India, the approach facilitated the further regime 
inclusion of a state not party to the NPT. 
Yet, the question needs to be asked to what extent “patchwork deals” also have a 
negative impact by undermining the non-proliferation regime in other ways. In this sense, 
the US-India nuclear deal has also received great criticism for virtually accepting the nuclear 
weapon status of India (see e.g. Kimball, 2005). The JCPOA, in turn, acknowledges that Iran 
can domestically produce fissile material, which according to some scholars sets a dangerous 
precedent (e.g. Kroenig, 2016). 
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5.3.3. Wildfire Approach 
The Geneva Nuclear Disarmament Initiative – better known as “Wildfire>_” – 
advertises a radical approach to improving the non-proliferation regime.318 The organization 
criticizes the slow progress in complete disarmament and argues that Nuclear Weapon States 
will not give up their nuclear weapons because they are “addicted” to them. Accordingly, a 
step-by-step approach is the wrong way to achieve a world free of nuclear weapons. 
The “wildfire” approach intends to shift emphasis away from the current nuclear 
landscape, which is supposedly defined by the power and interests of Nuclear Weapon 
States, by focusing on impact rather than output. The goal should be to “change the game.” 
States without nuclear weapons should not accept “empty promises,” bring forward a treaty 
that outlaws nuclear weapons (and Nuclear Weapon States) and that includes no withdrawal 
options or other loopholes. The effort contributed to the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear 
Weapons. 
Outlawing nuclear weapons would certainly reinforce the idea that they are illegitimate, 
turning the current ambiguous evaluation of nuclear weapons (no/yes-if) into a clear “no.” 
Strategically speaking, the approach offers more agency to Non-Nuclear Weapon States, i.e. 
those states that should have a particular interest in the complete disarmament of nuclear 
weapons. 
The question is whether Non-Nuclear Weapon States can pressure Nuclear Weapon 
States into disarming. This is doubtful. First, given that the interests of Non-Nuclear Weapon 
States and their relation towards nuclear weapons differ (i.e. in matters of nuclear sharing), 
it is doubtful that they can produce a united front against nuclear weapons. The divide in the 
support of the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons underlines this hurdle. 
Second, even if all NNWS agree to “outlaw” nuclear weapons, the impact on NWS may 
be weak, as the agreement would need to comprehensively address their strategic 
considerations. After all, the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons is not supported 
by any Nuclear Weapon State nor their military allies. Particularly with a low membership, 
the treaty may become another “paper crane” – the sort of agreement that Wildfire>_ 
intended to throw out. 
One decision by Non-Nuclear Weapon States that would strategically affect Nuclear 
Weapon States is nuclear blackmail: “If you do not get rid of your stocks within time x, we 
 
318 Details on “Wildfire>_” can be found in: Geneva Nuclear Disarmament Initiative (2019). 
 236 
will leave the NPT and give up our commitment not to acquire nuclear weapons.” Apart 
from the fact that this is a high gamble threatening past achievements, most NNWS can be 
expected to prefer the status quo over nuclear anarchy (e.g. Horovitz, 2014). In other words, 
the threat is unlikely to materialize. 
 
5.4. Additional Research 
Despite its comprehensive approach, this thesis leaves various starting points for 
additional research – both in better understanding regime effectiveness, in general, as well 
as the non-proliferation regime, in particular. Some studies can serve as a follow-up to my 
research. Others could cover aspects that were left aside here, owing to a narrowing of the 
research question. 
The major contribution of this work is the concept of assessing and explaining regime 
effectiveness. The three-dimensional model developed in the introductory section can 
easily be applied to other regimes, most notably security regimes. The model allows a better 
understanding of regimes relating to weapons of mass destruction and makes them more 
comparable. It would be worth using the same approach for the regimes surrounding 
biological and chemical weapons, which could use the same categories to determine regime 
effectiveness, i.e. regime task (commitment, verification, enforcement), policy field 
(acquisition, possession, use), and level of effectiveness (output, outcome, impact). 
Beyond WMD, I would argue that the effectiveness of virtually any regime could be 
measured against the three-dimensional model developed in this work. Two dimensions, the 
regime tasks and the levels of effectiveness, are universally applicable. While also the third 
dimension (policy field) remains valid for all regimes, its exact definition may require 
amendments. 
The policy fields of some regimes, e.g. as to be found in the environmental field, could 
be categorized like the non-proliferation regime. If the regime goal were to reduce CO2 
emissions, the policy fields could also be acquisition (e.g. making rules to build cars with 
low emissions), possession (e.g. creating incentives for consumers to trade in their old cars 
for environment-friendly vehicles), and use (e.g. prohibiting cars with high CO2 emissions 
in certain zones). 
My conceptual choice was to consider different incentives as driving forces that are 
prominent in the existing academic literature (norms, security, economics, status). There are 
other incentives that could be explored but have been left out in this work. For instance, a 
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focus on the possible factors of health, environment, technology, or research may be worth 
taking against the background of the three-dimensional model. To what extent have these 
aspects – treated in a more isolated fashion – advanced or hampered regime cooperation? 
Beyond incentives, regime effectiveness also depends on capacities. Just because an 
actor wants to do something does not mean that he or she can do something. Cognitive, 
financial, technological aspects, or natural resources may enable or hamper a certain 
development. To what extent do capacities affect cooperation in the regime? 
As we live in an ever more institutionalized world, the recent take on regime 
complexity is legitimate and deserves further attention. As I have argued before, the added 
conceptual value of regime complexity should not be the sheer coexistence of different 
institutions, as this can easily be explained with the existing regime concept. Instead, 
scholars of International Relations ought to focus on regimes that are “potentially 
problematic” towards each other, as defined by Orsini, Morin, and Young (2013, p.29). 
In the field of fissile material or nuclear weapons I would identify three regimes that are 
potentially problematic towards each other. They have similarities but also crucial 
differences in either norms, rules, principles, or decision-making procedures. Considering 
that it may not suffice to examine state behavior in an isolated fashion in one institution to 
understand regime effectiveness, further research could examine the effect of the three 
different regimes towards each other. 
Apart from the non-proliferation regime, as described in this thesis, it could be argued 
that the peaceful use of nuclear energy resembles a distinct regime that shares the same 
membership and even organizations. The potential conflict with the non-proliferation regime 
lies in the order of preferences. The peaceful use regime enables the use of fissile material 
and cooperation (for peaceful purposes). The non-proliferation regime restrains fissile 
material and cooperation (for military use). The NPT and the IAEA try to strike a balance 
between the two. Yet, a state that is solely interested in peaceful uses may be frustrated by 
the burden placed upon it. 
Then there is arguably also a nuclear deterrence regime. It may share the same principle 
as the non-proliferation regime that nuclear weapons pose a threat to human life (if they were 
to be used). It also shares the norm not to use nuclear weapons in an actual military conflict. 
Yet, the larger conclusions on norms and rules differ significantly. One underlying logic of 
a nuclear deterrence regime could be that the possession of nuclear weapons in the hands of 
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rational leaders may not only strengthen security but even enhance peace.319 This is highly 
problematic when compared with the norm of the non-proliferation regime not to possess 
nuclear weapons but to disarm. 
In addition to the larger state-centered regime approach laid out in this thesis, it is 
essential to devote further attention to groups of actors that affect the regime and vice versa, 
such as expert groups and epistemic communities (e.g. Pelopidas, 2011; Kutchesfahani, 
2014), intelligence (e.g. Bollfrass, 2017b), illicit trading and assistance networks (e.g. 
Albright, Brannan, and Stricker, 2010; Maccalman, 2016), or cyber networks (e.g. Zetter, 
2014; Rotondo, 2016). Here, small-n or single-case studies can provide closer insight into 
the nuts and bolts of the regime. 
These avenues for further research show that there is still a lot to be done by scholars 
studying the non-proliferation regime. At the same time, it is up to politicians and civil 
society to further strengthen the regime. More than 70 years after the devastating bombings 
of Hiroshima and Nagasaki, nuclear weapons still pose one of the greatest challenges in 
international relations. Facing the regime’s setbacks as pointed out in this thesis should not 
leave us discouraged. To the contrary, we should focus on the regime’s achievements and 
strive to do more. This way, the non-proliferation regime can become a testimony of what is 













319 On the argument that nuclear weapons in the hands of rational leaders may enhance peace see Waltz (1981). 
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6. Appendix 
Appendix 1 – Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: External Support 
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Appendix 4 – Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zones: Verification and Enforcement 
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Conclusion of safeguards agreements,  
additional protocols and small quantities protocols 
  
Status as of 06 March 2019 
 State a Small quantities  protocols b 
Safeguards  
agreements c INFCIRC 
Additional  
protocols 
Afghanistan Amended: 28 January 2016 In force: 20 Feb. 1978 257 In force: 19 July 2005 
Albania
1 
 In force: 25 March 1988  359 In force: 3 Nov. 2010 
Algeria  In force: 7 Jan. 1997 531 Signed: 16 Feb. 2018 
Andorra Amended: 24 April 2013 In force: 18 Oct. 2010 808 In force: 19 Dec. 2011 
Angola In force: 28 April 2010 In force: 28 April 2010 800 In force: 28 April 2010 
Antigua and Barbuda
2
 Amended: 5 March 2012 In force: 9 Sept. 1996 528 In force: 15 Nov. 2013 
Argentina
3
  In force: 4 March 1994 435  
Armenia  In force: 5 May 1994 455 In force: 28 June 2004 
Australia  In force: 10 July 1974 217 In force: 12 Dec. 1997 
Austria
4
  Accession: 31 July 1996 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Azerbaijan  In force: 29 April 1999 580 In force: 29 Nov. 2000 
Bahamas
2 
Amended: 25 July 2007 In force: 12 Sept. 1997 544  
Bahrain In force: 10 May 2009 In force: 10 May 2009 767 In force: 20 July 2011 
Bangladesh  In force: 11 June 1982 301 In force: 30 March 2001 
Barbados
2
 X In force: 14 Aug. 1996  527  
Belarus  In force: 2 Aug. 1995 495 Signed: 15 Nov. 2005 




 X In force: 21 Jan. 1997 532  
Benin Amended: 15 April 2008 Signed: 7 June 2005  Signed: 7 June 2005 





X In force: 6 Feb. 1995 465  
Bosnia and Herzegovina  In force: 4 April 2013 851 In force: 3 July 2013 
Botswana  In force: 24 Aug. 2006 694 In force: 24 Aug. 2006 
Brazil
6
  In force: 4 March 1994 435  
Brunei Darussalam X In force: 4 Nov. 1987 365  
Bulgaria
7
  Accession: 1 May 2009  193 Accession: 1 May 2009  
Burkina Faso Amended: 18 Feb. 2008 In force: 17 April 2003 618 In force: 17 April 2003 
Burundi In force: 27 Sept. 2007 In force: 27 Sept. 2007 719 In force: 27 Sept. 2007 
Cabo Verde Amended: 27 March 2006 Signed: 28 June 2005  Signed: 28 June 2005 
Cambodia Amended: 16 July 2014 In force: 17 Dec. 1999 586 In force: 24 April 2015 
Cameroon X In force: 17 Dec. 2004 641 In force: 29 Sept. 2016 
Canada  In force: 21 Feb. 1972 164 In force: 8 Sept. 2000 
Central African 
Republic 
In force: 7 Sept. 2009 In force: 7 Sept. 2009 777 In force: 7 Sept. 2009 
Chad In force: 13 May 2010 In force: 13 May 2010 802 In force: 13 May 2010 
Chile
8
  In force: 5 April 1995  476 In force: 3 Nov. 2003 
China  In force: 18 Sept. 1989 369* In force: 28 March 2002 
Colombia
8
  In force: 22 Dec. 1982 306 In force: 5 March 2009 
Comoros In force: 20 Jan. 2009 In force: 20 Jan. 2009 752 In force: 20 Jan. 2009 
Congo In force: 28 Oct. 2011 In force: 28 Oct. 2011 831 In force: 28 Oct. 2011 
Costa Rica
2
 Amended: 12 Jan. 2007 In force: 22 Nov. 1979 278 In force: 17 June 2011 

































Source: IAEA (2019d) Status List. Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols 
and Small Quantities Protocols. Status as of March, 6, 2019. International Atomic Energy Agency 
[online]. March 6, 2019, Avail ble fr m: https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/status-sg-








 State a Small quantities  protocols b 
Safeguards  
agreements c INFCIRC 
Additional  
protocols 
Côte d’Ivoire  In force: 8 Sept. 1983 309 In force: 5 May 2016 
Croatia9  Accession: 1 April 2017 193 Accession: 1 April 2017 
Cuba2  In force: 3 June 2004 633 In force: 3 June 2004 
Cyprus10  Accession: 1 May 2008 193 Accession: 1 May 2008 
Czech Republic11  Accession: 1 Oct. 2009  193 Accession: 1 Oct. 2009 
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo 
 In force: 9 Nov. 1972 183 In force: 9 April 2003 
Denmark12 
 In force: 1 March 1972 176 In force: 22 March 2013 
 In force: 21 Feb. 1977 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Djibouti In force : 26 May 2015 In force: 26 May 2015 884 In force: 26 May 2015 
Dominica5 X In force: 3 May 1996 513  
Dominican Republic2 Amended: 11 Oct. 2006 In force: 11 Oct. 1973 201 In force: 5 May 2010 
Democratic People’s 
Republic of Korea 
 In force: 10 April 1992 403  
Ecuador2 Amended: 7 April 2006 In force: 10 March 1975 231 In force: 24 Oct. 2001 
Egypt  In force: 30 June 1982 302  
El Salvador2 Amended: 10 June 2011 In force: 22 April 1975 232 In force: 24 May 2004 
Equatorial Guinea Approved: 13 June 1986 Approved: 13 June 1986   




            Amended: 23 July 2010 
Accession: 1 Dec. 2005 
In force: 28 July 1975 
193 
227 
Accession: 1 Dec. 2005 
In force: 8 Sept. 2010 
Ethiopia X In force: 2 Dec. 1977 261  
Fiji X In force: 22 March 1973 192 In force: 14 July 2006 
Finland14  Accession: 1 Oct. 1995 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
France 
 In force: 12 Sept. 1981 290* In force: 30 April 2004  
 Amended: 25 Feb. 2019 In force: 26 Oct. 200715 718  
Gabon Amended: 30 Oct. 2013 In force: 25 March 2010 792 In force: 25 March 2010 
Gambia Amended: 17 Oct. 2011 In force: 8 Aug. 1978 277 In force: 18 Oct. 2011 
Georgia  In force: 3 June 2003 617 In force: 3 June 2003 
Germany16  In force: 21 Feb. 1977 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Ghana  In force: 17 Feb. 1975 226 In force: 11 June 2004 
Greece17  Accession: 17 Dec. 1981 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Grenada2 X In force: 23 July 1996 525  
Guatemala2 Amended: 26 April 2011 In force: 1 Feb. 1982 299 In force: 28 May 2008 
Guinea Signed: 13 Dec. 2011 Signed: 13 Dec. 2011  Signed: 13 Dec. 2011 
Guinea-Bissau Signed: 21 June 2013 Signed: 21 June 2013  Signed: 21 June 2013 
Guyana2 X In force: 23 May 1997 543  
Haiti2 X In force: 9 March 2006 681 In force: 9 March 2006 
Holy See Amended: 11 Sept. 2006 In force: 1 Aug. 1972 187 In force: 24 Sept. 1998 
Honduras2 Amended: 20 Sept. 2007 In force: 18 April 1975 235 In force: 17 Nov. 2017 
Hungary18  Accession: 1 July 2007 193 Accession: 1 July 2007 
Iceland Amended: 15 March 2010 In force: 16 Oct. 1974 215 In force: 12 Sept. 2003 
India19 
 In force: 30 Sept. 1971 211  
 In force: 17 Nov. 1977 260  
 In force: 27 Sept. 1988 360  
 In force: 11 Oct. 1989 374  






 State a Small quantities  protocols b 
Safeguards  
agreements c INFCIRC 
Additional  
protocols 
 In force: 11 May 2009   754 In force: 25 July 2014 
Indonesia  In force: 14 July 1980 283 In force: 29 Sept. 1999 
Iran, Islamic Republic 
of20 
 In force: 15 May 1974 214 Signed: 18 Dec. 2003 
Iraq  In force: 29 Feb. 1972 172 In force: 10 Oct. 2012 
Ireland  In force: 21 Feb. 1977 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Israel  In force:  4 April 1975 249/Add.1  
Italy  In force: 21 Feb. 1977 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Jamaica2  In force: 6 Nov. 1978 265 In force: 19 March 2003 
Japan  In force: 2 Dec. 1977 255 In force: 16 Dec. 1999 
Jordan  In force: 21 Feb. 1978 258 In force: 28 July 1998 
Kazakhstan  In force: 11 Aug. 1995 504 In force: 9 May 2007 
Kenya In force: 18 Sept. 2009 In force: 18 Sept. 2009 778 In force: 18 Sept. 2009 
Kiribati X In force: 19 Dec. 1990 390 Signed: 9 Nov. 2004 
Korea, Republic of  In force: 14 Nov. 1975 236 In force: 19 Feb. 2004 
Kuwait Amended: 26 July 2013 In force: 7 March 2002 607 In force: 2 June 2003 
Kyrgyzstan X In force: 3 Feb. 2004 629 In force: 10 Nov. 2011 
Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic 
X In force: 5 April 2001 599 Signed: 5 Nov. 2014 
Latvia21  Accession: 1 Oct. 2008 193 Accession: 1 Oct. 2008 
Lebanon Amended: 5 Sept. 2007 In force: 5 March 1973 191  
Lesotho 
Liberia 
Amended: 8 Sept. 2009 
In force: 10 Dec. 2018 
In force: 12 June 1973 
In force: 10 Dec. 2018 
199 
927 
In force: 26 April 2010 
In force: 10 Dec. 2018 
Libya  In force: 8 July 1980 282 In force: 11 Aug. 2006 
Liechtenstein  In force: 4 Oct. 1979 275 In force: 25 Nov. 2015 
Lithuania22  Accession: 1 Jan. 2008 193 Accession: 1 Jan. 2008 
Luxembourg  In force: 21 Feb. 1977 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Madagascar Amended: 29 May 2008 In force: 14 June 1973 200 In force: 18 Sept. 2003 
Malawi Amended: 29 Feb. 2008 In force: 3 Aug. 1992 409 In force: 26 July 2007 
Malaysia  In force: 29 Feb. 1972 182 Signed: 22 Nov. 2005 
Maldives X In force: 2 Oct. 1977 253  
Mali Amended: 18 April 2006 In force: 12 Sept. 2002 615 In force: 12 Sept. 2002 
Malta23  Accession: 1 July 2007 193 Accession: 1 July 2007 
Marshall Islands  In force: 3 May 2005 653 In force: 3 May 2005 
Mauritania Amended: 20 March 2013 In force: 10 Dec. 2009 788 In force: 10 Dec. 2009 
Mauritius Amended: 26 Sept. 2008 In force: 31 Jan. 1973 190 In force: 17 Dec. 2007 
Mexico24  In force: 14 Sept. 1973 197 In force: 4 March 2011 
Micronesia, Federated 
States of 
Signed: 1 June 2015 Signed: 1 June 2015   
Monaco Amended: 27 Nov. 2008 In force: 13 June 1996 524 In force: 30 Sept. 1999 
Mongolia X In force: 5 Sept. 1972 188 In force: 12 May 2003 
Montenegro In force: 4 March 2011 In force: 4 March 2011 814 In force: 4 March 2011 
Morocco  In force: 18 Feb. 1975 228 In force: 21 April 2011 
Mozambique In force: 1 March 2011 In force: 1 March 2011 813 In force: 1 March 2011 
Myanmar X In force: 20 April 1995 477 Signed: 17 Sept. 2013 
Namibia X In force: 15 April 1998 551 In force: 20 Feb. 2012 















 State a Small quantities  protocols b 
Safeguards  
agreements c INFCIRC 
Additional  
protocols 
Nepal X In force: 22 June 1972 186  
Netherlands 
X In force: 5 June 1975 229  
 In force: 21 Feb. 1977 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
New Zealand25 Amended: 24 Feb. 2014 In force: 29 Feb. 1972 185 In force: 24 Sept. 1998 
Nicaragua2 Amended: 12 June 2009 In force: 29 Dec. 1976 246 In force: 18 Feb. 2005 
Niger  In force: 16 Feb. 2005 664 In force: 2 May 2007 
Nigeria  In force: 29 Feb. 1988 358 In force: 4 April 2007 
North Macedonia Amended: 9 July 2009 In force: 16 April 2002 610 In force: 11 May 2007 
Norway  In force: 1 March 1972 177 In force: 16 May 2000 
Oman X In force: 5 Sept. 2006 691  
Pakistan 
 
 In force: 5 March 1962 34  
 In force: 17 June 1968 116  
 In force: 17 Oct. 1969 135  
 In force: 18 March 1976 239  
 In force: 2 March 1977 248  
 In force: 10 Sept. 1991 393  
 In force: 24 Feb. 1993 418  
 In force: 22 Feb. 2007 705  
 In force: 15 April 2011 816  
 In force: 3 May 2017 920  
Palau Amended: 15 March 2006 In force: 13 May 2005 650 In force: 13 May 2005 
Panama8 Amended: 4 March 2011 In force: 23 March 1984 316 In force: 11 Dec. 2001 
Papua New Guinea Amended: 6 Feb. 2019 In force: 13 Oct. 1983 312  
Paraguay2 Amended: 17 July 2018 In force: 20 March 1979 279 In force: 15 Sept. 2004 
Peru2  In force: 1 Aug. 1979 273 In force: 23 July 2001 
Philippines  In force: 16 Oct. 1974 216 In force: 26 Feb. 2010 
Poland26 
 Accession: 1 March 2007 193 Accession: 1 March 
2007 
Portugal27  Accession: 1 July 1986 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Qatar In force: 21 Jan. 2009 In force: 21 Jan. 2009 747  
Republic of Moldova Amended: 1 Sept. 2011 In force: 17 May 2006 690 In force: 1 June 2012 
Romania28  Accession: 1 May 2010 193 Accession: 1 May 2010 
Russian Federation  In force: 10 June 1985 327* In force: 16 Oct. 2007 
Rwanda In force: 17 May 2010 In force: 17 May 2010 801 In force: 17 May 2010 
Saint Kitts and Nevis5 Amended: 19 Aug. 2016 In force: 7 May 1996 514 In force: 19 May 2014 
Saint Lucia5 X In force: 2 Feb. 1990 379  
St Vincent and the 
Grenadines5 
X In force: 8 Jan. 1992 400  
Samoa X In force: 22 Jan. 1979 268  
San Marino Amended: 13 May 2011 In force: 21 Sept. 1998 575  
São Tomé and Príncipe     
Saudi Arabia X In force: 13 Jan. 2009 746  
Senegal Amended: 6 Jan. 2010 In force: 14 Jan. 1980 276 In force: 24 Jul. 2017 
Serbia29  In force: 28 Dec. 1973 204 In force: 17 Sept. 2018 
Seychelles Amended: 31 Oct. 2006 In force: 19 July 2004 635 In force: 13 Oct. 2004 
Sierra Leone X In force: 4 Dec. 2009 787  










 State a Small quantities  protocols b 
Safeguards  
agreements c INFCIRC 
Additional  
protocols 
Slovakia30  Accession: 1 Dec. 2005 193 Accession: 1 Dec. 2005 
Slovenia31  Accession: 1 Sept. 2006 193 Accession: 1 Sept. 2006 
Solomon Islands X In force: 17 June 1993 420  
Somalia     
South Africa  In force: 16 Sept. 1991 394 In force: 13 Sept. 2002  
Spain  Accession: 5 April 1989 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Sri Lanka  In force: 6 Aug. 1984 320 Approved: 12 Sept. 2018 
State of Palestine32            Approved: 7 March 2018 Approved: 7 March 2018   
Sudan X In force: 7 Jan. 1977 245  
Suriname2 X In force: 2 Feb. 1979 269  
     
Sweden33  Accession: 1 June 1995 193 In force: 30 April 2004 
Switzerland  In force: 6 Sept. 1978 264 In force: 1 Feb. 2005 
Syrian Arab Republic  In force: 18 May 1992 407  
Tajikistan  In force: 14 Dec. 2004 639 In force: 14 Dec. 2004 
Thailand  In force: 16 May 1974 241 In force: 17 Nov. 2017 
     
Timor-Leste Signed: 6 Oct. 2009 Signed: 6 Oct. 2009  Signed: 6 Oct. 2009 
Togo Amended: 8 Oct. 2015 In force: 18 July 2012 840 In force: 18 July 2012 
Tonga Amended: 3 April 2018 In force: 18 Nov. 1993 426  
Trinidad and Tobago2 X In force: 4 Nov. 1992 414  
Tunisia  In force: 13 March 1990 381 Signed: 24 May 2005 
Turkey  In force: 1 Sept. 1981 295 In force: 17 July 2001 
Turkmenistan  In force: 3 Jan. 2006 673 In force: 3 Jan. 2006 
Tuvalu X In force: 15 March 1991 391  
Uganda Amended: 24 June 2009 In force: 14 Feb. 2006 674 In force: 14 Feb. 2006 
Ukraine  In force: 22 Jan. 1998 550 In force: 24 Jan. 2006 
United Arab Emirates  In force: 9 Oct. 2003  622 In force: 20 Dec. 2010 
United Kingdom 
 In force: 14 Dec. 197234 175  
 In force: 14 Aug. 1978 263* In force: 30 April 2004 
Signed: 6 Jan 1993 Signed: 6 Jan. 199315   
 
United Republic of 
Tanzania 
 
Amended: 10 June 2009 
Signed: 7 June 2018* 
In force: 7 Feb. 2005 
 
643 
Signed: 7 June 2018 
In force: 7 Feb. 2005 
United States of 
America 
 In force:  9 Dec. 1980 288* In force: 6 Jan. 2009 
Amended: 3 July 2018 In force: 6 April 198915 366  
Uruguay2  In force: 17 Sept. 1976 157 In force: 30 April 2004 
Uzbekistan  In force: 8 Oct. 1994 508 In force: 21 Dec. 1998 
Vanuatu In force: 21 May 2013 In force: 21 May 2013 852 In force: 21 May 2013 
Venezuela, Bolivarian 
Republic of 2  
 In force: 11 March 1982 300  
Viet Nam  In force: 23 Feb. 1990 376 In force: 17 Sept. 2012  
Yemen X In force: 14 Aug. 2002 614  
Zambia X In force: 22 Sept. 1994 456 Signed: 13 May 2009 











Bold States not party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) whose 
safeguards agreements are of INFCIRC/66-type. 
Italics States Parties to the NPT that have not yet brought into force comprehensive safeguards 
agreements (CSAs) pursuant to Article III of the NPT. 
 * Voluntary offer safeguards agreement with NPT nuclear-weapon States. 
 X ‘X’ in the ‘small quantities protocols’ column indicates that the State has an operative small 
quantities protocol (SQP). ‘Amended’ indicates that the operative SQP is based on the revised 
SQP standardized text. 
NB: This table does not aim at listing all safeguards agreements that the Agency has concluded. Not included 
are agreements under which the application of safeguards has been suspended upon the entry into force 
of a CSA. Unless otherwise indicated, the safeguards agreements referred to are CSAs concluded pursuant 
to the NPT. 
a An entry in this column does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever on the part of the Agency concerning the 
legal status of any country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers.  
b Provided that they meet certain eligibility criteria (including that the quantities of nuclear material do not exceed the limits 
set out in paragraph 37 of INFCIRC/153(Corrected)), countries have the option to conclude an SQP to their CSAs that 
holds in abeyance the implementation of most of the detailed provisions set out in Part II of the CSAs as long as eligibility 
criteria continue to apply. This column contains countries whose CSA with an SQP based on the original standard text has 
been approved by the Board of Governors and for which, as far as the Secretariat is aware, these eligibility criteria continue 
to apply. For those States that have accepted the revised standard SQP text (approved by the Board of Governors on 20 
September 2005) the current status is reflected. 
c The Agency also applies safeguards for Taiwan, China under two agreements, which entered into force on 13 October 1969 
(INFCIRC/133) and 6 December 1971 (INFCIRC/158), respectively. 
 
1 Sui generis comprehensive safeguards agreement. On 28 November 2002, upon approval by the Board of Governors, an 
exchange of letters entered into force confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirement of Article III of 
the NPT. 
2 Safeguards agreement is pursuant to both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. 
3 Date refers to the safeguards agreement concluded between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency. On 
18 March 1997, upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force between Argentina and 
the Agency confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirements of Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco 
and Article III of the NPT to conclude a safeguards agreement with the Agency. 
4 The application of safeguards for Austria under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/156), in force since 
23 July 1972, was suspended on 31 July 1996, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Austria had acceded, entered into force for 
Austria. 
5 Date refers to a safeguards agreement pursuant to Article III of the NPT. Upon approval by the Board of Governors, an 
exchange of letters entered into force (for Saint Lucia on 12 June 1996 and for Belize, Dominica, Saint Kitts and Nevis and 
Saint Vincent and the Grenadines on 18 March 1997) confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirement 
of Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 
6 Date refers to the safeguards agreement concluded between Argentina, Brazil, ABACC and the Agency. On 10 June 1997, 
upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force between Brazil and the Agency 
confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirement of Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. On 
20 September 1999, upon approval by the Board of Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force confirming that 
the safeguards agreement also satisfies the requirement of Article III of the NPT. 
7 The application of safeguards for Bulgaria under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/178), in force since 
29 February 1972, was suspended on 1 May 2009, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-













8 Date refers to a safeguards agreement pursuant to Article 13 of the Treaty of Tlatelolco. Upon approval by the Board of 
Governors, an exchange of letters entered into force (for Chile on 9 September 1996; for Colombia on 13 June 2001; for 
Panama on 20 November 2003) confirming that the safeguards agreement satisfies the requirement of Article III of the 
NPT. 
9 The application of safeguards for Croatia under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/463), in force since 19 
January 1995, was suspended on 1 April 2017, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Croatia had acceded, entered into force for 
Croatia. 
10 The application of safeguards for Cyprus under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/189), in force since 
26 January 1973, was suspended on 1 May 2008, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Cyprus had acceded, entered into force for 
Cyprus. 
11 The application of safeguards for the Czech Republic under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/541), in 
force since 11 September 1997, was suspended on 1 October 2009, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between 
the non-nuclear-weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which the Czech Republic had 
acceded, entered into force for the Czech Republic. 
12 The application of safeguards for Denmark under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/176), in force since 
1 March 1972, was suspended on 21 February 1977, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193) entered into force for Denmark. Since 21 February 
1977, INFCIRC/193 also applies to the Faroe Islands. Upon Greenland’s secession from Euratom as of 31 January 1985, 
INFCIRC/176 re-entered into force for Greenland. The Additional Protocol for Greenland entered into force on 22 March 
2013 (INFCIRC/176/Add.1). 
13 The application of safeguards for Estonia under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/547), in force since 
24 November 1997, was suspended on 1 December 2005, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-
nuclear-weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Estonia had acceded, entered into 
force for Estonia. 
14 The application of safeguards for Finland under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/155), in force since 
9 February 1972, was suspended on 1 October 1995, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Finland had acceded, entered into force for 
Finland. 
15 The safeguards agreement is in connection  with Additional Protocol I to the Treaty of Tlatelolco. 
16 The NPT safeguards agreement of 7 March 1972 concluded with the German Democratic Republic (INFCIRC/181) is no 
longer in force with effect from 3 October 1990, on which date the German Democratic Republic acceded to the Federal 
Republic of Germany. 
17 The application of safeguards for Greece under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/166), in force since 
1 March 1972, was suspended on 17 December 1981, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-
nuclear-weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Greece had acceded, entered into 
force for Greece. 
18 The application of safeguards for Hungary under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/174), in force since 
30 March 1972, was suspended on 1 July 2007, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Hungary had acceded, entered into force 
for Hungary. 
19 The application of safeguards for India under the safeguards agreement between the Agency, Canada and India 
(INFCIRC/211), in force since 30 September 1971, was suspended as of 20 March 2015. The application of safeguards for 
India under the following safeguards agreements between the Agency and India was suspended as of 30 June 2016: 
INFCIRC/260, in force since 17 November 1977; INFCIRC/360, in force since 27 September 1988; INFCIRC/374, in force 
since 11 October 1989; and INFCIRC/433, in force since 1 March 1994. Items subject to safeguards under the 
aforementioned safeguards agreements are subject to safeguards under the safeguards agreement between India and the 
Agency (INFCIRC/754), which entered into force on 11 May 2009. 
 
20  Pending entry into force, the Additional Protocol is being applied provisionally for the Islamic Republic of Iran as of 
16 January 2016. 
21 The application of safeguards for Latvia under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/434), in force since 
21 December 1993, was suspended on 1 October 2008, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-
nuclear-weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Latvia had acceded, entered into 
force for Latvia. 
22 The application of safeguards for Lithuania under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/413), in force since 

















weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Lithuania had acceded, entered into force 
for Lithuania. 
23 The application of safeguards for Malta under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/387), in force since 
13 November 1990, was suspended on 1 July 2007, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Malta had acceded, entered into force for 
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24 The safeguards agreement was concluded pursuant to both the Treaty of Tlatelolco and the NPT. The application of 
safeguards under an earlier safeguards agreement pursuant to the Treaty of Tlatelolco, which entered into force on 
6 September 1968 (INFCIRC/118), was suspended as of 14 September 1973. 
25 Whereas the NPT safeguards agreement and SQP with New Zealand (INFCIRC/185) also apply to Cook Islands and Niue, 
the additional protocol thereto (INFCIRC/185/Add.1) does not apply to those territories. Amendments to the SQP entered 
into force only for New Zealand on 24 February 2014 (INFCIRC/185/Mod.1). 
26 The application of safeguards for Poland under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/179), in force since 
11 October 1972, was suspended on 1 March 2007, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Poland had acceded, entered into force for 
Poland. 
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weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Portugal had acceded, entered into force 
for Portugal. 
28 The application of safeguards for Romania under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/180), in force since 
27 October 1972, was suspended on 1 May 2010, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Romania had acceded, entered into force 
for Romania. 
29 The NPT safeguards agreement concluded with the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia (INFCIRC/204), which 
entered into force on 28 December 1973, continues to be applied for Serbia to the extent relevant to the territory of Serbia. 
30 The application of safeguards for Slovakia under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement with the Czechoslovak Socialist 
Republic (INFCIRC/173), in force since 3 March 1972, was suspended on 1 December 2005, on which date the agreement 
of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which 
Slovakia had acceded, entered into force for Slovakia. 
31 The application of safeguards for Slovenia under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/538), in force since 
1 August 1997, was suspended on 1 September 2006, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-
nuclear-weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Slovenia had acceded, entered into 
force for Slovenia. 
32 The designation employed does not imply the expression of any opinion whatsoever concerning the legal status of any                  
country or territory or of its authorities, or concerning the delimitation of its frontiers. 
33 The application of safeguards for Sweden under the NPT bilateral safeguards agreement (INFCIRC/234), in force since 
14 April 1975, was suspended on 1 June 1995, on which date the agreement of 5 April 1973 between the non-nuclear-
weapon States of Euratom, Euratom and the Agency (INFCIRC/193), to which Sweden had acceded, entered into force for 
Sweden. 
34 Date refers to the INFCIRC/66-type safeguards agreement, concluded between the United Kingdom and the Agency, which 
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